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     Abstract 
 
This study explores the exercise of prosecutorial discretion during preliminary examinations 
at the International Criminal Court. The key questions it investigates are whether there is a 
secure legal and theoretical basis upon which such discretion can and should be exercised and 
whether the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court understands, develops and applies 
appropriate rules governing such discretion consistently. The study involves the analysis of 
various primary and secondary sources of law regulating the exercise of prosecutorial 
discretion. It begins by looking at the exercise of discretion at the national and international 
judicial systems to understand how their practices have informed and influenced the 
International Criminal Court Prosecutor, and then examines the provisions of the Rome 
Statute and its rules of evidence and procedure to determine the scope of the exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion. It also critically reviews the policy paper on preliminary 
examination adopted by the International Criminal Court Prosecutor.  
 
The study argues that, although the International Criminal Court Statute does not provide 
clear guidance on the exercise of prosecutorial discretion during preliminary examinations, 
there is a sufficient legal and theoretical basis upon which to exercise this discretion during 
preliminary examinations at the International Criminal Court. Article 42 of the Statute of the 
International Criminal Court, which provides for the independence of the Office of the 
Prosecutor is one such legal and theoretical basis. Thus, the Rome Statute clearly endorses 
the theory of prosecutorial neutrality.  
 
After expounding such a legal and theoretical basis, the thesis examines six case studies 
which represent six preliminary examinations conducted by the International Criminal Court 
Prosecutor in the conflicts in Uganda, Sudan, Côte d‘Ivoire, Central African Republic, Kenya 
and Libya. The examination will answer the question whether the Prosecutor has exercised 
discretion in accordance with the spirit of the International Criminal Court Statute, and in a 
manner that would assuage claims that the Court is not neutral, especially in its dealing with 
African states. The analysis of these case studies shows that the Prosecutor has not exercised 
its discretion consistently and in a manner that can inspire public confidence in the 
administration of international criminal justice. 
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To remedy this situation, the study recommends, among other things, the need for clarity on 
the exact roles of the Prosecutor and Pre-Trial Chambers during preliminary examinations, 
beyond the current practice where the Pre-Trial Chamber can only authorise the opening of 
proprio motu investigations. Second, the study recommends the review of the policy on the 
gravity of crimes. Although the policy paper on preliminary examination has clarified the fact 
that gravity involves both quantitative and qualitative analysis of victims of international 
crimes, it is not yet clear how to carry out gravity analysis. Third, the study proposes 
enhancing positive complementarity during preliminary examinations in order to encourage 
national efforts in the investigation and prosecution of international crimes. Finally, the study 
recommends that the decision to suspend or defer investigations or prosecutions in the 
‗interests of justice‘ under article 53 of the Rome Statute should be a shared responsibility 
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Chapter One 
Prosecutorial Discretion at the International Criminal Court 
 
1.0 Background to the study 
When the International Criminal Court (ICC) opened its doors in July 2002 to investigate and 
prosecute crimes the fall within its jurisdiction, it was generally welcomed with optimism.1 A 
key person in the administration of international criminal justice is the Prosecutor, who has 
enormous powers under the Rome Statute. One of the methods the Rome Statute provides for 
the ICC Prosecutor to exercise powers is through granting prosecutorial discretion, which is 
subject to varying legal interpretations. The discretion exercised by the ICC Prosecutor in the 
investigation and prosecution of crimes within its jurisdiction has been under intense scrutiny 
for various reasons and the debate generated is not likely to abate anytime soon. In relation to 
the powers of the ICC Prosecutor, a key question is what guides the prosecutor in the exercise 
of discretion to ensure that he or she operates within the ambit of the law.  This study 
attempts an answer to that question, by examining and reviewing the exercise of prosecutorial 
discretion relating to preliminary examinations at the ICC. 
 
The ICC is a permanent international judicial institution established by the Treaty of Rome.  
It has the power to hold individuals responsible for serious international crimes. Such crimes 
include genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and the crime of aggression.2 The 
ICC established the Office of the Prosecutor, which has the responsibility to investigate and 
prosecutes such crimes.3 The jurisdiction of the ICC can be activated by a State party to the 
                                                 
1 The ICC came into existence on 1 July 2002 when the treaty establishing the Court entered into force. See the 
Statute of the ICC A/CONF.183/9 (1998) 37 International Legal Materials 1002 - 1069 (Rome Statute). 
2 See Article 5 of the Rome Statute for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court.  
3 See Article 34 of the Rome Statute which provides for the organs of the Court including (a) The Presidency; 
(b) An Appeals Division, a Trial Division and a Pre-Trial Division; (c) The Office of the Prosecutor; (d) The 
Registry. As will be seen later in the study, the Pre-Trial Division plays an important role during preliminary 
examinations.  
 
2 | Page 
Rome Statute,4 by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) acting under Chapter VII of 
the UN Charter,5 or by the Prosecutor.6 
 
The manner of triggering the ICC jurisdiction is very important, since the Court does not 
have universal jurisdiction and can therefore not conduct investigations in all places.7 The 
Prosecutor is mandated by the Rome Statute to investigate crimes committed within the 
territory of States party to the Statute, or by citizens of States that are party to the ICC, or 
when a State not party to the Statute accepts the jurisdiction of the Court.8 However, when 
crimes are committed in the territories of States not party to the Statute and by their citizens, 
the ICC does not have jurisdiction, unless the UNSC refers the situation to the Prosecutor. 
 
Irrespective of who triggers the jurisdiction of the ICC, the Prosecutor has a mandate to 
conduct a preliminary examination to decide whether there is a reasonable basis to proceed 
with an investigation.9 The UNSC may suspend the decision to open an investigation after a 
preliminary examination, acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.10 The power of the 
                                                 
4 Articles 13 (a) and 14 of the Rome Statute; Nabil Elaraby ‗The Role of the Security Council and the 
Independence of the International Criminal Court‘ in Mauro Politi and Giuseppe Nesi eds The Rome Statute of 
the International Criminal Court: A Challenge to Impunity (2001) 43. 
5 Article 13 (b) of the Rome Statute. 
6 Articles 13(c) and 15 of the Rome Statute.    
7 Universal Jurisdiction is defined as ‗the assertion of jurisdiction to prescribe in the absence of any other 
accepted jurisdictional nexus at the time of the relevant conduct.‘ See Roger O‘Keefe ‗Universal Jurisdiction‘ 
(2004) 2 Journal of International Criminal Justice 735–760. See also Kenneth Randall, ‗Universal jurisdiction 
under international law‘ (1988) 66 Texas Law Review 785 – 841; Xavier Philippe ‗The Principles of Universal 
Jurisdiction and Complementarity: How Do the Two Principles Intermesh?‘ (2006) 88 International Review of 
the Red Cross 375 – 398.  
8 Article 12 of the Rome Statute; Dapo Akande ‗The Jurisdiction of the International Criminal over Nationals of 
Non-Parties: Legal Basis and Limit (2003) 1 Journal of International Criminal Justice 618 – 650; Eve La Haye 
‗The Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court: Controversies over the Preconditions for Exercising Its 
Jurisdiction‘ (1999) 46 Netherlands International Law Review 1 – 25. 
9 Article 53(1) provides that ‗[t]he Prosecutor shall, having evaluated the information made available to him or 
her, initiate an investigation unless he or she determines that there is no reasonable basis to proceed under this 
Statute. See also Situation in Cote d‘Ivoire - Judge Fernandez de Gurmendi's separate and partially dissenting 
opinion to the Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorisation of an Investigation into 
the Situation in the Republic of Côte d'Ivoire, paragraph 24, ICC-02/11, 3 October 2011.  
10 Article 16 of the Rome Statute provides, ‗[n]o investigation or prosecution may be commenced or proceeded 
with under this Statute for a period of 12 months after the Security Council, in a resolution adopted under 
 
 
3 | Page 
UNSC to suspend an investigation or prosecution does not, however, interfere with the 
discretion granted to the Prosecutor to conduct preliminary examinations.11 
 
The Chambers of the ICC are the Appeal, Trial and Pre-Trial Divisions.12 However, it is only 
the Pre-Trial Chamber of the ICC that may intervene during preliminary examinations. By 
August 2016, the ICC Prosecutor had made public preliminary examinations of several 
situations. In three situations, the Prosecutor decided not to proceed with an investigation,13 
while deciding to proceed in eleven. 14  The process is still continuing in the remaining 
situations.15   
 
Primarily, this study looks at the preliminary examinations concluded by the Prosecutor in 
the Central African Republic, Côte d‘Ivoire, Kenya, Libya, Sudan and Uganda. These case 
studies reflect different means through which cases are referred to the ICC Prosecutor. The 
cases of Uganda and Central African Republic were self-referrals; those of Sudan and Libya 
were UNSC referrals, while those of Kenya and Côte d‘Ivoire were initiated through proprio 
motu powers of the Prosecutor.16 These situations are discussed extensively in Chapters six to 
eight of the thesis. 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, has requested the Court to that effect; that request may be 
renewed by the Council under the same conditions.‘ 
11 Ibid.  
12 See Article 34 of the Rome Statute 
13 Comoros, Republic of Korea and Venezuela 
14 Central African Republic (I and II); Cote d‘Ivoire; Darfur (Sudan); Democratic Republic of the Congo; 
Georgia; Kenya; Libya; Mali and Uganda.  
15 Afghanistan; Columbia; Guinea; Honduras; Iraq; Nigeria; Palestine and Ukraine. See also ICC ‗Preliminary 
Examinations‘ available at https://www.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/icc/structure%20of%20the%20court/office%20of%20the%20prosecutor/comm%20and%20ref
/pe-ongoing/Pages/default.aspx, accessed  12 March 2016. In addition, there has been the opening of other 
preliminary examinations into the situation in Burundi on 25 April 2016 (propro motu) and into the situation in 
Gabon on 21 September 2016 (States Party  referral). 
16 Proprio motu refers to the inherent power of the Prosecutor to initiate proceedings without a referral from a 
State party to the Statute or from the UNSC. See Article 15 of the Rome Statute for the steps to be taken by the 
Prosecutor during proprio motu proceedings. The Prosecutor will only proceed with the approval of the Pre-
Trial Chamber of the ICC. See Articles 13(c) and 15 of the Rome Statute. See also Dan Sarooshi ‗Prosecutorial 
Policy and the ICC: Prosecutor‘s Proprio Motu Action or Self-Denial‘ (2004) 2 Journal of International 
Criminal Justice 940 – 943. 
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1.2 Statement of the problem  
 
As already noted, the Prosecutor has the sole discretion to decide whether to conduct a 
preliminary examination or not. However, this discretion is subject to the oversight functions 
of the Pre-Trial Chamber, once the Prosecutor decides to open an investigation proprio motu. 
Although the Rome Statute provides some principles governing the conduct of preliminary 
examinations,17 other provisions of the treaty in relation to the exercise of discretion are 
subject to different interpretations.18  
 
The first Prosecutor, Luis Moreno Ocampo, of Argentina, has been accused of making 
political, rather than legal decisions, in conducting some preliminary investigations.19 Some 
observers argue that he has made some decisions regarding the outcome of preliminary 
examinations which lack consistency or objectivity.20 For example, the Prosecutor has been 
criticised regarding the manner in which preliminary examinations were carried out in the 
situations of Uganda and Kenya.21 He was also accused of not showing a clear procedure 
regarding his decision not to open an investigation in the Gaza Strip, Palestine. His conduct 
of on-going preliminary examination in Columbia has also attracted some criticisms.22 
 
                                                 
17 See generally Article‘s 1, 15, 17 and 53 of the Rome Statute.  
18 Darryl Robinson ‗The Mysterious Mysteriousness of Complementarity‘ (2010) 21 Criminal Law Forum 67 – 
102, discussing conflicting interpretations of article 17 of the Rome Statute. 
19 Kamari Clarke Fictions of Justice: The International Criminal Court and the Challenge of Legal Pluralism in 
Sub-Saharan Africa (2009) 237; Sarah Nouwen and Wouter Werner ‗Doing Justice to the Political: The 
International Criminal Court in Uganda and Sudan‘ (2011) 21 European Journal of International Criminal Law 
941 – 965. 
20 Margaret M. deGuzman ‗Choosing to Prosecute: Expressive Selection at the International Criminal Court‘ 
(2012) 33 Michigan Journal of International Law 265 – 320.  
21 William Schabas ‗Prosecutorial Discretion v. Judicial Atavism at the International Criminal Court‘ (2008) 6 
Journal of International Criminal Justice, 731-761; William Schabas ‗Complicity before the International 
Criminal Tribunals and Jurisdiction over Iraq‘ in Phil Shiner and Andrews Williams (eds) The Iraq War and 
International Law (2008) Hart Publishing: Oxford and Portland, Oregon, 157.  
22  William Schabas, ‗Gravity and the International Criminal Court‘ in Chile Eboe-Osuji (ed.), Protecting 
Humanity: Essays in International Law and Policy in Honour of Navanethem Pillay (2010) 702; William 
Schabas, ‗Victor‘s Justice: Selecting ―Situations‖ at the International Criminal Court‘ (2010) 43 John Marshall 
Law Review 535 – 522. 
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It should be noted that prosecutorial discretion is a major source of the current tension 
between the African Union (AU) and the ICC concerning frequent investigations, and 
prosecutions of crimes and the indictment of (mostly) Africans by the Court.23 In fact, there is 
a perception, especially among African politicians, that the ICC Prosecutor is targeting 
African leaders while ignoring crimes committed in other parts of the world.24 Hence, the 
AU, during a Summit meeting in July 2009, decided not to cooperate with the ICC in the 
arrest and surrender of President Al-Bashir of Sudan.25 Furthermore, the continental body 
contemplated a mass withdrawal from the ICC aimed at weakening its global reach.26  
 
More recently, the AU, at a decision taken at the 26th Ordinary Session held in Addis Ababa 
in January 2016, gave the Open-ended Ministerial Committee a mandate to urgently develop 
a comprehensive strategy, including a collective withdrawal from the ICC to inform the next 
action of AU Member States that are also States party to the Rome Statute. The Ministerial 
Committee was required to submit this strategy to an Extraordinary Session of the Executive 
Council.27  
 
The problem with prosecutorial discretion, however, goes beyond the perception of bias 
against Africa. Some of these criticisms have arisen from the apparent contradictions in the 
legal criteria, the policies, principles and practices adopted by the Prosecutor in conducting 
                                                 
23 The African Union (AU) is a continental body made up of 54 member states. It replaced the Organisation of 
the African Unity (OAU) through the Constitutive Act of the African Union, adopted in 2000 at the Lome 
Summit in Togo and entered into force in 2001. More information on the AU is available at 
http://www.au.int/en/, accessed  11 January 2016. 
24 Kurt Mills '"Bashir is Dividing Us": Africa and the International Criminal Court' (2012)  34 Human Rights 
Quarterly, 404 - 447; Chikeziri Igwe 'The ICC's favourite customer: Africa and international criminal law' 
(2008) 41 Comparative and International Law Journal of Southern Africa, 294-323; Anthony Kariuki 'War 
Crimes and Punishment: Why Is The ICC Targeting Africa?' 12 March 2015, 
http://www.brownpoliticalreview.org/2015/03/war-crimes-and-punishment-why-is-the-icc-targeting-africa/, 
accessed 17 August 2016.   
25 Assembly/AU/Dec.245(XIII) Rev.1 Decision on the Report of the Commission on the Meeting of African 
States Parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal (ICC) – Doc. Assembly/AU/13 (XIII) 
3.  
26 British Broadcasting Commission ‗African Union summit on ICC pullout over Ruto trial‘ 20 September, 
2013, available online at http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-24173557, accessed 27 July 2015.  
27 See African Union ' Decision on the International Criminal Court Doc. EX.CL/952(XXVIII) adopted 31st 
January 2016.  
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preliminary examinations.28 These criticisms hint at a major legal problem concerning the 
nature of the discretion of the Prosecutor, and the principles that should govern how that 
discretion is exercised. For the ICC to operate effectively and command the respect of states 
and the international community, the Prosecutor has to act independently, and be totally free 
from any external control. 29   Perceptions of bias, inconsistent application of the Rome 
Statute, and political manipulation undermine the credibility of the Court and jeopardise the 
capability to administer international justice.30 
 
From the foregoing remarks, one can see that the exercise of prosecutorial discretion during 
preliminary examinations is an important building block of an independent and credible ICC. 
As the Prosecutor is the face of the ICC, the failure to discharge the responsibilities of the 
office effectively, as provided for in the Statute, weakens the pursuit of international justice 
by this global institution.  
 
1.3 Research questions and aims of the study  
 
As the preceding section makes clear, the power of the Prosecutor to conduct preliminary 
examinations is an important one for the effective functioning of the ICC. However, this 
power remains poorly understood or developed. Therefore, this study explores the extent and 
scope of prosecutorial discretion regarding the conduct of preliminary examinations. In 
particular, it seeks to answer the following sub-questions: 
 
a) What is the legal and theoretical basis of this discretion? 
b) Does the Rome Statute provide sufficient guidance on the exercise of this 
prosecutorial discretion? 
c) How has the Prosecutor understood and applied his or her prosecutorial discretion 
consistently during preliminary examinations? 
d) Is the Prosecutor‘s understanding and practice of his or her prosecutorial discretion 
during preliminary examinations legally defensible? 
 
                                                 
28 See the case studies in Chapters six to eight for details.  
29 Article 42 of the Rome Statute.  
30 See the Preamble to the Rome Statute.  
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Responses to these questions will go a long way towards clarifying the role of the Prosecutor 
in the dispensation of international criminal justice. A legal analysis of the exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion during preliminary examinations is needed to find out whether the 
ICC Prosecutors have developed a defensible approach to the exercise of this power, or 
whether they adhere to or deviate  from their approach. Much of this study therefore analyses 
and criticises the provisions of the Rome Statute, policy objectives, general principles and 
practices adopted by the Prosecutors during the conduct of preliminary examinations.  
 
In order to carry out such a critical analysis, a discussion of the theoretical framework 
adopted for the study i.e. prosecutorial neutrality, as well as principles and policies regulating 
the exercise of prosecutorial discretion is necessary.31 The research aims to reveal whether 
the Prosecutor has developed appropriate procedures, principles and practices so that the 
exercise of discretion can inspire public confidence. If the ICC Prosecutor has not done so, 
this study will consider how to ensure that the Prosecutor‘s discretion is exercised as 
envisaged by the Rome Statute. 
 
Thus, a critical aim of this study is to understand how the ICC‘s Prosecutor exercises 
prosecutorial discretion during preliminary examinations and whether the policies and 
principles adopted by the Prosecutor in carrying out the task is consonant with provisions of 
the Rome Statute. The premise upon which this study is based is that a lack of neutrality and 
objectivity in the process of conducting preliminary examination by the ICC Prosecutor has 
partly contributed to the criticisms currently trailing the activities of the Court. This has also 
diminished the effectiveness of the ICC as a Court of last resort whose judicial activities are 
expected to complement national judicial systems.  
 
 
1.4 Literature review and significance of the study 
 
Several studies have been conducted on the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. Some 
authors have discussed the provisions of the Rome Statute that grant discretionary powers to 
the Prosecutor of the ICC.32   Others have suggested that the Prosecutor should develop 
                                                 
31 See Chapters two and five for details. 
32 See e.g., Kenneth Rodman ‗Is Peace in the Interests of Justice? The Case for Broad Prosecutorial Discretion 
at the International Criminal Court‘ (2009) 22 Leiden Journal of International Law 99 – 126; Eric Blumenson 
‗The Challenge of a Global Standard of Justice: Peace, Pluralism, and Punishment at the International Criminal 
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publicly available guidelines that will determine the exercise of prosecutorial discretion.33 
However, other opinions doubt the efficacy of guidelines and their possible contribution to 
the exercise of prosecutorial discretion.34 In other words, there are those who advocate the 
                                                                                                                                                       
Court‘ (2006) 44 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law  801 – 874 arguing that ‗there are procedural, 
substantive, and pragmatic reasons why the ICC would do well to adopt a pluralist philosophy in its interests-of-
justice and complementarity assessments.‘ See also Avocats Sans Frontières ‗Africa and the International 
Criminal Court: Mending Fences‘ (2012) 12, available at http://www.asf.be/wp-
content/uploads/2012/08/ASF_UG_Africa-and-the-ICC.pdf, accessed 17 September 2016.  
33See eg Luc Côté ‗Reflections on the Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion in International Criminal Law‘ 
(2005) 3 Journal of International Criminal Justice 162–186 ; Brian D. Lepard ‗How Should the ICC Prosecutor 
Exercise His or Her Discretion? The Role of Fundamental Ethical Principles‘ (2010) 43 John Marshall Law 
Review 553–567 at 558; Mireille Delmas-Marty ‗Interactions Between National and International Criminal Law 
in the Preliminary Phase of Trial at the ICC‘ (2006) 4 Journal of International Criminal Justice 2–11; Nsereko 
op cit  note 18 at 143; Allison Danner ‗Enhancing the legitimacy and accountability of prosecutorial discretion 
at the International Criminal Court‘ (2003) 97 American Journal of International Law 510 – 552; Rod Rastan 
‗Comment on Victor‘s Justice & the Viability of Ex Ante Standards‘ (2010) 43 John Marshall Law Review 
569–602; Jo Stigen The Relationship between the International Criminal Court and National Jurisdictions: The 
Principle of Complementarity (2008) 411–12; Susana SáCouto & Katherine A. Cleary ‗The Gravity Threshold 
of the International Criminal Court‘ (2008) 23 American University International Law Review 807–854; Geert-
Jan A.  Knoops ‗Challenging the Legitimacy of Initiating Contemporary International Criminal Proceedings: 
Rethinking Prosecutorial Discretionary Powers from a Legal, Ethical and Political Perspective‘ (2004) 15 
Criminal Law Forum 365 – 390; Morten  Bergsmo, ‗The Theme of Selection and Prioritization Criteria and 
Why it Is Relevant‘, in Morten Bergsmo Criteria for Prioritizing and Selecting Core International Crimes 
Cases (ed), 2nd ed. (2010) 9; James A. Goldston, ‗More Candour about Criteria: The Exercise of Discretion by 
the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court‘, (2010) 8 Journal of International Criminal Justice 383 - 
406; Claudia Angermaier, ‗Essential Qualities of Prioritization Criteria: Clarity and Precision; Public Access; 
Non-Political and Confidence-Generating Formulations; Equal and Transparent Application; and Effective 
Enforcement‘ in Morten Bergsmo, Criteria for Prioritizing and Selecting Core International Crimes Cases (ed), 
2nd edition (2010) 201; Philippa Webb ‗The International Criminal Court Prosecutor‘s Discretion Not to 
Proceed in the ‗Interests of Justice‘‘ (2005) 50 Criminal Law Quarterly 305-348; Avril McDonald and Roelof 
Haveman ‗Prosecutorial Discretion--Some Thoughts on ―Objectifying‖ the Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion 
by the Prosecutor of the ICC,‘ 15 April 2003, at 3.; Christopher K. Hall ‗Suggestions concerning International 
Criminal Court  Prosecutorial Policy and Strategy and External Relations,‘ 11, submitted to the  Expert 
consultation process on general issues relevant to the ICC Office of the Prosecutor, 28 March 2003; Theresa 
("Tracy") Roosevelt ‗Ethics for the Ethical: A Code of Conduct for the International Criminal Court Office of 
the Prosecutor‘ (2011) 24 Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics 835 – 851 at 848.  
34 Linda M. Keller ‗Comparing the "Interests of Justice": What the International Criminal Court Can Learn from 
New York Law‘ (2013) 12 Washington University Global Studies Law Review, 1 - 39 at 37 arguing that 
‗[c]ommentators differ on whether the adoption of detailed prosecutorial guidelines for ―interests of justice‖ 
determinations will enhance the legitimacy of the ICC. An examination of the New York experience 
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development of publicly known, clear guidelines and principles, and those who argue that 
such principles and guidelines should evolve on a case-by-case basis.35  
 
Beyond these mainstream authors, there are some others who have advanced more specific 
ideas, which are relevant to this study. For example, Bitti has recommended the setting up of 
a ‗Committee of Prosecutors‘ that will guide the ICC Prosecutor on the exercise of 
prosecutorial discretions.36 Caban has analysed the legal criteria for preliminary examinations 
with the policy objectives and general principles adopted by the Prosecutor.37 However, the 
discussions relied on the draft paper on preliminary examination which was later revised and 
adopted by the current ICC Prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda. In addition, a report by Human 
Rights Watch (HRW) discussing the shortcomings of the Prosecutor during preliminary 
examinations, did not evaluate the provisions of the Rome Statute with the principles and 
policy objectives deployed by the Prosecutor.38 Another study on preliminary examinations 
did not discuss the gravity criteria under admissibility issues.39 Thus, there are several areas 
inadequately explored. 
 
Beyond the various scholarly papers already noted on this issue, a review of the opinions of 
other writers and legal commentators, show different and sometimes divergent ideas and 
suggestions. There are reasons for a lack of consensus on how the Prosecutor should exercise 
his discretion. Articles I5 and 53 of the Rome Statute deal with aspects of prosecutorial 
discretion, which regulate preliminary examinations. These provisions prescribe the powers 
                                                                                                                                                       
implementing specific criteria for dismissals in furtherance of justice shows that adoption of factors is not a 
panacea.‘ 
35Kai Ambos and Ignaz Stegmiller ‗Prosecuting International Crimes at the International Criminal Court: Is 
There a Coherent and Comprehensive Prosecution Strategy?‘ (2013)  59 Crime, Law and Social Change 415 – 
437. 
36 Gilbert Bitti, 'Article 53 — Ouverture D'Une Enquéte,' in Julian Fernandez and Xavier Pacreau X (eds), 
Commentaire article par article du Statut de Rome de la Cour pénale international (2012) 63-64 cited in 
Margaret deGuzman and William A. Schabas ‗Initiations of Investigations and Selections of Cases‘ in Göran 
Sluiter, Håkan Friman, Suzannah Linton, Sergey Vasiliev, Salvatore Zappalà eds.  International Criminal 
Procedure: Principles and Rules (2013) 169.  
37 Pavel Caban ‗Preliminary Examinations by the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court‘ 
(2011) 2 Czech Yearbook of Public & Private International Law 199 – 216. 
38  HRW ‗Course Correction: Recommendations to the ICC Prosecutor for a More Effective Approach to 
―Situations under Analysis‖ June 2011, 13 – 26.  
39 Dov Jacobs ‗A Samson at the International Criminal Court: The Powers of the Prosecutor at the Pre-Trial 
Phase‘ (2007) 6 Law and Practice of International Courts and Tribunals 317-341. 
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of the Prosecutor to initiate proceedings proprio motu and offer some guidance on the 
interpretation of notion of the interests of justice. Several writings have focused on the 
possible interpretation of these provisions and find that they do not offer much guidance on 
the exercise of prosecutorial discretion.40  
 
The Prosecutor has the power to discontinue prosecutions that do not serve the interests of 
justice. Therefore, the Rome Statute calls on the Prosecutor to weigh individual interests 
(measured by the gravity of the crime and the interests of victims) against the more general 
interests of justice. 41  International criminal justice is not the only appropriate mode of 
achieving justice as the Statute expects the Prosecutor to take into consideration several 
factors before initiating a prosecution.42 In support of this argument, Goldstone and Fritz 
have argued that there are circumstances in which the use of amnesty will comport with the 
interests of justice, provided that the circumstances under which the interests of justice is 
introduced adhere to minimum guidelines.43  
 
                                                 
 Simon Weldehaimanot ‗Arresting Al-Bashir: The African Union‘s Opposition and the legalities‘ (2011) 19 
African Journal of International and Comparative Law, 208 at 232; Chris Gallavin ‗Article 53 of the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court: In the interests of justice?‘ (2003) 14 Kings College Law Journal 
179 – 198; Jessica Gavron, ‗Amnesties in light of developments in international law and the establishment of 
the International Criminal Court‘ (2002) 51 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 91 at 110; Carsten 
Stahn ‗Complementarity, Amnesties and Alternative Forms of Justice: Some Interpretative Guidelines for the 
International Criminal Court‘ (2005) 3 Journal of International Criminal Justice 695 - 720; Héctor  Olásolo, 
‗The Prosecutor of the ICC Before the Initiation of Investigations: A Quasi-Judicial or a Political Body?‘ (2003) 
3 International Criminal Law Review 87-150; Thomas Clark ‗The Prosecutor of the International Criminal 
Court, Amnesties and the Interests of Justice: Striking a Delicate Balance‘ (2005) 4 Washington University 
Global Studies Law Review 389 – 414; Alexander Greenawalt ‗Complementarity in Crisis: Uganda, Alternative 
Justice, and the International Criminal Court‘ (2009) 50 Virginia Journal of International Law 107 – 162; 
Drazan Dukic ‗Transitional justice and International Criminal Court – in ‗the interests of justice‘?‘ (2007) 89 
International Committee of the Red Cross 691 – 718.  
40Kai Ambos ‗The Legal Framework of Transitional Justice‘ in Kai Ambos, Judith Large and Marieke Wierda 
(eds) Building a Future on Peace and Justice: Studies on Transitional Justice, Peace and Development (2008) 
Springer Science & Business Media 19 - 104.  
41Gerhard Hafner et al ‗A Response to the American View as Presented by Ruth Wedgewood‘ (1999) 10 
European Journal of International Law 108 - 123.  
42Linda Keller ‗The False Dichotomy of Peace versus Justice and the International Criminal Court‘ (2008) 3 
Hague Justice Journal 12 - 47.  
43  Richard Goldstone and Nicole Fritz ‗In the Interests of Justice‘ and Independent Referral: The ICC 
Prosecutor‘s Unprecedented Powers‘ (2000) 13 Leiden Journal of International Law 655 – 667.   
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The interests of justice allow the Prosecutor to consider wider issues of justice beyond those 
directly involved in the case, and these should include considering the political ramifications 
of initiating an investigation or prosecution.44 Stahn argues that the interests of justice may 
embody a broader concept, which extends beyond the consideration of criminal justice, and 
that the Prosecutor might invoke the concept of interests of justice to justify departures from 
classical prosecution, based on both amnesties and alternative methods of providing justice.45 
An argument has also been made by Villa-Vicencio that there should be recognition of 
restorative justice as opposed to retributive justice in the fight against impunity.46 
 
As the foregoing discussion shows, not enough attention is paid towards resolving the issue 
of the exercise of prosecutorial discretion during preliminary examinations at the ICC.  
Resolving this legal problem will help improve the status of the Prosecutor in the 
administration of international criminal justice and, in turn, the efficiency and efficacy of the 
ICC. A preliminary examination fills another function: it offers the Prosecutor an opportunity 
to prevent international crimes. This is because public information from the Prosecutor that a 
preliminary examination is underway provides a signal to the warring parties about the ICC‘s 
involvement, and that an investigation may follow, if the preliminary examination reveals 
that there is reasonable basis to open one. The action of the ICC in holding people 
accountable for their crimes is hoped to keep more people from transgressing. Yet another 
function of the preliminary examination is that it acts as a catalyst for complementarity by 
prodding national governments to prosecute international crimes committed within their 
jurisdictions.47  
 
A significant difference between the studies discussed above and this research is that this 
study specifically looks at the exercise of discretion during preliminary examinations at the 
ICC, a subject, which few authors have attempted to interrogate. Using the theory of 
                                                 
44 Gallavin op cit  at 186.  
45 Stahn op cit  at 698.  
46 Charles Villa-Vicencio ‗Why Perpetrators should not always be Prosecuted: Where the International Criminal 
Court and Truth Commissions Meet‘ (2000) 49 Emory Law Journal 205 – 222.  
47  ICC ‗Annex to the Paper on some Policy Issues before the Office of the Prosecutor: Referrals and 
Communications‘ 21 April 2004, available online at http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/278614ED-A8CA-
4835-B91D-DB7FA7639E02/143706/policy_annex_final_210404.pdf, accessed 19 September 2016; Louise 
Chappell, Rosemary Greyy and Emily Waller ‗The Gender Justice Shadow of Complementarity: Lessons from 
the International Criminal Court‘s Preliminary Examinations in Guinea and Colombia‘ (2013) 7 International 
Journal of Transitional Justice 455 – 475. 
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prosecutorial neutrality adopted in Chapter two, the study analyses the ICC's legal 
framework, the principles and the policy objectives that regulate the exercise of prosecutorial 
discretion at the ICC and applies these to the case studies discussed in the research. As 
further discussed in the next chapter, the theory of prosecutorial neutrality is based on the 
American criminal law system. However, it has been adopted for this study with 
modifications that suit the proceedings at the ICC.  
 
 
1.5    Methodology and limitations of the study 
 
Using the theory of prosecutorial neutrality, the study will analyse various primary sources of 
the international law governing the operations of the ICC, such as the Rome Statute and 
ICC‘s Rules of Evidence and Procedure. 48  It will also review the practice and judicial 
decisions of the ICC and other international criminal courts regarding the exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion.  There will be discussions on the policy papers and statements of the 
office of the Prosecutor, including general principles and policy objectives adopted by the 
Prosecutor during preliminary examinations.  
 
This study critically analyses the policy paper on preliminary examination adopted by the 
current Prosecutor of the ICC, Fatou Bensouda.49 Although the policy paper was formally 
adopted in 2013, its draft was developed and made public by the former Prosecutor, Moreno 
Ocampo in 2010.50 
 
A positive element of the policy paper on preliminary examination is that it attempts to give a 
clearer picture of how the Prosecutor operates and the challenges inherent in the decision 
making process. In essence, the policy paper on preliminary examination is an attempt to 
elaborate on the provisions of the Rome Statute and the underlying policies and principles 
used by the Prosecutor to carry out responsibilities of the office.  
 
                                                 
48 Rules of Procedure and Evidence ICC-ASP/1/3 (Part II-A), adopted 9 September 2002. The Rules assist in the 
application of the Rome Statute. Where there is a conflict between the Statute and the Rules, the Statute will 
prevail. See Article 21 of the Rome Statute. See Article 21 of the Rome Statute. 
49 See The Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations adopted in November, 2013.  
50 Draft Policy Paper on Preliminary Examination, 2010.  
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Although the focus of the study is on preliminary examinations, analysis in the thesis will 
take into consideration events beyond the preliminary examination stage. This is because 
issues bordering on the conduct of preliminary examination have had an impact on some 
situations and cases that have gone beyond the stage of inquiry. 
 
The envisaged analysis will take into consideration the standard of proof during a preliminary 
examination, which is that of a reasonable basis.51 This is interpreted by the Court as a 
justified belief that international crimes, within the jurisdiction of the ICC, have been or are 
being committed.52 Reasonable basis may be contrasted with other proceedings before the 
ICC. For the Court to issue an arrest warrant, it has to be satisfied that there is reasonable 
ground to believe that the person has committed a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court.53 
During the confirmation of charges (before the commencement of a trial), the Court has to 
determine whether there is sufficient evidence to establish substantial grounds to believe that 
the person committed each of the crimes he or she is charged with.54 However, in order to 
convict an accused person, the judges must be convinced beyond reasonable doubt of the 
guilt of the accused person.55  
 
This suggests that the standard of proof in preliminary examinations is lower than the 
standard of proof in other proceedings. 56  However, the lower standard of proof for 
'reasonable basis' does not lower the importance of preliminary examinations or the need for 
the Prosecutor to be objective, impartial or independent when taking a decision whether to 
proceed with an investigation, or stop it. 
 
1.6 Justification for case studies  
As earlier noted in this chapter, the study explores the extent and scope of prosecutorial 
discretion regarding the conduct of preliminary examinations.  This question is broken down 
                                                 
51 Paragraph 5 of the Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations. November 2013.  
52 Paragraph 34 of Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations; Paragraph 35 of the Situation in the Republic of 
Kenya, Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an Investigation into the 
Situation in the Republic of Kenya, ICC-01/09-19-Corr  31 March 2010. 
53 Article 58 of the Rome Statute; Paragraph 28 of the Situation in the Republic of Kenya. 
54 Article 61 (7) of the Rome Statute.  
55 Article 66 (3) of the Rome Statute.  
56 Ignaz Stegmiller ‗The International Criminal Court and Mali: Towards More Transparency in International 
Criminal Law Investigations?‘ (2013) 24 Criminal Law Forum 475 – 499.  
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into four different sub-questions. Sub-questions (a) and (b) are answered mainly in chapters 
four and five while questions (c) and (d) are answered using the case studies in chapters six to 
eight. These questions relate to how the ICC Prosecutor has understood and applied 
prosecutorial discretion consistently during preliminary examinations and if the Prosecutor's 
understanding and practice of discretion during preliminary examination is legally defensible.  
 
The thesis carried out a comparative analysis of the situations, following the procedures 
through which situations are referred to the Court i.e. through self referrals (Central African 
Republic I and II and Uganda); United Nations Security Council referrals (Sudan and Libya) 
and through the ICC Prosecutor's proprio motu referrals (Côte d'Ivoire and Kenya).  
 
For the situations in Central African Republic I and II and Uganda, the study was carried out 
to understand how the ICC Prosecutor understood and applied the exercise of discretion 
during the preliminary examinations of State Parties referral. This research was carried out 
using the publicly available records and policies of the Prosecutor. In addition, the  situations 
in Central African Republic I and II offered an opportunity to two compare and contrast the 
policies of the office of the Prosecutor under the former Prosecutor, Moreno Ocampo and the 
present Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda.  
 
The Sudan and Libya situations were used to understand the exercise of discretion during 
preliminary examination of situations referred to the ICC by the United Nations Security 
Council (UNSC) acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. The study looked at 
the consistency of the approach, understanding and practice of the ICC Prosecutor regarding 
UNSC referrals.  
 
The situations in Cote d' Ivoire  and Kenya examined the exercise of discretion during 
preliminary examinations initiated using the proprio moto powers of the ICC Prosecutor 
provided in article 15 of the Rome Statute. While the study compared the approaches adopted 
by the ICC Prosecutors in the initiation of the investigations, a key question is whether the 
Prosecutors were consistent in the applications of the provisions of the Rome Statute and the 
policies adopted by the office of the Prosecutor.  
 
These case studies are the most demonstrative of the exercise of discretion during preliminary 
examinations. In addition, the case studies analyse the similarities and differences in the 
exercise of prosecutorial discretion during preliminary examinations. Furthermore, the case 
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studies focus on African countries, in a bid to address the perception that the ICC is targeting 
only African countries.  
 
This study concentrates on seven out of the ten situations where the ICC Prosecutors decided 
to proceed with investigations in six African countries. Although the study did not discuss all 
the situations where the Prosecutor has decided to proceed with an investigation, the case 
studies reflects a pattern which has been studied and analysed in this thesis to answer the 
research questions posed in the study. From 2002 to 2016, the ICC Prosecutors carried out a 
total of 14 preliminary examinations. In ten of the situations, the ICC Prosecutors decided to 
proceed with an investigation.57 In the remaining three situations, they decided not to proceed 
with investigations. 58  Currently, there are nine ongoing preliminary examinations. 59  The 
study presents complete information on the status of preliminary examinations conducted by 
the ICC as of August 2016. This is provided in the annexure.60 
 
1.7 The structure of the thesis 
 
The study consists of nine chapters. Chapter one is the introduction, which has discussed the 
background to the study and identified the issue of impartiality and inconsistency in the 
exercise of prosecutorial discretion in international criminal law. How such discretion is 
exercised has a bearing on how the administration of international criminal justice is 
perceived by the public. In recent years, the ICC has not enjoyed universal support for its 
work as a result of allegations of partiality, in some instances on the part of the ICC 
Prosecutor. By analysing the policies and practices of the ICC Prosecutor in six countries, 
this study hopes to contribute to the development of the principles that should govern the 
exercise of such discretion, in a way that ensures public confidence in the administration of 
international criminal justice. 
 
                                                 
57 These include the Situations in Central African Republic I and II; Cote d'Ivoire; Darfur, Sudan; Democratic 
Republic of the Congo; Georgia; Kenya; Libya; Mali and Uganda. See ICC ' Preliminary Examinations', 
https://www.icc-cpi.int/pages/preliminary-examinations.aspx, accessed 17 August 2016.  
58 These are the Situations in Honduras, Republic of Korea and Venezuela. . 
59 These include Afghanistan; Burundi; Columbia; Guinea; Iraq/United Kingdom; Nigeria; Palestine; Registered 
Vessels of Comoros, Greece and Cambodia and Ukraine.  
60 See Annexure I for information on all preliminary examinations conducted from  July 2002 -  August 2016.  
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Chapter two reviews the theory of prosecutorial neutrality and its guiding principles. The first 
principle of prosecutorial neutrality is that prosecutors should be unbiased in their decision- 
making. The second principle is that the prosecutor should engage in non-partisan decision-
making, and the third principle is that prosecutors should base their decisions and activities 
on readily identifiable and consistently applied criteria. A major contribution of the chapter is 
the modification of the theory of prosecutorial neutrality to fit discussions on the exercise of 
discretion during preliminary examination at the ICC. In arguing that the ICC Prosecutor can 
exercise prosecutorial discretion independently, this study proposes that law can be dispensed 
to achieve justice and protect all equally. 
 
Chapter three reviews the evolution of the theory of prosecutorial neutrality at the national 
and international judicial systems and the influence of these institutions in the exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion at the ICC. This chapter seeks to draw from past experiences of the 
exercise of prosecutorial discretion and the role of the Prosecutor, in order to understand and 
criticise prosecutorial discretion at the ICC, as it is currently understood and applied by the 
office of the Prosecutor.  
 
Chapter four discusses the legal framework regulating the exercise of discretion at the ICC. It 
examines the influence of the theory of prosecutorial neutrality on the provisions of the Rome 
Statute governing the exercise of discretion during preliminary examinations. The aim of this 
chapter is to analyse the relevant provisions of the Rome Statute dealing with prosecutorial 
discretion and their interpretation by the ICC Prosecutor, by judges, and by scholars.  
 
Chapter five evaluates the principles and policy objectives governing the exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion during preliminary examinations adopted by the Prosecutor of the 
ICC. The evaluation will be based on the theory of prosecutorial neutrality discussed in 
Chapters two and three, and the analysis of the legal basis of such discretion in Chapter four.  
 
Chapters six to eight examine and critique the practice of the ICC Prosecutor regarding 
prosecutorial discretion during preliminary investigations. These Chapters are divided 
according to jurisdictional triggers of the respective situations. Thus, Chapter six discusses 
the exercise of prosecutorial discretion during preliminary examinations initiated by self-
referrals in the cases of Uganda and the Central African Republic. The chapter looks 
critically at how the Prosecutor of the ICC applied the principles and policy objectives 
adopted by the office in the exercise of discretion during the preliminary examination.  
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Chapter seven examines the situations in Darfur, Sudan and Libya. These are UNSC 
referrals. The objective of the chapter is to understand how the involvement of the UNSC 
affected or influenced the discretion exercised by the Prosecutor during the preliminary 
examination conducted in the two situations.  
 
Chapter eight evaluates the conduct of preliminary examination using proprio motu powers 
of the Prosecutor in Kenya and Côte d‘Ivoire. The objective of the chapter is to review and 
discuss how the Prosecutor arrived at the decision that there was a reasonable basis to open 
investigations in Kenya and Côte d‘Ivoire respectively.   
 
Chapter nine is the conclusion, which reviews the major findings of the study and makes 
recommendations on how to improve the exercise of prosecutorial discretion during 




The ICC was established in 2002 and has been in existence for more than a decade. However, 
studies on preliminary examination are not as significant yet as those conducted on issues of 
complementarity and interests of justice. Nevertheless, these issues cannot be discussed 
without a good understanding of how preliminary examinations are conducted and how they 
affect the activities of the Prosecutor. This study therefore contributes to knowledge by 
seeking to make the case for a thorough understanding of the process and its importance in 
the activities of the ICC Prosecutor.  
 
The introductory chapter has tried to set the tone for the remaining parts of this study. It has 
discussed the background to the study and the statement of the problem by highlighting the 
need for a study on the exercise of prosecutorial discretion during preliminary examinations.  
The chapter has also looked at the research questions, the aims and objectives of the research 
including the significance of the study, methodology and its limitations and justification for 
the case studies. The chapter has described the structure of the thesis and the overall 
argument that runs through the thesis. In order to develop the arguments in this thesis 
systematically, the next chapter will look at the theoretical framework adopted in this study. 
This will guide subsequent discussions on the study and also answer the question whether 
there is a theoretical basis for the exercise of prosecutorial discretion during preliminary 
examinations at the ICC. 
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Chapter Two 
The Theory of Prosecutorial Neutrality at the International Criminal Court 
2.0 Introduction 
 
This chapter reviews and discusses the theory of prosecutorial neutrality and its applicability 
in the exercise of discretion by the ICC Prosecutor during preliminary examinations. 
Although prosecutors perform almost similar tasks in prosecuting crimes, the exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion varies between national judicial systems, ad hoc tribunals and the 
ICC. This is because of historical antecedents of the evolution of the powers of the 
prosecutors and legal regimes adopted in different jurisdictions. For the proposes of this 
study, which focuses mainly on the exercise of discretion by the ICC Prosecutor during 
preliminary examinations, it is important to evaluate the theory of prosecutorial neutrality and 
its applicability to the ICC Prosecutor.  The theory of prosecutorial neutrality discussed in 
this chapter was originally advanced for the American legal system. However, it has been 
slightly modified in this chapter to accommodate the differences between national legal 
systems and the ICC. Therefore, a major contribution of this chapter is the adoption of  a 
modified theory of prosecutorial neutrality to discuss the exercise of discretion during 
preliminary examinations at the ICC.  
 
The ICC as a justice institution is an amalgamation of different legal systems around the 
world and the Rome Statute itself is a blend of several of these systems.1  Therefore, isolating 
the ICC from the national criminal justice system is not to its advantage.  It is conceded that 
there are differences in the mode of operation between the ICC and most domestic criminal 
justice systems.2 However, it is important to put into perspective that the powers currently 
enjoyed by the Prosecutor of the ICC evolved from both national and international criminal 
justice systems. In fact, in the early stages of the negotiation for the Rome Statute, 
reservations were expressed as to the possibility of having an independent Prosecutor. There 
were mixed feelings about the powers and roles of the proposed ICC prosecutor in terms of 
initiating cases and the conduct of preliminary examinations. As these issues are discussed 
exhaustively below and in subsequent chapters of this study, it will be seen that prosecutorial 
                                                 
1 William Burke-White refers to it as the 'Rome System of Justice'. See William Burke-White 'Proactive 
Complementarity: The International Criminal Court and National Courts in the Rome System of International 
Justice' (2008) Harvard International Law Journal 53 - 108.  
2 See discussions in Chapters Three and Four of the study.  
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discretion has become a thorny issue in the administration of criminal justice.3 This chapter 
adopts a holistic approach in arriving at a suitable framework, by analysing a theory of 
prosecutorial discretion applicable to both domestic and international criminal justice 
institutions. 
 
Prosecutorial discretion is defined as ‗the power to choose between two or more permissible 
courses of action.‘4 It is also defined as the process through which prosecutors discharge their 
responsibilities.5 Black‘s Law Dictionary defines prosecutorial discretion as ‗a prosecutor's 
power to choose from the options available in a criminal case, such as filing charges, 
prosecuting, not prosecuting … and recommending a sentence to the court.‘6 Prosecutorial 
discretion may also be defined as the thin line separating objectivity and subjectivity.7 This is 
because it gives the prosecutor wide latitude in deciding on issues relating to the investigation 
and prosecution of individuals accused of committing crimes at both national and 
international levels. Prosecutorial discretion is the fulcrum of criminal justice administration 
and the prosecutor plays a central and decisive role throughout the entire process. 
 
The discretion exercised by prosecutors in initiating investigations and prosecutions have 
been contested in courts, and most times resolved in their favour, because of the principles of 
separation of powers and presumption of regularity. The principle of separation of powers 
states that judges should not interfere needlessly in the discretion exercised by prosecutors as 
they act in their capacity as part of the executive arm of government.8 The implication of this 
is that the judiciary has always been circumspect in interfering with the discretion exercised 
by prosecutors unless there is evidence that the decision of the prosecutor is contrary to a 
provision of the constitution or law made in pursuant of the administration of criminal 
                                                 
3 Ibid.   
4 Allison Danner ‗Enhancing the legitimacy and accountability of prosecutorial discretion at the International 
Criminal Court‘ (2003) 97 American Journal of International Law 510 – 552. 
5 Jingbo Dong ‗Prosecutorial Discretion at the International Criminal Court: A Comparative Study‘ (2009) 2 
Journal of Politics and Law 109 - 114.   
6 Black's Law Dictionary, discretion (4), 9 edition (2009) 534. 
7  Kenneth Davis Discretionary Justice: A Preliminary Inquiry (1969) 3, argues that ‗[w]here law ends, 
discretion begins, and the exercise of discretion may mean beneficence or tyranny, justice or injustice, either 
reasonableness or arbitrariness.‘ 
8 Rebecca Krauss 'The Theory of Prosecutorial Discretion in Federal Law: Origins and Developments' (2009) 6  
Seton Hall Circuit Review 1 - 28.  
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justice. 9  Under the presumption of regularity, the discretion exercised by prosecutors is 
constitutionally guaranteed, meaning that their actions and decisions can only be questioned 
when they manifestly act outside the confines of the law. The US Supreme Court has 
generally held that the Attorney General and US Attorneys have broad discretion to enforce 
US laws, due to the presumption of regularity, which assumes that their decisions are within 
the ambits of the law unless the defendants can prove otherwise.10 
 
This chapter is divided into five broad sections. The next section discusses the historical 
evolution of prosecutorial discretion, while the third analyses the theory of prosecutorial 
neutrality. The fourth section evaluates the convergence of domestic and international 
criminal law systems under the theory of prosecutorial neutrality. The fifth section is the 
conclusion.  
 
2.2 Historical evolution of prosecutorial discretion  
 
The modern day prosecutor is an evolution of different criminal justice systems loosely 
identified in both common and civil law jurisdictions.11 In the seventeenth and eighteenth 
century, what was prevalent in England and Wales was a system of private prosecutors. 
Public prosecutors arrived later in the administration of criminal justice. These private 
lawyers acted as prosecutors for their clients who were mainly victims of crimes committed 
against them. However, whenever the need arose, the Attorney-General of England was 
required to initiate prosecution on behalf of the government. In addition, the Attorney-
General had the power to dismiss prosecutions initiated by private prosecutors by filing a writ 
of nolle prosequi.12 His decision was usually final, as the courts felt it was within the powers 
                                                 
9 See United States v. Armstrong 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996).      
10 See generally, Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985); United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 380 
(1982) ; United States v. Chemical Foundation, Inc., 272 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1926); Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 
U.S. 357, 364 (1978). 
11 Despina Kyprianou The Role of the Cyprus Attorney General's Office in Prosecutions: Rhetoric, Ideology and 
Practice (2009) Springer Verlag Berlin Heidelberg, 32; Ministry of Justice of New Zealand 'Examining the 
Prosecution Systems of England and Wales, Canada, Australia and Scotland: A background document to the 
Review of Public Prosecution Services in New Zealand' September 2011, 1 - 72;  
12 This is the process through which the Attorney-General can discontinue a prosecution whether commenced by 
the State or private prosecutors.  
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of the Attorney-General to discontinue any prosecution initiated by private prosecutors.13 The 
cost of hiring private prosecutors was relatively expensive in those days, and since most of 
the courts were based in the cities, it was difficult for parties to foot the combined bills of 
private prosecutors and transportation costs to where the courts were sitting.   
 
The practice of appointing a sole Attorney-General expanded beyond England and Wales to 
British Colonies in Europe and the American colonies. For example, Virginia had her first 
Attorney-General in 1643.14  However, the population and incidents of crimes increased, 
making the use of private prosecutors less attractive to the populace, and they opted for 
government intervention. This resulted in the establishment of county courts with county 
attorneys who were generally regarded as local prosecutors. Despite the existence of these 
county attorneys, there was no unifying central authority for their administration in the US 
until 1861 when the US Congress gave the US Attorney-General the power to control and 
direct the activities of all government attorneys, thereby laying the foundation for the 
establishment of the US Department of Justice.  
 
On the other hand, in Germany and mostly civil law countries like France and the 
Netherlands, there is the principle of compulsory prosecution, which is a limiting factor to the 
exercise of prosecutorial discretion.15  Discretionary powers of the prosecutor in civil law 
jurisdictions are curtailed to an extent. These civil law countries are said to be 'inquisitorial' 
and at times allow the participating judges to act as investigating officials.16  
 
Public prosecutors are generally powerful and the most constant figures in the administration 
of criminal justice. They usually interact with all the parties in the administration of justice 
including the police, victims, defendants and judges, and in some cases juries, where jury 
                                                 
13 Abraham S. Goldstein "Prosecution: History of the Public Prosecutor." (2002) Encyclopedia of Crime and 
Justice, available online at http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1G2-3403000209.html, accessed 19 September 
2016. 
14 Ibid.  
15  Sun-Woo Lee 'The Discordant Combination of Civil-Law Prosecution System and Presidentialism: A 
Theoretical Framework' (2014)  7 Journal of Politics and Law 81 - 93.  
16  John Langbein 'Controlling Prosecutorial Discretion in Germany' (1974) 41 University of Chicago Law 
Review, 439 - 467.  
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trials exist.17 Most times, they exert a controlling influence over defendants. Justice Robert 
Jackson, former US Supreme Court Judge and prosecutor at Nuremberg trials in Germany 
has argued that the 'prosecutor has more control over life, liberty and reputation than any 
other person ... His discretion is tremendous. He can have citizens investigated and, if he is 
that kind of person, he can have this done to the tune of public statements and veiled or 
unveiled intimations.' 18  Jackson recognises the enormous responsibilities bestowed on 
prosecutors and the dangers of having the wrong persons exercising their discretion. He 
further argues that 'the prosecutor at his best is one of the most beneficent forces in our 
society; when he acts for malice or other base motives, he is one of the worst.'19 This means 
that the powers of the prosecutor are open to abuse and therefore there is a need to ensure that 
the possibility of abuse is reduced to the barest minimum through effective checks and 
balances in the exercise of prosecutorial discretion.20  
 
The question therefore is what should guide the prosecutors in the exercise of discretion to 
ensure that they operate within the ambit of the law despite the wide latitude which they 
have. Authors and commentators have argued for different theories which should regulate the 
exercise of prosecutorial discretion, and some of these are discussed below.  
 
2.3 Theory of prosecutorial neutrality  
 
An important framework to discuss the exercise of prosecutorial discretion during 
preliminary examinations at the ICC is the theory of prosecutorial neutrality as espoused by 
Bruce Green and Fred Zacharias in 2004.21  The theory does not assume a single definition of 
the term neutrality. This is because the word 'neutrality' has different meanings and under the 
                                                 
17 Kenneth J. Melilli, Prosecutorial Discretion in an Adversary System, (1992) 3 Brigham Young University Law 
Review 669 - 704; Stephanos Bibas 'The Need for Prosecutorial Discretion'  (2010) Temple Political and Civil 
Rights Review 369 - 375.  
18 Robert H. Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, (1940)  31 Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, 1 - 6. 
19 Ibid.  
20 Rachel E. Barkow 'Organizational Guidelines for the Prosecutor‘s Office'  (2010) 31 Cardozo Law Review 
2089 - 2118.  
21 Bruce Green and Fred Zacharias 'Prosecutorial Neutrality' (2004) Wisconsin Law Review 837 - 904. See also 
H. Richard Uviller 'The Neutral Prosecutor: The Obligation of Dispassion in a Passionate Pursuit' (2000)  68 
Fordham Law Review 1695 - 1781; Timothy Waters  'Overview: Design and Reform of Public Prosecution 
Services' in Open Society Justice Initiative Sofia Promoting Prosecutorial Accountability, Independence And 
Effectiveness: Comparative Research (2008) 21. 
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administration of criminal justice assumes an entirely different concept. For example, 
neutrality has been defined as 'the state of not supporting or helping either side in a conflict 
or disagreement.'22 In addition, it is also defined as the 'absence of decided views, expression, 
or strong feeling.' 23  A synonym of neutrality is impartiality which involves the lack of 
prejudice towards or against any particular side or party, the quality of fairness or being 
unbiased. However, looking closely at these words, they may mean different things at 
different times. In the context of criminal justice, neutrality and impartiality may mean 
different things depending on the context. The same variation is applicable to bias and 
fairness.  
 
Neutrality was initially attributed to judges and as a concept was seen as a dividing line 
between judges and lawyers.24 This means judges were originally meant to be neutral, while 
discharging their responsibilities, whereas most lawyers, as discussed earlier, were involved 
in private practice, and had to fight the cause of their clients. However, the concept has 
evolved into including those lawyers who are seen as officers of the court serving in the 
temple of justice.25 Therefore in a sense, neutrality is a concept shared by prosecutors and 
judges as officers of the court.  
 
In the context of our discussion, there are three broad dimensions of neutrality which are 
closely linked to each other and will be discussed as proposed by Green and Zacharias. These 
are non-bias, non-partisanship and adherence to readily identifiable and consistently applied 
criteria in decision making. The theory of prosecutorial neutrality calls for the emergence of a 
three-dimensional neutral prosecutor. The central argument made by the authors is that: 
 
  'A three-dimensional "neutral prosecutor" simply would need to remain non-biased, 
 non-partisan, and principled. This prosecutor would ignore impermissible 
 considerations such as race, gender and religion, self-interest, personal beliefs, and 
 party politics. Her frame of mind would be independent, objective, and non-
                                                 
22 Oxford Dictionary of English 3rd Edition by Angus Stevenson  (2010) Oxford University Press, 1194. 
23 Ibid.  
24 Green and Zacharias, Prosecutorial Neutrality, 839.  
25 Ibid.  
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 political. She would need to act in a non-arbitrary fashion, consistently applying 
 decision- making criteria derived from societally acceptable sources.'26 
 
The authors argue that a three-dimensional neutral prosecutor is expected to take decisions 
that are depersonalised. In this instance, the decisions of the prosecutor should not be based 
on personal idiosyncrasies, but rather should be based on the pursuit of public interest.  In 
addition, this prosecutor will consistently make decisions by reference to a set of generalised, 
deeply-rooted decision making norms. These norms can be administrative laws set up to 
guide the operations of the office or administrative laws set out to guide prosecutors 
generally.27 Furthermore, the neutral prosecutor must be accountable to the public, in the 
broadest sense. In this instance, accountability refers to the fact that the primary 
responsibility of the prosecutor is to ensure that the public is the primary constituency of the 
prosecutor and not the police, the victims or the even the politicians whose interests at times 
may run contrary to those of the general public.  
 
This study adopts the theory of prosecutorial neutrality and the concept of three-dimensional 
neutral prosecutor proposed by Green and Zacharias. Although the theory and concept are 
based on an expansive study of the American criminal law system, the issues discussed are 
applicable to the ICC. The framework proposed by the authors clearly mirrors some of the 
approaches adopted by the former and current Prosecutors of the ICC. In addition, these 
policies have been made public in the policy paper on prosecutorial discretion during 
preliminary examinations which was released officially in November 2013. 28  These 
principles and polices in the policy paper on preliminary examinations will be applied in the 
case studies discussed later. In addition, ICC Prosecutors have consistently maintained that 
they only apply the provisions of the Rome Statute. Therefore, the policy papers ordinarily 
will reflect a progressive interpretation of the Treaty of Rome that established the ICC. 
 
                                                 
26Ibid at 886. See also Justice Robert Jackson The Federal Prosecutor, (1940)  31 Journal of Criminal Law and 
Criminology, 1 - 6, who argues that a good prosecutor is one 'who tempers zeal with human kindness, who seeks 
truth and not victims, who serves the law and not factional purposes, and who approaches his task with 
humility.'  
27 Rory K. Little 'Proportionality as an Ethical Precept For Prosecutors in Their Investigative Role' (1999) 68 
Fordham Law Review 723 - 770.  
28 The ICC 'Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations' November 2013. See Chapter Five for exhaustive 
discussions on the policy paper on preliminary examinations.  
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2.3.1 Neutrality as non-biased decision-making 
 
The first principle of the theory is that prosecutors should not be biased in their decision- 
making. Bias in this instance, means that the prosecutor should not be unduly influenced in 
making a decision, or determination on prosecution. This principle of non-bias is 
corroborated by the policy of the Director Public Prosecution of Victoria, Australia on 
prosecutorial discretion. The policy provides that a decision whether or not to prosecute must 
not be influenced by (a) the race, religion, sex, national origin or political associations, 
activities or beliefs of the offender or any other person involved (b) personal feelings 
concerning the offence, the offender or a victim (c) possible political advantage or 
disadvantage to the Government or any political group or party; and (d) the possible effect of 
the decision on the personal or professional circumstances of those responsible for the 
prosecution decision-making.29  
 
The principle of non-bias in the US criminal justice system extends to what is called avoiding 
impermissible considerations, where the prosecutor insists on opening a prosecution, 
regardless of the strength of the evidence or the likelihood of guilt.30   In this instance, 
prosecutors are not allowed to make decisions tainted with racial, ethnic or religious bias. 
This is one area where the discretion of the prosecutor is subject to judicial review as the 
right to non-bias is protected by the US Constitution.31 Therefore, when a decision of the 
prosecutor whether to prosecute or not to prosecute is based on an unjustifiable standard such 
as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification, the courts are bound to interfere.32  
 
Racial and ethnic bias refers to a decision is made for or against a person because of his or 
her race or ethnicity. In the same vein, a prosecutor may be biased in deciding whom to 
investigate or prosecute due to personal or economic interests. The prosecutor, in the decision 
to charge for a particular crime and not another one, especially when the crime committed 
falls under different counts of criminality, may also exhibit the possibility of bias. For 
countries that still retain the death penalty in their Statute books, the possibility of bias is 
                                                 
29Article 8 of the Director of Public Prosecution's Policy on Prosecutorial Discretion, Victoria, Australia, 24, 
November, 2014. 
30Earle Hobbs 'Prosecutor's Bias, an Occupational Disease' (1949)  Alabama Law Review, 40 - 62.  
31 United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 125 (1979). 
32 Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962). See also Angela Davis 'Prosecution and Race: The Power and 
Privilege of Discretion (1998) 67 Fordham Law Review 13 - 67.  
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always an issue.  This is because any decision to charge for capital punishment may be 
questioned by critics when there is lack of uniformity in application.33  
 
Ultimately, discretion is the hallmark of the administration of criminal justice. The prosecutor 
is not under obligation to explain why he decides to pursue the death penalty in a particular 
case and not the other. It only become problematic if a glaring case of injustice results due to 
racial, ethnic, gender or religious sentiments, or if the rights of the defendants are trampled 
upon, in the process of initiating criminal proceedings.  
 
Prosecutorial bias in the administration of criminal justice is also possible in countries where 
prosecutors are elected or appointed. In this instance, the prosecutor may be an active 
member of a political party and therefore use the position to further party interests instead of 
promoting justice and fairness to all parties involved in the criminal case. Bias can also be 
seen when a prosecutor takes a position not according to the law of the land but because of 
personal beliefs. The problem with personal beliefs is that although the right to hold a belief 
may be protected by the law, the prosecutor will be seen by those who practice a contrary 
belief, as biased. A clear example as pointed out by Green and Zacharias is that of laws that 
call for the protection of abortion clinics, and those that restrict abortion practices.34 In this 
instance, it may be difficult for the prosecutor to effectively enforce either of the laws 
without accusation of bias by the other party.   
 
Another instance of bias is a prosecutor's decision to press charges against a defendant based 
on personal or economic interest, or public and media pressure. The issue of personal or 
economic interests is clearly a case of conflict of interest, and may also result in breaking 
existing professional rules or legislation, which clearly speaks against prosecutors making 
decisions based on personal or economic benefit. On the other hand, public and media 
pressure may be used by the prosecutor to gain political capital to the detriment of the rights 
of the defendant. The International Association of Prosecutors argues that prosecutors should 
'remain unaffected by individual or sectional interests and public or media pressures and shall 
have regard only to the public interest'.35   
                                                 
33 John A. Horowitz 'Prosecutorial Discretion and the Death Penalty: Creating A Committee to Decide Whether 
to Seek the Death Penalty' (1997) 65 Fordham Law Review 2571 - 2610.  
34 Green and Zacharias, Prosecutorial Neutrality op cit at 854.  
35Article 3 (b) of Standards of Professional Responsibility and the Statement of the Essential Duties and Rights 
of Prosecutors, International Association of Prosecutors, 20 October 2003.  
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Thus, the theory of neutrality recognizes non-bias as a strong element in the exercise of 
discretion by the prosecutor. Bias based on ethnicity, race, religious group, economic or 
personal interests and party affiliations are generally seen as negating the principle of 
prosecutorial neutrality. However, it must be mentioned that these discussions are not cast in 
stone, and a decision by the prosecutor that is within an operational legal framework can still 
be labeled as biased, depending on the circumstance and the personalities involved. As earlier 
discussed, the courts can only step in when there is a clear violation of the laws of the land. 
This means that an accusation of bias against a prosecutor must be anchored in the provision 
of an existing law. The decision should not be based the discretion of the prosecutor to charge 
an individual for a crime and what charges should be brought before a court of law. Clearly, 
the courts will side with the prosecutor unless there is evidence that an impermissible 
consideration has been violated.   
 
2.3.2 Neutrality as non-partisan decision making  
 
 The second principle is that the prosecutor should engage in non-partisan decision-making. 
The factors that influence non-partisanship include a) independence from those actors within 
and outside the office of the prosecutor who tend to influence decisions, b) objectivity in 
weighing evidence before taking decisions, and c) freedom from political agendas.36   In 
relation to independence, prosecutors are not supposed to make decisions to prosecute or 
drop charges based only on the recommendations of the police or other investigating 
agencies. The decisions of prosecutors should be influenced by the evidence before them, the 
quality of witnesses, and the possibility of conviction.  Although prosecutors may ordinarily 
be aligned with the cause of the police and victims of crimes, their primary constituency is 
neither the police nor the victim, but the society at large.37 Therefore, in the final analysis, the 
prosecutors should make decisions on the potential cases before them without leaning to 
closely either to the victim or the police who may have conducted the initial investigation.  
 
Non-partisanship can also be referred to as objectivity in decision-making. This means that 
the prosecutor is under obligation to study the available evidence at all stages of reviewing a 
case-file. The review of cases must be based on available evidence within the reach of the 
                                                 
36 Green and Zacharias ‗Prosecutorial Neutrality‘ at 851. 
37Ibid at 863. 
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prosecutor.38 However, the notion of objectivity also creates problems. As noted by Green 
and Zacharias, when prosecutors represent the society at large, it equally means that the 
interest of the victim has to be protected. In addition, the prosecutor is under obligation to 
ensure that exculpatory evidence in favour of the defendant is made public or brought to the 
attention of the judge, as the sole aim of prosecution is not punishment, but to ensure that 
justice is done. 39  In addition, objectivity means that the personal dispositions of the 
prosecutor should not be an overriding factor in a decision whether to prosecute or not to. 
While they have to act in such a way as to express the will of the legislators (that is, 
according to the law that has been legislated), prosecutors are also under obligation to protect 
public interests and expectations of the society. Finally, they should be detached from factors 
that cloud their sense of judgment.40 
 
Another facet of neutrality as non-partisanship is that prosecutors should act non-politically. 
A prosecutor should not use the office or position to further the political interests of affiliated 
political parties or politicians.41 Green and Zacharias agree that there is tension between this 
principle and the concept that the prosecutor's responsibility is to represent the interest of the 
society.  An example of this inconsistency is when the interest of the society is akin to mob 
justice or societal agitations based on community sentiments. The prosecutor's role is to not 
to follow a particular interest group, but to weigh the evidence and make a decision based on 
principled criteria, guided by an objective disposition of the circumstances of each case.42 It 
may turn out that the prosecutor will become unpopular in the short term, however, a non-
partisan decision will stand the test of time, better than the one taken to satisfy a small section 
of the community. This means that the prosecutor will always engage in a balancing act to 
satisfy different and conflicting interests.  
 
The need for independence, objectivity and non-partisanship cannot be over-estimated. It 
shows that the exercise of discretion, although within the bounds of the rights of the 
prosecutor, is usually constrained by some of the factors outlined above.  
 
                                                 
38 Ibid at 864. 
39 Ibid at 868.  
40 Ibid at 869. 
41 Ibid at 869.  
42Ibid at 870.  
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2.3.3 Neutrality as principled decision-making  
 
The third principle of neutrality is that prosecutors should base their decisions and activities 
on readily identifiable and consistently applied criteria. 43  These include implementing 
legislative will, principled decision-making rooted in the purposes of criminal law, principled 
policy making through the adoption of administrative policies, and avoiding non-legal 
rationale in decision making.44 A major essence of the prosecutor‘s job is to implement the 
laws enacted by lawmakers to curtail or punish crimes. It is therefore a responsibility of the 
prosecutor to ensure that the enforcement of the law is not arbitrary or inconsistent and meets 
the threshold of justice and fairness. At times, it is noted that the desire of the lawmakers to 
punish a particular conduct is born out of the desire to please the electorate. Under these 
circumstances, the prosecutor has to work the fine line of implementing the legislators‘ will 
and also ensuring that discretion is not used to pander to the whims and caprices of elected 
officials.  
 
In relation to principled decision rooted in the purposes of criminal law, the prosecutor has to 
decide on the sole essence of seeking punishment for a defendant.  This is where the theories 
of punishment become handy and the prosecutor is expected to ensure that the desire to press 
charges is rooted in the purposes of criminal law. This relates to the reason or aim of 
punishing a defendant, which can either be retributive, deterrent or restorative in nature.  
 
In relation to retributive justice, there are several strands, which include vengeful, 
deontological and empirical conceptions of retribution.45  The vengeful strand of retribution 
also known as lex talionis is associated with the Judeo-Christian Bible which seeks to punish 
the offender ‗eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot, burning for burning, 
wound for wound, stripe for stripe.46 Retributive justice is an improved version of a system 
that knew overwhelming punishment, like destroying a village for one person‘s crime. The 
lex talionis limited retribution is to ensure that the punishment could be no greater than the 
crime. Therefore, retributive justice aims at achieving equal punishment for the crime 
                                                 
43 Ibid at 871.  
44 Ibid.  
45 Paul Robinson ‗Competing Conceptions of Modern Desert:  Vengeful, Deontological, and Empirical (2008) 
67 Cambridge Law, 145 – 175.  
46 See the Book of Exodus 21:24-25 (King James Version). 
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committed by the accused person.47 The essence of punishment under retributive justice does 
not focus on the harm of the offense committed but on the culpability of the offender.48 
Therefore, a prosecutor's decision to seek for punishment of the defendant is in furtherance of 
the purposes of criminal law and in this instance, retribution.  
 
The main argument of the retributive theory of punishment is that criminal punishment is 
justified by the moral desert of the perpetrator. In other words, retributive justice theories are 
characterised by their emphasis on the relationship between punishment and moral 
wrongdoing of the perpetrator.49 Another element of retributive justice is the fact that the 
victims are reduced to being witnesses, and not really recognised as stakeholders in the 
process. Although some commentators have argued that the process of arrest, prosecution and 
punishment of the perpetration does justice to the victims, it is clear that the focus of 
retributive justice is on the offender and not the victim.50 
 
On the other hand, a prosecutor's choice of punishment may be based on deterrence, which 
has its origin from the utilitarian moral philosophy espoused by philosophers like Jeremy 
Bentham, who argues that punishment persuades potential perpetrators not to commit 
crimes. 51  Prospective perpetrators of crimes constantly engage in a cost/benefit analysis 
whether to commit crimes or not.52 Therefore perpetrators are assumed to always rationalise 
whether the possibility of apprehension and prosecution outweighs the benefits of committing 
the crime.  
 
Generally, deterrence is divided into two broad categories of general deterrence and specific 
deterrence. General deterrence refers to the situation where punishment is meted out to an 
individual to deter the general public. However, specific deterrence refers to the punishment 
that is meted out to an individual, in order to deter that particular individual from committing 
                                                 
47 Michael Moore 'The Moral Worth of Retribution' in Andrew von Hirch and Andrew Ashworth (eds.) 
Principled Sentencing: Readings on Theory and Policy 2nd edition (1998) Oxford University Press, 179 - 190.  
48 Paul Robinson op cit at 148.  
49Godfrey Musila Restorative Justice in International Criminal Law: The Rights of Victims in The International 
Criminal Court (2009) PhD Thesis submitted to the University of Witwatersrand, 8 - 10.   
50 Ibid.  
51 Jeremy Bentham ‗An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation' (1907) Library of Economics 
and Liberty, available at http://www.econlib.org/library/Bentham/bnthPML14.html, accessed, 19 September 
2016.   
52 Richard Posner 'An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law' (1995)  85 Columbia Law Review, 1193 - 1321 
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a related crime. General deterrence is more pronounced than individual deterrence as the goal 
of deterrence is aimed more at the society than an individual. It is argued that a prosecutor 
who decides to prosecute a defendant to deter others or the particular individual facing 
investigation or prosecution is exercising discretion and furthering one the aims of criminal 
law.  
 
If the prosecutor's reason for seeking punishment is to ensure justice for the victim through 
restorative justice, it is still within the confines of prosecutorial discretion. Restorative justice 
is aimed at both the defendant and victim of crime. It places victims at the centre of the 
criminal investigation and gives them a voice and place of participation, depending on the 
procedure in place. A major feature of the Rome Statute is the expansive focus on the rights 
of victims of international crimes. They participate in the proceedings and are entitled to 
reparations including compensation and restitution. In addition, a Victims‘ Trust Fund is 
dedicated to victims of international crimes. Therefore, a prosecutor who prioritises the 
interests of victims in prosecuting a defendant is exercising discretion, in furtherance of the 
purposes of criminal law.      
 
Another concept of prosecutorial neutrality is principled policy making, which involves the 
adoption of administrative policies that guide the exercise of prosecutorial discretion.53 It is 
the responsibility of the prosecutor to ensure that decisions follow laid-down procedures and 
easy to follow principles, policies and guidelines affecting the exercise of discretion.54  
 
Several countries have adopted different policies to guide the exercise of prosecutorial 
discretion. These policies vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.  For example, the American 
Bar Association (ABA) Standards for Criminal Justice in prosecutorial investigations 
provides standards governing the exercise of prosecutorial discretion during investigations.55 
The ABA Standards argues that 'a prosecutor is not an independent agent, but is a member of 
an independent institution, the primary duty of which is to seek justice.' 56  The ABA 
Standards also expects the prosecutor not to take decisions that are considered impermissible, 
as earlier discussed.  
 
                                                 
53 Green and Zacharias, Prosecutorial Neutrality at 877.  
54 Ibid at 870.  
55 ABA Standards for Criminal Justice - Prosecutorial Investigations 3rd Edition, Prosecutorial Investigations. 
56 Standard 26-1.2 General Principles ABA  
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In Ireland, there is a guideline for public prosecutors known as the Code of Ethics.57 Its 
primary aim is to ensure the promotion of those principles and standards recognised as 
necessary for the proper and independent prosecution of offences. The Code of Ethics sets 
out the standards of conduct and practice expected of prosecutors working for, or on behalf 
of, the Director of Public Prosecutions in Ireland. It is intended to supplement, rather than to 
replace applicable professional codes, governing the conduct of lawyers and public 
servants.58 The Code establishes minimum standards of ethical conduct.  In addition, it is 
meant to provide general but not exhaustive, guidance to prosecutors. Furthermore, it is 
formulated to assist in securing and promoting the effectiveness, impartiality and fairness of 
prosecutors in criminal proceedings.  
 
The overriding principle in the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in Ireland is public 
interest. For example, the code of ethics provides that 'a fundamental consideration when 
deciding whether to prosecute is whether to do so would be in the public interest.' 59 
Therefore, a prosecution should be initiated or continued, subject to the available evidence 
disclosing a prima facie case, if it is in the public interest, and not otherwise.60 
 
In New Zealand, prosecutorial discretion is exercised independently, and subject to 
evidentiary and public interests tests, which must be conducted by the prosecutor before any 
prosecution is carried out.61  Therefore, if there is evidentiary evidence that a crime has been 
committed, the prosecutor has to be satisfied that prosecution is required in the public 
interest.62 
 
It is clear from the discussions in this section that some countries have adopted different 
administrative policies to guide the exercise of discretion. The extent to which these policies 
are adhered to is  debatable. However, it is obvious that prosecutors who fail to observe the 
minimum ethics prescribed in these polices risk sanctions.  From the foregoing, one thing that 
is clear is that the existence of these policies does not limit discretion, but tries to ensure 
consistency and less dependence on the personal disposition of the prosecutors. 
  
                                                 
57 Ireland Guidelines for Prosecutors  Director of Public Prosecutions Revised November 2010 
58 Ibid.  
59 Ibid  
60 Ibid.  
61 Sections 5.3 and 5.5 of the New Zealand Code of Ethics. 
62 Ibid.  
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There have been several debates on whether it is desirable to have clear, written criteria for 
the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. The contention is based on the fact that prosecutorial 
discretion is ordinarily not subject to judicial control and prosecutors are free to exercise their 
discretion within the confines of the law. However, the inability of prosecutors to show 
clearly how decisions are made affects citizens‘ perceptions of  the powers of the prosecutor.   
 
2.4 Prosecutorial neutrality: convergence of domestic and international criminal law 
systems 
As already noted above, this study adopts the theory of prosecutorial neutrality to examine 
the exercise of prosecutorial discretion during preliminary examinations at the ICC. 
However, since the ICC is an international justice institution and applies a hybrid legal 
system derived from national judicial systems, it is also necessary to discuss the similarity 
and differences between the domestic and international criminal justice system and the 
applicability of the theory of prosecutorial neutrality at the ICC.  
 
There is a nexus between the theory of prosecutorial neutrality as advanced by Green and 
Zacharias and the activities of the ICC Prosecutor. However, it has to be reiterated that the 
theory as propounded by Green and Zacharias standing alone does not answer the critical 
questions discussed in this thesis, which revolves around the powers of the ICC Prosecutor.  
As the theory of prosecutorial neutrality was originally developed from the American legal 
system, there are notable differences between a domestic legal system and the international 
criminal justice system.   
 
The prosecutor at the national level has more latitude to operate compared to the ICC 
Prosecutor in the exercise of the functions of the office. This is because the ICC Prosecutor is 
considerably restricted by the Pre-Trial Chamber that must approve a request by the 
Prosecutor to open an investigation.63 However, at the national level and depending on the 
legal system in place,  there is a distinction between general and specific control of the 
prosecutor.64 For example, the executive arm of the government can issue guidelines for the 
exercise of discretion but there is no direct control of the prosecutor in the discharge of daily 
activities. This includes the decision to charge or not charge a particular defendant.65  
                                                 
63 Article 15 (3) of the Rome Statute. See generally, chapter four of the study.  
64 See chapter three, paragraph 3.1.  
65 Kai Ambos op cit at 115.  
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Depending on the jurisdiction, national prosecutors conduct investigations with police or with 
investigative judges.66 For instance, in most commonwealth countries, the police conducts 
investigations and hands over the docket to the national prosecutor for decision whether to 
prosecutor or not.67 In civil-law jurisdictions like France, an investigative judge is part of the 
decision to investigate and prosecute crimes.68 However, under the Rome Statute of the ICC, 
the responsibility to investigate and prosecute international crimes is the sole responsibility of 
the office of the ICC Prosecutor. While the prosecutor at the national level is responsible for 
the prosecution of every criminal offence, the ICC Prosecutor is limited to the prosecution of 
'serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole'.69  
 
Although national prosecutors are independent, they are accountable to government 
institutions. For example, some national prosecutors are accountable to the Parliament 
through appropriate line Ministries which is directly under the control of the executive arm of 
government.70  However, the ICC Prosecutor is accountable to the Assembly of States Parties 
of the ICC who provides 'management oversight to the Presidency, the Prosecutor and the 
Registrar regarding the administration of the Court'.71 
 
Some national legal systems like the US employ the use of private prosecutors for the 
prosecution of crimes. 72  This has its historical roots in the emergence of the modern 
prosecutor as earlier discussed in this chapter. However,  the use of private prosecutors is 
alien to the ICC.  The Rome Statute provides that the Prosecutor is responsible for 
conducting investigations and prosecutions before the Court.73 The Statute allows the ICC 
Prosecutor to appoint advisers with legal expertise on specific issues, including but not 
limited to , sexual and gender violence and violence against children.74 These experts only 
                                                 
66 See Chapter three, paragraph 3.1.  
67 Kai Ambos, op cit at 116.  
68 See Chapter three, paragraph 3.1.  
69 See Article 5 of the Rome Statute.  
70 Daniel Nsereko op cit at 144.    
71 Article 112 (2)(b) of the Rome Statute. 
72 Roger A. Fairfax 'Delegation of the Criminal Prosecution Function to Private Actors' (2009) 43 University of 
California, Davis  Law Review 411 - 456.   
73  See Chapter 42 (1) of the Rome Statute. See also chapter four  of the study.  
74  Article 42 (9) of the Rome Statute.  
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advise the Prosecutor on areas of their expertise but do not take over the investigation and 
prosecution roles of the Prosecutor which is obtainable in some national legal systems.  
 
As the theory of prosecutorial neutrality was originally developed for the American criminal 
law system, it has to be adapted into the international criminal justice system, to 
accommodate some of the differences inherent in the two systems. The relationship between 
the domestic and international criminal law systems are discussed in subsequent chapters of 
the study. However, it is important at this stage to lay the foundation that will guide further 
discussions.  
 
What is generally known today as the international criminal justice system is a hybrid of 
different domestic criminal justice systems that evolved over time to give birth to procedures 
applied at the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals in Germany and Japan respectively.75 The 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) in The Hague and Tanzania respectively benefitted 
from developments in domestic legal systems. In addition, as noted in Chapter four of the 
study, the Rome Statute itself is an amalgam of different legal systems that converged to 
form what is loosely termed the Rome Statute System of Justice. Prosecutorial discretion, the 
subject matter of this study, also evolved from the national to international criminal justice 
systems. Lawyers in both systems train and practice at the national level. There is currently 
no special training for lawyers who practice in the international criminal justice system. 
Therefore, the major legal education received by lawyers and judges is first and foremost at 
the domestic level.  
 
The Rome Statute that established the ICC is a treaty negotiated by sovereign States whose 
primary interest is to protect national interests.76 In this regard, a key interest in establishing 
the ICC is for it to collaborate with national judicial institutions in investigating and 
prosecuting crimes within its jurisdiction. This is the reason why a key principle of the Rome 
Statute is complementarity. 77  It places primary obligation on States to investigate and 
prosecute those accused of international crimes at the domestic level. It is only when a State 
is unable, unwilling and inactive in doing so that the ICC will step in to ensure that there is 
                                                 
75 See Chapter three of the study generally.  
76 Robert Cryer 'International Criminal Law vs State Sovereignty: Another Round?' (2006) 16 European Journal 
of International Law, 979 - 1000.  
77 See the Preamble and Articles 1 and 17 of the Rome Statute.  
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justice and no impunity gap.  The relationship between the domestic legal system and 
international criminal justice system is reinforced by the fact that national procedures are 
recognised as legitimate and effective, as long as they meet the threshold of justice and 
fairness and, in this instance, the principle of complementarity. 
 
In addition, it will be recalled that that the highest decision-making organ of the ICC is the 
Assembly of States Parties, which appoints and elects officials of the Court, including the 
Prosecutor, Registrar, Judges and Board Members of the Victims‘ Trust Fund.78 In addition, 
the Assembly of States party to the Statute provides management oversight to the Presidency, 
the Prosecutor and the Registrar regarding the administration of the Court. 79  Although 
composed mainly of sovereign states, its decisions are binding on the ICC as a justice 
institution.  
 
From the foregoing, it is argued that the Rome Statute is a merger of the procedures used in 
different legal domestic criminal justice systems and the ad-hoc tribunals. Therefore it can 
best be described as a hybrid system of justice.  
 
2.5 Conclusion  
 
This chapter has established that the theory of prosecutorial neutrality applies at the national 
and international criminal justice institutions. The chapter adopts prosecutorial neutrality as 
the working theory for the study. Although the theory is based on the American criminal law 
system, the study expounds on the similarities and differences between the domestic and 
international criminal law systems represented by the American legal system and the ICC. 
The chapter makes a case for the transposition of the theory of neutrality from the American 
criminal justice system to the ICC. 
 
The chapter notes that early manifestations of prosecutorial discretion were expressed 
through private prosecutors who acted on behalf of their clients. However, their powers to act 
were subject to the decision of an Attorney-General, who had to power to terminate 
proceedings through the issuance of nolle prosequi. The study further notes that courts are 
generally reluctant to intervene in the way prosecutors exercise discretion due to the doctrine 
                                                 
78 See Article 112 of the Rome Statute. 
79 See Article 112(2) of the Rome Statute. 
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of separation of powers and the presumption of regularity. It is usually when a decision of the 
prosecutor infringes constitutionally protected rights that that courts would intervene.  
 
The chapter extensively discusses the theory of prosecutorial neutrality, which proposes a 
three-dimensional neutral prosecutor who is expected to be non-biased, non-partisan and 
principled. The chapter discusses the three principles of prosecutorial neutrality and their 
applicability to the discretion exercised by the Prosecutor of the ICC. The chapter also notes 
that although the theory is primarily related to the American criminal justice system, its 
applicability to the ICC cannot be faulted as evidenced by the policy paper adopted by the 
ICC Prosecutor on the issue. The next chapter looks at the evolution of prosecutorial 
discretion from the domestic to international legal systems and how these institutions have 












This chapter looks at the historical evolution of the exercise of prosecutorial discretion from 
national to international criminal justice systems. It compares the powers and limits on the 
powers of prosecutors in the common and civil law systems regarding the exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion. This discussion sets the stage for the analysis of the powers of the 
prosecutors of the ad hoc international criminal tribunals on the exercise of prosecutorial 
discretion. The main objective of the chapter is to track the development of prosecutorial 
discretion in international criminal law from its domestic origins to its international 
manifestations. 
 
3.1.    Prosecutorial discretion and national judicial systems 
 
The exercise of discretion by the prosecutor at the state level is influenced by the criminal 
justice system that is in operation in that State. There are two main legal systems within 
which prosecutorial powers are exercised: the common law and civil law criminal systems. 
The common law system is mainly ‗adversarial‘ while the civil law system is mainly 
‗inquisitorial‘.‘ 1  These two criminal justice systems each define a particular role for 
prosecutors. However, recent developments in some civil law countries have blurred the 
distinction between common law and civil law models of prosecutorial discretion.2 Factors 
                                                 
1 China does not fall into any of the categories discussed. See Kai Ambos ‗The Status, Role and Accountability 
of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court: A Comparative Overview on the Basis of 33 National 
Reports‘ (2000) 8 European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 89 – 118. 
2 Julia G. Mirabella  ‗Scales of Justice: Assessing Italian Criminal Procedure Through the Amanda Knox Trial 
(2012) 30 Boston University International Law Journal 229 – 260; Yue Ma ‗Prosecutorial Discretion and Plea 
Bargaining in the United States, France, Germany, and Italy: A Comparative Perspective‘ (2002) 12 
International Criminal Justice Review 22 – 52; Elisabetta Grande  ‗Italian Criminal Justice: Borrowing and 
Resistance, (2000) 48 American Journal of Comparative Law 227 – 259; William T. Pizzi & Luca Marafioti, 
The New Italian Code of Criminal Procedure: The Difficulties of Building an Adversarial Trial System on a 
Civil Law Foundation (1992) 17 Yale Journal of International Law 1 – 40; William T. Pizzi and Mariangela 
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which influence the independence of prosecutors when exercising discretion include the legal 
status of the office, the method of appointment, the degree of autonomy of the office and the 
tenure of the incumbent.  
 
In general rule, prosecutorial independence is guaranteed in common law countries although 
how this is done and ensured in practice differs in each country.3 Thus, in common law 
systems, prosecutors have discretion on whether to initiate a proceeding or not. Even when 
proceedings have been initiated, a prosecutor can decide to close the investigation and even 
decide not to prosecute at all.4 According to the Canadian Supreme Court, the:  
 
'independence of the Attorney General is so fundamental to the integrity and 
efficiency of the criminal justice system that it is constitutionally entrenched. The 
principle of independence requires that the Attorney General act independently of 
political pressures from government and sets the Crown‘s exercise of prosecutorial 
discretion beyond the reach of judicial review, subject only to the doctrine of abuse of 
process.'5  
 
In deciding whether to initiate investigations or to prosecute, the prosecutor applies 
evidentiary and public interest tests.6 Because of the similarity in their roles and functions, 
the specifications applied to the prosecutor at a national level can logically transfer to the 
Prosecutor in the ICC.  
 
Even though the prosecutor has overall control over prosecutions, in some instances 
investigations are carried out by a different government institution, for example, the police. 
This means that the role of the prosecutor begins after the police have concluded 
                                                                                                                                                       
Montagna ‗The Battle to Establish an Adversarial Trial System in Italy‘ (2004) 25 Michigan Journal of 
International Law 429 – 466.  
3 Philip C Stenning ‗Prosecutions, politics and the law: The way things are‘ in Danwood Chirwa and Liz Nijzink 
eds. Accountable Government in Africa: Perspectives from Public Law and Political Studies (2012) 109.  
4 Ambos op cit at 98. 
5 Paragraph 46 of Miazga v. Kvello Estate 2009 SCC 51. 
6 Evidentiary test refers to the ‗existence of sufficient credible and admissible evidence that could sustain a 
conviction.‘ The public policy text involves decisions that are in the public interests and not based on legal 
judgments. Stenning op cit  at 106; See also Part 4 of the South African Prosecution Policy, 1 December 2005; 
Paragraph 523 - 4 of Gouriet v Union of Post Office Workers [1978] AC 435; Deborah MacNair ‗In the name of 
the public good: Public interest as a legal standard (2006) 10 Canadian Criminal Law Review 175 – 204.  
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investigations.7 For example, in England and Wales, the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) is 
headed by the Director of Public Prosecution (DPP) who is responsible for the prosecution of 
crimes.8 The DPP is not involved in the investigation of crimes as this is the responsibility of 
the police. It is after the police have concluded investigation that the DPP takes over the file 
for prosecution. This practice has been replicated in many Commonwealth countries. 
 
In some common law countries, the prosecutor called Director of Public Prosecution (DPP) 
or National Director of Public Prosecution, is appointed by the President or the parliament, 
and has the final decision on the prosecution of crimes. However, in some countries the chief 
prosecutor is subject to some control by the Attorney General.9 In this context, it is possible 
for the attorney general and the chief prosecutor to disagree on the exercise of prosecutorial 
discretion. In such instances, the courts have tended to hold that there is a limitation to the 
exercise of prosecutorial discretion but the attorney general cannot do certain things. For 
example, in Attorney-General In Re: Constitutional Relationship Between Attorney-General 
and the Prosecutor-General the Supreme Court of Namibia held that the Attorney-General 
cannot ‗instruct the Prosecutor-General to institute a prosecution, to decline to prosecute or to 
terminate a pending prosecution in any matter‘.10 In addition, the Supreme Court stated that 
the Attorney General cannot ‗instruct the Prosecutor-General to take or not to take any steps 
which the Attorney-General may deem desirable in connection with the preparation, 
institution or conduct of any prosecution‘, 11  which is a notable separation between the 
politician and the civil servant. However, the court further held that the Constitution of 
Namibia provides that ‗the Prosecutor-General should keep the Attorney-General informed of 
                                                 
7 Julia Fionda Public Prosecutors and Discretion: A Comparative Study (1995) 14; Kai Ambos ‗The Status, 
Role and Accountability of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court: A Comparative Overview on the 
Basis of 33 National Reports‘ (2000) 8 European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 89 – 
118. 
8 Section 1 of the Prosecution of Offences Act 1985, Cap 23.  
9 The Constitution of Namibia, for example, provides for the position of Attorney-General who is appointed by 
the President. The powers and functions of the Attorney-General of Namibia include (a) to exercise the final 
responsibility for the office of the Prosecutor-General; (b) to be the principal legal adviser to the President and 
Government; (c) to take all action necessary for the protection and upholding of the Constitution; and (d) to 
perform all such functions and duties as may be assigned to the Attorney-General by Act of Parliament.  See 
also the Section 76 of Indian Constitution which provides for the powers and functions of the Attorney-General 
of India.  
10  See Ex Parte: Attorney-General In Re: Constitutional Relationship Between Attorney-General and the 
Prosecutor-General 1995 (8) BCLR 1070 (NmS) (13 July 1995), 39.  
11 Ibid. 
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all prosecutions initiated or to be initiated which might arouse public interest or involve 
important aspects of legal or prosecutorial authority‘. 12  This means that the Prosecutor 
General is subject to a minimum degree of accountability through the Attorney General, at 
least as far as information sharing is concerned. 
 
In the Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa,13 the Constitutional 
Court interpreted a similar relationship between the National Director of Public Prosecution 
and the Minister of Justice. In interpreting section 179(4) of the South African Constitution, 
the Supreme Court of Appeal of South Africa held that ‗although the Minister may not 
instruct the NPA to prosecute or to decline to prosecute or to terminate a pending 
prosecution, the Minister is entitled to be kept informed of all prosecutions initiated or to be 
initiated which might arouse public interest or involve important aspects of legal or 
prosecutorial authority‘.14  
 
In civil law countries, the position and role of the prosecutor are slightly different. The 
investigation and prosecution of crimes are carried out by prosecutors and investigative 
judges. In France, for example, ‗a judge, called the investigative judge or juge d’instruction, 
participates in the investigation and in the decision to prosecute‘.15 In addition, the principle 
of legality applies in some civil law countries requiring an investigative judge or prosecutor 
to investigate and prosecute individuals for crimes where prima facie evidence exists.16  
 
The German Criminal Code provides that ‗the public prosecution office shall be obliged to 
take action in the case of all criminal offences which may be prosecuted, provided there are 
sufficient factual indications‘.17 German Prosecutors have the same career as judges and are 
civil and public servants.18 This means prosecutors are under obligation to investigate and 
prosecute offenders as long as there is evidence in support. According to Fionda, in Germany, 
                                                 
12 Ibid.  
13 Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (10) BCLR 1253 (CC) (6 September 
1996). 
14 See paragraph 32 of the National Director of Public Prosecutions v. Zuma 2009 (4) BCLR 393 (SCA). 
15 Nsereko op cit  at 126.  
16 Nidal Jurdi The International Criminal Court and National Courts: A Contentious Relationship (2011) 94; 
Nsereko op cit at 127. 
17 Section 152 (2) of the German Code of Criminal Procedure known as principle of legality (Legalitatsprinzip) 
18 Ambos op cit at 94.  
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there is no uniform prosecutorial policy. Instead, each prosecutorial office develops 
guidelines that guide the exercise of discretion in its area of jurisdiction.19 
 
From the foregoing, it can be argued that the extent of discretion exercised by prosecutors at 
national level is subject to several factors. These include the provisions of the constitution, 
the type of legal system adopted by the country in question and the practice that has evolved 
over the years in the administration of criminal justice. In addition, other institutions such as 
the police might play a role, particularly in countries where investigations are conducted by 
the police.  
 
3.1.2    Prosecutorial discretion at the International Criminal Tribunals 
 
 
In the International Criminal Tribunals, does the position of prosecutor resemble that of civil 
law or common law systems or both? This section seeks to answer this question. 
 
After the end of the Second World War, the allied forces set up the Nuremberg International 
Military Tribunal (IMT) for the ‗just and prompt trial and punishment of the major war 
criminals‘ in Europe. 20  The crimes prosecuted by the Nuremberg Tribunal were crimes 
against peace, war crimes and crimes against humanity. 21  Instead of having a single 
prosecutor, the Nuremberg Tribunal Charter established a ‗Committee of Prosecutors‘ for the 
investigation and prosecution of war criminals. The Committee was made up of Chief 
Prosecutors appointed by States that were signatories to the Charter.22 
 
According to the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal, the responsibilities of the Chief 
Prosecutors were (a) to agree upon a plan of the work of each of the Chief Prosecutors and 
his staff; (b) to settle the final designation of major war criminals to be tried by the Tribunal; 
(c) to approve the indictment and the documents to be submitted therewith; (d) to lodge the 
indictment and the accompanying documents with the Tribunal; and (e) to draw up and 
                                                 
19 See Fionda op cit at 11.  
20 Preamble to the Charter of the IMT. The Tribunal was set up pursuant to the Agreement signed on the 8th day 
of August 1945 by the Government of the United States of America, the Provisional Government of the French 
Republic, the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of 
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.  
21 Article 6 of the IMT Charter.  
22 Article 14 of the IMT Charter. 
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recommend draft rules of procedure to the Tribunal for its approval.23 The Chief Prosecutors 
were also mandated to prepare indictments for approval by the Committee and to conduct 
preliminary examination of all necessary witnesses and all defendants.24  
 
The Chief Prosecutors acting individually and in collaboration with other members of the 
Committee, investigated, collected and produced evidence before and during the trial of the 
defendants.25 Since they received direct instructions from their respective governments, they 
did not have the independence needed to discharge their duties. 26  No wonder these 
prosecutors failed to prosecute any Nazi officials who had collaborated with the allied forces 
during the war.27 
 
Unlike in the Nuremberg Tribunal, the Tokyo Tribunal granted more discretion to 
prosecutors. The Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (Tokyo 
Tribunal) took a different path by not leaving the appointments of the prosecutor entirely to 
their respective governments. The Tokyo Tribunal had the responsibility to ensure that war 
criminals from the Far East received justice and prompt trial.28 The Tokyo Tribunal Charter 
provided for a Chief of Counsel to be appointed by the Supreme Commander of the Allied 
Powers. The responsibilities of the Chief of Counsel (Chief Prosecutor) included ‗the 
investigation and prosecution of charges against war criminals within the jurisdiction of this 
Tribunal, and …render[ing] such legal assistance to the Supreme Commander as is 
appropriate‘.29 The Charter also provided for the appointment of Associate Counsel (Deputy 
Prosecutor) to assist the Chief Prosecutor. Countries with which Japan had been at war were, 
however, allowed to appoint Deputy Prosecutors to assist the work of the Chief Prosecutor.30 
 
                                                 
23 Ibid.  
24 Ibid. 
25 Article 15 of the IMT Charter. 
26 William Schabas Unimaginable Atrocities: Justice, Politics, and Rights at the War Crimes Tribunals (2012) 
75.  
27 Margaret M. DeGuzman and William A. Schabas ‗Initiation of Investigations and Selection of Cases‘ in 
Göran Sluiter, Håkan Friman, Suzannah Linton, Sergey Vasiliev, Salvatore Zappalà eds.  International Criminal 
Procedure: Principles and Rules (2013) 133 – 34.   
28 Article 1 of the IMTFE Charter of 1946.  
29 Article 8 of the IMTFE Charter of 1946 
30 Ibid. These countries were Australia; Republic of China; Provisional Government of the French Republic; 
British India; Netherlands; New Zealand; United Kingdom and former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
(USSR).  
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However, notwithstanding these differences, both the Nuremberg and Tokyo prosecutors 
largely acted to serve the interests of their governments. The indictments of the Tokyo 
Tribunal were a result of political negotiations between the allied forces.31 They did not 
address the crimes of the individuals accused of war crimes who had handed over classified 
information on chemical weapon experiments.32 In addition, the prosecutors were responsible 
to the States that appointed them into the tribunals.33  
 
Both the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals were largely adversarial in their procedures and 
proceedings. The prosecutors were responsible for both the investigation and prosecution of 
the crimes. There were no judicial reviews of the decisions of the prosecutors, as the enabling 
legislation did not provide for such powers.34  
 
From the foregoing, it is clear that prosecutors at the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals did not 
exercise discretion independently. The shortcomings at both Nuremberg and Tokyo played an 
important role in the conception of prosecutorial discretion for the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
(ICTR),35 to which we now turn. 
 
3.1.3    Prosecutorial discretion at the ad hoc tribunals 
 
The establishment of the ad-hoc criminal tribunals in Rwanda (ICTR) and in the former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY) marked a turning point in the functions, powers, importance or 
independence of the prosecutor in the administration of international criminal justice. Unlike 
the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals that were established by the allied powers (the victors in 
the conflict), the ICTR and ICTY were established pursuant to a UN Security Council 
                                                 
31 DeGuzman and Schabas op cit  at 134.  
32 DeGuzman and Schabas op cit at 135; Robert Cryer Prosecuting International Crimes: Selectivity and the 
International Criminal Regime (2005) 208.  
33  Luc Cote ‗Independence and Impartiality‘ in Luc Reydams, Jan Wouters and Cedri Ryngaert eds. 
International Prosecutors (2012)  372; Ralph Zacklin ‗The Failings of Ad Hoc International Tribunals‘ (2004) 2 
Journal of International Criminal Justice 541-545. 
34DeGuzman and Schabas op cit at 135. 
35 Schabas Unimaginable Atrocities op cit at 76.  
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resolution.36 These were passed pursuant to Article 39 of the UN Charter which mandates the 
Security Council to act when there is a threat to international peace and security.37  
 
The prosecutors of the ad-hoc tribunals are appointed by the UN Security Council and are 
expected to possess high moral character and the highest levels of competence and 
experience in the conduct of investigation and prosecution of criminal cases.38 The ICTY and 
ICTR Statutes provide that the prosecutors serve four year terms and are eligible for 
reappointment.39 This guarantees security of tenure of the prosecutors. The advantage is that 
prosecutors cannot easily be removed during their tenure without following the laid down 
procedure. In addition, the two Statutes provide that the prosecutors shall act independently 
as separate organs of the tribunals.40 Articles 15 of the ICTR and 16 of the ICTY do not allow 
the prosecutors to seek or receive instructions from any government or from any other 
source.41  
 
When the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals are compared with the ICTY and the ICTR, some 
differences are apparent. Under the ICTY and the ICTR Statutes, prosecutors‘ independence 
is clearly recognised and protected while the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals‘ founding 
documents did not reflect that.  Then there is the issue of appointment. While the prosecutors 
of the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals were appointed by the Allied Powers themselves, the 
prosecutors of the ICTY and the ICTR were appointed by the UNSC. The distinct processes 
through which the ad-hoc tribunals were set-up, it can be argued, mirror the differences in the 
appointment of their prosecutors. 
 
Article 16 (2) of the ICTR Statute and Article 17 (2) of the ICTY Statute provide that the 
prosecutors shall initiate investigations ex-officio or on the basis of information obtained 
from any source, particularly from governments, United Nations organs, intergovernmental 
and non-governmental organisations. These articles require the prosecutor to assess the 
information received or obtained and decide whether there is sufficient basis to proceed with 
an investigation or prosecution. In addition, the ICTY and ICTR prosecutors have the power 
                                                 
36  The ICTY was established by Resolution 827 of the UNSC passed on 25 May 1993 while the ICTR 
established on 8 November 1994 by the UNSC Resolution 955.  
37 See Article 39 of the UN Charter. .   
38Article 15 (4) of the ICTR Statute; Article 16 (4) of the ICTY Statute. 
39 Ibid.  
40 Article 15 (2) of the ICTR Statute; Article 16 (2) of the ICTY Statute; 
41 Ibid.  
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to question suspects, victims and witnesses, to collect evidence and to conduct on-site 
investigations.42 Whenever a determination that a prima facie case exists has been made, 
prosecutors are required to prepare indictments containing concise statements of the facts and 
the crimes with which the accused persons are charged for the judges of the Trial 
Chambers.43 It is up to the judges of the ICTY and ICTR to decide whether to confirm or 
dismiss the indictments.44 Thus, the two statutes guarantee the independence of the ICTY and 
ICTR explicitly and prescribe a procedure for exercising prosecutorial decision that 
guarantees such independence.  
 
As noted in chapter two, a three-dimensional prosecutor has to exercise discretion through a 
process that is not biased and is objective by consistently applying criteria derived from 
societally acceptable sources.45 The question that needs to be asked then is whether the 
prosecutors of the ad-hoc tribunals measure up to the theory of prosecutorial neutrality 
adopted in this study. This brings up the issue of discretion and selectivity. 
 
In relation to the discretion exercised by the ICTY, Kerr argues that there is a difference 
between prosecutorial discretion and ‗selective prosecution‘. 46  Selective prosecution is 
defined as ‗partiality or bias on the part of the prosecutor, rather than the exercise of 
discretion based on fixed criteria‘.47 In other words, the prosecutor of an ad-hoc tribunal can 
afford to be selective in the indictment of criminals in contrast with the prosecutor at the 
national level who is not called to be selective in the prosecution of criminals as long as there 
is evidence. This is because the financial implication of selection of cases for prosecution is 
more pronounced at the international level.48 
 
The discretionary power of the ad-hoc tribunals was confirmed in Prosecutor vs Zejnil 
Delalic, Zdravko Mucic, Hazim Delic and Esad Landžo (Čelebići case)49 where the Appeals 
                                                 
42 Article 17 (2) of the ICTR Statute; Article 18 (2) of the ICTY Statute 
43 Article 17 (4) of the ICTR Statute 18 (4) of the ICTY Statute. 
44Article 18 (1) of the ICTR Statute; Article 19 (1) of the ICTY Statute 
45 Chapter Two para 2.3.1 
46 Rachel Kerr International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: An Exercise in Law, Politics and 
Diplomacy (2004) New York: Oxford University Press, 178.  
47 Ibid.  
48 Louise Arbour ‗Progress and Challenges in International Criminal Justice‘ (1997) 21 Fordham International 
Law Journal 531 – 540. 
49 Celebisi Delalić and others, IT-96-21-A, Decision of the Appeal Chambers of the ICTY, 20 February 2001. 
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Chamber held that prosecutor of the ICTY had broad discretion in the investigation and 
prosecution of international crimes within the jurisdiction of the tribunal.50 The ICTY Appeal 
Chambers further stated that ‗[p]rosecutorial discretion must therefore be exercised entirely 
independently, within the limitations imposed by the Tribunal‘s Statute‘.51  
 
Despite clear guarantees of independence, accusations of bias have been made about the 
manner in which the prosecutors of the ICTY and ICTYR have exercised their discretion in 
practice. For example, these tribunals have been criticised for not adopting regulations and 
clear prosecutorial strategies that outline how decisions are taken by the tribunals.52 Some 
criticisms have focussed on the specific decisions of the prosecutors. For example, the 
prosecutor of the ICTY‘s decision not to prosecute North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
(NATO) officials for the bombing that took place during the Kosovo conflict has been cited 
as evidence of bias.53 So too  has the decision not to launch an investigation into the NATO 
bombings led to accusations that the ICTY was pursuing victor‘s justice reminiscent of 
prosecutions in Nuremberg and Tokyo after the Second World War.54 The possibility of 
investigating citizens of NATO countries for alleged crimes committed in Kosovo would 
have incurred hostility on the part of the governments responsible. 55  According to 
Koskenniemi, a key proponent of the critical legal studies theory, the failure to prosecute 
NATO officials have ‗provided space for cynicism and denial‘ regarding the successes of the 
ICTY as an international criminal justice institution. 56   
 
                                                 
50 Ibid at paragraph 602.   
51 Ibid at Paragraph 603.  
52 Luc Cote ‗Reflections on the Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion in International Criminal Law‘ (2005) 3 
Journal of International Criminal Justice 162 – 186 at 171-72 who argues that ‗[i]t is difficult to understand 
why the Prosecutors of the ICTR and ICTY both institutions being confronted with credibility problems in their 
specific regions, failed to adopt public regulations stating the criteria used in the general exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion. It becomes even more difficult if we consider that regulations were adopted in order to 
guide prosecutorial discretion in the case of nolle prosequi. It is all the more regrettable, considering that these 
important and broad discretionary powers are minimally regulated by the Statutes and Rules and, to a large 
extent, escape judicial control.‘  
53 See Paragraph 91 of the Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the NATO 
Bombing Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 13 June 2000. 
54 Kerr op cit at 203.  
55 Ibid at 204.  
56 Martti Koskenniemi ‗Between Impunity and Show Trials‘ in J. A. Frohwein and R. Wolfrum (eds.), (2002) 6 
Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law, 1 – 35. 
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On its part, the ICTR has been accused for the lack of prosecution of soldiers of the Rwanda 
Patriotic Front (RPF) for crimes committed during 1994 genocide which stands out as a 
reminder that there are constraints to prosecutorial independence. 57  The ICTR has only 
succeeded in indicting one party to the Rwandan conflict. This is because prosecutors have 
failed to pursue a single case of atrocities committed by RPF soldiers.58  
 
The experiences of the ICTY and ICTR show that prosecutorial independence and discretion 
are important for the effectiveness of international criminal tribunals. However, to insulate 
the tribunals from accusations of bias, more needs to be done to guarantee that independence 
and to regulate the exercise of discretion. 
 
 3.1.4   Prosecutorial discretion and completion strategies of the ICTY/ICTR 
 
The ad hoc nature of international criminal tribunals serves as a constraint on the exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion. For the ICTY and ICTR, it was always expected that they would be 
wound up at some point. In order to systematically carry out its responsibility and also wind 
up its activities within a clear time-bound strategy, the President of the ICTY, Judge Claude 
Jorda, in 2002 submitted an annual report to the UNSC which contained a comprehensive 
strategy to fulfill the task of the ICTY and wind down its operation.59  
 
The genesis of the completion strategy of the ad hoc tribunals can be traced to the ‗Rules of 
the Road‘ program established by the Rome Agreement of 18 February 1996. The 
governments of Croatia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Bosnia and Herzegovina 
agreed that war crimes investigations pursued by the authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
                                                 
57 See generally George W. Mugwanya ‗The Contribution of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda to 
the development of International Criminal Law‘ in Chacha Murungu and Japhet Biegon (eds), Prosecuting 
International Crimes in Africa (2011) 63 – 93.   
58 HRW ‗Rwanda Tribunal Should Pursue Justice for RPF Crimes: Failure to Act Risks Undermining Court‘s 
Legacy‘ 12 December 2008, available online at http://www.hrw.org/news/2008/12/12/rwanda-tribunal-should-
pursue-justice-rpf-crimes, accessed 7 January 2016; HRW ‗ICTR: Address Crimes Committed by the RPF - A 
Letter to the ICTR Prosecutor‘ 11 December 2008, available online at 
http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2008/12/11/ictr-address-crimes-committed-rpf, accessed 7 January 2016.  
59See ICTY ‗Report on the Judicial Status of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and 
the Prospects for Referring Certain Cases to National Court‘ S/2002/678, June 2002, available online at 
http://www.icty.org/x/file/About/Reports%20and%20Publications/CompletionStrategy/judicial_status_report_ju
ne2002_en.pdf, accessed 14 September 2014.  
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were to be submitted to the ICTY Prosecutor for review prior to an arrest warrant, indictment 
and proceeding to trial before domestic courts.60 
 
This completion strategy proposed by the ICTY president was endorsed by the UNSC 
through the presidential statement which stated that ‗the ICTY should concentrate its work on 
the prosecution and trial of the civilian, military and paramilitary leaders suspected of being 
responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory 
of the former Yugoslavia since 1991, rather than on minor actors.‘61 In addition, UNSC 
resolution 1503 also confirmed the presidential statement.62 Furthermore, resolution 1503 
also requested the ICTR to develop a completion strategy modeled after the ICTY.63 The 
ICTR later developed its own completion strategy as required by the UNSC.64 The ICTY and 
ICTR completion strategies envisage concentration on the investigation and prosecution of 
senior officials most responsible for crimes within the tribunals and the possibility of 
transferring cases involving those who may not bear this level of responsibility to competent 
national jurisdictions.65 However, the UNSC adopted resolution 1534 and clearly stated that 
judges of the ICTY and ICTR ‗in reviewing and confirming any new indictments, to ensure 
that any such indictments concentrate on the most senior leaders suspected of being most 
responsible for crimes within the jurisdiction of the relevant Tribunal as set out in resolution 
1503‘.66 This is a clear limitation on the discretions of the prosecutors of the ICTY and 
ICTR.67 
 
In conformity with the resolution of the UNSC, the judges of the ICTY amended the RPE to 
allow the transfer of cases to national jurisdictions and vetting of indictments by the 
prosecutor to ensure that only senior officials most responsible for crimes were charged.68 
However, the judges of the ICTR approved the amendment of the RPE to allow for the 
                                                 
60 Daryl Mundis ‗Completing the Mandates of the Ad Hoc International Criminal Tribunals: Lessons from the 
Nuremberg Process?‘ (2004) 28 Fordham Journal of International Law 591 – 615.  
61 UNSC ‗Statement of the President of the Security Council‘ S/PRST/2002/21, 23 July 2002. 
62 Resolution 1503, S/RES/1503 (2003) adopted on 28 August 2003. 
63 Ibid at paragraph 8 of the Preamble.   
64 See ICTY ‗Completion Strategy‘ op cit  at 85.   
65 Laura Bingham ‗Strategy or Process - Closing the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia 
and Rwanda‘ (2006) 24 Berkeley Journal of International Law 687 – 717. 
66 UNSC resolution 1534, S/RES/1534 (2004), 26 March 2004.  
67 Bingham op cit 92 at 703.  
68 See ICTY RPE 11 bis and 28 respectively.  
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transfer of cases to national judicial systems under RPE 11 bis but refused to amend RPE 28 
to vet the powers of the prosecutor to indict individuals. The judges argued that such a 
decision would infringe on the independence of the prosecutor and the discretion exercised 
under the ICTR Statute.69 Although the ICTR judges declined to amend the RPE to allow 
them to vet the indictments of the prosecutor, the possibility of the UNSC suggesting such a 
process clearly infringes on the independence of the activities of the prosecutors of the 
tribunals. However, since the tribunals were set up by the UNSC, it may not be out of place 
for the UNSC to issue policy directions, as long as it is within the parameters of the Statutes 
that set up the ad hoc tribunals. 
 
3.2    Prosecutorial discretion at the hybrid tribunals 
3.2.1   The Special Court for Sierra Leone 
 
Hybrid or mixed tribunals combine national and international criminal justice models of 
prosecutorial independence. Prosecutors of hybrid tribunals exercise discretion at various 
stages of the prosecution of international crimes. Unlike the ICC, the Special Court for Sierra 
Leone (SCSL) does not conduct preliminary examinations, although the prosecutor has 
discretion to charge individuals for crimes within the jurisdiction of the tribunal. The SCSL 
Statute empowers the tribunal to prosecute persons who bear the greatest responsibility for 
international crimes committed in the territory of Sierra Leone within the temporal 
jurisdiction of the Court.70 In addition, the SCSL has the power to indict those leaders that 
threatened the establishment and implementation of the peace process in Sierra Leone 
through the commission of crimes of international concern.71 The Statute provides that the 
prosecutor shall be responsible for the investigation and prosecution of persons who bear the 
greatest responsibility for serious violations of international humanitarian law and crimes 
under Sierra Leonean law committed in the territory of Sierra Leone.72 
 
                                                 
69 Daryl Mundis ‗The Judicial Effects of the "Completion Strategies" on the Ad Hoc International Criminal 
Tribunals‘ (2005) 99 American Journal of International Law 142 – 158; Mundis op cit note 87 at 612; Bingham 
op cit 92 at 705. 
70 Article 1 of the SCSL Statute.  
71 Ibid. See generally Charles Chernor Jalloh ‗Prosecuting those Bearing ―Greatest Responsibility‖: The 
Contributions of the Special Court for Sierra Leone in Charles Chernor Jalloh ed. The Sierra Leone Special 
Court and its Legacy: The Impact for Africa and International Criminal Law (2013) 589 – 623. 
72 Article 15 (1) of the SCSL Statute.  
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In discharging the responsibilities provided in the SCSL Statute, the Prosecutor is required to 
act independently as a separate organ of the Special Court and shall not seek or receive 
instructions from any government or from any other source. 73  The SCSL Prosecutor is 
appointed by the UN Secretary-General for a three-year term and is eligible for re-
appointment.74 In addition, the Prosecutor is expected to be of high moral character, possess 
the highest level of professional competence, and have extensive experience in the conduct of 
investigations and prosecutions of criminal cases.75  Furthermore, the SCSL Prosecutor is 
empowered to question suspects, victims and witnesses, to collect evidence and to conduct 
on-site investigations.76 The SCSL has concurrent jurisdiction with national courts in Sierra 
Leone in the prosecution of international crimes.77  
 
The Statute gives the SCSL primacy over national proceedings. This is because at any stage 
of the proceedings at the national level, the SCSL may formally request a national court to 
defer to its competence in accordance with its Statute and the Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence.78 Elucidating the powers/functions of the SCSL Prosecutor, the Appeals Chamber 
of the SCSL in Brima’s case held that the Prosecutor is expected to indict the defendants 
bearing the greatest responsibility for international crimes, but the prosecutorial discretion to 
determine the individuals that meet the criteria is not subject to judicial review.79 This shows 
the extent of the discretion given to the Prosecutor of the SCSL. One thing that stands out in 
the indictment of those responsible for international crimes in the SCSL is that the 
indictments targeted all the parties in the conflict.  
 
The decision to indict all parties demonstrates an effort to balance prosecutorial discretion at 
the SCSL.80 Its enabling statute clearly states the parameters within which it operates. The 
                                                 
73 Ibid.  
74 Article 15 (3) of the SCSL Statute.  
75 Ibid.  
76 Article 15 (2) of the SCSL Statute.  
77 Article 8 (1) of the SCSL Statute 
78 Article 8 (2) of the SCSL Statute.  
79 Paragraph 282-83 of Brima’s case, Appeal Chambers, SCSL, 22 February 2008. 
80 William Schabas ‗Prosecutorial Discretion v. Judicial Activism at the International Criminal Court‘ (2008) 6 
Journal of International Criminal Justice, 731-761 at 750 argues that ‗the most sincere attempt at balanced 
prosecution came from the Prosecutor of the SCSL. He issued three clusters of indictments, each directed at a 
different group in the conflict, including the government-supported Civil Defence Forces.‘; Cote op cit note 56 
at 385.  
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temporal jurisdiction of the SCSL is limited to the events that occurred within a specific 
period in Sierra Leone. The SCSL is an example of an international institution with an 
independent prosecutor expected to exercise prosecutorial discretion within the parameters of 
its enabling statute. 
3.2.2    Extra-Ordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia 
 
Another innovation of hybrid tribunals in the exercise of prosecutorial discretion is the 
appointment of co-prosecutors. The enabling law of the Extraordinary Chambers in the 
Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) provides for two Co-Prosecutors. One must be Cambodian and 
the other an international staff member.81 The Co-Prosecutors are independent and not to be 
influenced by external actors in reaching their decisions.82 Furthermore, they shall not accept 
or seek instructions from any government or any other source.83 The Co-Prosecutors are 
expected to reach decisions together and when there is no consensus between them, the Pre-
Trial Chamber consisting of five judges settles the matter.84 
 
The exercise of prosecutorial discretion between two co-prosecutors at the ECCC became a 
problematic issue as they could not agree on some issues including the number of the people 
to be indicted by the ECCC. Furthermore, they had limited discretion in the exercise of their 
duties. A scholar argues that ‗the discretion afforded to the ECCC Co-Prosecutors seems 
rather limited. The obvious limits of temporal, material, and personal jurisdiction contained 
in the ECCC law serve as the initial limitation as to whom the Co-Prosecutors may indict.‘85 
For example, the ECCC can only try those who are responsible for the crimes committed 
during the reign of the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia.  
 
The uniqueness of the ECCC in having two co-Prosecutors also had its own problems. 
Decision making was always a problem as the co-Prosecutors had divergent views on the 
same issue at times. This was witnessed when the International Prosecutor requested to open 
investigations for other top ranking Khmer Rouge leaders for crimes committed during the 
                                                 
81 Article 16 of the ECCC Law.  
82 Rule 13 of the ECCC Rules of Procedure.  
83 Article 19 of the ECCC Law.  
84 Article 20 of the ECCC Law.  
85 Neha Jain ‗Between the Scylla and Charybdis of Prosecution and Reconciliation: The Khmer Rouge Trials 
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period. The Cambodian Co-Prosecutor resisted this move arguing that opening more 
investigations in Cambodia would cause undue tension and make reconciliation difficult.86 In 
its decision, the Pre-Trial Chamber resolved that the investigations should continue since 
there was no super majority as required by law to stop the discretion exercised by the 
International Co-Prosecutor. 87  The ECCC operates in a civil law system and has co-
investigating judges, who are responsible for running the investigation and for effecting the 
indictment, following an introductory submission by the prosecutors. This can be contrasted 
with the Rome Statute where the Prosecutor has to apply for Pre-Trial Chamber for 
authorisation to proceed with investigations proprio motu.88 
 
Discussing prosecutorial discretions in the hybrid tribunals involves contrasting the activities 
of the SCSL and the ECCC. One major problem hampering the discretion of the prosecutor in 
the ECCC is the appointment of two independent prosecutors with divergent views as 
illustrated in their divergent views on the prosecution of Khmer Rouge suspects. Having two 
individuals agree on the same course of action and working together was not achieved in the 
ECCC.89 On the other hand, though the Prosecutor for the SCSL has the discretion to choose 
who should be indicted for international crimes committed during the Sierra Leonean civil 
war, it is obvious that he had to contend with several political choices relating to the 
indictment of former President of Liberia, Charles Taylor.   
 
In contrast with the ICC, the ECCC does not provide for preliminary examinations. Whereas 
the ICC Statute provides for the suspension or deferral of cases in the interests of justice, the 
ECCC law does not have such a provision. The procedure at the ICC is different in this 
regard, in that the Prosecutor has power to decide whether there is a reasonable basis to 
proceed with an investigation or to do otherwise. One factor that the ICC Prosecutor has to 
take into consideration is the interests of justice as provided in article 53 of the Rome Statute, 
which was one of the contentious issues for the ECCC. 
                                                 
86 Open Society for Justice Initiative ‗Political Interference at the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of 
Cambodia‘ July 2010, 16 available online at http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/reports/political-
interference-extraordinary-chambers-courts-cambodia (accessed 10 November 2013).  
87 See paragraph 45 of the Public redacted version - Considerations of the PTC regarding the Disagreement 
between the Co-Prosecutors pursuant to Internal Rule 71, available online at Public_redacted_version_-
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Prosecutors_pursuant_to_Internal_Rule_71_(English).pdf , accessed 11 January 2016.  
88 Article 15 (3) of the Rome Statute.  
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3.2.3 Special Tribunal for Lebanon 
 
The Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) was established through an agreement between the 
UN and the Government of Lebanon.90 It is a treaty-based special tribunal established to try 
those responsible for the death of the former Prime Minister of Lebanon, Rafic Hariri, who 
was killed along with 21 others in a terrorist attack on 14 February 2005. The STL is neither 
a subsidiary organ of the UN nor part of the Lebanese court system.91 For the purposes of our 
discussion, the STL can be distinguished from other international criminal tribunals in several 
ways.  
 
First, in the conduct of trials, more elements of civil law are evident than that of common 
law. Second, the investigation conducted by the International Independent Investigation 
Commission constitutes the core nascent prosecutor‘s office.92 Third, the STL is the first 
international criminal tribunal to combine substantial elements of both civil and common 
legal systems. For example, the applicability of the Lebanese Code of Criminal Procedure as 
a guiding principle alongside other reference materials reflecting the highest standards of 
international criminal procedure is a clear example of this development.93 Fourth, the powers 
of the STL are enhanced by the provisions of the Statute to take measures to ensure 
expeditious hearing and prevent any action that may cause unreasonable delay during 
investigations and trials of accused suspects.94 Fifth, the STL introduces trials in absentia.95 
This means that even when an accused person is not in the custody of the STL trials can be 
commenced pending the arrest and transfer of the accused person to the STL. This is a 
manifestation of elements of civil law in the activities of the STL.96 
 
It should be noted that the establishment of the STL was preceded by the Commission 
established by UNSC.97 The report of the UN Secretary–General argues that establishing the 
                                                 
90 Paragraph 6 of the Report of the Secretary-General on the establishment of a special tribunal for Lebanon 15 
November 2006, S/2006/893. 
91 Ibid.  
92 Ibid at paragraph 8. 
93 See Article 28 of the STL Statute.  
94 Article 21 of the STL Statute.  
95 Article 22 of the STL Statute.  
96 Paragraph 9 of the UN Secretary General Report. 
97 UNSC  Resolution 1595 (2005). 
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Commission first, has the ‗effect of reducing the lifespan of the tribunal and increasing the 
efficiency and cost-effectiveness of its operation.‘98 
 
The Statute of the STL provides that the prosecutor shall be responsible for the investigation 
and prosecution of persons responsible for the crimes falling within the jurisdiction of the 
STL.  In addition, the Statute provides that in the interest of proper administration of justice, 
he or she may decide to charge jointly, persons accused of the same or different crimes 
committed in the course of the same transaction.99 The prosecutor of the STL is expected to 
act independently as a separate organ of the STL, and shall not seek or receive instructions 
from any Government or from any other source.100 
 
The Statute provides that the prosecutor may be appointed by the Secretary-General for a 
three-year term and may be eligible for re-appointment for a further period to be determined 
by the Secretary-General in consultation with the Government. The prosecutor shall be of 
high moral character and possess the highest level of professional competence, and have 
extensive experience in the conduct of investigations and prosecutions of criminal cases.101 
The STL Statute also provides that the prosecutor shall be assisted by a Lebanese Deputy 
Prosecutor and by such other Lebanese and international staff as may be required to perform 
the assigned functions effectively and efficiently.102 In addition, the prosecutor has the power 
to question suspects, victims and witnesses, to collect evidence and to conduct on-site 
investigations. In carrying out these tasks, the prosecutor shall, as appropriate, be assisted by 
the Lebanese authorities concerned.103  
 
The co-operation between the STL and the Lebanese government is vital for the success of 
the STL. However, such cooperation also raises challenges for the independence of the 
Prosecutor of the STL. This challenge of cooperation and independence has also played out 
                                                 
98Paragraph 10 of the UN Sec Gen Report. See also Nidal Jurdi ‗The Subject-Matter Jurisdiction of the Special 
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99 Article 11 of the STL Statute.  
100 Article 11 (2) of the STL Statute.  
101 Article 11 (3) of the STL Statute.  
102 Article 11 (4) of the STL Statute.  
103 Article 11 (5) of the STL Statute.  
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in the activities of the Prosecutor of the ICC. This is because the ICC Prosecutor is accused 




This chapter has traced the evolution of prosecutorial discretion at national jurisdictions and 
international criminal courts. Its main purpose was to lay a foundation for the examination of 
the legal framework governing prosecutorial discretion at the ICC in chapter three. The 
chapter has noted the differences in the appointment, powers, roles and responsibilities of 
prosecutors at national and international criminal justice institutions. In most common law 
systems, the prosecutors are not responsible for carrying out investigations. This 
responsibility lies with other organs of the government, like the police. In addition, 
international criminal justice systems like the ICTY and the ICTR do not carry out 
preliminary examinations to determine whether there is a reasonable basis to commence an 
investigation.  This is because the mere fact that tribunals were set up by the UNSC acting 
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter means that the gravity of the crimes is not in question. 
The UNSC also limited the territorial and temporal jurisdictions of the tribunals, meaning 
that they could not investigate or indict individuals outside the provisions of the enabling 
statutes. The ICC Prosecutor has wider jurisdiction than that of the ad-hoc tribunals (ICTY 
and ICTR). 
 
The jurisdiction of the ICC is not limited to a particular conflict as the Prosecutor has the 
power to investigate crimes committed in the territory of both States Parties and non-State 
Parties. This means the ICC Prosecutor has a wider territorial and temporal jurisdiction 
compared with the ad-hoc tribunals. Furthermore, the ICC can investigate the conduct of non-
State Parties if the conduct is referred to the ICC by the UN Security Council acting under 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter.105 
 
                                                 
104Darryl Robinson ‗Inescapable Dyads: Why the ICC Cannot Win‘ (2015) 28 Leiden Journal of International 
Law   323 - 347; Ray Murphy ‗Gravity Issues at the International Criminal Court‘ (2006) 17 Criminal Law 
Forum, 281 – 315; Adam Branch ‗Uganda‘s Civil War and the Politics of Intervention‘ (2007) 21 Ethics and 
International Affairs 179 - 198.  
105 Luc Cote ‗International Criminal Justice: Tightening up the Rules of the Game‘ (2006) 88 International 
Review of the Red Cross 133 – 144.  
 
58 | Page 
Overall, the ICTY and the ICTR represent improvements in the administration of justice over 
the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals as far as prosecutorial independence is concerned. 
However, each has shown that the tension between the independence of the prosecutor and 
exercise of prosecutorial discretion, by the tribunals has not been resolved. These experiences 
shaped negotiations for the adoption of the Statute that established the ICC which also placed 
some restrictions on the powers of the ICC Prosecutor to exercise discretion. For example, 
Nsereko argues that: 
 
 'the restrictions placed on the [ICC] Prosecutor may appear intrusive and obstructive. 
 Nevertheless, given the volatile political environment in which the Court operates the 
 interests of States that may be at stake and the profile of the individuals that are likely 
 to appear before the Court, the restrictions are justified. They ensure transparency and 
 accountability in the exercise of the Prosecutor's powers. They serve to shield the 
 Prosecutor from accusations of initiating politically motivated prosecutions.106 
 
It does not seem, however, as if these restrictions have shielded the ICC Prosecutor from 
these accusations. The next chapter will discuss the Rome Statute legal frame work and how 
it regulates the exercise of prosecutorial discretion during preliminary examinations. 
 
 
                                                 
106 Nsereko op cit at 141.   
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Chapter Four 




To critically evaluate the activities of the Prosecutor of the ICC during preliminary 
examination, it is pertinent to understand the legal framework governing the powers of the 
ICC Prosecutor and how the theory of neutrality features in that legal framework. This will 
entail a discussion of the formal protection of the independence of the Prosecutor and the 
mechanisms of ensuring that the Prosecutor is independent in fact. Other questions answered 
by the chapter are to what extent does the ICC Statute guarantee the independence of the 
Prosecutor? What mechanisms are there to ensure that the Prosecutor is independent in law 
and in practice? Uniting these questions is the assumption that the proper exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion depends on the independence and accountability of the Prosecutor.  
In answering these questions, the chapter will draw from the preceding chapters which have 
looked at prosecutorial independence and discretion as it has evolved at the national level and 
in international criminal law. Of interest is how much the ICC framework for the exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion has learnt from the past and whether there are specific lessons for the 
future. 
The Prosecutor of the ICC is the heart of the international criminal justice system. One area 
where the role of the Prosecutor is crucial relates to preliminary examinations. The 
Prosecutor, as will be seen in this chapter, has the responsibility to conduct preliminary 
examinations of national situations to determine whether international crimes have been 
committed before charges can be brought against specific individuals. The manner in which 
that discretion is exercised has a bearing on how the ICC is perceived throughout the world. 
 
4.1  Prosecutorial discretion and treaty interpretations 
 
Before the review of the provisions of the Rome Statute is attempted, it is important to set out 
clearly the parameters of interpretation that will guide subsequent discussions. The Vienna 
Convention on the Laws of Treaties (VCLT) applies in the interpretation of the provisions of 
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the Rome Statute.1 This is because the Statute is a multi-lateral treaty signed by about 122 
State Parties.2 Therefore, the customary rules of treaty interpretation under article 31 of the 
VLCT will ordinarily apply.3  
 
The VCLT provides that a treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the 
ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its 
object and purpose.4 This is a three-step inquiry involving, the ‗ordinary meaning‘ the ‗object 
and purpose‘ and ‗the context‘ of the provision in relation to other provisions.5 The text of the 
Rome Statute, its preamble and available annexes form part of the materials consulted to 
interpret the provision of the Statute.6 However, where there is ambiguity in the provisions of 







                                                 
1 The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties was adopted on 22 May 1969 and entered into force on 27 
January 1980 United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 1155, 331; Leila Sadat and Jarrod Jolly ‗Seven Canons of ICC 
Treaty Interpretation: Making Sense of Article 25's Rorschach Blot‘ (2014) 27 Leiden Journal of International 
Law, 755-788.  
2  See Paragraph 19 of Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an 
Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Kenya, ICC-01/09 31 March 2010; Para 33 of Judgment on 
Prosecutor's Application for Extraordinary Review of Pre-Trial Chamber I's 31 March 2006 Decision Denying 
Leave to Appeal in the Situation in Democratic Republic of the Congo, ICC-01/04-168 of 13 July 2006. 
3Para 33 of Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions (Qatar v. Bahrain), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 
Judgment of 15 February 1995, ICJ Reports 1995; Para 47 of the Dispute Regarding Navigational And Related 
Rights (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua) Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2009, 213; Para 41 of Territorial Dispute (Libyan 
Arab Jamahiriyal v Chad), Judgment of 3 February 1994, ICJ Reports 1994; Para 160 of the Application of the 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia 
and Montenegro), Judgment, ICJ Reports 2007.  
4 Article 31 (1) of the VCLT. 
5 Michael Kourabas ‗A Vienna Convention Interpretation of the "Interests of Justice" Provision of the Rome 
Statute, the Legality of Domestic Amnesty Agreements, And the Situation In Northern Uganda: A "Great 
Qualitative Step Forward," or A Normative Retreat? (2007) 14 University of California Davis Journal of 
International Law and Policy 59 – 93 at 69.  
6 Article 31 (2) of the VCLT.  
7 Article 32 of the VCLT.  
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4.2 The Prosecutor of the ICC: Drafting history 
 
As noted in chapter two, the office of the Prosecutor was one of the most contentious issues 
that negotiators had to resolve during the Diplomatic Conference in Rome.8 One of the issues 
in contention was whether the prosecutor should be allowed to initiate investigations proprio 
motu. The initial drafts produced by the ILC in 1994 did not allow for that possibility.9 The 
ILC was of the opinion that 'the investigation and prosecution of the crimes covered by the 
statute should not be undertaken in the absence of the support of a State or the UNSC, at least 
not at the present stage of development of the international legal system‘. 10 The ILC was of 
the view that the support of State parties or the UNSC would prevent ‗frivolous, groundless 
or politically motivated complaints‘.11 In other words, the ILC assumed that the prosecutor 
was vulnerable to political pressures and frivolous complaints. Only member States and the 
UNSC could rise above such pressures. 
 
However, at a meeting of the Ad hoc Committee on the Establishment of the International 
Criminal Court in 1995, a proposal was made by some delegates supporting an enhanced role 
for the Prosecutor, including the possibility to initiate investigations and prosecutions of 
international crimes of its own accord.12 The delegates argued that such a role would enhance 
‗the independence and autonomy of the prosecutor, who would be in a position to work on 
behalf of the international community rather than a particular complainant State or the 
Security Council‘.13 
 
                                                 
8Chapter two, paragraph 2.5. See also Morten Bergsmo and Jelena Pejic ‗Article 15‘ in Otto Triffterer ed. 
Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: Observers’ Notes, Article by Article 2nd 
ed. (2008) 582. 
9 Paragraph 4 of commentary to Article 25 of the Draft Statute of the International Criminal Court in Report of 
the International Law Commission on the Work of its Forty-Sixth Session A/CN.4/SER.A/1994/Add.l (Part 2). 
10Ibid at Paragraph 5.  
11 Draft Statute of the International Criminal Court in Report of the International Law Commission on the Work 
of its Forty-Sixth Session A/CN.4/SER.A/1994/Add.l (Part 2). Yearbook of the International Law Commission 
1994: Report of the Commission to the General Assembly on the work of its forty-sixth session (1997) 46.  
12 William Schabas The International Criminal Court: A Commentary on the Rome Statute (2010) 316. 
13Paragraph 113 of the Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal 
Court General Assembly Official Records, Fiftieth Session Supplement No. 22 (A/50/22), 26.  
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The States that opposed the possibility of having an independent Prosecutor included the 
US.14 The US believed that it would be detrimental to the pursuit of international peace and 
security to have a prosecutor with unfettered powers.15 The US stated further that the UN 
Security Council and States Parties were better positioned to refer cases to the ICC and that 
the Prosecutor could be politically motivated in initiating investigations and prosecutions.16 
Japan, India and Malaysia supported the position of the US.17   
 
However, several countries, including those from Africa, argued for an independent 
prosecutor with powers to refer matters to the ICC. A delegate from South Africa argued that 
‗a strong Prosecutor, with the power to act proprio motu, [i]s critical to the independence and 
effectiveness of the Court‘. 18  A delegate from Belgium argued that ‗the power of the 
Prosecutor to initiate investigations proprio motu was essential‘.19  The delegate from Sierra 
Leone argued that it was 'imperative that the Court should have inherent jurisdiction and that 
the Prosecutor should be empowered to initiate investigations proprio motu’.20 The delegate 
from Namibia argued that the 'independence of the Prosecutor was of great importance to the 
effective operation of the Court; he or she must be able to initiate investigations and institute 
                                                 
14 For example, the US government opposed the idea of an independent prosecutor by arguing that ‗[i]t would 
be unwise to grant the Prosecutor the right to initiate investigations. That would overload the Court, causing 
confusion and controversy, and weaken rather than strengthen it. The Prosecutor should not be turned into a 
human rights ombudsman responding to complaints from any source.‘ See Official Records of the United 
Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court 
Rome, 15 June - 1 7 July 1998, Summary records of the plenary meetings and of the meetings of the Committee 
of the Whole, A/CONF.183/13 (Vol.11), 95, available at  
http://legal.un.org/icc/rome/proceedings/E/Rome%20Proceedings_v2_e.pdf , accessed 12th March 2016.  
15 Morten Bergsmo ‗The Jurisdictional Regime of the International Criminal Court (Part II, Articles 11-19)‘ 
(1998) 6 European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 345 – 363 at 356. 
16 William Schabas ‗United States Hostility to the International Criminal Court: It‘s All About the Security 
Council‘ (2004) 15 European Journal of International Law 701 – 720.  
17 For example, the Japanese delegate argued it was ‗inappropriate to give the Prosecutor the right to initiate an 
investigation proprio motu’. The delegate from India argued that ‗it was inappropriate to vest an individual 
Prosecutor with the power to initiate investigations proprio motu.‘The delegate from Malaysia stated that ‗the 
Prosecutor … should not be empowered to initiate an investigation proprio motu in view of the principle of 
complementarity and the danger of adverse effects on the integrity and credibility of the office and possible 
accusations of bias.‘ See Rome Statute Official Records 67 – 109.  
18 Ibid 
19 Ibid.  
20 Ibid.  
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prosecutions proprio motu, subject to appropriate judicial scrutiny‘.21 The Philippine delegate 
argued that the ICC Prosecutor should be 'independent and be entitled to investigate 
complaints proprio motu, subject to the safeguards provided by a supervisory pre-trial 
chamber‘.22 In the end, there was a compromise between the two camps, leading to the 
current provisions in the Rome Statute regarding the powers of the Prosecutor. The Rome 
Statute empowers the prosecutor to open an investigation, proprio motu, over a situation 
within the jurisdiction of the ICC, but subjects this power to the authority of the Pre-Trial 
Chamber of the ICC.23 
 
4.3 The formal independence of the Prosecutor 
 
The office of the Prosecutor is established under Article 42 of the ICC Statute. The ICC 
Prosecutor is elected by secret ballot and needs an absolute majority of State Parties to the 
Rome treaty. 24  Although the Statute provides limited information on the procedure for 
nominating and electing the Prosecutor, the State Parties have adopted a procedure for the 
nomination of judges, the Prosecutor and the Deputy Prosecutors of the Court (Resolution on 
the Procedure for the nomination and election).25 
 
These Procedures attempt to ensure that the person appointed as Prosecutor is independent in 
law and practice. For example, they state that nominations for the Prosecutor should be made 
by several State Parties.26 In addition, they urge State Parties to make every effort to elect the 
Prosecutor by consensus.27 If consensus does not emerge, then the candidates have to be put 
                                                 
21 Ibid.  
22 See Rome Conference Official Records. See also Lawyers Committee for Human Rights ‗The International 
Criminal Court Trigger Mechanisms and the need for an independent Prosecutor: A position paper of the 
Lawyers Committee for Human Rights‘, July 1997, available online at  
http://www.iccnow.org/documents/LCHRTriggerMechanism.pdf, accessed 19 September 2016. 
23 Article 15 (3) of the Rome Statute.  
24 Article 42 (4) of the Rome Statute. The Assembly of States Parties of the Rome Statute consists of all States 
that have ratified the treaty. Though non-state parties can participate in the meetings, they do not have a right to 
vote. 
25 Resolution on the Procedure for the nomination and election of judges, the Prosecutor and Deputy Prosecutors 
of the International Criminal Court, ICC-ASP/3/Res.6, adopted at the 6th plenary meeting, on 10 September 
2004, available online at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/Resolutions/ICC-ASP-3-Res.6-
CONSOLIDATED-ENG.pdf, accessed 7 January 2016.  
26 Ibid at paragraph 29. 
27 Paragraph 33 of the Resolution on the Procedure for the nomination and election. 
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up for election. The absolute majority required for election was intended to ensure that the 
Prosecutor garners widespread support from states. Such level of support would militate 
against partiality on the part of the Prosecutor. In addition to these requirements, candidates 
for the office of the Prosecutor are expected to be persons of high moral character and 
competence, and to have extensive practical experience in the prosecution or trial of criminal 
cases.28   
 
The Prosecutor enjoys a relatively secure tenure. The Prosecutor is appointed to an 
uninterrupted single term of nine years.29 During this period, the Prosecutor is expected not to 
engage in any activity which is likely to interfere with his or her prosecutorial functions or to 
affect confidence in his or her independence.30 Furthermore, the Prosecutor is prohibited 
from engaging in any other occupation of a professional nature while in office.31 If there is 
any likelihood of conflict of interest, the Prosecutor may request to be excused from a 
particular situation or case.32  
 
The Prosecutor can be removed from office on two grounds only. The first is when the 
Prosecutor is found to have committed ‗serious misconduct‘ or a ‗serious breach‘ of his or 
her duties under the Statute, as provided for in the Rules of Procedure and Evidence or 
displays inability in exercising the functions required by the Statute.33 The second is when the 
Prosecutor is unable to exercise the functions required by the Rome Statute.34  
 
A serious misconduct is conduct that is incompatible with official functions, and causes or is 
likely to cause serious harm to the proper administration of justice before the Court or the 
proper internal functioning of the Court.35 Serious breach of duty occurs where a person has 
been grossly negligent in the performance of his or her duties or has knowingly acted in 
contravention of those duties.36  Inability to exercise the functions of the office can be due to 
                                                 
28 Article 42 (3) of the Rome Statute 
29 Article 42 (4) of the Rome Statute 
30 Article 42 (5) of the Rome Statute. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Article  42 (6) of the Rome Statute.  
33 Article 46 (1) (a) of the Rome Statute. 
34 Article 46 (1) (b) of the Rome Statute.  
35 Rule 24 (1) of the Rule of Procedure and Evidence.  
36 Rule 24 (2) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence. 
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sickness or any other factor that could militate against the effective functioning of the 
Prosecutor.  
 
The security of tenure of the Prosecutor is not only guaranteed by the prescription of grounds 
of removal. It is also guaranteed by a specific procedure by which such removal can happen. 
Article 46 (2) of the Rome Statute provides that a decision to remove the Prosecutor from 
office is made by the ASP through a secret ballot by an absolute majority of States Parties to 
the Rome Statute.37 This means that the Prosecutor can be removed for gross misconduct 
only during the annual sessions of the ASP, unless a special session is convened for that 
purpose.38 Where the Prosecutor has committed misconduct of less serious nature, he or she 
shall be subject to disciplinary measures, in accordance with the Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence.39  
 
For the Prosecutor to be independent, it is important that his or her powers are clearly laid 
down by law. The Rome Statute does this in Article 42 of the Rome Statute which provides 
that the 'Prosecutor shall have full authority over the management and administration of the 
Office, including the staff, facilities and other resources thereof.'40 The Rome Statute also 
provides that the Prosecutor shall be assisted by one or more Deputy Prosecutors, who shall 
be entitled to carry out any of the acts required of the Prosecutor under this Statute.  In 
addition, it states that the Prosecutor and the Deputy Prosecutors shall be of different 
nationalities and shall both serve on a full-time basis.41 
 
The Rome Statute sets a high standard for the ICC Prosecutors with regard to character and 
competence.  It provides that the Prosecutor and the Deputy Prosecutors 'shall be persons of 
high moral character, be highly competent in and have extensive practical experience in the 
prosecution or trial of criminal cases'.42 In addition, the Prosecutor and Deputy Prosecutors 
                                                 
37 Article 46 (2) (b) of the Rome Statute.  
38 Annual Sessions of the ASP meeting are alternated between The Hague, Netherlands and the United Nations 
Headquarters in New York. See Art 112 (6) of the Rome Statute; S. Rama Rao ‗Assembly of States Parties‘ in  
Otto Triffterer ed. Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: Observers’ Notes, 
Article by Article 2nd ed. (2008) 1687 – 1697 at 1695.  
39 Article 47 of the Rome Statute.  
40 Article 42 (1) of the Rome Statute.  
41 Ibid.  
42 Article 43 (3) of the Rome Statute.  
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shall have an excellent knowledge of and be fluent in at least one of the working languages of 
the Court.43 
 
The Rome Statute provides expressly that the ICC Prosecutor shall act independently as a 
separate organ of the Court. As such, it has a responsibility to receive referrals on crimes 
within the jurisdiction of the Court, examine evidence and conducting investigations and 
prosecutions before ICC judges. The Office of the Prosecutor is prohibited from seeking or 
acting on instructions from any external source.44 
 
This discussion shows that at the formal level, the Rome Statute has provisions aimed at 
ensuring that the Prosecutor is independent and exercises prosecutorial discretion without any 
interference or favour. Like the prosecutors at the national level and in other international 
criminal tribunals, the ICC Prosecutor derives his or her powers from the empowering law.  
Such guarantee of formal independence is bolstered by other specific provisions of the Rome 
Statute and its accompanying subsidiary laws that define the powers of the Prosecutor, make 
provision for a relatively credible appointment process of the Prosecutor, protect the tenure of 
the incumbent and provide the legal framework for the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. 
This is a marked improvement on the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals whose prosecutors 
were appointed in a partisan fashion by the Allied Powers to prosecute losers of the World 
War II. To some extent, this is also an improvement on the prosecutors of the ICTY and the 
ICTR who were appointed by the UNSC with recommendations from the Secretary-General 
of the UN.  
 
The Prosecutor of the ICC also enjoys a longer tenure of nine years compared to the 
prosecutors of the SCSL and the STL referred to in this study as hybrid tribunals who were or 
are appointed into office by the UN Secretary-General for three renewable years, and the 
prosecutors of the ICTY and ICTR, who enjoy four-year renewable terms.  
 
4.4 The Prosecutor and jurisdiction of the ICC 
 
Jurisdiction is a critical factor in the exercise of discretion during preliminary examinations. 
If the ICC does not have jurisdiction over a situation, the Prosecutor cannot exercise 
                                                 
43 Ibid. The Working Languages of the Court are French and English. However, the Official Languages of the 
Court are Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish. See Article 50 of the Rome Statute.  
44 Article 42 of the Rome Statute.  
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discretion over that situation. There are several forms of jurisdiction and these are discussed 
extensively in the following section.  
 
4.4.1 The subject matter jurisdiction of the ICC 
 
As already noted in this chapter, the jurisdiction of the ICC is limited to the most serious 
crimes of concern to the international community as a whole. Therefore, the Court has 
jurisdiction over the crimes of genocide; Crimes against humanity; War crimes; and the crime 
of aggression.45 
 
According to the Rome Statute, the crime of genocide is committed when it can be 
established that the perpetrator acted with an intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, 
ethnical, racial or religious group, by committing any of the following crimes: (a) Killing 
members of the group; (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; 
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical 
destruction in whole or in part; (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the 
group; (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.46 
 
On the other hand, crimes against humanity involves several acts when committed as part of 
a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of 
the attack. 47  The ICC also has jurisdiction in respect of war crimes in particular when 
committed as part of a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale commission of such crimes.  
In addition, these crimes are related to the grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 12 
August 1949. Furthermore, War crimes also include other serious violations of the laws and 
                                                 
45 Article 5 of the Rome Statute.  
46 Article 6 of the Rome Statute.  
47See Article 7 of the Rome Statute. These acts include the following crimes (a) Murder; (b) Extermination;  (c) 
Enslavement; (d) Deportation or forcible transfer of population; (e) Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of 
physical liberty in violation of fundamental rules of international law; (f) Torture; (g) Rape, sexual slavery, 
enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of 
comparable gravity; (h) Persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial, national, 
ethnic, cultural, religious, gender, or other grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible under 
international law; (i) Enforced disappearance of persons;(j) The crime of apartheid; (k) Other inhumane acts of a 
similar character intentionally causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health. 
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customs applicable in international armed conflict, within the established framework of 
international law.48  
 
Regarding the crime of aggression, the Review Conference of the Rome Statute held in 
Kampala, Uganda from 31 May - 11 June 2010 adopted a definition of the crime of 
aggression. However, the ICC will have jurisdiction over the crime subject to a decision to be 
taken after 1 January 2017 by the same majority of State parties as is required for the 
adoption of an amendment to the Statute. 49 
 
4.4.2 The personal jurisdiction of the ICC  
 
The personal jurisdiction of the ICC, which can be contrasted with the subject matter 
jurisdiction already discussed, is subject to the provisions of the Rome Statute. This is 
because the ICC does not have universal jurisdiction and therefore cannot conduct 
investigations in all places where crimes are committed. A State which becomes a party to 
the Rome Statute accepts the jurisdiction of the Court.  The jurisdiction of the ICC can be 
activated by a State Party to the Rome Statute,50 by the UNSC acting under Chapter VII of 
the UN Charter,51 and when the Prosecutor initiates an investigation in respect of a crime 
within the jurisdiction of the ICC.52  
 
A State Party may refer to the Prosecutor a situation in which one or more crimes within the 
jurisdiction of the Court appear to have been committed, requesting the Prosecutor to 
investigate the situation for the purpose of determining whether one or more specific persons 
should be charged with the commission of such crimes.53  
 
                                                 
48 Ibid.  
49Assembly of State Parties resolution RC/Res.6 adopted at the 13th plenary meeting, on 11 June 2010, 
available at  http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/Resolutions/RC-Res.6-ENG.pdf, accessed 2nd February 
2016.  
50 Article‘s 13 (a) and 14 of the Rome Statute; Nabil Elaraby ‗The Role of the Security Council and the 
Independence of the International Criminal Court‘ in Mauro Politi and Giuseppe Nesi eds. The Rome Statute of 
the International Criminal Court: A Challenge to Impunity (2001) 43. 
51 Article 13 (b) of the Rome Statute. 
52 Article‘s 13(c) and 15 of the Rome Statute.  
53 Article 14 (1) of the Rome Statute.  
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When a State has ratified the Rome Statute, it means that the ICC has jurisdiction over its 
citizens regarding crimes which are within the jurisdiction of the ICC. Therefore, ratification 
of the Rome Statute activates the jurisdiction of the ICC.  The jurisdiction of the ICC can be 
activated by a State Party that decides to refer a situation to the ICC. The Rome Statute 
provides that the State Party shall specify, as far as possible, the relevant circumstances of the 
crimes allegedly committed and be accompanied by such supporting documents as is 
available to the State referring the situation.54  
 
Although the Statute envisages the referral of a situation by a State Party, the ICC Prosecutor 
has opened several situations as a result of self-referral. Some scholars have argued that the 
ICC Statute did not envisage self- or auto-referrals.55 However, there is no provision in the 
Statute that excludes the use of self-referral as a mode of triggering the jurisdiction of the 
Court.  
 
The ICC may exercise jurisdiction over non-States party that, by declaration lodged with the 
Registrar of the ICC, accept the jurisdiction of the Court.56 In addition, if a State becomes a 
Party after the entry into force of the Statute, the Court may exercise its jurisdiction only with 
respect to crimes committed after the entry into force of the Statute for that State, unless the 
State in question makes a declaration accepting the retroactive jurisdiction of the ICC.57 
 
When a State Party or the Prosecutor initiates an investigation, the ICC may exercise 
jurisdiction over the territory of which the conduct in question occurred or, if the crime was 
committed on board a vessel or aircraft, the State of the registration of that vessel of 
aircraft.58 In addition, the Court has jurisdiction over nationals of State Parties accused of 
committing international crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC whether the crimes were 
committed within the territory of the State party or that of a non-State Party.59 
 
The way the jurisdiction of the ICC is triggered is important in a study on preliminary 
examinations. This is because the Prosecutor is mandated by the Rome Statute to investigate 
                                                 
54 Article 14 (2) of the Rome Statute.  
55 William Schabas ‗Complementarity in Practice: Some Uncomplimentary Thoughts‘ (2008) 19 Criminal Law 
Forum 5 – 33.   
56 Article 12 (3) of the Rome Statute.  
57 Article 11 (2) of the Rome Statute.  
58 Article 12 (2) (a) of the Rome Statute.  
59 Article 12 (2) (b) of the Rome Statute.  
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crimes committed in the territory of State Parties or by citizens of State Parties or when a 
non-State Party accepts the jurisdiction of the Court.60  
 
However, when crimes are committed in the territories of non-State Parties and by their 
citizens, the ICC does not have jurisdiction unless the UNSC refers the situation to the 
Prosecutor as already stated.61 Irrespective of how the jurisdiction of the ICC is triggered, the 
Prosecutor is mandated to conduct a preliminary examination to decide whether there is 
reasonable basis to proceed with an investigation.62 The decision to open an investigation 
after a preliminary examination can be suspended by the UNSC acting under Chapter VII of 
the UN Charter.63 This means that the decision of the Prosecutor is subject at times to the 
decisions of the UN Security Council.  
 
If a situation is referred to the Prosecutor by a State Party or the UNSC, the Prosecutor 
initiates an investigation once a determination is made that there is a reasonable basis to 
proceed. However, if a communication is submitted to the Prosecutor under article 15 of the 
Rome Statute, the Prosecutor has to seek an authorisation from the Pre-Trial Chamber to 
open an investigation. For the ICC to exercise jurisdiction over a situation, it has to be 
established that crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court have been committed.64As already 
noted in chapter one, the Pre-Trial Chamber of the ICC can intervene in a preliminary 
examination only when a decision is made not to proceed.65  
 
                                                 
60 Article 12 of the Rome Statute; Dapo Akande ‗The Jurisdiction of the International Criminal over Nationals 
of Non-Parties: Legal Basis and Limit (2003) 1 Journal of International Criminal Justice  618 – 650; Eve La 
Haye ‗The Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court: Controversies over the Preconditions for Exercising 
It‘s Jurisdiction‘ (1999) 46 Netherlands International Law Review 1 – 25. 
61 Article 13 (b) of the Rome Statute.   
62 See Paragraph 1.0 of chapter one; Article 53 (1) of the Rome Statute.  
63 Article 16 of the Rome Statute provides, ‗[n]o investigation or prosecution may be commenced or proceeded 
with under this Statute for a period of 12 months after the Security Council, in a resolution adopted under 
Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, has requested the Court to that effect; that request may be 
renewed by the Council under the same conditions.‘ 
64 These are Genocide (Article 6), War Crimes (Article 8), Crimes Against Humanity (Article 7) and the Crime 
of Aggression (Article 8bis). See Kelly D. Askin ‗Crimes Within the Jurisdiction of the International Criminal 
Court (1999) 10 Criminal Law Forum 33 – 59.  
65 Article 53 (3) (a) of the Rome Statute.  
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As a court of last resort, its jurisdiction is limited to the most serious crimes of concern to the 
international community.66 Jurisdiction is an important aspect of preliminary examination. 
The Prosecutor cannot commence an investigation if the ICC does not have jurisdiction. 
Jurisdiction relates to the period when the crimes were committed, the types of crimes that 
were committed, the territory where the crimes were committed and whether the ICC has 
jurisdiction over individuals who committed the alleged crimes. 
 
The ICC has jurisdiction only over natural persons. 67  This means that crimes allegedly 
perpetrated by States and non-State actors like multinational corporations are not within the 
jurisdiction of the Court.68  
 
The exercise of prosecutorial discretion during preliminary examinations is limited by the age 
of an individual accused of committing an international crime. The Statute prohibits the 
Prosecutor from investigating or prosecuting any person who is under the age of eighteen at 
the time the person is alleged to have committed international crimes within the jurisdiction 
of the ICC.69  
 
4.4.3 Jurisdiction ratione temporis 
 
According to Article 11 of the Rome Statute, the ICC‘s jurisdiction relates to crimes 
committed after July 2002 when the Statute entered into force. This is referred to as 
jurisdiction ratione temporis.70  This means that the jurisdiction of the ICC is not retroactive 
and commences after the entry into force of the Rome Statute in 2002.71 Furthermore, if a 
state becomes a State Party to the Statute after its entry into force, the ICC may exercise its 
jurisdiction only with respect to crimes committed after the entry into force of the Statute for 
                                                 
66 Article 5 of the Rome Statute; Daniel N. Nsereko ‗The International Criminal Court: Jurisdictional and 
Related Issues‘ (1999) 10 Criminal Law Forum 87 – 120.  
67 Article 25 (1) of the Rome Statute.  
68 There were discussions to include crimes committed by non-state actors under the jurisdiction of the Court. 
However, the proposals were not accepted as the negotiators settled for core international crimes dealing with 
individual criminal responsibility.  
69 Article 26 of the Rome Statute.  
70 Article 11 (1) of the Rome Statute.  
71 See Article 24 of the Rome Statute.  
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that State.72 This provision can only be waived if the State makes a declaration under article 
12 (3) of the Statute.73 
 
4.4.4 Jurisdiction ratione materiae 
 
Therefore, crimes that fall outside genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes are 
beyond the investigative powers of the Prosecutor during preliminary examinations.74  A 
person is not criminally liable unless the conduct in question constitutes a crime within the 
jurisdiction of the Court at the time it took place. That means that crimes that do not meet the 
threshold set out in the Rome Statute are beyond the discretionary powers of the Prosecutor 
and the scope of the ICC. Jurisdiction ratione materiae or subject-matter jurisdiction is an 
important aspect of jurisdiction analysis during preliminary examinations. This is because the 
Prosecutor cannot investigate crimes that are not within the jurisdiction of the Court.75 
 
4.4.5 Territorial jurisdiction  
 
The ICC needs to have both territorial and personal jurisdiction in order for the Prosecutor to 
decide whether there is reasonable basis to proceed with an investigation.76 This means that 
preliminary examinations will involve questions as to whether crimes within the jurisdiction 
of the ICC were committed on the territory of a State Party or by a national of a State Party.77  
Furthermore, jurisdiction ratione personae is satisfied if a State that is not a party to the 
Statute lodges a declaration to that effect, accepting the jurisdiction of the Court.78  The 
UNSC provides an exception to this rule. This is because the UNSC can refer non-State 




                                                 
72 Article 11 (2) of the Rome Statute.  
73 Ibid. Cote D‘Ivoire made such a declaration which means that the ICC has jurisdiction over crimes committed 
in the country since July 2002.  
74 Paragraph 37 of the Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations.   
75 See Article 5 of the Rome Statute.  
76 Paragraph 40 of the Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations.  
77 Article  12 (2) of the Rome Statute. 
78 Article 12 (3) of the Rome Statute.  
79 Article 13 (b) of the Rome Statute.  
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4.5 The Prosecutor and trigger mechanisms of jurisdiction 
 
There are different ways that the jurisdiction of the ICC can be activated. These are generally 
referred to as trigger mechanisms because it is usually through these processes that the 
jurisdiction of the ICC is activated by one of the following: a State Party, the Prosecutor of 
the ICC or by the UNSC acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. These trigger 
mechanisms are discussed below. It is important to discuss the trigger mechanisms through 
which situations can be referred to the ICC. In addition, as stated in chapter one, the case-
studies in the thesis adopts the three ways through which referrals are made to the ICC in the 
analysis made in chapters six to eight subsequently.  
 
4.5.1 Referral of a situation by a State party 
 
A situation that is within the jurisdiction of the ICC can be referred to the Prosecutor by a 
State Party to the Rome Statute. The ICC Prosecutor encourages States to self-refer cases 
within the jurisdiction of the Court to the ICC for adjudication.80 This means that State 
Parties to the Rome Statute refer potential situations within their jurisdiction to the ICC 
Prosecutor to commence preliminary examinations.81  
 
This procedure has given rise to self-referral or auto-referral which is consistent with the 
provisions of the Statute regarding the principle of complementarity.82 For example, a State 
                                                 
80 Paragraph 98 Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations.  
81 Non-States Parties can accept the jurisdiction of the ICC under article 12 (3) of the Rome Statute to refer 
situations to the Prosecutor. Carsten Stahn ‗Why Some Doors May Be Closed Already: Second Thoughts on a 
‗Case-by-Case‘ Treatment of Article 12(3) Declarations‘ (2006) 75 Nordic Journal of International Law, 243 – 
248; Steven Freeland ‗How Open Should the Door Be? Declarations by Non States Parties under Article 12(3) 
of the Statute of the International Criminal Court (2006) 75 Nordic Journal of International Law 211- 241; 
James Chan ‗Judicial Oversight over Article 12(3) of the ICC Statute‘ (2013) 11 Forum for International 
Criminal and Humanitarian Law Policy Brief 1-4, available online at 
http://www.fichl.org/fileadmin/fichl/documents/FICHL_Policy_Brief_Series/FICHL_PB11.pdf, accessed 16 
September 2016.  
82Andreas Muller and Ignaz Stegmiller ‗Self-Referrals on Trial: From Panacea to Patient‘ (2010) 8 Journal of 
International Criminal Justice 1267 – 1294; Jann Kleffner ‗Auto-referrals and the Complementarity Nature of 
the ICC‘ in Carsten Stahn and Goran Sluiter eds. The Emerging Practice of the International Criminal Court 
(2009) Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague, 42; The Lord‘s Resistance Army Case: Uganda‘s Submission 
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Party that fails to investigate and prosecute crimes committed in its territory and also falling 
within the jurisdiction of the ICC can refer the situation to the Prosecutor using the legal 
framework established by the Statute.83 However, the encouragement of self-referrals by the 
Prosecutor has proved to be counter-productive and continues to be a source of concern in the 
activities of the ICC.84   
 
4.5.2 Initiation of an investigation by the Prosecutor 
 
The exercise of prosecutorial discretion at the ICC begins with the Prosecutor‘s initiation of 
preliminary examinations.85 The Prosecutor exercises various types of discretion until the 
accused person is either convicted or acquitted of the alleged crimes. The Prosecutor receives 
information from individuals or groups, States, intergovernmental or non-governmental 
organisations, or a referral from a State Party or the Security Council, or a declaration issued 
pursuant to article 12(3) of the Statute by a state that is not a State Party to the Statute, but 
which accepts the jurisdiction of the Court.86 Subsequently, the Prosecutor embarks upon a 
four-phased process to evaluate whether the case complies with the requirements provided in 
the Statute. These factors are jurisdiction, admissibility (complementarity and gravity) and 
interests of justice.87   
                                                                                                                                                       
of the First State Referral to the International Criminal Court (2005) 99 American Journal of International Law 
403 at 405; Claus Kress ‗‗Self-Referrals‘ and ‗Waivers of Complementarity‘: Some Considerations in Law and 
Policy‘(2004) 2 Journal of International Criminal Justice at 944 – 948. However, see William Schabas An 
Introduction to the International Criminal Court 4th ed. (2011) 167 who argues that ‗[t]he self-referral sends the 
troubling message that States may decline to assume their duty to prosecute, despite the terms of the preamble to 
the Statute, not to mention obligations imposed by international human rights law, by invoking the provisions of 
Article 14 and referring the ‗situation‘ to The Hague‘.  
83 Paragraph 35 of the Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Prosecutor v. Lubanga (Decision on 
the Prosecutor‘s Application for Warrant of Arrest, ICC-01/04-01/06-8-US-Corr (10 February 2006) Article 58, 
Annex I; Ignaz Stegmiller ‗The International Criminal Court and Mali: Towards More Transparency in 
International Criminal Law Investigations?‘ (2013) 24 Criminal Law Forum 475 – 499.  
84 HRW ‗The Selection of Situations and Cases for Trial before the International Criminal Court‘ October 2006, 
3 (HRW Policy Paper). 
85 Danner op cit note 36. 
86Article 12 of the Rome Statute; Regulation 25 of the Regulations of the Office of the Prosecutor (2009); 
Paragraph 4 and 73 of the Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations.  
87 Article 53(1) (a-c); Morten Bergsmo and Pieter Kruger ‗Article 53‘ in Otto Triffterer ed Commentary on the 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: Observers’ Notes, Article by Article 2nd ed. (2008) 1065 - 
1076; Giuliano Turone ‗Powers and Duties of the Prosecutor‘ in Anthonio Cassese, Paola Gaeta and John 
 
 
75 | Page 
According to the policy paper on preliminary examinations, the information received is 
assessed to identify matters that fall within the jurisdiction of the ICC and those that do not. 
The initial assessment distinguishes between communications relating to matters that are 
manifestly outside the jurisdiction of the Court, situations that are already under preliminary 
examination, situations that are already under investigation or that form the basis of a 
prosecution, and lastly, matters that are neither manifestly outside the jurisdiction of the 
Court nor related to situations already under preliminary examination or that form the basis 
of a prosecution.88  
 
The second phase relates to the preliminary examination, and is focussed on all petitions that 
have scaled through the first phase.89 It involves factual and legal assessments of the crimes 
committed in the referred situation. The Prosecutor pays particular attention to ‗crimes 
committed on a large scale, as part of a plan or pursuant to a policy‘.90  
 
After this phase, an ‗Article 5 report‘ is published, which includes a decision on whether the 
alleged crimes fall within the material jurisdiction of the ICC in relation to the provisions of 
article 5 of the Statute. 91  This involves the evaluation of whether the threshold of 
complementarity and gravity provided in article 17 of the Statute has been met.92 The next 
phase is an assessment that leads to the publication of ‗Article 17 report‘ detailing how 
admissibility issues have been resolved by the Prosecutor. 93  The final phase considers 
whether a decision to initiate an investigation would be in the interests of justice.94 A report 
titled ‗Article 53 report‘ is published discussing the reasons for the Prosecutor‘s decision to 
proceed or not to proceed with an investigation.95  
 
For the Prosecutor to commence any preliminary examination, the above factors must be 
considered in detail. The Prosecutor cannot commence an investigation and prosecution of 
                                                                                                                                                       
R.W.D. Jones (eds.), The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary Vol II. (2002) 1138 
– 1180. 
88 Paragraph 78 Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations. 
89 Paragraph 80 Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations. 
90 Paragraph 81 Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations. 
91 Ibid.  
92 Paragraph 82 Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations. 
93 Ibid.  
94 Paragraph 83 Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations.  
95 Ibid.  
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crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC without conducting a preliminary examination. 
There is a difference between a preliminary examination conducted before the initiation of an 
investigation and the examination conducted before the initiation of a prosecution.96 If the 
Prosecutor decides that there is a reasonable basis to open an investigation, the Statute 
mandates that a preliminary examination be conducted following the criteria laid down in 
article 53 of the Rome Statute to determine whether there is reasonable basis to proceed with 
a prosecution.  
 
Before the Prosecutor can decide that there is a reasonable basis to proceed with an 
investigation, there must be a determination that the ICC has jurisdiction over the case. The 
Prosecutor regards this decision to be a core element of the preliminary examination. Indeed, 
the policy paper on preliminary examinations states that ‗[t]he establishment of the Court‘s 
jurisdictional scope in accordance with article 53(1)(a) defines in objective terms the 
parameters within which the Office conducts its investigative activities, i.e, the ‗situation.‘‘97  
 
Irrespective of how a preliminary examination is initiated, the Prosecutor must analyse the 
seriousness of any information received,98 and may seek additional information from States, 
organs of the UN, intergovernmental organisations, NGOs or other reliable sources through 
written or oral testimonies. 99 At this stage, victims of the alleged crimes may make 
representations to the Pre-Trial Chamber, in accordance with the provisions of the Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence that govern such submissions.100 A preliminary examination must 
conclude with a decision whether or not to proceed with an investigation.  
 
Some authors have argued that in case of UNSC referral, the Prosecutor does not have the 
power to decide whether there is reasonable basis to proceed with an investigation.101 A close 
                                                 
96 Article 53 (1) (a-c) and (2) (a-c). 
97 Paragraph 41 Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations.  
98 Article 15(2) of the Rome Statute; Geert-Jan Alexander Knoops, ‗Challenging the Legitimacy of Initiating 
Contemporary International Criminal Proceedings: Rethinking Prosecutorial Discretionary Powers from a 
Legal, Ethical and Political Perspective‘ (2004) 15 Criminal Law Forum 365 – 390;  
99Article 15 (2) of the Rome Statute.  
100 Ibid. 
101Jens Ohlin ‗Peace, Security, and Prosecutorial Discretion‘ in Carsten Stahn and Göran Sluiter (eds.), The 
Emerging Practice of the International Criminal Court (2008), 189; George Fletcher and Jens Ohlin ‗The ICC -  
Two Courts in One?‘ (2006) 4 Journal of International Criminal Justice 428 at 431-32; Jens D. Ohlin 
‗International Law and Prosecutorial Discretion‘ (2007) 8 Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy and International 
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reading of article 53 shows that this is not a correct interpretation of the Statute. Every 
referral is subject to preliminary examination and the Rome Statute does not limit the conduct 
of preliminary examination to State and propro motu referrals only. In addition, as will be 
noted in the discussions in chapter seven of the study, the ICC Prosecutor conducted 
preliminary examinations in the UNSC referrals in Sudan and Libya which is a precedent 
followed by the Prosecutor. This view is supported by other scholars.102 
 
4.5.3 Referral by the UNSC 
 
The UN Charter provides a significant role for the UNSC in promoting international peace 
and security and the creation of the ICC was seen as an extension of that role.103 The 1994 
version of the Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind prepared by 
the ILC made the jurisdiction of the ICC subject to the approval of the UNSC.104 If the 
provision had been adopted, it would have given the UNSC a considerable influence over the 
activities of the ICC. 105  During the Preparatory Committee meeting in August 1997, 
Singapore proposed an amendment reversing the structure of the ICC-Security Council 
relationship as initially provided for in the 1994 ILC Draft Statute.106  
 
The adoption of article 16 has several implications for the work of the ICC. According to 
some scholars: 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
Relations 146 at 147; Jens D. Ohlin ‗On the Very Idea of Transitional Justice‘ (2007) 8 Whitehead Journal of 
Diplomacy and International Relations 51 - 68. 
102  Luc Cote ‗Independence and Impartiality‘ in Luc Reydams, Jan Wouters and Cedri Ryngaert (eds) 
International Prosecutors (2012) 405; John L. Washburn ‗On Some Aspects of Prosecutorial Discretion in the 
International Criminal Court (2007) 8 Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations 145; Pavel 
Caban ‗Preliminary Examinations by the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court‘ (2011) 
Czech Yearbook of Public & Private International Law 199 – 216. 
103 Article 39 of the UN Charter.  
104  Article 23(3) of the ILC 1994 Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court provides that ‗[n]o 
prosecution may be commenced under this Statute arising from a situation which is being dealt with by the 
Security Council as a threat to or breach of the peace or an act of aggression under Chapter VII of the Charter, 
unless the Security Council otherwise decides.‘ 
105 Elizabeth Wilmhurst ‗The International Criminal Court: The Role of the Security Council‘ in Mauro Politi 
and Giuseppe Nesi (eds) The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Challenge to Impunity (2001) 
Ashgate: Aldershot and Burlington, 40. 
106 Bergsmo and Pejic  op cit at 597. 
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 'the drafting history of article 16 gives rise to at least three comments. First, political 
 considerations were not surprisingly given more weight than legal arguments in the 
 determination of the appropriate role for the [UNSC] in ICC proceedings. Second, the 
 [UNSC]‘s deferral power confirms its decisive role in dealing with situations where 
 the requirements of peace and justice seem to be in conflict. Third, article 16 provides 
 an unprecedented opportunity for the [UNSC] to influence the work of a judicial 
 body.'107  
 
The UNSC is empowered by the Rome Statute to trigger the jurisdiction of the Court when 
crimes within the jurisdiction of the court have been committed in the territory of both State 
Parties and non-State Parties to the treaty.108 The UNSC has made use of this provision in the 
cases of Sudan and Libya which were referred to the ICC pursuant to the Chapter VII powers 
of the UNSC. Article 16 of the Statute grants the UNSC the power to defer cases before the 
ICC. In deferring cases, the UNSC acts under Chapter VII of the UN Charter which means 
that there has to be evidence that there is a threat to international peace and security. 
 
4.5.4 Referrals and prosecutorial discretion 
 
When a situation is referred by a State Party or the UNSC acting under Chapter VII of the 
UN Charter, the Prosecutor opens an investigation after reaching a decision that there is 
reasonable basis to proceed. However, if the preliminary investigation is initiated through 
article 15 of the Rome Statute, the Prosecutor has to apply to the Pre-Trial Chamber for an 
authorisation to initiate an investigation.109 The reason for this difference is that State Parties 
were not comfortable with an unaccountable Prosecutor exercising unfettered discretion. The 
Pre-Trial Chamber is expected to authorise the commencement of investigations if it appears 
to it that the case falls within the jurisdiction of the ICC.110 However, the decision is without 
                                                 
107 Ibid at 598.  
108 Article 13(b) of the Rome Statute; Sharon Williams and William Schabas ‗Article 13: Exercise of 
Jurisdiction‘ in Otto Triffterer (ed.) Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: 
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109Article 15(4) of the Rome Statute; Lakshman Marasinghe, ‗Proprio Motu Powers – The Prosecutor of the 
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prejudice to subsequent determinations regarding jurisdiction and admissibility.111 If the Pre-
Trial Chamber refuses to authorise the investigation of crimes, the decision does not preclude 
the Prosecutor from making subsequent representation based on new facts or evidence 
regarding the same situation.112 
 
Jurisdiction is not the only factor that the Prosecutor has to consider. However, jurisdiction is 
so fundamental that the judges of the ICC are mandated to inquire if they have jurisdiction to 
handle a particular situation irrespective of the determination of the Prosecutor to proceed 
with an investigation. Another important factor is admissibility, which is divided into 
complementarity and gravity as discussed below.  
 
4.6 Admissibility and prosecutorial discretion 
 
Article 53(1) (c) of the Statute provides that in deciding whether to initiate an investigation, 
the Prosecutor shall consider whether the case is or would be admissible under article 17 of 
the Statute. Article 17 of the Statute provides for issues of complementarity113 and gravity.114 
The Statute does not provide a particular sequence on the examination of complementarity 
and gravity.115 However, the Prosecutor must be satisfied as to admissibility on both aspects 
before deciding whether there is sufficient basis to proceed with an investigation.116  An 
assessment of complementarity is in relation to serious crimes allegedly committed by those 
who bear the greatest responsibilities for international crimes within the jurisdiction of the 
ICC.117  
                                                                                                                                                       
accepted by the Chambers of the ICC. Hector Olasolo ‗The Prosecutor of the ICC before the Initiation of 
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on the Authorization of an Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Kenya, ICC-01/09-19-Corr, 31 
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A determination on admissibility conducted by the Prosecutor during a preliminary 
examination is not binding on the Prosecutor when taking the decision whether to proceed 
with a prosecution. In addition, legal assessments conducted during preliminary examinations 
are not binding for the purpose of future admissibility determinations that may be made by 
ICC judges for a situation or case.118  The relevance of the discussion above is that the 
conduct of preliminary examination relates to situations and circumstances in existence 
during the process. It does not bind the judges of the ICC or the Prosecutor in future 
determinations regarding the admissibility of a situation. 
 
4.6.1 Complementarity and prosecutorial discretion 
 
Another crucial factor in the exercise of preliminary examination is the principle of 
complementarity which gives primacy to national judicial systems in the investigation and 
prosecution of international crimes. The Rome Statute provides that the ICC is 
complementary to national judicial systems. 119  It has been defined as the ‗fulcrum that 
prioritises the authority of domestic fora to prosecute the crimes defined in Article 5 of the 
Rome Statute.‘120 In addition, the complementarity principle is aimed at encouraging national 
judicial systems to investigate and prosecute international crimes committed within their 
jurisdictions.121  
                                                 
118  ICC ‗Situation in Mali - Article 53(1) Report‘, 28, 16 January 2013; Para 56 of the Situation in the 
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‗Embracing Impasse: Admissibility, Prosecutorial Discretion, and the Lessons of Uganda for the International 
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Complementarity refers to the principle that the ICC can gain jurisdiction only when 
domestic legal systems are inactive, unwilling or genuinely unable to carry out an 
investigation or prosecution of an accused individual.122 This means that the ICC is not a 
court of first instance, but rather a court of last resort when it is obvious that a State has failed 
to discharge obligations assumed under the Rome Statute. 
 
This is a unique development of the Rome Statute, as the ICC does not have primacy over 
domestic legal systems. The ICC is not expected to assume jurisdiction over situations a State 
is already investigating or prosecuting. It is desirable that the definition of international 
crimes by national judicial systems reflect the progressive nature of the Rome Statute. 
However, States can prosecute international crimes using national laws. This is valid as long 
as the proceedings were not conducted in ways that defeat the cause of justice. The preamble 
and article 1 of the Rome Statute provide that the ICC ‗shall be complementary to national 
criminal jurisdictions,‘ meaning that States have primacy over the prosecutions of 
international crimes.123  
 
The relationship between the ICC and national governments is vital to the effective 
functioning of the ICC. In his statement as the first Prosecutor of the ICC in 2003, Luis 
Moreno-Ocampo acknowledged the complementary nature of the jurisdiction of the ICC 
when he stated that ‗[t]he effectiveness of the [ICC] should not be measured by the number 
of cases that reach it. On the contrary, complementarity implies that the absence of trials 
before this Court, as a consequence of the regular functioning of national institutions, would 
be a major success.‘124  
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82 | Page 
The complementarity principle defines the relationship between the ICC and State Parties to 
the Statute and provides that a case is inadmissible if it is being investigated or prosecuted by 
a State which has jurisdiction over it, unless the State is unwilling or unable to carry out the 
investigation or prosecution.125 Unwillingness and inability are resolved by looking critically 
at the activities of a state at the national level and weighing those activities with the 
provisions of article 17 of the Rome Statute.  
 
A case is also inadmissible if it has been investigated by a State which has jurisdiction over it 
and the State has decided not to prosecute the person concerned, unless the decision resulted 
from the unwillingness or genuine inability of the State genuinely to prosecute. 126 
Furthermore, a case is inadmissible if the person concerned has already been tried for the 
conduct which is the subject of the complaint, and a trial by the Court is not permitted under 
article 20 (3) of the Rome Statute on the ne bis in idem rule.127 A case is also not admissible 
if it is not of sufficient gravity to justify further action by the Court.128  
 
According to the Statute, determination of unwillingness is subject to several factors. This 
relates to proceedings conducted for the purpose of shielding the person from criminal 
responsibility for crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC. 129  Another example of 
unwillingness is that there has been an unjustified delay in the proceedings which is 
inconsistent with an intention to bring the person concerned to justice. 130  In addition, 
unwillingness to prosecute an individual can be seen when proceedings are not conducted 
independently or impartially or are conducted ‗in a manner which, in the circumstances, is 
inconsistent with an intention to bring the person concerned to justice.131  
                                                 
125Article 17 (1) (a) of the Rome Statute. 
126 Article 17 (1) (b) of the Rome Statute.  
127 See the Ne bis in idem principle in Article 20 (3) of the Rome Statute which provides that, ‗[n]o person who 
has been tried by another court for conduct also proscribed under article 6, 7 or 8 shall be tried by the Court with 
respect to the same conduct unless the proceedings in the other court:  (a)Were for the purpose of shielding the 
person concerned from criminal responsibility for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court; or (b) Otherwise 
were not conducted independently or impartially in accordance with the norms of due process recognized by 
international law and were conducted in a manner which, in the circumstances, was inconsistent with an intent 
to bring the person concerned to justice.' 
128 Article 17 (1) (d) of the Rome Statute. 
129 Article 17 (2) (a) of the Rome Statute. 
130 Article 17 (2) (b) of the Rome Statute. 
131 Article 17 (2) (c) of the Rome Statute; John Holmes ‗Principle of complementarity‘ in Roy Lee ed The 
International Criminal Court – The making of the Rome Statute: Issues - negotiations – results (1999) 50.  
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Complementarity during the preliminary examination phase involves the evaluation ‗of the 
existence of relevant national proceedings in relation to the potential cases being considered 
for investigation.‘132 An admissibility determination is not ‗a judgment or reflection on the 
national justice system as a whole.‘133 This is because the Prosecutor may still consider the 
absence of relevant domestic proceedings regarding a case that has come before him as 
evidence that the criminal justice system, though efficient and well run, has failed to initiate 
necessary proceedings in that matter.134 For example, if a State is inactive, the Prosecutor 
need not inquire whether the State is unwilling or unable. The mere fact that there are no 
relevant proceedings at the national level makes the case admissible.  
 
This interpretation of the provisions of the Rome Statute has been endorsed by several 
decisions of the ICC. The Appeals Chamber has held that there are two limbs of 
interpretation under article 17 of the Rome Statute. The first relates to the existence of 
national proceedings and the second is whether the state involved is unwilling or unable to 
prosecute the cases.135 If a State is not investigating or prosecuting a crime and has not taken 
any step whatsoever, this is referred to as ‗inactivity‘ or ‗inaction‘. The case is automatically 
admissible and there is no need to question whether the State concerned is ‗unwilling‘ or 
‗unable‘ to prosecute the crimes.136  
 
                                                 
132 Paragraph 8 Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations. 
133 Paragraph 46 Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations.  
134 Ibid.  
135 Paragraph 78 of the Decision Judgment on the Appeal of Mr. Germain Katanga against the Oral Decision of 
Trial Chamber II of 12 June 2009 on the Admissibility of the Case; The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and 
Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, 25 September 2009, ICC-01/04-01/07 OA 8. 
136 Paragraph 4 of the Decision on the Prosecutor's Application under Article 58, 7 May 2009, ICC-02/05-02/09, 
Prosecutor v. Bahr Idriss Abu Garda  where Pre-Trial Chamber I argued that ‗since the Prosecutor has indicated 
that there are no national proceedings in relation to the case, the Chamber sees no ostensible cause or self-
evident factor compelling it to exercise its discretion to review the admissibility of the case proprio motu at the 
instant stage of the proceedings'; Para 66 of the Decision on the Application by the Government of Kenya 
Challenging the Admissibility of the Case Pursuant to Article 19(2)(b) of the Statute, the Prosecutor v. Francis 
Kirimi Muthaura, Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta And Mohammed Hussein Ali,  30 May 2011, ICC-01/09-02/11, 
where Pre-Trial Chamber II held that ‗in the absence of information, which substantiates Government of 
Kenya's challenge that there are ongoing investigations against the three suspects, up until the party filed its 
Reply, the Chamber considers that there remains a situation of inactivity.‘ 
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In the Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir (‘Omar Al Bashir’), Pre-Trial Chamber I 
held that: 
 
 'the materials presented by the Prosecution in support of the Prosecution Application 
 offer no indication that: (i) national proceedings may be conducted, or may have been 
 conducted, at the national level against Omar Al Bashir for any of the crimes 
 contained in the Prosecution Application; or that (ii) the gravity threshold provided 
 for in article 17(l)(d) of the Statute may not be met.'137 
 
The Chambers have also held that in terms of admissibility proceedings, there must be a 
correlation between the individual and the conduct in both the ICC and national judicial 
system for a case to be inadmissible. This means that a case is inadmissible at the ICC if the 
domestic system is functional and effective. For example, in the Prosecutor v Thomas 
Lubanga Dyilo, Pre–Trial Chamber I held that ‗it is a conditio sine qua non for a case arising 
from the investigation of a situation to be inadmissible that national proceedings encompass 
both the person and the conduct which is the subject of the case before the Court.‘138 This is 
referred to as the ‗same person/same conduct‘ test, which has been adopted in most Pre-Trial 
Chamber decisions.139 The Appeals Chamber confirmed this jurisprudence in the Kenyan 
situation.140  
                                                 
137 See Para 50 of the Decision on the Prosecution's Application for a Warrant of Arrest against Omar Hassan 
Ahmad Al Bashir, 4 March 2009, ICC-02/05-01/09.  
138 Para 31 of Decision concerning Pre-Trial Chamber I's Decision of 10 February 2006 and the Incorporation of 
Documents into the Record of the Case against Mr Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga 
Dyilo, 24 February 2006, ICC-01/04-01/06-8-Corr. 
139 See Para 219 of the Decision on the admissibility of the case against Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi, the Prosecutor v. 
Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah Al-Senussi, 31 May 2013, ICC-01/11-01/11, where Pre-Trial Chamber I 
held that it ‗has not been provided with enough evidence with a sufficient degree of specificity and probative 
value to demonstrate that the Libyan and the ICC investigations cover the same conduct and that Libya is able 
genuinely to carry out an investigation against Mr Gaddafi. The Chamber finds that the present case is 
admissible before the Court and recalls Libya's obligation to surrender the suspect.‘;  Para 24 of the Decision on 
the Prosecution Application under Article 58(7) of the Statute, 27 April 2007, ICC-02/05-01/07-1-Corr, 
Prosecutor v. Ahmad  Muhammad Harun ('Ahmad Harun') and Ali Muhammad Ali Abd-Al-Rahman ('Ali 
Kushayb'), where Pre-Trial Chamber I held that ‗for a case to be admissible, it is a condition sine qua non that 
national proceedings do not encompass both the person and the conduct which are the subject of the case before 
the Court.; Para 20 of Decision on the evidence and information provided by the Prosecution for the issuance of 
a warrant of arrest for Germain Katanga, 6 July 2007, ICC-01/04-01/07, Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga  where 
Pre-Trial Chamber I held that ‗on the basis of the evidence and information provided in the Prosecution 
Application, the Prosecution Supporting Materials and the Prosecution Response, the proceedings against 
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The provisions of the Statute relating to the principle of complementarity are subject to 
different interpretations and have led to different opinions on the issue. For example, several 
commentators have argued that ‗inactivity‘ or ‗inaction‘ is a basis for the admissibility of a 
case before the ICC and that the Court‘s interpretation is consistent with the Statute.141 If the 
ICC labels a case inactive, it automatically becomes admissible regardless of the action that 
might have been taken to bring the person to justice at the national judicial system.  However, 
other scholars argue that the interpretation by ICC judges does not reflect the intention of the 
drafters of the treaty. These authors accuse the Chambers of expanding the interpretation of 
                                                                                                                                                       
Germain Katanga in the DRC do not encompass the same conduct which is the subject of the Prosecution 
Application.‘; Para 21 Decision on the evidence and information provided by the Prosecution for the issuance of 
a warrant of arrest for Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, 6 July 2007, ICC-01/04-01/07-262,  Prosecutor v. Mathieu 
Ngudjolo Chui where Pre-Trial Chamber I held that ‗ on the basis of the evidence and information contained in 
the Prosecution Application, the Prosecution Supporting Materials and the Prosecution Response, the 
proceedings against Mathieu Ngudjolo in the DRC do not encompass the same conduct which is the subject of 
the Prosecution Application.‘; Para 21 of the Decision on the Prosecutor's Application for a Warrant of Arrest 
against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, 10 June 2008, ICC‐01/05‐01/08, where Pre-Trial Chamber III held that ‗the 
circumstances in the instant case justify it in ruling on the admissibility of the case, and finds that there is no 
reason to conclude that Mr Jean‐Pierre Bemba‘s case is not admissible, particularly since there is nothing to 
indicate that he is already being prosecuted at national level for the crimes referred to in the Prosecutor‘s 
Application.‘ 
140 The Appeal Chambers held that ‗the defining elements of a concrete case before the Court are the individual 
and the alleged conduct. It follows that for such a case to be inadmissible under article 17 (1) (a) of the Statute, 
the national investigation must cover the same individual and substantially the same conduct as alleged in the 
proceedings before the Court.‘ See Para 40 of the Judgment on the appeal of the Republic of Kenya against the 
decision of Pre-Trial Chamber II of 30 May 2011 entitled ‗Decision on the Application by the Government of 
Kenya Challenging the Admissibility of the Case Pursuant to Article 19(2)(b) of the Statute‘, Prosecutor v. 
William Samoe Ruto, Henry Kipron Kosgey and Joshua Arap Sang, 30 August 2011, ICC-01/09-02/11 O A. 
141Darryl Robinson ‗The mysterious mysteriousness of complementarity‘ (2010) 21 Criminal Law Forum 67 – 
102; Jo Stigen The relationship between the International Criminal Court and national jurisdiction (2008) 199; 
Jann Kleffner, Complementarity in the Rome Statute and national criminal jurisdiction (2008) New York: 
Oxford University Press, 104; Mohamed El Zeidy, The Principle of Complementarity in International  Criminal 
Law: Origin, Development and Practice (2008) 230; Markus Benzing 'The Complementarity Regime of the 
International Criminal Court:  International Criminal Justice between State Sovereignty and the Fight against 
Impunity', (2003) 7 Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law 591 – 632.; William Burke-White and Scott 
Kaplan 'Shaping the Contours of Domestic Justice: The International Criminal Court and an Admissibility 
Challenge in the Ugandan Situation' (2009) 7 Journal of International Criminal Justice 257 - 279. 
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the Statute to accommodate ‗inaction and inactivity‘ as a basis for the intervention of the 
ICC.142 
 
The decision of the Appeals Chamber confirming the Pre-Trial Chambers interpretation of 
admissibility is adopted in this study as it also regulates the preliminary examination carried 
out by the Prosecutor. According to the policy paper on preliminary examinations, the non-
availability of proceedings or inactivity in a state is a basis for the Prosecutor to decide that 
there is reasonable basis to open an investigation. Several factors may be responsible for 
inactivity including lack of adequate legislative framework,143 amnesties, immunities and 
statutes of limitations, focus on low level perpetrators, lack of judicial capacity and political 
will.144  
 
If there is evidence that the state involved is investigating or prosecuting crimes within the 
jurisdiction of the ICC, the Prosecutor has to evaluate whether the state is ‗unwilling‘ and 
‗unable‘ to carry out genuine proceedings.145 In citing inability on the part of a state to 
conduct prosecutions, the Prosecutor has to determine whether, due to a total or substantial 
collapse or unavailability of its national judicial system, the State is unable to carry out its 
                                                 
142 William Schabas An Introduction to the International Criminal Court 4th edition (2011) 193; Mahnoush  
Arsanjani  and Michael Reisman ‗The Law-in-Action of the International Criminal Court‘ (2005) 99 American 
Journal of International Law, 385 - 403; William Schabas ‗Prosecutorial Discretion v. Judicial Activism‘ 
(2008) 6 Journal of International Criminal Justice 731 – 761; Ada Sheng ‗Analyzing the International Criminal 
Court Complementarity Principle Through a Federal Court Lens‘ (2007) 13 International Law Students 
Association Journal of International and Comparative Law  413 – 452.. 
143Several States Parties to the Statute are yet to adopt implementing legislation to incorporate provisions of the 
Rome Statute into domestic legal systems. This problem is acute in the African continent where only few 
African countries have ratified and implemented the treaty into national law. See generally Max du Plessis and 
Jolyon Ford (eds.) Unable or Unwilling: Case Studies on Domestic Implementation of the ICC Statute in 
Selected African Countries (2008); Max du Plessis ‗Bringing the International Criminal Court Home: The 
Implementation of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Act‘ (2003) 16 South African Journal 
of Criminal Justice 1-16; Cathleen Powell and Florence Jessberger ‗Prosecuting Pinochets in South Africa: 
Implementing the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (2001) 14 South African Journal of 
Criminal Justice 344 - 362; Christopher Mbazira ‗Prosecuting International Crimes committed by the Lord‘s 
Resistance Army in Uganda‘ in Chacha Murungu and Japhet Biegon (eds) Prosecuting International Crimes in 
Africa (2011) 197 at 205;  Mandiaye Niang ‗The Senegalese Legal Framework for the Prosecution of 
International Crimes‘ (2009) 7 Journal of International Criminal Justice 1047 - 1062. 
144 Paragraph 48 Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations. 
145Paragraph 49 Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations; Article 17 (2) (a-c) of the Rome Statute  
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proceedings.146 Unwillingness refers to the political will to pursue prosecution while inability 
refers to structural deficiencies in the national legal system due to substantial collapse or 
unavailability of the national legal system.147 
 
Positive complementarity has its roots in the complementarity principle which has its origin 
in the 1994 ILC Draft Statute for the ICC.148 The 1994 ILC Draft provided in its preamble 
that the ‗[ICC] is intended to be complementary to national criminal justice systems in cases 
where such trial procedures may not be available or may be ineffective.‘149 The ILC Draft 
also proposed circumstances under which situations or cases within the jurisdiction of the 
Court may be inadmissible.150  
 
The proposals in the ILC Draft went through several changes during the Preparatory 
Committee meetings convened by the UN. 151  However, some of the thorny issues 
surrounding the principle were agreed upon before the Diplomatic Conference in Rome.152 
For example, States were interested in the relationship between the proposed court and 
national courts and hesitant to accept any compromise proposal without knowing the legal 
relationship between the two.153 This shows that States were interested in how the ICC would 
                                                 
146 Article 17 (3) of the Rome Statute; Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations Para 56. 
147 Article 17 (2) and (3) of the Rome Statute.  
148 The Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court was adopted by the ILC at its forty-sixth session, in 
1994, and was submitted to the General Assembly as a part of the ILC‘s report covering the work of that 
session. The report, which also contains commentaries on the draft articles, appears in the Yearbook of the 
International Law Commission, 1994, vol II (Part Two); Mohamed El-Zeidy, The Principle of Complementarity 
in International Criminal Law: Origin, Development and Practice (2008) 126. 
149 Paragraph 3 of the 1994 ILC Draft. 
150 Article 35 of the 1994 ILC Draft provides that ‗[t]he Court may, on application by the accused or at the 
request of an interested State at any time prior to the commencement of the trial, or of its own motion, decide, 
having regard to the purposes of this Statute set out in the preamble, that a case before it is inadmissible on the 
ground that the crime in question:(a) Has been duly investigated by a State with jurisdiction over it, and the 
decision of that State not to proceed to a prosecution is apparently well-founded; (b) Is under investigation by a 
State which has or may have jurisdiction over it, and there is no reason for the Court to take any further action 
for the time being with respect to the crime; or (c) Is not of such gravity to justify further action by the Court.‘ 
151 The Ad-hoc Committee that drafted the ILC Draft in 1994 was replaced by the Preparatory Committee in 
1996. 
152 John Holmes ‗Principle of Complementarity‘ in Roy Lee (ed) The International Criminal Court – The 
Making of the Rome Statute: Issues - negotiations – results (1999) 43. 
153 Mohamed El-Zeidy The Principle of Complementarity in International Criminal Law: Origin, Development 
and Practice (2008) 127. 
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affect their sovereignty and also wanted to ensure that the ICC would not take over genuine 
efforts by national judicial institutions to make their citizens accountable for crimes 
committed in their jurisdiction. The complementarity principle is recognised as the hallmark 
of the Rome Statute because of the relationship envisaged between States and the Court. 
 
The Statute gives States the primary responsibility to prosecute international crimes 
committed in their jurisdiction, which means the ICC is not expected to supplant the 
prosecution of international crimes by national courts.154 The principle of complementarity is 
based not only on respect for the primary jurisdiction of States, but also on practical 
considerations of efficiency and effectiveness, since States when willing and able to 
prosecute international crimes will generally have the best access to evidence, witnesses, and 
resources to carry out proceedings.155 However, willingness and ability to investigate and 
prosecute international crimes is at times a tall order for the countries that the ICC is 
currently operating in.  
 
The ICC Prosecutor argues that the office would operate on four fundamental principles: (a) 
positive complementarity, (b) focussed investigations and prosecutions, (c) addressing the 
interests of victims, and (d) maximising the impact of the Prosecutor‘s work. 156  This 
reiterates the importance of complementarity in the activities of the Prosecutor of the ICC.  
 
In analysing the need for positive complementarity, it is important to highlight some 
provisions of the Rome Statute that support this view.  Under part 9 of the Rome Statute, 
which provides for ‗International Cooperation and Judicial Assistance,‘ the ICC ‗may, upon 
request, cooperate with and provide assistance to a State Party conducting an investigation 
into or trial in respect of conduct which constitutes a crime within the jurisdiction of the 
Court or which constitutes a serious crime under the national law of the requesting State.‘157 
The Prosecutor is also given the opportunity to ‗seek for additional information from States‘ 
regarding crimes that fall under the jurisdiction of the ICC.158 The Prosecutor can defer an 
                                                 
154 Michael Newton ‗Comparative Complementarity: Domestic Jurisdiction Consistent with the Rome Statute of 
the International Criminal Court‘ (2001) 167 Military Law Review 20 – 73. 
155 Robert Cryer et al. An Introduction to International Criminal Law and Procedure (2007) 127. 
156 Paragraph 15 OTP Prosecutorial Strategy 2009 – 2012. 
157 Article 93(10) of the Rome Statute. 
158 Article 15 of the Rome Statute. 
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investigation at the request of the State to allow the State to conduct its own investigations 
and trials.159   
 
The ICC Prosecutor can encourage State Parties to investigate and prosecute crimes and may 
at any time reconsider a decision to initiate an investigation or prosecution based on new 
facts or information which may be related to the ability of the State concerned to hold its 
nationals accountable.160 These provisions in the Rome Statute recognise the role of the 
Prosecutor in promoting positive complementarity.161  
 
Positive complementarity is an important tool in the fight against impunity and should not be 
ignored for several reasons. The ICC can only try a few of those who bear responsibility for 
crimes of international concern. If there are no effective national judicial mechanisms, there 
will be serious issues of impunity gap which could undermine any success recorded by the 
ICC.  
 
 In an ideal situation, national judicial institutions offer the best places to try these crimes, as 
they would serve as a deterrent to others and give victims the opportunity to participate and 
closely follow the proceedings at the national level. Furthermore, positive complementarity 
will ensure the development of national judicial systems in the prosecution of international 
crimes. However, most domestic legal systems do not have legal procedures for the 
participation of victims in the proceedings at domestic level except as witnesses.   
 
4.6.2 Gravity and prosecutorial discretion 
 
Another crucial factor in the exercise of prosecutorial discretion during preliminary 
examination is gravity. It plays an important role in the determination by the Prosecutor 
whether or not to proceed with an investigation. The Statute provides that the Prosecutor 
should determine that a case is inadmissible where the case is not of sufficient gravity to 
justify further action by the Court.‘162 The Prosecutor assesses gravity on potential cases that 
                                                 
159 Article 18 of the Rome Statute. 
160 Article 53 of the Rome Statute. 
161 Burke-White op cit at 62. 
162 Article 17 (1) (d) of the Rome Statute; Ray Murphy ‗Gravity Issues and the International Criminal Court‘ 
(2006) 17 Criminal Law Forum 281 – 235 at 297 argues that ‗[t]he gravity of the crime is one of the express 
considerations to be taken into account in ascertaining the existence of a reasonable basis to proceed.‘ 
 
90 | Page 
will likely arise from investigating a situation. 163  This is because during preliminary 
examinations, there are no concrete cases before the Court. The factors used by the 
Prosecutor in assessing the gravity of a situation include: (a) scale of the crimes committed, 
(b) nature of the crimes, (c) the manner of commission of the crimes and (d) the impact of the 
crimes.164 
 
The scale of the crimes is evaluated using the number of direct or indirect victims who have 
suffered as a result of the crimes. Furthermore, the geographical andS temporal spread of the 
crimes is relevant.165 The inquiry into the nature of crimes will involve specific elements of 
each offence including killing, rapes and other crimes involving sexual or gender violence 
and crimes committed against children, persecution, or the imposition of conditions of life on 
a group calculated to bring about its destruction.166  
 
The gravity of the manner of the commission of a crime includes: (a) the means employed to 
execute the crime, (b) the degree of participation and (c) the intent of the perpetrator (if 
discernible) at the particular stage of the inquiry.167 Other relevant factors include the extent 
to which the crimes were systematic or resulted from a plan or organised policy or otherwise 
resulted from the abuse of power or official capacity.168 Also important are the elements of 
particular cruelty, including the vulnerability of the victims, the use of rape or sexual 
violence as a weapon and means of destroying groups.169 The impact of the crimes may be 
assessed by the sufferings endured by the victims and their increased vulnerability; terror 
subsequently instilled, or the social, economic and environmental damage inflicted on the 
affected communities.170 
 
                                                 
163 Paragraph 59 of the Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations; Regulations 29 of the Regulations of the 
Office of the Prosecutor; Rules 48 and 104 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.  
164 Regulation 29(2) of the Regulations of the Office of the Prosecutor; Paragraph 188 of Situation in the 
Republic of Kenya, Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an Investigation 
into the Situation in the Republic of Kenya, ICC‐01/09‐19‐Corr, 31 March 2010; Paragraph 203-204 of the 
Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorisation of an Investigation into the Situation 
in the Republic of Côte d'Ivoire, ICC-02/11-14, 3 October 2010.  
165 Paragraph 62 Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations. 
166Paragraph 63 Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations. 
167Paragraph 64 Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations. 
168 Ibid. 
169 Ibid.  
170 Paragraph 65 of the Policy on Preliminary Examinations.  
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Although the mandate and scope of their jurisdictions differ from those of the ICC, the 
sentencing history of the ICTY and ICTR are illustrative of the gravity criteria.171 In this 
instance, several sentencing judgments of the tribunals have highlighted the importance of 
gravity in the sentences pronounced on the accused persons.172 In addition, Rule 11 bis of the 
ICTY and the ICTR also highlights the gravity of crimes within the ad hoc tribunals.173 
 
Gravity is not defined or explained in the Statute.174 The first policy paper released by the 
Prosecutor on preliminary examination did not contain gravity as a legal criterion. 175   
However, it has gradually emerged as a decisive factor in the decision by the Prosecutor 
whether to proceed with an investigation.176 After conducting preliminary examinations in 
Iraq and Venezuela, the Prosecutor decided not to proceed with an investigation due to lack 
of sufficient gravity of the crimes committed. 177  On the other hand, the opening of 
                                                 
171 Susana SáCouto and Katherine A. Cleary ‗The Gravity Threshold of the International Criminal Court‘ (2008) 
5 American University International Law Review 807 – 854. 
172 See generally, Paragraph 18 Prosecutor v. Kayishema, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T, Sentence Judgment 21 May 
1999; Paras 29 – 30 Prosecutor v. Serushago, Case No. ICTR-98-39, Sentencing Judgment, 5 February 1999; 
Para 884 of Prosecutor v. Ntakirutimana and Ntakirutimana, Case No. ICTR-96-10, ICTR-96-17, Judgment and 
sentence, 21 February 2003; Para 572 of Prosecutor v. Karera, Case No. ICTR-01-74-T, Judgment and 
Sentence, 7 December 2007; Paragraph 693 Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33, Judgment, 2 August 2001; 
Paragraph 7 of Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94- 1, Sentencing Judgment, 11 November 1999; Para 571 of 
Prosecutor v. Semanza Case No. ICTR-97-20; Judgment and Sentence, 15 May 2003; Paragraph 702 of 
Prosecutor v. Kvocka, Case No. IT-98-30/1, Judgment, 2 November 2001; Para 512 of Prosecutor v. Kmojelac, 
Case No. IT-97-25, Judgment, 15 March 2002; Paragraph 3 of Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, 
Sentence 2 October 1998.  
173See Rule 11 bis, ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence, IT/32/Rev. 49, 22 May 2013. See also Rule 11 bis  
ICTR Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 10 April 2013.  
174  Margaret M. deGuzman ‗Gravity and the Legitimacy of the International Criminal Court‘ (2008) 32 
Fordham International Law Journal, 1400 – 1465.   
175 See Annex to the Policy Paper which states that ‗[t]he Prosecutor makes the determination as to whether 
there is a reasonable basis to proceed based on the three factors required by the Statute (Article 53. 1 (a) to (c)):  
a) the factual/legal basis: the information available provides a reasonable basis to  believe that a crime within the 
jurisdiction of the Court has been or is being committed; b) the admissibility test: the case is or would be 
admissible (including on complementarity grounds) under Article 17; c) the interests of justice: taking into 
account the gravity of the crime and the interests of victims, there are nonetheless substantial reasons to believe 
that an  investigation would not serve the interests of justice.‘ 
176 Margaret M. DeGuzman ‗Choosing To Prosecute: Expressive Selection at the International Criminal Court‘ 
(2012) 33 Michigan Journal of International Law 265 – 320.  
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investigations in other countries was because the gravity threshold and other necessary legal 
factors were fulfilled.178 
 
There are problems associated with interpretation of gravity by the Prosecutor during 
preliminary investigations. 179  For example, despite the argument by the Prosecutor that 
gravity of the crimes committed in DRC were decisive in opening investigations, the 
Prosecutor charged Thomas Lubanga, with the war crimes of enlisting and conscripting of 
children under the age of 15 years and using them to participate actively in hostilities.180  
 
There is no doubt that conscripting and enlisting children under the age of 15 and using them 
actively in hostilities is a war crime of serious proportion. However, its gravity pales into 
insignificance compared with other international crimes committed in DRC especially the 
issue of rape and sexual violence and other related crimes.181 In fact, when the Prosecutor 
issued the arrest warrant against Lubanga, there was outrage in DRC as victims and survivors 
of international crimes contended that there were cases of sexual crimes which the Prosecutor 
had ignored. Furthermore, it was argued that the Prosecutor was insensitive to the plight of 
                                                                                                                                                       
4CDB2FDEBEF7/143682/OTP_letter_to_senders_re_Iraq_9_February_2006.pdf, accessed 19 September 2016; 
ICC ‗OTP response to communications received concerning Venezuela‘ 9 February 2006, available online at 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/4E2BC725-6A63-40B8-8CDC-
ADBA7BCAA91F/143684/OTP_letter_to_senders_re_Venezuela_9_February_2006.pdf, accessed 19 
September 2016. 
178 According to the former Prosecutor of the ICC ‗[g]ravity is one of the most important criteria for selection of 
our situations and cases. The Congo is the gravest situation under our treaty jurisdiction, and Northern Uganda 
is the second gravest. Darfur, referred to the Court by the Security Council, is even graver still. The three 
situations are in Africa precisely because of the gravity criterion.' See Luis Moreno-Ocampo ‗Keynote Address: 
Integrating the Work of the ICC into Local Justice Initiatives‘ (2006) 21 American University International Law 
Review  497–503 at 498; See also Luis Moreno-Ocampo ‗Statement  at the Informal Meeting of Legal Advisors 
of Ministries of Foreign Affairs‘ 6, 24 October 2005.  
179 Mohamed M. El Zeidy ‗The Gravity Threshold Under The Statute of the International Criminal Court‘ 
(2008) Criminal Law Forum 35 - 57. 
180 See Paragraph 1358 of The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the 
Statute, ICC-01/04-01/06-2842, 14 March 2013.  
181 Gregory Gordon ‗An African Marshall Plan: Changing U.S. Policy to Promote the Rule of Law and Prevent 
Mass Atrocity in the Democratic Republic of the Congo‘ (2008) 32 Fordham International Law Journal  1361- 
1399; Amber Peterman, Tia Palermo and Caryn Bredenkamp ‗Estimates and Determinants of Sexual Violence 
Against Women in the Democratic Republic of Congo‘ (2011) 101 American Journal of Public Health 1060–
1067;  British Broadcasting World Service ―UN official calls DR Congo 'rape capital of the world' 28 April 
2010, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8650112.stm, accessed 19 September 2016.  
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the women who faced several challenges daily due to sexual crimes committed against them 
by warring parties in the conflict.182  
 
It is obvious that the indictment of Lubanga was not due to the gravity of his crimes but was 
simply based on the practical consideration of successfully transferring him to The Hague for 
trial.183 This is because at the time the warrant of arrest was issued, Lubanga was in detention 
in DRC for charges of genocide and crimes against humanity before the national judicial 
system. These crimes are graver than the crimes he was eventually charged with by the 
Prosecutor of the ICC.184 The sentence passed on an accused person also reflects the gravity 
of the crime committed. Lubanga was sentenced to fourteen years‘ imprisonment. However, 
the time he will spend in prison will be reduced due to the time already spent in detention.185  
 
The assessment of gravity by the Prosecutor includes both qualitative and quantitative 
considerations. 186  However, it is not clear from the practice of the Prosecutor what 
importance is attached to gravity related during preliminary examinations.187 One problem 
with the issue of gravity is that the Prosecutor has failed to show effectively how gravity is 
measured during preliminary investigations. The reports on preliminary examinations do not 
offer concrete information on how the Prosecutor approaches the issue of gravity. For 
example, a recent report in which the Prosecutor determined that there was reasonable basis 
to proceed with an investigation in the Mali situation failed to address in clear terms the 
issues of gravity and how it has influenced the decision to proceed with an investigation.188  
                                                 
182  Susana Sacouto and Katherine A. Cleary ‗The Importance of Effective Investigation of Sexual Violence and 
Gender-based Crimes at the International Criminal Court (2009) 17 American University Journal of Gender, 
Social Policy and the Law 339 – 359.  
183 ICC ‗Office of the Prosecutor, Report on the Activities Performed during the First Three Years (June 2003-
June 2006), 8; Susana SáCouto and Katherine A. Cleary  op cit at 852; Mohamed M. El- Zeidy  op cit at 41.  
184 William Schabas ‗Prosecutorial Discretion v. Judicial Activism‘ (2008) 6 Journal of International Criminal 
Justice 731 – 761. 
185 Paragraph 107 and 108 of The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo Decision on Sentence pursuant to 
Article 76 of the Statute, ICC-01/04-01/06-2901, 10 July 2012.  
 186  Paragraph 61 Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations; Paragraph 31 of Prosecutor v. Abu Garda, 
Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, ICC‐02/05‐02/09‐243‐Red, 8 February 2010. 
187 Jan Wouters and Kenneth Chan ‗Policies, Not Politics: The Pursuit of Justice in Prosecutorial Strategy at the 
International Criminal Court‘ Leuven Centre for Global Studies Working Paper No. 95 (July 2012), 11. 
188 ICC ‗Situation in Mali: Article 53(1) Report‘ 16 January 2013, 29 – 31, available online at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/icc/press%20and%20media/press%20releases/news%20and%20highlights/Pages/pr869.aspx, 
accessed 19 September 2016; Stegmiller op cit  at 499.  
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The Pre-Trial Chamber has held that in analysing gravity ‗the conduct which is the subject of 
a case must be either systematic (pattern of incidents) or large-scale.‘189 In addition, the 
Chamber argues that ‗in assessing the gravity of the relevant conduct, due consideration must 
be given to the social alarm such conduct may have caused in the international 
community.‘190 However, the Appeals Chamber has rejected the requirements set by the Pre-
Trial Chamber by arguing that the interpretation of article 17 (1) (d) is ‗inconsistent with the 
definition of crimes over which the Court has jurisdiction.‘191 In essence, the Court argued 
that setting such a legal requirement for gravity will hamper the deterrent effect of the ICC.192 
The Court has confirmed this ruling in subsequent decisions.193 This current approach makes 
it possible for the ICC to admit any case that is within the jurisdiction of the Court.194  
 
The decision of the Appeals Chamber and subsequent endorsement by the Pre-Trial 
Chambers does not affect the importance of gravity during preliminary examination. This is 
because the decision of the Appeals Chamber related specifically to the legal criteria for the 
admissibility of the case before the Court and does not affect the discretion of the Prosecutor 




4.7   Interests of justice and prosecutorial discretion 
 
The interests of justice is another factor which the prosecutor has to weigh in order to reach a 
decision whether to open an investigation. The interests of justice under the Rome Statute has 
                                                 
189 Paragraph 47 Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Decision on the Prosecutor's Application for 
Warrants of Arrest, Article 58, ICC-01/04-01/07, 10 February 2006.  
190 Ibid. 
191  Paragraph 69 of the Situation in Democratic Republic of the Congo, Judgment on the Prosecutor’s 
Application for Warrants of Arrest, Article 58, ICC-01/04-16913 July 2006. 
192 Paragraph 60 of the Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations.  
193  See for example, Paragraph 30 of Prosecutor vs Bahar Idriss Abu Garda, Case No ICC-02/05-02/09, 
Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, 8 February 2010; Paragraphs 27 – 28 of Prosecutor v. Abdallah 
Banda Abakaer Nourain and Saleh Mohammed Jerbo Jamus, Case No ICC-02/05-03/09, Corrigendum of the 
‗Decision on the Confirmation of Charges‘ 7 March 2011. 
194  Margaret M. DeGuzman ‗The International Criminal Court‘s Gravity Jurisprudence at Ten‘ (2013) 12 
Washington University Global Studies Review 475 – 483.   
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been subjected to different kinds of debate and scholars are polarised on how the principles 
sit with the primary obligation of the ICC Prosecutor to investigate and prosecute those 
accused of complicity in crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC.  
 
4.7.1 Background to the interests of justice debate 
 
The relationship between the ICC and national governments has brought into focus the debate 
between peace and justice and whether amnesty and truth commissions can be 
accommodated under the interests of justice. The preliminary examination conducted by the 
Prosecutor raises the issue whether amnesties, including truth and reconciliation commissions 
embarked upon by national governments, are compatible with the provisions of the Statute. 
The preamble to the Statute supports the prosecution of international crimes.195 However, 
whether amnesties are compatible with the Rome Statute is subject to debate.  
 
During the fourth session of the Preparatory Committee meeting on the establishment of the 
ICC in August 1997, the US government issued a document requesting the recognition of 
amnesties in the Rome Statute.196 Several delegates did not accept the proposal and there was 
no consensus on amnesty during the negotiations in Rome in 1998.197 A major issue was that 
amnesty provisions obtainable in some countries were incompatible with the Rome Statute. 
The ‗interests of justice‘ in article 53 is subject to different interpretations including the 
                                                 
 195Paragraph 4 of the Preamble to the Rome Statute provides that ‗the most serious crimes of concern to the 
international community as a whole must not go unpunished and … their effective prosecution must be ensured 
by taking measures at the national level and by enhancing international cooperation.‘ 
196 The US delegation argued in a statement (‗non-paper‘) that ‗[m]any amnesties and pardons have formed part 
of transitions to democratic governments, in which members of the outgoing regime, the armed forces, and the 
national security apparatus, as well as political insurgents, are protected from prosecution for ‗political‘ acts that 
were carried out during the rule of the outgoing regime. Amnesties and pardons are also promulgated in the 
hope of achieving a kind of ‗national reconciliation‘ by closing a door on the conflict of a past era. Also, 
amnesties and pardons have been offered to encourage the surrender or reintegration of armed dissident groups.‘ 
See CICC ‗US Delegation Draft: State Practice Regarding Amnesties and Pardons‘ available online at 
http://www.iccnow.org/documents/USDraftonAmnestiesPardons.pdf, accessed 19 September 2016; Ruth 
Wedgwood ‗The International Criminal Court: An American View‘ (1999) 10 European Journal of 
International Law 93 - 107; Manhoush Arsanjani ‗International Criminal Court and National Amnesty Laws: 
The Future of the International Criminal Court‘ (1999) 93 American Journal of International Law 385 - 403. 
197 Louise Mallinder Amnesty, Human Rights and Political Transitions: Bridging the Peace and Justice Divide 
(2008) 280. 
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possibility of deferring investigations and prosecutions due to amnesties, truth commissions 
and other alternative justice mechanisms.198 
 
During preliminary examinations, the Prosecutor is invited to consider whether, taking into 
account the gravity of the crimes and the interests of victims, there are nonetheless, 
substantial reasons to believe that an investigation would not serve the interests of justice. 
The ‗substantial reasons‘ are not enumerated, thereby giving the Prosecutor the discretion to 
determine other factors that should be taken into consideration. Kenneth Rodman argues that 
the Prosecutor should apply discretionary powers in a broad manner to accommodate the 
exigencies of each situation before the ICC.199  
 
It is safe to conclude that whenever the Prosecutor decides there is a reasonable basis to 
proceed with an investigation during a preliminary examination, the decision, though a purely 
legal question, is not immune to political interpretations. This problem can only be minimised 
if the Prosecutor adheres to the legal criteria set out in the Rome Statute and consistently 
follows the policy objectives and rules laid down for the conduct of preliminary 
examinations. There is no guarantee that this will solve all the problems associated with the 
criticisms against the Prosecutor in the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. However, it will 
to an extent, show that the activities of the Prosecutor are objective, independent and 
impartial. 
 
                                                 
198For example, Michael Scharf argues that article 53 of the Rome Statute, ‗reflects ‗creative ambiguity‘ which 
could potentially allow the prosecutor and judges of the ICC to interpret the Rome Statute as permitting 
recognition of an amnesty exception to the jurisdiction of the court.‘ See Michael Scharf  ‗The Amnesty 
Exception to the Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court‘ (1999) 32 Cornell International Law Journal 
507 - 527; Kristin Henrard ‗The Viability of National Amnesties in View of the Increasing Recognition of 
Individual Criminal Responsibility at International Law‘ (1999) 8 Michigan State University-DCL Journal of 
International Law 595 - 650; Michael Scharf ‗From the eXile Files: An Essay on Trading Justice for Peace‘ 
(2006) 63 Washington and Lee Law Review, 339 - 376; Michael Kourabas ‗Vienna Convention Interpretation of 
the ‗Interests of Justice‘ Provision of the Rome Statute, the Legality of Domestic Amnesty Agreements, and the 
Situation in Northern Uganda: A Great Qualitative Step Forward or a Normative Retreat?‘ (2007) 14 University 
of California Davis Journal of International Law & Policy 59 - 94. 
199 Kenneth Rodman argues that ‗[p]ursuing justice in ways that are blind to power realities will either be futile 
exercises in high-mindedness or counterproductive to political settlements that are necessary to end violent 
conflicts. International law cannot be isolated from the political context in which it has to operate.‘ See Kenneth 
Rodman ‗Is Peace in the Interests of Justice? The Case for Broad Prosecutorial Discretion at the International 
Criminal Court‘ (2009) 22 Leiden Journal of International Law 99 - 126.  
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4.7.2 The Rome Statute and the interests of justice 
 
 
A decision by the Prosecutor during preliminary examinations that there is no basis to 
proceed with an investigation due to the interests of justice is subject to review. If the 
Prosecutor‘s decision not to proceed with an investigation is based on the interests of justice, 
he or she must inform the Pre-Trial Chamber of the decision.200  The Prosecutor is required to 
promptly inform in writing the State or States that referred the matter under article 14 of the 
Rome Statute, or the UNSC if the situation is referred pursuant to Chapter VII powers under 
article 13(b) of the Rome Statute.201  
 
Beyond the preliminary examination phase, the Prosecutor can also conclude after 
investigation that there is not sufficient basis for a prosecution because a prosecution is not in 
the interests of justice. Such a conclusion must have taken into account all the circumstances, 
including the gravity of the crime, the interests of victims, the age or infirmity of the alleged 
perpetrator, and his or her role in the alleged crime. The Prosecutor shall inform the Pre-Trial 
Chamber and the State making a referral under article 14 or the Security Council in a case 
under article 13(b) of his or her conclusion and the reasons for the conclusion.202  
 
If a situation under preliminary examination is referred to the Prosecutor through a State 
Party or the UNSC, and the Prosecutor decides that there is no reasonable basis to proceed 
with an investigation because of jurisdiction and admissibility, the Prosecutor is obliged to 
inform the State or the UNSC. However, if the decision not to proceed is solely based on the 
interests of justice, a State Party or the UNSC that referred the situation can, through the Pre-
Trial Chamber, request the Prosecutor to review the decision not to proceed with an 
investigation that is not in the interests of justice.203 If the decision of the Prosecutor is based 
on the interests of justice alone, the Pre-Trial Chamber may on its own initiative review a 
decision by the Prosecutor. Such a decision not to proceed with an investigation can only be 
effective if confirmed by the Pre-Trial Chamber.204 
 
                                                 
200 Article 53 (1) (c) of the Rome Statute.  
201 Rule 105 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.  
202 Article 53 (2) (c) of the Rome Statute. 
203 Article 53 (3) (a) of the Rome Statute. 
204 Article 53 of the Rome Statute.  
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The Prosecutor may, at any time, reconsider a decision whether to initiate an investigation or 
prosecution based on new facts or information regarding a case or situation currently before 
the Court.205 This means that a concluded preliminary examination not to proceed with an 
investigation can be re-opened when new facts emerge that may change the circumstances 
under which the previous decision was made. This is exactly what happened in the Iraq 
situation when on 13 May 2014, the current Prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, decided to re-open 
the preliminary examination of the situation in Iraq, previously concluded in 2006, following 
submission of further information to the Office of the Prosecutor in January 2014 in 
accordance with Article 15 of the Rome Statute.206 
 
4.8   Prosecutorial discretion and interests of victims  
 
Another factor in the exercise of discretion is the interest of victims. An innovation of the 
Rome Statute is the participation of victims in the proceedings of the ICC. The Statute does 
not define ‗victims.‘ However, the RPE defines victims as ‗natural persons who have suffered 
harm as a result of the commission of any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court.‘207 It 
also includes ‗organisations or institutions that have sustained direct harm to any of their 
property which is dedicated to religion, education, art or science or charitable purposes, and 
to their historic monuments, hospitals and other places and objects for humanitarian 
purposes.‘208 Another international instrument, the Basic Principles and Guidelines on the 
Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human 
Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law includes the family 
and dependents of victims in its definition. 209 
                                                 
205 Article 53 (4) of the Rome Statute.  
206  See ICC ‗Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Fatou Bensouda, re-opens the preliminary 
examination of the situation in Iraq‘ 13 May 2014, available online at https://www.icc-
cpi.int//Pages/item.aspx?name=otp-statement-iraq-13-05-2014, accessed 19 September 2016.  
207 Rule 85 of the RPE, Official Records of the Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute, First Session, 
New York, 3- 10 September 2002, ICC-ASP/1/3 (Part.II-A).  
208 Ibid. 
209 Paragraph 8 of the UN General Assembly resolution on Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a 
Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious 
Violations of International Humanitarian Law, adopted by the General Assembly, 21 March 2006, 
A/RES/60/147 defines victims as persons who individually or collectively suffered harm, including physical or 
mental injury, emotional suffering, economic loss or substantial impairment of their fundamental rights, through 
acts or omissions that constitute gross violations of international human rights law, or serious violations of 
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The Declaration of the Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power 
define victims as persons who, individually or collectively, have suffered harm, including 
physical or mental injury, emotional suffering, economic loss or substantial impairment of 
their fundamental rights, through acts or omissions that are in violation of criminal laws 
operative within Member States, including those laws proscribing criminal abuse of power.210 
The Statute provides that victims can serve as sources of information for the Prosecutor 
during preliminary examination.211  In addition, the Prosecutor has to take into consideration 
‗the gravity of the crime and the interests of the victims‘ in determining whether there is 
reasonable basis to proceed with an investigation.212  
 
Whenever there is a determination by the Prosecutor to proceed with an investigation, victims 
are allowed to make representations to the Pre-Trial Chamber when the Prosecutor requests 
for an authorisation to commence an investigation.213  The Statute also provides that the 
Prosecutor may seek a ruling from the Court regarding a question of jurisdiction or 
admissibility of a situation.214 In proceedings with respect to jurisdiction or admissibility, 
those who have referred the situation under article 13, as well as victims, may also submit 
observations to the Court.215 In addition, the Statute provides that where the personal interests 
of the victims are affected, the Court shall permit their views and concerns to be presented 
and considered at stages of the proceedings determined to be appropriate by the Court and in 
a manner which is not prejudicial to, or inconsistent with, the rights of the accused. 
                                                                                                                                                       
international humanitarian law. Where appropriate, and in accordance with domestic law, the term ‗victim‘ also 
includes the immediate family or dependents of the direct victim and persons who have suffered harm in 
intervening to assist victims in distress or to prevent victimisation.‘ 
210 UN General Assembly A/RES/40/34 adopted 29 November 1985. 
211 Regulations of the Office of the Prosecutor 2009 (OTP Regulations) ICC-BD/05-01-09, entered into force 23 
April 2009, Regulation 16; Article‘s 15(2) and 41 (1) of the Rome Statute; Rules 46 and 47 of the Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence; Paragraph 46 of the report of the Court on the strategy in relation to victims 
ICCASP/8/45, 10 November 2009, available online at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ASP8/ICC-ASP-
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212 Article 53 (1)(c) of the Rome Statute.  
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Beyond these factors which regulate the exercise of prosecutorial discretion are some 
accountability mechanisms which can affect the discretion exercised by the ICC Prosecutor 
and these mechanisms are discussed below.  
 
 
4.9 The ICC Prosecutor and accountability mechanisms in the Rome Statute 
 
Notwithstanding the fact that prosecutors have discretion to decide whether to investigate or 
prosecute a crime, there are still accountability mechanisms regulating on the exercise of this 
right. Even in domestic legal systems, the exercise of prosecutorial discretion is not 
absolute. 216  The same accountability mechanisms also apply to international criminal 
tribunals. The ICC is not an exception as there are accountability mechanisms which serve as 
a check on the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. These are ICC Pre-Trial Chamber, UNSC 
and the Assembly of States of Parties.217 In addition, this study identifies other accountability 
mechanisms to the exercise of prosecutorial discretion that are not well addressed in the 
literature. 
 
4.9.1 Judicial review of prosecutorial discretion 
 
 
The exercise of prosecutorial discretion is subject to the powers of the Pre-Trial Chamber of 
the ICC. As earlier noted, when the Prosecutor decides that there is no basis to proceed with 
an investigation because it is not in the interests of justice, the Prosecutor is under obligation 
to inform the Pre-Trial Chamber.218  After investigation is completed and the Prosecutor 
determines there is no basis to proceed with prosecution because it is not in the interest of 
justice, the Prosecutor is required to inform the Pre-Trial Chamber and whoever triggered the 
investigation219 of the reasons for the decision.220  
 
                                                 
216 See for example, Siyuan Chen ‗The limits on prosecutorial discretion in Singapore: Past, present, and future‘ 
(2013) 5 International Review of Law, 1 - 27. 
217 Nidal Jurdi The International Criminal Court and National Courts: A Contentious Relationship (2011) 
Ashgate Publishing Limited, Surrey 97 - 99.  
218 Article 53 (1) (c) of the Rome Statute.  
219 Either the UNSC under article 13 (b) or a State Party under article 14 of the Rome Statute.  
220 Article 53 (2) (c) of the Rome Statute.  
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The UNSC or the State Party that referred the matter to the ICC can request a review of the 
decision of the Prosecutor not to proceed with a prosecution through the Pre-Trial Chamber 
which in turn can request the Prosecutor to review the decision not to proceed.221 On its own 
initiative, the Pre-Trial Chamber can review the decision of the Prosecutor not to proceed 
with an investigation or prosecution based only on the interests of justice. If the Pre-Trial 
Chamber decides to take this route, the decision of the Prosecutor can only stand if confirmed 
by the Pre-Trial Chamber.222 However, if the Pre-Trial Chamber does not initiate a review of 
the decision not to proceed with an investigation or prosecution of an international crime, the 
discretion exercised by the Prosecutor remains valid unless contested by the State or the UN 
Security Council that referred the matter to the ICC. 
 
Despite the oversight function of the Pre-Trial Chamber on the exercise of prosecutorial 
discretion, the Prosecutor is at liberty to reconsider a decision whether to initiate an 
investigation or prosecution based on new facts or information.223 This means that a decision 
to proceed with an investigation or prosecution can be suspended or continued as long as 
there are new facts or information at the disposal of the Prosecutor to merit a reconsideration 
of an earlier decision.  
 
It should be noted that there are two probable outcomes regarding the intervention of the Pre-
Trial Chamber on a decision by the Prosecutor not to proceed with an investigation or 
prosecution in the interests of justice. If the request is made by the UNSC or a State Party, the 
Pre-Trial Chamber may review the information and request the Prosecutor to reconsider the 
decision. The use of ‗may‘ in the Statute means that the Pre-Trial Chamber is not compelled 
to review the decision of the Prosecutor not to proceed with an investigation and prosecution 
that is not in the interest of justice. Similarly, the Prosecutor is not compelled to accept the 
request by the Pre-Trial Chamber to review the decision not to proceed. However, if the 
review of the decision not to proceed is an initiative of the Pre-Trial Chamber, the 
Prosecutor‘s decision is subject to the confirmation of the Pre-Trial Chamber.  
 
The Statute is silent on what happens if the Pre-Trial Chamber refuses to confirm a decision 
by the Prosecutor not to proceed with an investigation or prosecution in the interests of 
justice. However, the Statute uses the words ‗shall be effective only if confirmed,‘ meaning 
                                                 
221 Article53 (3) (a) of the Rome Statute.  
222 Article 53 (3) (b) of the Rome Statute.  
223 Article 53 (4) of the Rome Statute. 
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that there is an obligation on the Prosecutor to reconsider a decision not to proceed. This 
shows that the discretion of the Prosecutor not to proceed with an investigation or 
prosecution in the interests of justice is limited by the powers of the Pre-Trial Chamber to 
confirm the decision or disagree with the Prosecutor and order a re-consideration of the 
decision.  
 
There are circumstances when a unique investigative opportunity may be available to the 
Prosecutor to take the testimony or a statement, examine, collect or test evidence of a witness 
which may not be available subsequently for the purposes of a trial. In any of these 
circumstances, the Prosecutor is under an obligation to inform the Pre-Trial Chamber of the 
decision to utilise this opportunity. 224  The prosecutorial discretion exercised by the 
Prosecutor regarding the existence of a unique investigative opportunity is subject to the 
limitations imposed by the Statute, to the extent that the Prosecutor has to inform the Pre-
Trial Chamber of the decision.  
 
The reason for this disclosure is to ensure, amongst other things, that efficiency and integrity 
of the proceedings are maintained, including the rights of the defence.225 The Prosecutor has 
the discretion to decide on the measures to be adopted during the proceedings. A decision by 
the Pre-Trial Chamber to impose its initiative on the Prosecutor is subject to an appeal by the 
Prosecutor if the decision infringes on the discretion of the Prosecutor.226 
 
4.9.2  Prosecutorial discretion and the Assembly of State Parties of the ICC  
 
The Assemblies of State Parties influences the discretion exercised by the Prosecutor.227 The 
ASP is responsible for the election and discipline of senior officials of the Court, including 
the Prosecutor.228 The ASP is also responsible for approving the annual budget of the Court, 
and this function has significant impact on the activities of the Prosecutor. For example, the 
Committee on Budget and Finance recommended the reduction of the overall budget 
                                                 
224 Article 56 of the Rome Statute.  
225 Article 56 (1) (b) of the Rome Statute.  
226 Article 56 (3) (b) of the Rome Statute.  
227 Danner op cit at 524; Jurdi op cit at 99. 
228 See generally Article‘s 36; 42(4) and 46 of the Rome Statute.  
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estimates for the office of the Prosecutor for 2014.229  It is obvious that finance plays a 
significant role in the administration of justice and if the Prosecutor does not get the 
necessary funding required for activities, this will negatively influence the independence and 
the discretion of this Office provided under the Rome Statute. 
 
4.9.3    Prosecutorial discretion and UNSC 
 
The exercise of prosecutorial discretion is influenced by the UNSC.230 This is because the 
Rome Statute gives the UNSC the power to defer proceedings currently before the Court, if 
the proceedings constitute a threat to international peace and security.231 The UN Charter 
provides a significant role for the UNSC in promoting international peace and security. The 
ICC complements the efforts of the UNSC through the investigation and prosecution of 
perpetrators of crimes that threaten international peace and security.232  
 
The 1994 version of the Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind 
prepared by the ILC made the jurisdiction of the ICC subject to the approval of the UNSC.233 
If the provision had been adopted, it would have given the UNSC considerable influence over 
the activities of the ICC.234 However, the current article 16 gives the UNSC the power to 
suspend ongoing investigations.  The adoption of article 16 in the Rome Statute has had 
several implications for the work of the ICC in the exercise of prosecutorial discretion.235 The 
                                                 
229 The Prosecutor had requested a working budget of 35.74 million Euros for 2014. However, the Committee 
on Budget and Finance proposed to cut the budget by 2.2 million Euros.  See ASP ‗Report of the Committee on 
Budget and Finance on the work of its twenty-first session‘ 4 November 2013, available online at 
https://asp.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ASP12/ICC-ASP-12-15-ENG.pdf, accessed 19 September 2016.  
230  As noted in chapter one this limitation does not affect the discretion exercised during preliminary 
examinations.  
231 Article 16 of Rome Statute.  
232 Article 39 of the UN Charter.  
233  Article 23 (3) of the ILC 1994 Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court provides that ‗[n]o 
prosecution may be commenced under this Statute arising from a situation which is being dealt with by the 
Security Council as a threat to or breach of the peace or an act of aggression under Chapter VII of the Charter, 
unless the Security Council otherwise decides.‘ 
234 Elizabeth Wilmhurst ‗The International Criminal Court: The Role if the Security Council‘ in Mauro Politi 
and Guuseppe Nesi (eds) The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Challenge to Impunity 
(2001) 40.  
235 According to Bergsmo and Pejic ‗[t]he drafting history of article 16 gives rise to at least three comments. 
First, political considerations were not surprisingly given more weight than legal arguments in the determination 
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power of the UNSC to defer cases before the ICC is not limited by the process through which 
the cases are referred to the Court. This means that the UNSC can defer cases that were 
referred to the ICC through the UNSC, State Parties or by the Prosecutor‘s own initiative. In 
deferring cases, the UNSC acts under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which means that there 
has to be evidence that there is a threat to international peace and security. It is not enough 
for a State to make a request.  
 
It has been suggested that while the Prosecutor focusses on investigating and prosecuting 
international crimes, it is the responsibility of the UNSC, as a political body, to determine 
when an investigation and prosecution will not serve the interests of justice under article 
16.236 In other words, if a decision on deferral is to be made, the proper channel is through the 
UNSC, which is a political body with the mandate to maintain international peace and 
security.237 While this proposition has merit, it is important to note that though the UNSC has 
the primary responsibility to maintain international peace and security, it does not have 
exclusive responsibility in the maintenance of international peace and security regarding 
activities of the ICC.238  
 
During preliminary examinations, article 53 of the Statute confers on the Prosecutor the 
power to decide whether there is reasonable basis to proceed with an investigation. Beyond 
this, the Prosecutor may, at any time, reconsider a decision whether to initiate an 
investigation or prosecution based on new facts or information.239 A decision to proceed with 
an investigation can be rescinded before the commencement of prosecution and a decision 
not to investigate can also be reversed, if there is evidence to support the change in status 
quo. Therefore, the power to discontinue cases before the ICC is a shared responsibility 
between the Prosecutor and the UNSC.  
 
                                                                                                                                                       
of the appropriate role for the [UNSC] in ICC proceedings. Secondly, the [UNSC]‘s deferral power confirms its 
decisive role in dealing with situations where the requirements of peace and justice seem to be in conflict. 
Thirdly, article 16 provides an unprecedented opportunity for the [UNSC] to influence the work of a judicial 
body. Bergsmo and Pejic, Ibid, 598. 
236 Kenneth Rodman op cit at 120. 
237 Ibid.  
238Sun Kim ‗Maintaining the Independence of the International Criminal Court: The Legal and Procedural 
Implications of an Article 16 Deferral Request‘ (2011) 29 Agenda Internacional, 175 - 212.  
239 Article 53 (6).  
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Recent developments before the Court make it imperative to reconsider the role of the UNSC 
in maintaining international peace and security and its impact on the activities of the ICC. For 
example, the UNSC referred cases in Sudan and Libya to the Court.240 The referrals have 
been controversial as some permanent members of the UNSC have been accused of using the 
provisions of the Statute as leverage for political convenience. 241  This is because other 
countries like Syria, Afghanistan, Sri Lanka and Iraq have had similar conflicts that should 
logically necessitate the intervention of the UNSC. However, due to the politicised nature of 
the UNSC, the possibility of the UNSC referring these countries to the ICC is minimal. 
 
In UNSC resolution 1970, Libya was referred to the ICC.242 The UNSC argued that ‗the 
widespread and systematic attacks currently taking place in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 
against the civilian population may amount to crimes against humanity.‘243  
 
In making the decision to refer the matter to the ICC, the UNSC reiterated the fact that the 
investigations and prosecution could be delayed by one year if a resolution were adopted to 
that effect.244 In addition, the resolution was unequivocal in relation to the jurisdiction for 
crimes that may be committed in Libya by nationals that are not States Parties to the Rome 
Statute while enforcing the UNSC resolution.245  
 
The involvement of the UNSC in the activities of the ICC has had mixed results. The powers 
of the UNSC under the UN Charter are positive responses to threats to international peace 
and security. However, the political nature and composition of the UNSC has resulted in its 
actions and decisions coming under scrutiny and criticism.246 The relationship between the 
ICC and the UNSC has affected the AU‘s policy towards the ICC because of the concern that 
                                                 
240 See UNSC Resolutions 1593 and 1970 referring the situations in Sudan and Libya to the ICC.  
241 Dharmendra Chatur ‗A Synergistic Failure between the UN Security Council and the International Criminal 
Court‘ available online at: http://works.bepress.com/dchatur/7, 1 - 9 accessed  19 September 2016..  
242The referral includes acts that took place in Libya from 11 February 2011. See resolution 1970 (2011) 
adopted by the Security Council at its 6491st meeting, on 26 February 2011. 
243 Paragraph 6 of UNSC resolution 1970.  
244 Paragraph 12 of UNSC resolution 1970.  
245 See Paragraph 6 of the resolution which provides that ‗nationals, current or former officials or personnel 
from a State outside the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya which is not a party to the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court shall be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of that State for all alleged acts or omissions arising 
out of or related to operations in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya established or authorized by the Council, unless 
such exclusive jurisdiction has been expressly waived by the State‘.  
246 Thomas Weiss ‗The Illusion of UN Security Council Reform‘ (2003) 26 Washington Quarterly, 147 – 161. 
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the UNSC can refer non-State parties of the Statute to the ICC. However, the power of the 
UNSC to refer non-State Parties to the ICC is not part of the responsibility of the Prosecutor 
and has to be addressed within the UN system. 
 
These mechanisms, if well monitored and implemented, stand a good chance of regulating 
the activities of the ICC Prosecutor. These mechanisms will aid in making the ICC 
Prosecutor a three-dimensional neutral prosecutor who is non-biased, non-partisan, and 
highly principled.247 Although it cannot be guaranteed that the existence of these structures 
will radically transform the ICC Prosecutor, they will act as accountability platforms that 
regulate and reduce the possibility of the ICC Prosecutor abusing the discretion provided by 
the Rome Statute. 
 
4.10    The review of prosecutorial discretion using international human rights law   
 
The accountability mechanisms discussed earlier will help to review the activities of the ICC 
Prosecutor in the light of the provisions of international human rights law applicable to 
international criminal law trials. It has to be noted that the discretion exercised by the 
Prosecutor is subject to the rights of accused persons as provided in the Rome Statute. These 
rights generally include the rights of persons during investigations,248 the presumption of the 
innocence of the accused person,249 and the rights of accused persons.250 These rights are 
available in treaties of international human rights law, namely the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights251 and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights.252 These international treaties deal specifically with the rights to equality and non-
discrimination, which are limitations to the discretion exercised by the Prosecutor.  
 
                                                 
247Zacharias and Green op cit at 886.  
248 Article 55 of the Rome Statute. 
249 Article 66 of the Rome Statute. 
250 Article 67 of the Rome Statute.  
251 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights was adopted and opened for signature, ratification and 
accession by General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966 and entered into force on 23 
March 1976.  
252 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights was adopted and opened for signature, 
ratification and accession by General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966 and entered into 
force on 3 January 1976.  
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Prosecutorial discretion is limited to the extent that the Prosecutor is not allowed by the 
Statute to infringe on the rights of the accused person. The decision to charge a person for an 
international crime does not remove the presumption of innocence until proven guilty. 
Further, when the Prosecutor has decided to investigate an individual, the person shall not be 
compelled to incriminate himself or herself or to confess guilt.253  
 
The Prosecutor is not allowed to subject the accused person to any form of coercion, duress 
or threat, to torture or to any other form of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment.254 The accused person should not be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention, 
nor be deprived of his or her liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with 
procedure set out in the Statute.255 Even when proceedings take place at the national level in 
relation to the investigation and prosecution of international crimes, the rights and privileges 
of an accused person are not suspended by the discretion exercised by the Prosecutor in 
relation to questioning and obtaining evidence.256  
 
The presumption of innocence of an accused person is a limitation to the prosecutorial 
discretion exercised by the Prosecutor. This is because the Statute provides that the accused 
person is presumed to be innocent until proved guilty before the ICC in accordance with the 
applicable law.257 Furthermore, it is the responsibility of the Prosecutor to prove the guilt of 
the accused person. 258  This is notwithstanding the determination by the Prosecutor that 
crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC have been committed and that there is a reasonable 
basis to proceed with an investigation and prosecution of crimes within the jurisdiction of the 
Court. Moreover, to secure a conviction of the accused person, the Prosecutor has to convince 
the judges beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused person.259  
 
The exercise of prosecutorial discretion does not allow the Prosecutor to treat accused 
persons unfairly. In the determination of any charge, the accused shall be entitled to a public 
                                                 
253 Article 55 (1) (a) of the Rome Statute; Article 14 (3) (g) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights 1966; Christopher Hall ‗Article 55‘ in in Otto Triffterer ed. Commentary on the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court: Observers’ Notes, Article by Article 2nd edition (2008)  1193.  
254 Article 55 (1) (b) of the Rome Statute.  
255Article 55 (1) (d) of the Rome Statute.  
256 Article 55 (2) of the Rome Statute. 
257Article 66 (1) of the Rome Statute.  
258 Article 66 (2) of the Rome Statute 
259 Article 66 (3) of the Rome Statute.  
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hearing, which is fair and conducted impartially.260 Furthermore, the Prosecutor has to make 
available to the defence any evidence that shows or tends to show the innocence of the 






4.10.1    Prosecutorial discretion and general principles of law  
 
Prosecutorial discretion is subject to general principles of law.262  For example, Prosecutorial 
discretion is limited by nullum crimen sine lege.263 This means that a person is not criminally 
liable unless the conduct in question constitutes a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court at 
the time it took place. Thus, crimes that do not meet the threshold set out in the Statute are 
beyond the discretionary powers of the Prosecutor. In addition, the Statute provides that the 
definition of a crime shall be strictly construed and shall not be extended by analogy. In 
addition, if there is any ambiguity in the definition of a crime, it will be interpreted in favour 
of the person being investigated, prosecuted or convicted.264 Closely related to the above 
principle is the non-retroactivity rationae which states that no person shall be criminally 
responsible for a conduct that was not a crime before the entry into force of the Statute.265 In 
addition, if there is a change in the law applicable to a given case prior to a final judgment, 
the law more favourable to the person being investigated, prosecuted or convicted shall 
apply.266  
 
The powers of the Prosecutor to investigate are limited only to natural persons. This is 
because the Statute provides that the ICC has jurisdiction only over natural persons.267 
Therefore, a person who commits a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court shall be 
                                                 
260 Article 67 (1) of the Rome Statute; Kai Ambos ‗The Right of Non- Self-Incrimination of Witnesses before 
the ICC‘ (2002) 155 Leiden Journal of International Law 155 – 177. 
261 Article 67 (2) of the Rome Statute   
262 Cote op cit  at 172 – 73.  
263Article 22 (1) of the Rome Statute 
264  Article 22 (2) of the Rome Statute.  
265 Article 24 (1) of the Rome Statute.  
266 Article 24 (2) of the Rome Statute. 
267 Article 25 (1) of the Rome Statute.  
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individually responsible and liable for punishment in accordance with the provisions of the 
Statute.268 Prosecutorial discretion is also limited to the investigation and prosecution of 
persons above the age of eighteen years at the time of the alleged commission of a crime.269 
This means that individuals below eighteen years are not criminally responsible for their 





4.10.2  Prosecutorial discretion and cooperation from states 
 
Although the ICC is an independent international criminal justice institution, its survival and 
effectiveness is anchored on the co-operation of both State Parties and non-State Parties to 
the treaty. In fact, part nine of the Statute titled ‗International cooperation and judicial 
assistance‘ provides for effective cooperation between the ICC and State Parties. The Statute 
provides that State Parties shall cooperate fully with the Court in the investigation and 
prosecution of crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court as provided in the Statute.270 
Officials of the ICC including the Prosecutor have the authority to make requests to State 
Parties for co-operation depending on the circumstances of the request.271   Whenever a 
request is made by the ICC, the requested State shall keep confidential a request for co-
operation and any documents supporting the request, until the disclosure is necessary for 
execution of the request.272  
 
Whenever a request is made by the ICC for assistance, the Court may take such measures, 
including measures related to the protection of information, as may be necessary to ensure the 
safety or physical or psychological well-being of any victims, potential witnesses and their 
families. In addition, the Court may request that any information that is made available  in 
furtherance of the request for assistance shall be provided and handled in a manner that 
protects the safety and physical or psychological well-being of any victims, potential 
                                                 
268 Article 25 (2) of the Rome Statute.  
269 Article 26 of the Rome Statute.  
270  Article 86 of the Rome Statute.  
271 Article 87 (1) of the Rome Statute.  
272 Article 87 (3) of the Rome Statute.  
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witnesses and their families.273 Where a State Party fails to comply with a request to co-
operate with the Court contrary to the provisions of this Statute, thereby preventing the Court 
from exercising its functions and powers under this Statute, the Court may refer the matter to 
the Assembly of State Parties or to the UNSC depending on how the initial referral was 
made.274 
 
The request for assistance is not limited to State Parties. Non-State Parties to the Statute are 
expected to provide assistance to the ICC on the basis of an ad hoc arrangement, an 
agreement with such State or any other appropriate basis.275 In addition, where a State is not 
party to the Statute and entered into an ad hoc agreement with the Court, fails to cooperate 
with requests pursuant to any such arrangement or agreement, the Court may so inform the 
ASP, or the UNSC if the situation was referred to the Court by the UNSC.276 Furthermore, 
the court officials including the Prosecutor may ask any inter-governmental organization to 
provide information or documents. The Court may also ask for other forms of co-operation 
and assistance which may be agreed upon with such an organization and which are in 
accordance with its competence or mandate.277 Unlike States, which can be reported to the 
ASP and the UNSC, there is no sanction for an intergovernmental organisation that fails to 
provide assistance to the ICC upon requests. 
 
According to the Rome Statute, the Prosecutor, in order to establish the truth, may extend the 
investigation to cover all facts and evidence relevant to an assessment of whether there is 
criminal responsibility under the Statute. 278  In doing so, the Prosecutor investigates 
incriminating and exonerating circumstances simultaneously.279 In addition, the Prosecutor is 
expected to take appropriate measures to ensure effective investigation and prosecution of 
crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court, and in doing so, to respect the interests and 
personal circumstances of victims and witnesses, including age, gender and health, and to 
take into account the nature of the crime, especially where it involves sexual violence, gender 
violence or violence against children.280  
                                                 
273 Article 87 (4) of the Rome Statute.  
274 Article 87 (7) of the Rome Statute.  
275 Article 87 (5) (a) of the Rome Statute.  
276 Article 87 (5) (b) of the Rome Statute. 
277 Article 87 (6) of the Rome Statute.  
278 Article 54 of the Rome Statute.  
279 Article 54 (a) of the Rome Statute.  
280 Article 54 (b) of the Rome Statute.  
 
111 | Page 
 
The Prosecutor may conduct investigations on the territory of a State when a State has agreed 
to the requests of the Prosecutor for co-operation. 281  However, when a State under 
investigation is unable to respond to the requests of the Prosecutor for co-operation, the Pre-
Trial Chamber can authorise the Prosecutor to take specific investigative steps within the 
territory of a State Party without having secured the co-operation of that State. This is subject 
to a determination by the Pre-Trial Chamber that the State is clearly unable to execute a 
request for co-operation due to the absence of any authority or any component of its judicial 
system competent to execute the request for co-operation.282 
 
The Statute further provides that the Prosecutor may do any of the following: (a) collect and 
examine evidence; (b) request the presence of and question persons being investigated, 
victims and witnesses; (c) seek the cooperation of any State or inter-governmental 
organisation or arrangement in accordance with its respective competence and/or mandate; 
(d) enter into such arrangements or agreements, not inconsistent with this Statute, as may be 
necessary to facilitate the cooperation of a State, inter-governmental organisation or person; 
(e) agree not to disclose, at any stage of the proceedings, documents or information that the 
Prosecutor obtains on the condition of confidentiality and solely for the purpose of generating 
new evidence, unless the provider of the information consents; and (f) take necessary 
measures, or request that necessary measures be taken, to ensure the confidentiality of 
information, the protection of any person or the preservation of evidence.283 
 
The co-operation between the ICC and State Parties is a limitation to the exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion. This is because it exposes the Prosecutor to a lot of criticism in the 
course of carrying out the responsibilities within the provisions of the Statute. This dilemma 
is obvious in situations or countries where the ICC is investigating crimes within the 
jurisdiction of the Court and also needs the co-operation of the State where investigations are 
currently ongoing.   
 
Robinson has argued that in situations involving the co-operation of States where the ICC 
Prosecutor is investigating crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court, the Prosecutor is not 
likely to escape criticism as every decision taken is bound to be interpreted differently by 
                                                 
281 Article 54 (2) (a) of the Rome Statute.  
282 Article 57 (3) (d) of the Rome Statute.  
283 Article 54 (3) (a –f) of the Rome Statute.  
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different parties.284 While this is a fair comment, it also means that the Prosecutor has to act 
within the provisions of the Rome Statute and weigh options in relation to requests for 
assistance for States under investigation for international crimes. The Statute clearly provides 
the duties and powers of the Prosecutor with respect to investigations which also touches on 
the issues of cooperation with State Parties and non-State Parties to the Statute. 
 
4. 11  Conclusion 
 
This chapter has identified and analysed the ICC legal framework and the criteria set out for 
the exercise of prosecutorial discretion during the conduct of preliminary examinations 
provided in article 53 of the Rome Statute. It has shown that the Rome Statute provides the 
needed legal framework on the exercise of prosecutorial discretion during preliminary 
examinations. The discussions lay the background for the next chapter which discusses the 
policy documents adopted by the ICC Prosecutor in the interpretation of the discretion 
exercised during preliminary examinations.   
 
It has been established that during the negotiations for the establishment of the Court, the 
powers of the Prosecutor were one of the contentious issues that polarised the negotiators. 
The Rome Statute provides for a unique process for the election of the Prosecutor of the ICC 
which is different from what is obtainable in national legal systems, or ad-hoc and hybrid 
tribunals. It has also looked critically at the jurisprudence of the Court in relation to the 
powers of the Prosecutor including independence of the Prosecutor, removal, discipline and 
tenure of office which is slightly different when compared with the ad-hoc and hybrid 
tribunals.   
 
The chapter extensively discussed the legal framework established by the Statute to guide 
preliminary examinations. This comprises jurisdiction, admissibility (complementarity and 
gravity), the interests of justice and the interests of victims. It has been noted that irrespective 
of how the jurisdiction of the ICC is triggered, the Prosecutor has to decide whether there is a 
legal basis to proceed with an investigation through a preliminary examination.285   
 
                                                 
284 Robinson op cit 324.  
285See Chapter one, paragraph 1.0.  
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It was further noted that if the decision not to proceed is due to the interests of justice, the 
Prosecutor must inform the Pre-Trial Chamber. In addition, if Prosecutor decides that there is 
reasonable basis to proceed with an investigation during proprio motu investigations, the 
authorisation of the Pre-Trial Chamber is required in order to open an investigation. 
 
The chapter notes that the Prosecutor of the ICC occupies a sensitive position in the 
administration of justice at the ICC. Although the Prosecutor has discretion in carrying out 
the mandates envisaged in the treaty, there are accountability mechanisms to check the 
powers of the Prosecutor. These include judicial oversight provided by the Pre-Trial Chamber 
of the ICC, role of the Assembly of State Parties and the UNSC.  
 
The most controversial of all the limitations is the role of the UNSC, which is generally seen 
as the source of the conflict between the ICC and the AU in relation to the cases in Libya and 
Sudan. Furthermore, prosecutorial discretion is subject to accountability mechanisms to the 
extent that the ICC Prosecutor is obliged to adhere to international human rights law of 
equality and non-discrimination and to ensure that the general principles of law apply in the 
exercise of prosecutorial discretion.  
 
Under the one court principle, the Prosecutor is not meant to act alone which means that the 
responsibilities of the ICC Prosecutor have to take into consideration the roles and powers of 
other organs of the Court, including the Registrar and the Presidency. One major attribute of 
the office of the Prosecutor is independence, and that gives the Prosecutor the opportunity to 
ensure that activities are within the confines of the provisions of the Rome Statute. However, 
in reality, these issues have not played out exactly as envisaged and will be discussed in 
detail in subsequent chapters.286  
 
The chapter also notes that the Prosecutor is under an obligation in all cases submitted before 
the office to conduct an analysis of the available information before deciding whether there is 
reasonable basis to proceed with an investigation. This is irrespective of the procedure 
through which the situation was referred to the Prosecutor.  
 
As the chapter has shown, the Prosecutor was initially supportive of suspending 
investigations and prosecutions of crimes that were not in the interests of justice. However, 
the release of the policy paper on the interests of justice marked a shift in the policy of the 
                                                 
286 See Chapters Six to Eight for extensive discussions.  
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Prosecutor.287 This chapter argues that the role of the UNSC under article 16 of the Rome 
Statute to suspend investigations or prosecutions before the Court does not affect the powers 
of the Prosecutor under article 53 of the Rome Statute to suspend investigations in the 
interests of justice. 
 
An overview of discussions in this study is necessary at this stage.  It has been established 
that provisions of the Rome Statute and RPE regulate the exercise of prosecutorial discretion 
during preliminary examinations. The Rome Statute and the RPE prescribe the substantive 
provisions of the Rome Statute while the Prosecutor has adopted general principles and 
policy objectives guiding the process which will be extensively discussed in the next chapter.  
 
 
                                                 
287 See Chapter five for further discussions on this issue.  
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Chapter Five 
The Principles and Policy Objectives guiding the exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion 
during Preliminary Examinations 
 
5.0 Introduction  
Previous chapters in this study have laid out the theory and evolution of the practice of 
prosecutorial discretion from national to international criminal justice systems. They have 
also discussed the legal framework guiding the exercise of prosecutorial discretion at the 
ICC, looking specifically at provisions of the Rome Statute as it pertains to the independence, 
powers and tenure of the ICC Prosecutor. In the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, the ICC 
Prosecutor has adopted policy documents, guidelines and practices over the years. This 
chapter analyses the Prosecutor‘s interpretation of his or her powers during preliminary 
examination.1  
 
During the tenure of the former Prosecutor of the ICC, Luis Moreno Ocampo, limited 
information on preliminary examinations was made available to the public. This created 
several problems for the office of the Prosecutor, including charges of inability of the 
Prosecutor to effectively articulate rationale for decisions made.2  
 
The situation gradually changed as the Prosecutor became more transparent about the status 
of preliminary investigations before the ICC. In addition, the Prosecutor released a draft 
policy paper on preliminary examinations in October 2010 signifying a major shift in the way 
preliminary examinations were to be handled.3 However, some scholarly materials written on 
the conduct of preliminary examinations relied on the draft policy paper.4  Which means that 
                                                 
1The general principles adopted by the office of the Prosecutor guiding the conduct of preliminary examinations 
are independence, impartiality and objectivity while the policy objectives are transparency, ending impunity by 
encouraging genuine national proceeding and the prevention of crimes. See paragraphs 25 and 93 of the Policy 
Paper on Preliminary Examinations.   
2 Ray Murphy ‗Gravity Issues and the International Criminal Court‘ (2006) 17 Criminal Law Forum 281 –315; 
Côté op cit at 171.  
3 ICC ‗Draft Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations,‘ 4 October 2010.   
4 Caban op cit; deGuzman op cit .  
 
116 | Page 
as at the time the authors made their arguments, the policy paper was still a draft. The current 
Prosecutor of the ICC, Fatou Bensouda, has made information on how the activities of the 
office of the Prosecutor are carried out more available to the general public. The publication 
of the final version of the policy paper on preliminary examinations in November 2013 is just 
one example. 
 
5.1 The ICC prosecutor and policy documents on the exercise of discretion  
The strategies and policies the Prosecutor has adopted have concerned the regulation of the 
office of the Prosecutor, the definition of the interests of justice, victims‘ participation, 
preliminary examination and sexual and gender based crimes.  
 
5.2 Prosecutorial discretion and rules of engagement   
As noted in the introductory chapter, several scholars have emphasised the need to adopt 
guidelines to regulate the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. 5  Chapter two has also 
emphasised principled decision making based on clear rules as a crucial element of neutrality. 
The Prosecutor duly adopted the views of the UN Guidelines on the Role of Prosecutors 
which provides that 'where prosecutors are vested with discretionary functions, the law or 
published rules or regulations shall provide guidelines to enhance fairness and consistency of 
approach in taking decisions in the prosecution process, including institution or waiver of 
prosecution.'6 
 
Guidelines will help the ICC Prosecutor to implement provisions of the Statute in a clear, 
unambiguous and systematic form. In addition, the provision of the guidelines will help 
observers of the ICC to measure the activities of the Court with the provisions of the 
guidelines. Furthermore, it will help reduce the criticisms that the ICC operates in a secretive 
manner. If critics understand how the decisions are made by the Prosecutor, their accusations 
of bias and partiality will probably decrease. The value of developing guidelines cannot be 
underestimated. For example, the UN guidelines on the role of prosecutors support the 
provision of rules and regulations guiding the exercise of prosecutorial discretion.  
                                                 
5 See chapter one, paragraph 1.4.  
6 Paragraph 17 UN Guidelines on the Role of Prosecutors adopted by the Eighth United Nations Congress on the 
Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Havana, Cuba, 27 August to 7 September 1990, available 
online at http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/RoleOfProsecutors.aspx,, accessed 19 September 
2016. 
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It will be recalled that in 2009, the AU issued a resolution requesting the ICC Prosecutor to 
‗review the 2009 regulations and 2007 Policy Paper regarding the guidelines and code of 
conduct of the exercise of Prosecutorial powers to include factors promoting peace and 
submit them to the ASP in order to ensure more accountability‘.7  This request presupposes 
that the exercise of prosecutorial discretion by the Prosecutor should be regulated by the 
ASP. In addition, the AU‘s resolution raises the question as to whether in the exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion, the Prosecutor should take into consideration factors promoting 
peace. The answer to this question is fluid.  
 
As already noted in chapter four, article 53 of the Rome Statute provides for factors to be 
considered before the initiation of investigations. Although 'interests of peace' is not clearly 
stated in the Statute, the 'interests of justice' can be said to encompass both peace and justice. 
However, the office of the Prosecutor has vehemently opposed this interpretation by arguing 
that there is a significant difference between the two concepts.8  
 
Different scholars have weighed in on the debate for prosecutorial guidance at the ICC. 
Schabas has suggested the introduction of ‗political guidance‘ to the Prosecutor as a way of 
improving the exercise of prosecutorial discretion.9  He argues that the lack of ‗political 
guidance may be one factor that explains the lack-luster performance of the Court in its first 
decade of activity‘.10  However, Schabas did not discuss which organ of the ICC or external 
body should be responsible for the role of ‗political direction or guidance‘ over the 
Prosecutor in the exercise of prosecutorial discretion.  
 
It is possible that the ASP may be called upon to play such a role as recommended by the 
AU. However, the suggestion by the AU did not gain any support amongst State Parties of 
the Statute. This is because the resolution is seen as an intrusion into the discretionary powers 
granted to the Prosecutor of the ICC.11 
 
                                                 
7 Report of the 2nd Ministerial Meeting on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 6 November 
2009 at Addis Ababa.   
8  See ICC 'Policy Paper on the Interests of Justice' September 2007 available online at https://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/library/organs/otp/ICC-OTP-InterestsOfJustice.pdf, accessed 8 January 2016.  
9 Schabas Unimaginable Atrocities op cit at 91.  
10 Ibid at 92. 
11 Goldston  op cit at  405. 
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Another problem with the suggestion of involving the ASP is the political nature of its 
existence. The ASP is made up of all State Parties to the Rome Statute and can be said to 
reflect the positions of member States that are parties to the Statute. In terms of its voting 
pattern, the ASP has a more democratic structure than that of the UNSC with its five 
permanent members, any one of whom can veto the decision of other members.  
 
One reason why the ASP could fit into such a role is that all members of the ASP are State 
Parties of the Rome Statute, unlike the UNSC where some members (both permanent and 
non-permanent) are not State Parties to the Statute. However, as things stand currently, the 
Statute does not provide for the regulation of the exercise of prosecutorial discretion through 
the ASP. This makes the recommendation of the AU somewhat superfluous unless the Statute 
is amended to ensure that the exercise of prosecutorial discretion is regulated by the ASP.  
 
However, the publication of the policy paper on preliminary examinations in November 2013 
makes it imperative that an evaluation of the policy paper should be undertaken to understand 
the procedural factors affecting the conduct of preliminary examinations. The policy paper 
divides the procedural factors into two main streams: general principles and policy 
objectives. 
 
5.3 Prosecutorial discretion and policy paper on preliminary examinations  
 
The policy paper adopted by the office of the Prosecutor describes the practice and policy of 
the ICC during the conduct of preliminary examinations. Its main objective is to assess 
whether the legal requirement for opening investigations are met. In other words, the 
Prosecutor weighs the facts and circumstances of a case to determine whether it meets the 
criteria set in the provisions of the Rome Statute. 12 
 
The policy paper on preliminary examination is a combination of several legal instruments of 
the ICC including the Rome Statute, RPE, Regulations of the ICC, Regulations of the office 
of the Prosecutor, prosecutorial strategies of ICC and other relevant policy documents. In 
addition, the practical experience gained by the Prosecutor and decisions of the ICC judges 
have proved beneficial in the process of developing the policy paper.13  
                                                 
12  Paragraph 19 of the policy paper on preliminary examination.  
13 Ibid.  
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The policy paper is a document reflecting an internal policy of the office of the Prosecutor 
and therefore does not give rise to legal rights. Furthermore, it is subject to revisions based on 
experiences of the Prosecutor and decisions of the Judges of the ICC.14 Although the policy 
paper is an internal document, the Prosecutor of the ICC has made it public in the 'interest of 
promoting clarity and predictability regarding the manner in which it applies the legal criteria 
set out in the Statute'.15 The Rome Statute does not require the Prosecutor to declare how 
prosecutorial discretion is exercised during preliminary examinations, however the need for 
'clarity and predictability' as stated by the Prosecutor is a key ingredient of the three-
dimensional neutral prosecutor.  
 
The policy paper affirms the fact that a major goal of the ICC is to put an end to impunity for 
the most serious crimes of concern to the international community by ensuring effective 
prosecution of international crimes at the national level. It therefore prioritises the primary 
responsibility of national judicial systems to hold accountable their citizens alleged to have 
committed international crimes. The activation of the jurisdiction of the Court is only 
possible in the absence of genuine national proceedings. As already noted in chapter four, 
although the prosecutor has discretion to open investigations after conducting preliminary 
examination, that power is subject to the authorisation of the pre-trial Chambers if it is a 
proprio motu investigation.16  
 
The policy paper recognises the argument already made in this study that the power of the 
ICC Prosecutor to open investigations is a unique role that distinguishes it from other 
international tribunals, including the ad-hoc and hybrid criminal justice institutions.17 This 
policy paper could be seen as an attempt to create a model policy for the three-dimensional 
neutral prosecutor as proposed by Green and Zacharias. This prosecutor according to the 
policy paper pursues general principles and policy objectives that clearly reflect the role of 
the ICC Prosecutor and envisaged in the Rome Statute. These principles and objectives are 
discussed extensively below.  
 
 
                                                 
14 Paragraph  20 of the policy paper on preliminary examination.  
15 Paragraph 21 of the policy paper on preliminary examination.  
16 See generally Articles 15(3), 42(1) and 53 (1) of the Rome Statute.  
17 See Chapter Three of the study  
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5.4  General principles of prosecutorial discretion during preliminary examinations  
 
Although the theory of neutrality identifies three distinct features, the office of the Prosecutor 
in the policy paper on preliminary examination has two main sub-divisions. These are the 
general principles guiding the conduct of preliminary examinations and the statutory factors 
applied at the preliminary examination in order to determine whether there is a reasonable 
basis to proceed with an investigation based on the information available.18  
It is necessary at this stage to examine the applicability of the principle of neutrality to the 
exercise of prosecutorial discretion during preliminary examinations at the ICC. The 
principle against bias, an aspect of neutrality, is implicit in the general principle of non-
discrimination recognised by the Rome Statute which provides that the application and 
interpretation of law must be consistent with internationally recognised human rights. This of 
course must be without any adverse distinction founded on grounds as gender, age, colour, 
language, religion, or belief, political opinion, national, ethnic or social origin, wealth, birth 
or other status.19  There is a relationship between bias and discrimination. If a decision is 
based on discrimination, it can be impeached on the basis of bias.  
5.4.1  Independence during preliminary examinations  
 
The first principle of the policy paper on preliminary examination is the independence of the 
office of the Prosecutor.20 According to the policy paper, independence means that ‗decisions 
shall not be influenced or altered by the presumed or known wishes of any party, or in 
connection with efforts to secure co-operation'.21  
 
As already discussed in chapter four of this study, the independence of the Prosecutor is 
crucial to the administration of justice. It is what differentiates the Prosecutor of the ICC 
from prosecutors at the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals.22 The Rome Statute guarantees the 
independence of the Prosecutor from external influences by forbidding the Prosecutor or any 
member of his or her staff from seeking or acting on instructions from any external source.  
 
                                                 
18 Paragraph 35 of the Policy Paper on Preliminary Examination.  
19 See Article 21(3) of the Rome Statute.  
20 Article 42 of the Rome Statute.  
21 Paragraph 26 of the Policy Paper on Preliminary Examination. 
22 Chapter four, paragraph 4.3.  
 
121 | Page 
The Policy paper states that during preliminary examinations, the Prosecutor has a duty to 
investigate all sides involved in a conflict and cannot be limited in a manner contrary to the 
provisions of the Statute.23 For example, when the Ugandan government submitted a referral 
to the Prosecutor in December 2003, it was with respect to the activities of the Lord‘s 
Resistance Army (LRA).24 However, the former Prosecutor correctly expanded the referral to 
include investigations into acts committed by both the LRA and government soldiers in the 
Northern Uganda conflict.25   
 
The preliminary examination of the Darfur situation offered an opportunity for the Prosecutor 
to demonstrate independence. He consulted several publicly available materials, although he 
also requested information from those with expertise on the conflict. Even though a list of 
potential suspects was handed to the Prosecutor by an International Commission of Inquiry, 
his decision to proceed with an investigation was based on his independent assessment of the 
conflict situation.  
 
Independence is the hallmark of the Prosecutor as noted in chapter four. Prosecutorial 
neutrality, related to non-partisanship, encompasses independence from actors within and 
outside the office of the prosecutor. These actors would likely influence decisions, 
compromising objectivity in weighing every piece of evidence before a decision is made. In 
this instance, the Prosecutor of the ICC would deal with a variety of factors and actors, 
including the states of those under preliminary investigation, ASP members, and also the 
UNSC members with controlling influence over the activities of the ICC.   
 
5.4.2  Impartiality during preliminary examinations 
 
Impartiality is one of the core principles governing the work of the Prosecutor during 
preliminary examinations. It involves a fair-minded and objective treatment of persons and 
issues, free from any bias or influence.26 The Statute provides that the Prosecutor and the 
                                                 
23 Paragraph 27 Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations. See generally Rule 44(2) RPE; Arts 12, 13, 14, 15, 
42(1) and 54(1)(a) of the Rome Statute.  
24 ICC ‗President of Uganda Refers Situation Concerning the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) to the ICC‘, ICC-
20040129-44, 29 January 2004.   
25 ICC ‗Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court Opens an Investigation into Northern Uganda‘,  
 ICC-OTP-20040729-65, 29 July 2004. 
26 Paragraph 29 of the Code of Conduct for the Office of the Prosecutor.  
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Deputy Prosecutor shall not participate in any matter in which their impartiality might 
reasonably be doubted on any ground. 27  The Policy Paper states that the Prosecutor is 
expected to be impartial during preliminary examinations and that ‗impartiality‘ requires the 
application of consistent methods and criteria, irrespective of the States or other parties 
involved. 28  Furthermore, geo-political implications, or geographical balance between 
situations, are not relevant criteria for determining whether or not to open an investigation 
into a situation under the Statute.29  
 
5.4.3 Objectivity during preliminary examinations  
 
Objectivity relates to the ability of the Prosecutor to investigate equally both incriminating 
and exonerating circumstances in order to establish the truth in a situation before the ICC.30 
Article 54(1) of the Rome Statute refers to the duties and powers of the prosecution during 
investigations, but the Prosecutor also maintains ‗objectivity‘ as a self-regulating principle 
during preliminary examination. 31  However, deciding whether the Prosecutor has been 
objective or otherwise during preliminary examinations is subject to debate. The principle of 
objectivity requires the Prosecutor to ensure the reliability of the information received, as 
well as its source.32 
 
These three principles of independence, impartiality and objectivity reflect the theory of 
neutrality adopted in chapter two of the study. In addition, a prosecutor that exhibiting the 
above traits approximates the three-dimensional neutral prosecutor as presented by Green and 
Zacharias.  It can also be added that a combination of independence, impartiality and 
objectivity should ordinarily lead to neutrality because these principles are the attributes of a 
plain reading of the word neutral. However, beyond these principles are the policy objectives 




                                                 
27 Article 42(7) of the Rome Statute; Rule 34(1) RPE. 
28 Paragraph 28 Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations.  
29 See Paragraph 29 Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations.  
30 Article 54(1) of the Rome Statute; Regulation 34(1) OTP Regulations.   
31 Paragraph 30 Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations. 
32 Paragraph 31 Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations.  
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5.5 Prosecutorial discretion and policy objectives guiding preliminary examinations 
 
The policy objectives that guide the exercise of prosecutorial discretion are transparency, 
ending impunity through positive complementarity and the prevention of international 
crimes.  
5.5.1 Transparency during preliminary examinations  
 
One of the themes addressed in the policy paper is transparency during preliminary 
examinations. Transparency is a process through which the Prosecutor promotes a better 
understanding of preliminary examinations through regular public engagements.  According 
to the policy paper, transparency involves making public the findings of each preliminary 
examination to all concerned stakeholders, the provision of reasoned decisions either to 
proceed or not to proceed with an investigation, and the publication of periodic reports 
showing how decisions on preliminary examinations are made. 33  The main goal of 
transparency during preliminary examinations is to ensure predictability in the activities of 
the Prosecutor without raising undue expectations that an investigation will be opened in 
every preliminary examination conducted by the Prosecutor.34 
 
These provisions represent a welcome departure from the previous policy of the Prosecutor, 
especially   during the tenure of the former Prosecutor Moreno Ocampo, where preliminary 
examinations were treated as confidential information with little or no information released to 
the public during the process.35 The lack of transparency in the early years of the operation of 
the ICC weakened the possibility of using preliminary investigations to spur national 
proceedings to deter the commission of international crimes within the jurisdiction of the 
ICC. 36    
                                                 
33 Paragraph 15 of the Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations.  
34 Paragraph 94 of the Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations.  
35 HRW argues that ‗[w]hile the OTP initially treated these preliminary examinations as confidential, it now 
routinely makes public the fact that it has initiated the examination and provides information on the different 
activities it is undertaking to further its analysis such as meetings with national authorities.‘ See HRW ‗Course 
Correction: Recommendations to the ICC Prosecutor for a More Effective Approach to ―Situations under 
Analysis‖, June 2011, 1, available online at http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/06/16/icc-course-correction, 
accessed 11 January 2016.  
36 Ibid at 3. 
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5.5.2 Ending impunity through positive complementarity during preliminary 
examinations  
 
Positive complementarity is a key policy objective of the Prosecutor during preliminary 
examinations. It will be recalled from the previous chapter that complementarity is a key 
factor in the determination of whether or not to proceed with an investigation during a 
preliminary examination.37 Under the Rome Statute, the Prosecutor has to ensure that a case 
is admissible using the legal criteria established in the Rome Statute under article 17. 
However, during a preliminary examination, the Prosecutor is expected to use the 
proceedings to spur the national government to investigate and prosecute international crimes 
within the jurisdiction of the Court that occurred in the State concerned. However, when the 
State remains inactive, unwilling and unable to carry out investigations and prosecutions, the 
Prosecutor intervenes to ensure there is no impunity for international crimes at national 
level.38   
 
Positive complementarity has been defined by the Prosecutor as a pro-active policy of co-
operation aimed at promoting national proceedings.39 It is regarded as a managerial concept 
that governs the relationship between the court and domestic jurisdictions on the basis of 
three cardinal principles: (a) the idea of a shared burden of responsibility, (b) the 
management of effective investigations and prosecutions, and (d) the two-pronged nature of 
the cooperation regime.40 
 
                                                 
37 See chapter four of the study.  
38 Paragraph 100 Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations. 
39  ICC ‗Prosecutorial Strategy 2009 ‐ 2012‘, 1 February 2010, available online at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/66A8DCDC-3650-4514-AA62-
D229D1128F65/281506/OTPProsecutorialStrategy20092013.pdf, accessed 19 September 2016; The ASP report 
of the Bureau on complementarity refers to positive complementarity as ‗all activities/actions whereby national 
jurisdictions are strengthened and enabled to conduct genuine national investigations and trials of crimes 
included in the Rome Statute, without involving the Court in capacity building, financial support and technical 
assistance, but instead leaving these actions and activities for States, to assist each other on a voluntary basis‘ 
See paragraph 16 Report of the Bureau on Stocktaking: Complementarity, available online at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ASP8R/ICC-ASP-8-51-ENG.pdf, accessed 11 January 2016. 
40 Carsten Stahn ‗Complementarity: A Tale of Two Notions‘ (2008) 19 Criminal Law Forum 87 at 113.  
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According to Burke-White, positive complementarity is also defined as a process by which 
the Prosecutor ‗would actively encourage investigation and prosecution of international 
crimes within the court‘s jurisdiction by States where there is reason to believe that such 
States may be able or willing to undertake genuine investigations and prosecutions and where 
the active encouragement of national proceedings offers a resource-effective means of ending 
impunity.‘41 However, that this policy has not been pursued effectively is evident in the 
manner the ICC Prosecutors have interpreted and applied the principle.  
 
According to Human Rights Watch, the Prosecutor has not used positive complementarity 
very effectively and its potentials are yet to be fully explored. 42 This is because the time that 
it takes to carry out a preliminary examination provides the ICC Prosecutor with 
opportunities to catalyze national proceedings. This can be understood as a component of 
'positive complementarity', that is, active efforts to see the complementarity principle put into 
practice through national prosecutions of ICC crimes. 
 
5.5.3 Prevention of international crimes during preliminary examinations 
 
The third and final policy paper on preliminary examinations deals with the prevention of 
international crimes. According to the Policy Paper, the Prosecutor performs an early 
warning function through public service announcements regarding crimes that appear to fall 
within the jurisdiction of the ICC.43 The Prosecutor argues publicising ICC activities will 
help in breaking the circle of impunity by deterring international criminals.44 For example, 
the Prosecutor has intervened in several situations currently under analysis by releasing 
reports that condemn crimes committed against civilians and threatening prosecution for 
alleged perpetrators of these crimes.  
 
In the Central African Republic, the Prosecutor argued that ‗deteriorating security situation 
… has contributed to the escalation of unlawful killings, sexual violence, recruitment of child 
                                                 
41 William Burke-White ‗Implementing a Policy of positive Complementarity in the Rome System of Justice‘ 
(2008) 19 Criminal Law Forum 59 - 85. 
42  HRW ‗Course Correction: Recommendations to the ICC Prosecutor for a More Effective Approach to 
―Situations under Analysis‖ June 2011, at 2. 
43 Paragraph 104 Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations.  
44 Paragraph 106 Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations.  
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soldiers and other grave crimes, across the country.‘ 45  In furtherance of the policy of 
preventing international crimes, the Prosecutor has issued statements in relation to situations 
in Georgia,46 Kenya,47 Guinea,48 South Korea,49 Nigeria,50 Côte d‘Ivoire51 and Mali.52 The 
preventive effects of these statements are, however, subject to debate. This is because the use 
of international criminal courts to deter future criminals is a highly contested issue.53 There is 
no general agreement on whether the ICC has had any deterrent or preventive effect on future 
criminals and their collaborators. Payam Akhavan has argued that the ICC‘s preventive effect 
is visible in Northern Uganda where the ICC helped to isolate the LRA thereby ending the 
conflict.54 The assertion is disputable to the extent that the ICC has been accused of derailing 
the proposed peace deal between the LRA and the government of Uganda. For example, 
regarding the involvement of the ICC in the Juba peace process, Kamari Clarke argues that 
the arrest warrants issued against the LRA were responsible for the failure of the Juba peace 
process.55  
 
                                                 
45 Statement of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Fatou Bensouda, in relation to the escalating 
violence in the CAR, 9 December 2013.  
46 Prosecutor's statement on Georgia, 14 August 2008..  
47 OTP statement in relation to events in Kenya, 5 February 2008..  
48 Statement of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Fatou Bensouda, on the occasion of the 28 
September 2013 elections in Guinea, 27 September, 2013. ICC Prosecutor confirms situation in Guinea under 
examination, 14 October 2009..  
49 ICC Prosecutor: Alleged war crimes in the territory of the Republic of Korea under preliminary examination, 
6 December 2010.  
50 ICC ‗OTP Statement on Electoral Violence in Nigeria‘ 21 April 2011. 
51 Statement by ICC Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo on the situation in Côte d‘Ivoire, 21 December 2010,  
ICC-OTP-20101221-PR617; Statement by ICC Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo on official visit to Côte 
d'Ivoire, 14 October 2011.  
52 Statement by ICC Prosecutor concerning Mali, 28 January 2013; Statement from the Office of the Prosecutor 
of the International Criminal Court, 24 April 2012.  
53 Payam Akhavan ‗Beyond Impunity: Can International Criminal Justice Prevent Future Atrocities?‘ (2001) 95 
American Journal of International Law 7- 31.  
54 Payam Akhavan ‗The Lord‘s Resistance Army Case: Uganda‘s Submission of the First State Referral to the 
International Criminal Court‘ (2005) 99 American Journal of International Law 403- 421.  
55 The Juba peace process was initiated by the former Vice-President of South Sudan, Riek Machar between the 
Government of Uganda and the LRA. The deliberations were inconclusive as the leader of the LRA Joseph 
Kony refused to sign the final peace deal. See Kamari Clarke ‗Kony 2012, the ICC, and the Problem with the 
Peace-and-Justice Divide‘ (2012) 106 Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the American Society of 
International Law 309 - 313. 
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From the foregoing discussion, it can be argued that the publication of the policy paper on 
preliminary examination is a positive development for the office of the Prosecutor as it was a 
significant shift for the office in the way preliminary examinations were carried out. In 
addition, the policy paper on preliminary examination recognised the fact that there was need 
for public scrutiny of the activities of the office leading to greater predictability of its actions.  
The policy paper also supports the argument for guidelines regulating the conduct of 
preliminary examinations.  
 
However, as has been noted in this chapter, the publication of the policy paper on preliminary 
examination has not totally removed the criticisms against the ICC for the conduct of 
preliminary examinations and what informs the decision to proceed. In addition, some of the 
reports produced under the policy paper on preliminary examination are yet to define clearly 
how the Prosecutor evaluates the decision whether to open an investigation or not.  Beyond 
the policy paper discussed above are other documents that regulate the exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion; they are discussed below and possible linkages are made to the 
policy paper on preliminary examination.    
 
5.6 Other policy papers regulating the exercise of prosecutorial discretion  
 
As already noted, there are several other policy papers that are relevant to the exercise of 
discretion beyond the policy paper on preliminary examinations. These are discussed below 
and their applicability to the issues under discussion are highlighted.  
 
5.6.1 The policy paper on the interests of justice  
 
In September 2007, Moreno Ocampo‘s administration adopted a policy paper on the meaning 
and interpretation of the interests of justice in article 53 of the Rome Statute.56According to 
this policy paper, ‗the issue of the interests of justice … represents one of the most complex 
aspects of the Treaty. It is the point where many of the philosophical and operational 
challenges in the pursuit of international criminal justice coincide (albeit implicitly), but there 
is no clear guidance on what the content of the idea is.‘57 During negotiations for the adoption 
                                                 
56Policy Paper on the Interests of Justice, September 2007.  
57 ICC Policy Paper on the Interests of Justice September 2007, 2. 
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of the Rome Statute, there was no consensus on the meaning of the interests of justice and the 
term has been subjected to different interpretations.58 
The policy paper deviated slightly from an earlier position taken by Moreno Ocampo on the 
meaning and interpretation of article 53 of the Statute. For instance, at the early stages of the 
investigation of international crimes committed in some situations in Africa, the Prosecutor 
stated that he had the discretion under article 53 of the Statute to discontinue investigations 
that were not in the interests of justice. For example, in April 2005, the former Prosecutor 
announced that he was considering suspending investigations in the Northern Uganda conflict 
for that reason.59 
 
Furthermore, during his speech to the UNSC in December 2005, Moreno Ocampo noted the 
importance of making an assessment under article 53 of the Rome Statute in the prosecution 
of international crimes in the Darfur conflict. He rightly stated that article 53(2)(c) gives the 
Prosecutor the discretion to consider whether a prosecution was in the interests of justice. He 
further stated that in the consideration of the interests of justice in relation to the Darfur 
conflict, the Prosecutor would consider the views of witnesses and victims of international 
crimes and observe various national and international efforts to achieve peace and security.  
                                                 
58 For example, Michael Scharf argues that article 53 of the Rome Statute, ‗reflect[s] ‗creative ambiguity‘ which 
could potentially allow the Prosecutor and judges of the ICC to interpret the Rome Statute as permitting 
recognition of an amnesty exception to the jurisdiction of the court.‘ See Michael Scharf ‗The Amnesty 
Exception to the Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court‘ (1999) 32 Cornell International Law Journal 
507 - 528; Manhoush Arsanjani  ‗International Criminal Court and National Amnesty Laws: The Future of the 
International Criminal Court‘ (1999) 93 American Journal of International Law 65 - 68; HRW ‗The Meaning of 
"the Interests of Justice" in Article 53 of the Rome Statute‘ 1 – 25, 1 June 2005.   
59According to Yves Sorokobi, the then spokesperson of the office of the Prosecutor: ‗If it is in the interest of 
justice to proceed with a peace agreement, the ICC is ready to suspend its investigation. The prosecutor was 
putting in simple terms what has always been the policy of the ICC. Any decision to suspend the investigation 
depends on judicial review and must be carried out according to specified guidelines. Article 53 of the Rome 
Statute … covers such a situation. The ICC continually assesses the developments on the ground in all its 
investigations, and if it becomes apparent that continuing the investigation is not in the interests of justice, the 
necessary action will be taken.‘ UN Integrated Regional Information Networks ‗Uganda: ICC could Suspend 
Northern Investigations – Spokesman‘, 18 April 2005; Louise Parrott ‗The Role of the International Criminal 
Court in Uganda: Ensuring that the Pursuit of Justice does not come at the Price of Peace‘ (2006) 1 Australian 
Journal of Peace Studies 1 - 29; Katherine Southwick ‗Investigating War in Northern Uganda: Dilemmas for the 
International Criminal Court (2005) 1 Yale Journal of International Affairs 105 - 119.  
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Ocampo also noted that his office had contacted several organisations as a prelude to making 
an ‗interests of justice‘ assessment.60  
 
However, Moreno Ocampo‘s later approach to the interests of justice changed from earlier 
propositions. This is because the former Prosecutor differentiated between the interests of 
peace and interests of justice.61 In the policy paper on the interests of justice published in 
2007 earlier referred to, Moreno Ocampo acknowledges the complementary role of national 
judicial systems through domestic prosecutions and alternative justice mechanisms in the 
pursuit of a broader justice.62 However, in relation to the discretion given to the prosecutor 
under article 53 of the Rome Statute, the policy paper argues that there is a difference 
between the interests of justice and interests of peace.63  
 
In making this statement, the policy paper differentiates between the interests of justice and 
interests of peace by placing peace and justice in different compartments. The statement 
further alludes to article 16 of the Rome Statute which provides that the UNSC may invoke 
its powers under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to defer investigations by the ICC.64 The 
former Prosecutor also argued that the interests of justice should not be used as a conflict 
management tool as this move would be contrary to the role of the Prosecutor in the Statute.65 
The former Prosecutor further stated that the feasibility of conducting effective investigation 
                                                 
60 ICC ‗Address by Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, to the United Nations 
Security Council‘ 13 December 2005, 1- 7. 
61 UN News Centre ‗International Criminal Court already Changing Behaviour, says Prosecutor‘ where the 
former Prosecutor, Luis Moreno Ocampo, argued that ‗[p]eace negotiations can be long and complicated. But I 
can‘t be involved in their aspects … The Security Council has noted that lasting peace requires justice and it‘s 
my role to help in that.  My duty is to end impunity and to contribute to the prevention of future crimes.‘ 2 July 
2007. 
62 ICC ‗Policy Paper on the Interests of Justice‘, September 2007.  
63 Ibid.  
64 Article 16 provides that ‗no investigation or prosecution may be commenced or proceeded with under this 
Statute for a period of 12 months after the Security Council, in a resolution adopted under Chapter VII of the 
Charter of the United Nations, has requested the Court to that effect; that request may be renewed by the 
Council under the same conditions.‘ See Ademola Abass ‗The Competence of the Security Council to Terminate 
the Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court‘ (2005) 40 Texas International Law Journal, 264 - 297.  
65 Paragraph 69 of the Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations provides that ‗the concept of the interests of 
justice should not be perceived to embrace all issues related to peace and security. In particular, the interests of 
justice provision should not be considered a conflict management tool requiring the Prosecutor to assume the 
role of a mediator in political negotiations: such an outcome would run contrary to the explicit judicial functions 
of the Office and the Court as a whole.‘ See Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, November 2013.  
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is not a relevant factor to be considered during preliminary examinations. This means that 
‗[w]eighing feasibility as a separate self-standing factor, moreover, could prejudice the 
consistent application of the Statute and might encourage obstructionism to dissuade ICC 
intervention.‘66  
 
The former Prosecutor also stated that ‗there is a strong presumption that investigations and 
prosecutions will be in the interests of justice, and therefore a decision not to proceed on the 
grounds of the interests of justice would be highly exceptional.‘67 The arguments by Moreno 
Ocampo that the use of interests of justice to defer the investigation and prosecution of 
international crimes should be an exceptional option are very persuasive. 68  However, it 
should be noted that the Statute does not differentiate between the pursuit of justice and 
peace. The preamble of the Rome Statute ‗recogni[ses] that … grave crimes threaten the 
peace, security and well-being of the world.‘69 Justice and peace are inter-related and the two 
concepts cannot be pursued in isolation.70  
 
                                                 
66 Ibid at 70.   
67 Paragraph 71 Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations.  
68  There is a difference between the interests of justice during preliminary examinations and during 
investigations. The Statute gives the Prosecutor a freer hand during investigations to consider the interests of 
justice before commencing prosecution of international crimes. See Art 53(1)(c) and 2(c) of the Rome Statute. 
69 Paragraph 3 of the Preamble to the Rome Statute.  
70 For example, the former UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan stated that ‗justice, peace and democracy are not 
mutually exclusive objectives, but rather mutually reinforcing imperatives.‘ Report of the Secretary General to 
the UNSC ‗The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post – Conflict Societies‘ S/2004/616, 23 
August 2004; Kai Ambos ‗The Legal Framework of Transitional Justice‘ Study Prepared for the International 
Conference ‗Building a Future on Peace and Justice‘, Nuremberg, 25 – 27 June 2007. Furthermore, the current 
UN Secretary-General, Mr Ban Ki-moon, has also argued that ‗[f]ighting impunity and pursuing peace are not 
incompatible objectives – they can work in tandem, even in an on-going conflict situation. This requires us to 
address very real dilemmas, and the international community must seize every opportunity to do so.‘ See the 
Message from Mr Ban Ki-moon, Secretary-General of the United Nations, for the Meeting on Building a Future 
on Peace and Justice in Kai Ambos, Judith Large and Marieke Wierda (eds) Building a Future on Peace and 
Justice: Studies on Transitional Justice, Peace and Development (2009) (emphasis in the original). The former 
Prosecutor of the ICC acknowledges the interaction between peace and justice by stating that ‗peace and justice 
are integrated; but they do not necessarily follow a linear peace-then-justice trajectory.‘ Luis Moreno Ocampo 
‗Integrating the Work of the ICC into Local Justice Initiatives‘ (2006) 21 American University International 
Law Review 497 - 503. 
 
131 | Page 
Some Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) support Moreno Ocampo‘s view that the 
interests of justice in article 53 of the Statute should be given a restrictive interpretation.71 
For example, HRW argues that the ‗[Prosecutor] should adopt a strict construction of the 
term ‗interests of justice‘ in order to adhere to the context of the Statute, its object and 
purpose, and to the requirements of international law.‘72 A failure to prosecute would be 
contrary to the object and purposes of the Statute.73  
 
HRW argues that it is the UNSC and not the Prosecutor that is empowered to act when an 
investigation or prosecution of international crimes is a threat to peace and security.74 HRW 
also argues that giving the Prosecutor the power make decisions based on political 
developments undermines the independence and integrity of the ICC.75 In addition, HRW 
questions the interpretations of participants at the Rome conference who argue that the 
interests of justice in article 53 of the Statute give the prosecutor an opportunity to recognise 
alternative justice mechanisms in the prosecution of international crimes.76  
 
In an open letter to the Prosecutor of the ICC, AI argues that article 53 of the Rome Statute 
does not give the Prosecutor the power to suspend investigations and that only the UNSC 
acting under article 16 of the Rome Statute has such powers.77 AI is also of the view that the 
                                                 
71 These NGOs include HRW, Amnesty International (AI) and International Federation for Human Rights 
(FIDH), Steering Committee members of the Coalition for the International Criminal Court (CICC). According 
to the CICC ‗[t]he Coalition‘s Steering Committee is comprised of a core group of member organisations which 
provide policy and program coherence for the Coalition‘s efforts and activities.‘ The Steering Committee 
members are: Adaleh Center for Human Rights Studies; AI; Andean Commission of Jurists; Asian Forum for 
Human Rights and Development (FORUM-ASIA); Asociación Pro Derechos Humanos (APRODEH-Perú); 
Civil Resource Development and Documentation Centre (CIRDDOC); FIDH; Georgian Young Lawyers 
Association (GYLA); Human Rights Network-Uganda (HURINET-Uganda); HRW; Justice Without Frontiers 
(JWF); No Peace Without Justice; Parliamentarians for Global Action; The Redress Trust; Women's Initiatives 
for Gender Justice; World Federalist Movement-Institute for Global Policy (WFM-IGP). 
72 HRW ‗Policy Paper: The Meaning of ―Interests of Justice‖ in article 53 of the Rome Statute‘ June 2005, 2. 
73 Ibid at 5. HRW argues that ‗the prosecutor may not fail to initiate an investigation or decide not to proceed 
with the investigation because of national efforts, such as truth commissions, national amnesties, or traditional 
reconciliation methods, or because of concerns regarding an on-going peace process, since that would be 
contrary to the object and purpose of the Rome Statute.‘  
74 Ibid. Paragraph 69 Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations. 
75 HRW Policy Paper op cit at 8.  
76 Ibid at 4.  
77 See AI ‗Open letter to the Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court: Comments on the Concept of 
the Interests of Justice‘, AI Index: IOR 40/023/2005, 17 June 2005. 
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suspension of investigations by the Prosecutor under article 53 of the Rome Statute would be 
prejudicial to the right of victims. 78  Furthermore, AI argues that the suspension of 
investigations would affect the perception of the general public in relation to the 
independence of the Prosecutor from external diplomatic or political pressure.79  Another 
NGO, FIDH argues that in any decision not to prosecute, the ‗prosecutor will have to account 
for the inevitably negative impact that a potential decision not to investigate or not to 
prosecute could have for the end of impunity, the prevention of the most serious crimes of 
international concern, and the lasting respect for and enforcement of international justice.‘80  
 
The views espoused by these NGOs have been endorsed by Errol Mendes.81 Mendes further 
argues that the UNSC is better equipped to deal with the issue of justice and security as 
`provided under the Rome Statute in order to avoid the ICC becoming enmeshed in 
politically charged situations.82  On the other hand, Pavel Cabal argues that ‗entrust[ing] 
―interests of peace‖ into the hands of the ICC might be even politically problematic.‘83 He 
further argues that ‗these political issues concerning the ―interests of peace‖ should be dealt 
with by the competent political organs (above all the UNSC) which should not try to ―make 
their life easier‖ by relying on the actions of the Prosecutor − who should insist on his non-
political, judicial role.‘84  
 
Article 16 of the Rome Statute empowers the UNSC to defer investigations and prosecutions 
of the ICC in the interest of international peace and security.85 However, it is suggested that 
the deferral of cases should not be exercised only by the UNSC under article 16 of the Rome 
Statute but should be expanded to accommodate the role of the Prosecutor in article 53 in a 
shared division of labour between the prosecutor and the UNSC. In addition, there is the 
                                                 
78 Ibid. 
79 Ibid.  
80 See FIDH ‗Comments on the Office of the Prosecutor's Draft Policy paper on ―the Interest of Justice‖, 14 
September 2006.  
81 Errol argues that ‗in determining whether to begin an investigation or prosecution…there is the strongest of 
presumptions in favour of seeking accountability for the most serious of crimes.‘ See Errol Mendes Peace and 
Justice at the International Criminal Court: A Court of Last Resort (2010) 33.  
82 Ibid at 34. 
83 Pavel Caban ‗Preliminary Examinations by the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court‘ 
(2011) Czech Yearbook of Public & Private International Law 199 - 216.  
84 Ibid.  
85 Henry Lovat ‗Delineating the Interests of Justice‘ (2006) 35 Denver Journal of International Law and Policy 
275 - 286.  
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political difficulty of obtaining a UNSC resolution. The conflict in Syria is a case in point 
where members of the UNSC have failed to agree on a resolution to refer the situation in 
Syria to the ICC due to the veto powers exercised by Russia and China.86  
 
5.6.2 The regulations of the office of the prosecutor 
 
The regulations of the office of the Prosecutor is another document that regulates the exercise 
of prosecutorial discretion during preliminary examinations and was alluded to in the policy 
paper discussed earlier in the chapter. The regulations entered into force on 23 April 2009.87 
These regulations have been adopted pursuant to provisions of the Statute and RPE.88 The 
regulations provide that in all operational activities of the office of the Prosecutor, whether at 
headquarters and in the field, the Prosecutor shall ensure that its members maintain their full 
independence and do not seek or act on instructions from any external source.89  
 
The regulation also provides that the Prosecutor shall make public its Prosecutorial Strategy 
and shall contribute to the Court‘s strategic plan.90 In addition, the Prosecutor is expected to 
publicise policy papers that reflect the key principles and criteria of the prosecutorial 
strategy.91 The regulations also provide that the office of the Prosecutor shall disseminate 
information of its activities to, and respond to enquiries from, States, international 
organisations, victims, non-governmental organisations and the general public, with a 
particular focus on the communities affected by the work of the office, as appropriate in co-
ordination with the registry.   
 
In addition, this document requires the office of the Prosecutor to sometimes ensure 
compliance with its statutory obligations and the decisions of the Chambers regarding 
                                                 
86 HRW ‗UN Security Council: Vetoes Betray Syrian Victims‘ In Face of Mounting Pressure, Russia, China 
Block ICC Referral‘ 22 May 2014, available online at http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/05/22/un-security-
council-vetoes-betray-syrian-victims, accessed 17 September 2016.  
87 Regulations of the Office of the Prosecutor entered into force on 23 April 2009. ICC-BD/05-01-09. 
88 Article 42 (2) of the Rome Statute and Rule 9 RPE. 
89 Regulation 13 of the Regulations of office of the Prosecutor.  
90 Regulation 14 (1) of the Regulations of office of the Prosecutor. 
91 See Regulation 14(2) of the Regulations of the office of the Prosecutor. These are Policy Paper on Sexual and 
Gender-Based Crimes (2014); Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations (2013); Policy Paper on Victims‘ 
Participation (2010); Policy Paper on the Interests of Justice (2003); Policy Paper on the Office of the 
Prosecutor and Annex to the Policy Paper: Referrals and Communications (2003).  
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confidentiality, and the safety and well-being of victims, witnesses, Office staff and other 
persons at risk on account of their interaction with the Court.92 Furthermore, the regulations 
instruct the office of the Prosecutor to contribute to the outreach strategies and activities of 
the ICC in general.93 Regarding the rights of victims within the jurisdiction of the ICC, the 
regulations provide that the office of the Prosecutor shall coordinate with the Victims 
Participation and Reparations Section of the Registry in seeking and receiving the views of 
the victims at all stages of work in order to be mindful of and to take into account their 
interests.94 
 
The regulations provide that preliminary examination and evaluation of a situation by the 
Prosecutor may be initiated on the basis of: (a) any information on crimes, including 
information sent by individuals or groups, States, intergovernmental or non- governmental 
organisations; (b) a referral from a State Party or the Security Council; or (c) a declaration 
pursuant to article 12, paragraph 3 by a State which is not a Party to the Statute.95 However, 
when a situation has been referred to the Prosecutor, he or she shall provide notice and other 
information to the Presidency in accordance with regulation 45 of the Regulations of the 
Court.96 
 
During the examination of information on crimes pursuant to the proprio motu powers,  the 
Prosecutor shall  make a preliminary distinction between: (a) information relating to matters 
which manifestly fall outside the jurisdiction of the Court;  (b) information which appears to 
relate to a situation already under examination or investigation or forming the basis of a 
prosecution, which shall be considered in the context of the ongoing activity; and (c) 
information relating to matters which do not manifestly fall outside the jurisdiction of the 
Court and are not related to situations already under analysis or investigation or  forming the 
basis of a prosecution, and which therefore warrant further examination in accordance with 
Rule 48 RPE.97 
 
                                                 
92 Regulation 15 (1) of the Regulations of the office of the Prosecutor.  
93 Regulation 15 (2) of the Regulations of the office of the Prosecutor. 
94 Regulation 16 of the Regulations of the office of the Prosecutor.  
95 Regulation 25 (1) of the Regulations of the office of the Prosecutor. 
96 Regulation 25 (2) of the Regulations of the office of the Prosecutor. 
97 Regulation 27 of the Regulations of the office of the Prosecutor. 
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The regulations provide that the Prosecutor shall send an acknowledgement in respect of all 
information received on crimes to those who provided the information. In addition, the 
Prosecutor may decide to make public such acknowledgement, subject to the Prosecutor‘s 
duty to protect the confidentiality of such information pursuant to Rule 46 RPE and 
regulation 21 of the ICC.98 In addition, the Prosecutor may decide to make public the Office‘s 
activities in relation to the preliminary examination of information on crimes under article 15, 
paragraph 1 and 2, or a decision under Article 15(6) that there is no reasonable basis to 
proceed with an investigation. In doing so, the office shall be guided inter alia by 
considerations for the safety, well-being, and privacy of those who provided the information 
or others who are at risk on account of such information in accordance with Rule 49 (1) 
RPE.99 In addition, whenever the Prosecutor intends to submit a request under Article 15(3) 
to the Pre-Trial Chamber, he or she shall provide notice and other information to the 
Presidency in accordance with regulation 45 of the regulations of the Court.100 
 
Before the Prosecutor can initiate an investigation or prosecution, the office shall produce an 
internal report analysing the seriousness of the information and considering the factors set out 
in article 53(1)(a)-(c), namely issues of jurisdiction, admissibility (including gravity), as well 
as the interests of justice, pursuant to Rules 48 and 104 RPE. The report shall be 
accompanied by a recommendation on whether there is a reasonable basis to initiate an 
investigation.101  
 
In order to assess the gravity of the crimes allegedly committed in the situation, the Office 
shall consider various factors including their scale, nature, manner of commission, and 
impact.102 Based on the report, the Prosecutor shall determine whether there is a reasonable 
basis to proceed with an investigation.103 The evaluation of the report shall continue for as 
long as the situation remains under investigation. In addition, when a preliminary 
examination is conducted in accordance with Article 53 (2), the provisions of the regulation 
are also applicable.104  When a situation has been referred to the Prosecutor pursuant to 
Article 13(b) and the Prosecutor has determined that there would be a reasonable basis to 
                                                 
98 Regulation 28(1) of the Regulations of the office of the Prosecutor.   
99 Regulation 28(2) of the Regulations of the office of the Prosecutor. 
100 Regulation 28(3) of the Regulations of the office of the Prosecutor. 
101 Regulation 29 (1) of the Regulations of the office of the Prosecutor. 
102 Regulation 29 (2) of the Regulations of the office of the Prosecutor. 
103 Regulation 29 (3) of the Regulations of the office of the Prosecutor. 
104 Regulation 29 (4) of the Regulations of the office of the Prosecutor. 
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initiate an investigation, the Prosecutor shall notify the UNSC through the Secretary-General 
of the United Nations.105  
 
In acting pursuant to Article 53 (1)(c) and 2(c), the Prosecutor shall base his or her decision 
on an internal report on the interests of justice submitted to Executive Committee of the 
office of the Prosecutor for consideration and approval. If the decision not to proceed is based 
solely on Article 53(1)(c) or 2(c), the Prosecutor shall promptly inform the Pre-Trial 
Chamber in accordance with Rule 105 (4 – 5) and 106.106 
 
Several points can be made from the discussions above on the regulations of the office of the 
Prosecutor of the ICC. The regulations form part of the tools used by Prosecutor during the 
process of deciding whether there are reasonable basis to open an investigation. Therefore, it 
is an important policy paper in the case studies discussed subsequently. The regulations insist 
on the independence of the Prosecutor and other officers of the office which is also a 
principle adopted for the three-dimensional neutral prosecutor in the theoretical framework 
used in this study. The regulation differentiates alternative ways through which preliminary 
examinations can be activated. The legal framework guiding the regulations is rooted in the 
provisions of the Rome Statute and RPE.  Finally and as already noted, it is part of the core 
policy papers for the exercise of discretion during preliminary examination, used before the 
official adoption of the policy paper on preliminary examinations in 2013.  
 
Although the regulations of the office of the Prosecutor can be seen as a policy of the office, 
it is part of the journal of the ICC and therefore the Prosecutor is under obligation to make its 
provisions public since it is a legal text of the ICC. A distinction needs to be made regarding 
the policies and strategies of the office of the Prosecutor and the official journal of the 
ICC.107 
                                                 
105 Regulation 30 of the Regulations of the office of the Prosecutor. 
106 Regulation 31 of the Regulations of the office of the Prosecutor. 
107 The official journal of the ICC was created pursuant to regulation 7 of the Regulations of the Court and 
contains the following texts and amendments there to: (a)The Rome Statute; (b)The Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence; (c)The Elements of Crimes; (d) The Regulations of the Court; (e)The Regulations of the Office of the 
Prosecutor; (f)The Regulations of the Registry; (g)The Code of Professional Conduct for counsel; (h)The Code 
of Judicial Ethics; (i)Staff rules of the International Criminal Court;(j) The Staff Regulations; (k)The Financial 
Regulations and Rules; (l)The Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities of the International Criminal Court; 
(m)Agreement between the International Criminal Court and the United Nations; (n)The Headquarters 
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The regulation of the office of the Prosecutor provides that the ICC Prosecutor shall develop 
and apply a consistent and objective method for the evaluation of sources, information and 
evidence.108 In addition, the Prosecutor has to take into account the credibility and reliability 
of the sources, information and evidence, and shall examine information and evidence from 
multiple sources as a means of bias control. In addition to several other provisions, the 
regulations of the office of the Prosecutor make provision for the exercise of discretion 
during preliminary examinations and evaluation of information.  
 
5.6.3  The code of conduct for the office of the Prosecutor 
 
The code of conduct for the office of the Prosecutor is another policy paper used during 
preliminary examinations.  It was adopted in September 2013 under the leadership of Fatou 
Bensouda. Its main objective is to put into operation the mandate and responsibilities of the 
office of the Prosecutor.109 Despite the importance of a code of conduct for the office of the 
Prosecutor, the former Prosecutor, Moreno Ocampo was very reluctant to adopt one,  fueling 
the suspicion that there was lack of clarity and predictability in the activities of the office of 
the Prosecutor.110 
 
In accordance with Article 42 of the Statute, the office of the Prosecutor acts independently 
as a separate organ of the Court in the execution of its mandate. Members of the office of the 
Prosecutor shall exercise their functions free of any external influences, inducements, 
pressures, threats or interference, direct or indirect.111 In addition, impartiality is one of the 
core principles governing the work of the Office. Impartial conduct encompasses the fair-
minded and objective treatment of persons and issues, free from any bias or influence.112 
Members of the office of the Prosecutor are expected not to participate in any matter in which 
their impartiality might reasonably be doubted on any ground, and shall request to be excused 
from any matter as soon as grounds for disqualification arise.113 
                                                                                                                                                       
Agreement with the Host State; (o)Any other material as decided by the Presidency in consultation with the 
Prosecutor and/or the Registrar.  
108 Regulation 24 of the Office of the Prosecutor, IC-BD/05-01-09, entered into force 23rd April 2009.  
109 ICC ‗Code of Conduct for the Office of the Prosecutor‘ 5 September 2013.   
110 Milan Markovic ‗The ICC Prosecutor‘s Missing Code of Conduct‘ (2011) 47 Texas International Law 
Journal 201 – 236. 
111 Section 21 of the Code of Conduct for the Office of the Prosecutor.  
112 Section 29 of the Code of Conduct for the Office of the Prosecutor. 
113 Section 31 of the Code of Conduct for the Office of the Prosecutor. 
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The code of conduct is an important policy document of the office of the Prosecutor. It 
clearly adopts some of the principles in the theory of neutrality already discussed in chapter 
two. These include independence, impartiality, objectivity, non-bias, non-partisanship etc. 
Thus. a Prosecutor that adheres to the provisions of the code of conduct will probably 
conform to the model of the three-dimensional neutral prosecutor.  
 
5.6.4 The prosecutor’s strategic plan 
 
The Prosecutor‘s Strategic plan published in October 2013 is the current policy of the 
Prosecutor dealing with strategies and policies of the Prosecutor and was developed under the 
leadership of Fatou Bensouda, who is the current Prosecutor of the ICC. It reviews previous 
prosecutorial strategies and adopts new ones to meet the changing and challenging 
environment in which the Prosecutor operates. These strategic plans and policies are relevant 
sources when interpreting the obligations on the Prosecutor under the Rome Statute. In 
addition, these documents benefitted from public consultations which enhanced their quality, 
outputs and acceptability.114 It is easily noticeable in the strategic plan that there is a renewed 
interest in improving the conduct of preliminary examinations, necessitating the review of 
previous prosecutorial policies.  
 
The change in strategy led to the adoption of six strategic goals reflecting the importance of 
preliminary examinations in the activities of the ICC.115  The plan to conduct ‗impartial, 
independent, high-quality, efficient and secure preliminary examinations, investigations and 
prosecutions‘ presupposes that the criminal justice process of the Prosecutor commences with 
                                                 
114 The ICC organises a yearly ICC-NGO dialogue where issues relating to the administration of justice are 
discussed. In addition, during the yearly Assembly of States Parties of the ICC, officials of the ICC including 
the Prosecutor, are invited to discuss ongoing preliminary examinations, investigations and general activities of 
the Court.  
115  The current strategic goals of the Prosecutor are to: (1) Conduct impartial, independent, high-quality, 
efficient and secure preliminary examinations, investigations and prosecutions; (2) Further improve the quality 
and efficiency of the preliminary examinations, the investigations and the prosecutions. (3) Enhance the 
integration of a gender perspective in all areas of [our] work and continue to pay particular attention to sexual 
and gender based crimes and crimes against children. (4) Enhance complementarity and co-operation by 
strengthening the Rome System in support of the ICC and of national efforts in situations under preliminary 
examination or investigation. (5) Maintain a professional office with specific attention to gender and nationality 
balance, staff quality and motivation, and performance management and measurement. (6) Ensure good 
governance, accountability and transparency. See ICC ‗Strategic plan June 2012-2015‘ 11 October 2013, 1 – 43.  
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preliminary examinations.116 This is the connection the previous Prosecutor of the ICC failed 
to make.  
 
However, the adoption of a strategy is very different from its implementation. The 
development is an acknowledgement that the success of the activities of the Prosecutor will 
not entirely depend on the number of investigations and prosecutions conducted but the 
ability to conduct preliminary examinations.  In fact, the former Prosecutor, Moreno Ocampo 
had argued that the success of the ICC should not be measured by the number of cases that 
get to the Court but by the ability of the ICC to spur domestic judicial institutions into 
action.117  
 
5.8 Conclusion  
 
This chapter has analysed the policy paper on preliminary examination and other critical 
policy documents adopted by the office of the Prosecutor. The policy paper on preliminary 
examination is derived from provisions of the Rome Statute and RPE and other policies like 
the policy paper on the interests of justice, regulations of the office of the Prosecutor and 
code of conduct for staff of the office of the Prosecutor.  
 
The policy paper on preliminary examination articulates the understanding of the ICC 
Prosecutor on the meaning and application of the interests of justice and clearly deviates from 
an earlier understanding and interpretation given by the former Prosecutor. As noted, this 
interpretation tries to differentiate between the interests of justice and peace but fails to show 
how this differentiation applies in practice, as it ignores already developed linkages between 
the pursuit of peace and interests of justice.  
 
The Regulation of the office of the Prosecutor provides for the independence of staff of the 
office of the Prosecutor by insisting that staff of the office of the Prosecutor should not seek 
or act on instructions from an external source. In addition, the regulations provide that the 
Prosecutor should make the prosecutorial strategy of the office public and also contribute to 
                                                 
116 Ibid.  
117Paragraph 10 of the Report on Prosecutorial Strategy 2006; ICC ‗Election of the Prosecutor, Statement by Mr. 
Moreno Ocampo‘   ICC-OTP-20030502-10, 22 April 2003; Carsten Stahn ‗The Future of International Criminal 
Justice‘, The Hague Justice Portal 2009, 1-11.   
 
140 | Page 
the overall strategy of the ICC. The regulations also provide information on how preliminary 
examinations should be carried out.  
 
The code of conduct of the office of the Prosecutor provides for the conduct of the staff of the 
Prosecutor. The code amongst other things provides for the independence and impartiality of 
the office of the Prosecutor. In addition, staff members are expected not to engage in any 
conduct or participate in any matter in which their impartiality might be in question. The 
current strategic plan adopted by the office of the Prosecutor plans to improve the conduct of 
preliminary examinations which will necessitate a review of previous prosecutorial policies 
adopted by the office.   
 
The chapter also noted that the policy paper delineates the principles and policy objectives 
which govern the exercise of discretion. The principles are (a) independence, (b) impartiality 
and (c) objectivity, while the policy objectives are: (a) transparency, (b) ending impunity 
through positive complementarity, and (c) preventing international crimes during preliminary 
examinations. 
 
From the foregoing, it is clear that the publication of the policy paper on preliminary 
examination by the Prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, is an improvement in the activities of the 
former Prosecutor, Moreno Ocampo, as the factors and policy objectives that guide the 
discretion exercised during preliminary examination are now made public. However, there 
are still difficulties  as the communication of the office of the Prosecutor in relation to these 
policies and how they galvanise national consciousness in the investigation and prosecution 
of international crimes is not yet clearly stated. In addition, the approach of the Prosecutor 
does not clearly prioritise positive complementarity, which is a major principle behind the 
setting-up of the ICC.  The concluding chapter of this study offers recommendations on how 
these weaknesses can be  remedied.  
 
A principle of the theory of neutrality is that the prosecutor should engage in non-partisan 
decision making which can be attributed to the general principles of independence and 
objectivity in the policy paper on prosecutorial discretion.  According to the policy paper on 
preliminary examinations, independence means that ‗decisions shall not be influenced or 
altered by the presumed or known wishes of any party, or in connection with efforts to secure 
co-operation.118  
                                                 
118 Paragraph 26 of the Policy Paper on Preliminary Examination. 
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The independence of the activities of the Prosecutor is crucial in the administration of 
justice. 119  It is what differentiates the Prosecutor of the ICC from prosecutors at the 
Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals. The Rome Statute guarantees the independence of the 
Prosecutor from external influences.  It also forbids the Prosecutor or any member of his or 
her staff from seeking or acting on instructions from any external source.120 
 
During preliminary examinations, the Prosecutor must investigate all sides involved in a 
conflict and cannot be limited in a manner contrary to the provisions of the Statute.121 For 
example, when the Ugandan government submitted a referral to the Prosecutor in December 
2003, it was with respect to the activities of the Lord‘s Resistance Army (LRA).122 However, 
the former Prosecutor subsequently expanded the referral to include investigations into acts 
committed by the LRA and government soldiers in the northern Uganda conflict.123  
 
Independence of the Prosecutor also means that ‗decisions shall not be influenced or altered 
by the presumed or known wishes of any party, or in connection with efforts to secure co-
operation.‘124 The preliminary examination of the Darfur situation offered an opportunity for 
the Prosecutor to demonstrate independence. He consulted several publicly available 
materials, although he also requested for information from those with expertise on the 
conflict. Even though a list of potential indictees was handed to the Prosecutor by an 
International Commission of Inquiry, his decision to proceed with an investigation was based 
on his independent assessment of the conflict situation.  
 
Another principle of neutrality argues that prosecutors should base their decisions and 
activities on readily identifiable and consistently applied criteria.125  It is argued that the 
adoption of policy papers by the office of the Prosecutor of the ICC tries to achieve this aim. 
                                                 
119 Paragraph 21 of the Code of Conduct of the Office of the Prosecutor.  
120 Article 42 of the Rome Statute.  
121 Paragraph 27 Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations. See generally Rule 44(2) RPE; Article's 12, 13, 14, 
15, 42(1) and 54(1)(a) of the Rome Statute.  
122 ICC ‗President of Uganda Refers Situation Concerning the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) to the ICC‘, ICC-
20040129-44, 29 January 2004.  
123 ICC ‗Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court Opens an Investigation into Northern Uganda‘,  
 ICC-OTP-20040729-65, 29 July 2004. 
124 Paragraph 26 Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations. 
125 Ibid. 
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However, the question is whether there is a legal obligation for prosecutors to apply 
consistent and readily identifiable criteria in the exercise of discretion.  
 
While it is desirable for the ICC Prosecutor to be consistent in using identifiable criteria, the 
discretion on what modalities to adopt is still within the powers of the Prosecutor. In addition, 
although some countries have made public the criteria for the exercise of discretion in their 
jurisdiction, that decision whether to do so is within the powers of the prosecutor unless there 
is a law or constitutional provision that mandates the prosecutor to make the criteria for the 
exercise of prosecutorial discretion public. Even when these documents are made public, they 
only serve a limited purpose and cannot guarantee rights to potential litigants. 
 
In this instance, the adoption of the policy paper on preliminary examination achieves the 
purpose of making public the procedure of exercising prosecutorial discretion during 
preliminary examinations. However, it should be noted that the Rome Statute does not place 
an obligation on the Prosecutor to make public the criteria under which decisions are made 
during preliminary examinations. The criticisms and the sensitive nature of the office of the 
Prosecutor has made this development inevitable. 
 
There is a clear convergence between the policy papers discussed here and the theory of 
neutrality adopted as the framework for this study. Although there are variations in the ways 
these principles and policies are used, these are to a large extent minimal. As already noted in 
chapter two, another issue that may be problematic is the fact that the arguments  presented 
by Green and Zacharias were modeled on the American legal system.  This is because, issues 
of death sentence and plea bargain which features prominently in the Unites States Criminal 
Justice system is not applicable to the ICC. This challenge is also minimal as the study has 
argued that the ICC is an amalgam of different legal systems as discussed in Chapter three. 
Therefore, the use of a theory advanced for a domestic legal system for an international 
justice institution is not problematic, as long as the parameters of comparison are clearly 
defined.  
 
It will be recalled that the aim of this study is to explore the extent and scope of prosecutorial 
discretion during preliminary examination and a key question to be answered is how the ICC 
Prosecutor has understood and applied this key discretion.126  In order to answer this question 
systematically, the theory of neutrality was adopted which argues that a three-dimensional 
                                                 
126 Chapter one, paragraph 1.3 
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neutral prosecutor should be non-biased, non-partisan and principled. 127  In addition, the 
prosecutor is expected to be independent, objective and non-political.128  
 
The policy paper adopted by the ICC Prosecutor discussed extensively in this chapter argues 
that the Prosecutor should be independent, impartial and objective. In addition, the Prosecutor 
should be transparent, end impunity using positive complementarity, and prevent the 
commission of crimes during preliminary examination. The question arises as to whether 
there a common denominator between the two propositions. This study argues that there are 
several of them. 
 
A three-dimensional neutral prosecutor as proposed by Green and Zacharias cannot be un-
biased, non-partisan and principled without being independent, objective and impartial, as 
stated in the policy paper on preliminary examinations. In addition, the ICC Prosecutor 
cannot be transparent, end impunity through positive complementarity and prevent 
international crimes during preliminary examinations without been independent, objective 
and non-political, as extensively discussed by Green and Zacharias.  
 
It is submitted that the policies and principles used in the theory of prosecutorial neutrality 
and policy paper on preliminary examination are used interchangeably. They are connected 
and aim at the highest ethics of prosecutorial discretion and therefore can be used to evaluate 
the activities of the Prosecutor of the ICC in the case studies discussed in subsequent chapters 
of this thesis.  
 
Despite the adoption of the policies and principles described above, it does not seem as if 
things have changed much. Preliminary examination is still being conducted in a mechanical 
manner that makes both the public and even the office of the Prosecutor lose the significance 
of the opportunity. Preliminary examinations should be used to show the importance of the 
ICC and its deterrent effect. They should also be used to galvanise support for national 
prosecution of crimes under the principle of positive complementarity.129  
 
                                                 
127 Chapter two, paragraph 2.3.1 
128 Ibid.  
129 See Claire Grandison ‗Maximizing the Impact of ICC Preliminary Examinations‘ (2012) 19 Human Rights 
Brief 49, available online at http://hrbrief.org/2012/02/maximizing-the-impact-of-icc-preliminary-examinations/, 
accessed 11 January 2016.  
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It is this 'greater impact outside the court room' that the ICC Prosecutor should aim at 
achieving in the exercise of discretion during preliminary examinations. The present conduct 
of these examination does not have that result, as several opportunities are lost due to the 
inability of the Prosecutor to articulate a coherent policy and  implement it with a practical 
and understandable decision-making process.  
 
 The next chapter introduces the first case studies, which are those of Uganda and the Central 
African Republic. The preliminary examinations were initiated through self-referrals by the 
governments of Uganda and the Central African Republic.  
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Chapter Six 
Self-Referrals and the Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion during Preliminary 




This chapter is about the first case study, focussing on the preliminary examinations 
conducted in Uganda and the Central African Republic (CAR). As was pointed out in the 
introduction, the two case studies were chosen because they are self-referrals, meaning that 
the situations were brought to the attention of the Prosecutor of the ICC by the governments 
concerned.1 It should be noted that by March 2016, seven preliminary examinations had been 
commenced through self-referrals. These include preliminary examinations on the Central 
African Republic I and II, the Comoros,2 the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mali, South 
Korea and Uganda.3 Four of these resulted in a decision to proceed with an investigation; 
those in respect of the Comoros and South Korea did not proceed to the investigation stage.4   
 
Uganda and the CAR provide a good template to carry out comparative analysis of the 
activities of the ICC Prosecutor in the two countries. The two situations were referred to the 
ICC by the states concerned. This means that the Uganda and CAR activated the jurisdiction 
of the Court. In addition, the preliminary examination in the two countries gives an 
opportunity to evaluate the similarities and differences in approach between the former and 
current ICC Prosecutors. Focusing on these two cases also allows for discussions on the 
preliminary examinations carried out on situations that were referred by the UNSC or 
                                                 
1 see Chapter one, paragraph 1.6.  
2 The self-referral by Comoros refers partly to the conflict between Israel and Palestine and relates specifically 
to the incidents that took place aboard a vessel registered in Comoros. Article 12 (3) of the Rome Statute 
provides that the Court may exercise jurisdiction in the State on whose territory the conduct in question 
occurred, or if the crime was committed on board a vessel or aircraft, in the State of registration of that vessel or 
aircraft.  
3 See Annexure I of the study for details of all preliminary examinations conducted from 2002 to 2015. See also 
ICC 'Preliminary Examinations' available online at https://www.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/icc/structure%20of%20the%20court/office%20of%20the%20prosecutor/comm%20and%20ref
/Pages/communications%20and%20referrals.aspx, accessed 6 February 2016.  
4 Ibid 
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initiated by the Prosecutor using propro motu powers. These case studies are discussed 
further in subsequent chapters of the study.  
 
The two previous chapters of the study looked at the legal and theoretical basis of 
prosecutorial discretion. In addition, the chapters inquired whether the Rome Statute provide 
sufficient guidance on the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. The objective of this chapter 
and subsequent ones in the study is to investigate how the Prosecutor has exercised discretion 
in practice. The critical questions examined are how has the Prosecutor understood and 
applied prosecutorial discretion during preliminary examinations, and whether the 
Prosecutor's understanding and practice during preliminary examinations is legally 
defensible? The key contribution of this chapter is to evaluate the consistency of the ICC 
Prosecutor in the application of the Rome Statute and the policies adopted in relation to State 
Parties referral.   
 
6.1 Historical contest of the Northern Uganda conflict  
 
For a proper understanding of the case study on Uganda, it is pertinent to give a background 
to the conflict that resulted in the self-referral of the case to the ICC. The conflict in Uganda 
is deeply rooted in the politics of instability and inequality in Uganda caused by colonial 
politics, military dictatorships and poor administration by civilian governments.5 The conflict 
raged for almost two decades with little international attention and was referred to by Jan 
Egeland in 2003 as ‗the biggest forgotten, neglected humanitarian emergency in the world 
today‘.6 The involvement of the ICC after 2003 changed the dynamics of the conflict. It also 
brought attention to the plight of victims, especially women and children who had borne the 
brunt of the war for several years.  
 
Christian missionaries arrived in Buganda kingdom in 1870 and Uganda became a British 
protectorate in 1894.7 The country gained independence from the British government in 1962 
                                                 
5 Hema Chatlani ―Uganda: A Nation in Crisis‖ (2007) 37 California Western International Law Journal, 277 - 
297.   
6 Agence France-Presse ‗Uganda War in northern Uganda world's worst forgotten crisis: UN Report‘ 11 
November 2003 available online at http://reliefweb.int/report/uganda/war-northern-uganda-worlds-worst-
forgotten-crisis-un, accessed 6 February 2016. 
7 Chris Dolan Social Torture: The Case of Northern Uganda, 1986 – 2006 (2009) New York and Oxford: 
Berghahn Books 41.  
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and is a member of the East African Community.  The British colonial government has been 
accused of using a divide and rule strategy in Uganda. While they favoured the south for 
economic and political favours, the north was reserved as a breeding ground for Uganda‘s 
future military engagements.8  While southern Uganda was economically viable, the north 
was impoverished and militarised. According to International Crisis Group, ‗[t]he post-
colonial governments of Milton Obote and Idi Amin found this formula politically expedient, 
which in turn further fuelled ethnic polarisation and the militarisation of politics‘.9 
 
Milton Obote, the former Prime Minister (1962–70) and President of Uganda (1966–71, 
1980–85), used the military as a means of political control, including the sacking of the 
Kabaka of Buganda, the traditional leader and constitutional monarch of the Buganda region 
of modern Uganda.10  Idi Amin, who later became the Head of State after a coup d‘état 
against Obote, also used the military to suppress any dissent.11 The return of Obote from 
1980–1985 after a general election worsened the situation as the military became more 
politicised, escalating the political and economic tension between the South and the North.12 
 
When General Tito Okello Lutwa removed Milton Obote from power in 1985, he was helped 
by Acholi soldiers who had found their voice back into the Uganda political power struggle.13 
However, this romance was short-lived as Yoweri Kaguta Museveni overthrew the Okello 
government with his National Resistance Movement (NRM) in January 1986.14 This was 
                                                 
8 Refugee Law Project ‗Behind the Violence: Causes, Consequences and the Search for Solutions to the war in 
northern Uganda‘ February 2004, Refugee Law Project Working Paper No. 11 at 10, available online at 
http://www.refugeelawproject.org/working_papers/RLP.WP11.pdf , accessed 11 January 2016.    
9 International Crisis Group (ICG) ‗Northern Uganda: Understanding and Solving the Conflict‘ ICG Africa 
Report 14 April 2004, 2.  
10 Aili Tripp ‗The Politics of Constitution Making in Uganda‘ in Laurel Miller and Louis Aucoin (eds) Framing 
the State in Times of Transition: Case Studies in Constitution Making (2010) Washington DC: US Institute of 
Peace Press, 160. 
11 Francis Ssekandi and Cos Gitta ‗Protection of Fundamental Rights in the Uganda Constitution‘ (1994) 26 
Columbia Human Rights Law Review 191 at 196.  
12 Frances Stewart and Meghan O'Sullivan ―Democracy, Conflict and Development - Three Cases‖ June 2008, 
Queen Elizabeth House Working Paper 1- 38.  
13 Ernest Welker ‗South Africa in Context‘ (1985) 25 Economic Education Bulletin, 1 - 19.  
14 Sverker Finnstrom ‗Wars of the Past and War in the Present: The Lord‘s Resistance Movement/ Army in 
Uganda‘ (2006) 76  Africa, 200.  
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despite a peace agreement signed between government of Tito Okello and the NRM led by 
Yoweri Museveni.15   
 
After the fall of Tito Okello‘s government, the soldiers who had supported him, known as the 
Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA), retreated across the border into the Sudan in July 
1986, fearing that there would be a massacre of those who stayed at the seat of power in 
Kampala. The activities of the NRM soldiers when they reached northern Uganda 
exacerbated an already dire situation. The NRM soldiers were accused of carrying out 
executions and massive human rights atrocities against the population in northern Uganda. 
UNLA soldiers harboured ill feelings against the NRM leadership for not keeping to the 
terms of the peace agreement signed in Kenya and because of the atrocities committed in 
northern Uganda.16   Most of the UNLA soldiers re-emerged in northern Uganda as the 
Uganda People‘s Democratic Army (UPDA) and established a political wing known as 
Uganda People‘s Democratic Movement (UPDM).17 
 
A peace agreement signed in Gulu in 1988 ended most of their rebellion against the NRM 
government.18 However, it also led to the breakup of the UPDA as some members were 
interested in the peace process, while others did not want to negotiate peace with the NRM 
government. One commentator  believes that some members of the UPDA who refused to 
surrender to the NRM joined forces with Alice Auma ‗Lakwena‘ and her Holy Spirit 
Movement (HSM).19 However, when the HSM was defeated, the Lord‘s Resistance Army 
(LRA) led by Joseph Kony emerged as the foremost rebel group in Uganda.  
 
6.1.1 Uganda's Self-referral and the LRA Conflict  
 
The escalation of the conflict between the LRA and Uganda forces in 2002 prompted the 
President of the Government of Uganda in December 2003 to refer the case concerning the 
                                                 
15 The Uganda Peace Talks Agreement for the Restoration of Peace to the Sovereign State of the Republic of 
Uganda between the Government of Uganda and the National Resistance Movement, 17 December 1985.   
16 Nidal Jurdi The International Criminal Court and National Courts: A Contentious Relationship (2011) Surrey 
and Burlington: Ashgate, 136.  
17 Ibid at 137. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid at 137. 
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LRA to the ICC.20 Although the conflict had lasted for more than a decade before 2002, it is 
important to note that the jurisdiction of the ICC only commenced after the Rome Statute 
entered into force in July 2002.  
 
After the preliminary examination and conclusion of investigation, the Prosecutor applied to 
the Pre-trial chambers for the issuance of arrest warrants. Subsequently, Pre-Trial Chamber II 
of the ICC issued a warrant of arrest unsealed in October 2005 against five LRA commanders 
following a request made by the Prosecutor in May 2005.21  
 
According to the ICC Prosecutor, Joseph Kony is allegedly criminally responsible for 12 
counts of crimes against humanity and 21 counts of war crimes.22 His deputy, Vincent Oti is 
also charged with committing crimes against humanity and war crimes. 23  Late Okot 
                                                 
20 ICC ―President of Uganda refers situation concerning the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) to the ICC‖ 29 
January 2004; Mohammed El Zeidy ‗The Ugandan Government Triggers the First Test of the Complementarity 
Principle: An Assessment of the First State‘s Party Referral to the ICC‘ (2005) 5 International Criminal Law 
Review  83 - 120; Payam Akhavan ‗The Lord‘s Resistance Army Case: Uganda‘s Submission of the First State 
Referral to the International Criminal Court‘ (2005) 99 American Journal of International Law 403 - 421; 
Payam Akhavan ‗Self-Referrals before the International Criminal Court: Are States the Villains or Victims of 
Atrocities‘ (2010) 21 Criminal Law Forum, 103 - 120.  
21 ICC ‗Warrant of Arrest unsealed against five LRA Commanders‘ 14 October 2005.  The Prosecutor v. Joseph 
Kony, Vincent Otti, Okot Odhiambo and Dominic Ongwen ICC-02/04-01/05.  The case against Raska Lukwiya 
was terminated in July 2007 due to the confirmation of his death in August 2006. See the decision of Pre-Trial 
Chamber II, ICC-02/04-01/05-248 of 11 July 2007.  
22 According to the ICC, Joseph Kony is allegedly criminally responsible for twelve counts of crimes against 
humanity of murder - article 7(1)(a); enslavement - article 7(1)(c); sexual enslavement – article 7(1)(g); rape - 
article 7(1)(g); inhumane acts of inflicting serious bodily injury and suffering - article 7(1)(k)); and, twenty-one 
counts of war crimes (murder - article 8(2)(c)(i); cruel  treatment of civilians – article 8(2)(c)(i); intentionally 
directing an attack against a civilian population – article 8(2)(e)(i); pillaging - article 8(2) (e)(v); inducing rape – 
article 8(2)(e)(vi); forced enlistment of children - 8(2)(e)(vii)). See Art 25(3)(a) and 25(3)(b) of the Rome 
Statute.  
23 According to the ICC, Vincent Oti is  allegedly criminally responsible for eleven counts of crimes against 
humanity (murder - article 7(1)(a); sexual enslavement – article 7(1)(g); inhumane acts of inflicting serious 
bodily injury and suffering - article 7(1)(k)); and, twenty-one counts of war crimes (inducing rape – article 
8(2)(e)(vi); intentionally directing an attack against a civilian population – article 8(2)(e)(i); forced enlistment of 
children - 8(2)(e)(vii); cruel treatment of civilians – article 8(2)(c)(i); pillaging - article 8(2)(e)(v); murder - 
article 8(2)(c)(i)). There are unconfirmed reports that Vincent Otti, LRA‘s second in command was executed in 
October 2007 on Joseph Kony‘s orders. However his name is still retained in the ICC case. See Ronald 
Atkinson ―From Uganda to the Congo and Beyond: Pursuing the Lord‘s Resistance Army (2009) New York: 
International Peace Institute, 12. 
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Odhiambo was charged with two counts of crimes against humanity and eight war crimes.24 
On 10 September 2015, Pre-trial Chamber II terminated proceedings against Late Okot 
Odhiambo following the forensic confirmation of his death on 27 October 2013.25 Dominic 
Ongwen was originally charged with three crimes against humanity and four war crimes.26 
He was surrendered to the ICC custody in January 2015 and in December 2015, the ICC 
Prosecutor charged Dominic Ongwen with 70 more counts than those set out in the warrant 
of arrest issued in July 2005.27 Of all the LRA members indicted by the ICC,   Ongwen is the 
only one currently facing trial..  
 
6.1.2 The CAR conflict and the intervention of the ICC 
 
Two preliminary examinations have been carried out in the CAR. The first was under Luis 
Moreno Ocampo, the first Prosecutor and the second under Fatou Bensouda, the current 
Prosecutor.28 The crimes under examination were committed between 2003 and 2014. They 
involved killing, looting and rape, which occurred during intense fighting in October – 
November 2002 and in February‐March 2003 for situation I and between December 2012 and 
August 2014 for situation II.29 To understand the contexts in which the alleged crimes were 
committed, it is important to discuss briefly how events in the CAR have unfolded. 
 
6.1.3 Background history to the CAR conflict  
 
The CAR is a former French colony which gained independence from France on 13 August 
1960.  CAR shares borders with Chad, Sudan, South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the 
                                                 
24 According to the ICC, the accused person is charged with two counts of crimes against humanity (murder - 
article 7(1)(a); enslavement - article 7(1)(c)); and, eight counts of war crimes (murder - article 8(2)(c)(i ); 
intentionally directing an attack against a civilian population – article 8(2)(e)(i);     pillaging - article 8(2)(e)(v); 
forced enlisting of children - 8(2)(e)(vii)). 
25 Situation in Uganda In the case of the Prosecutor v. Joseph Kony, Vincent Otti and Okot Odhiambo,  Decision 
terminating proceedings against Okot Odhiambo, CC-02/04-01/05 10 September 2015.  
26 These include three counts of crimes against humanity (murder - article 7(1)(a);  enslavement - article 7(1)(c); 
inhumane acts of inflicting serious bodily injury and suffering - article 7(1)(k)); and, four counts of war crimes 
(murder - article 8(2)(c)(i)); cruel treatment of civilians – article 8(2)(c)(i); intentionally directing an attack 
against a civilian population – article 8(2)(e)(i); pillaging - article 8(2)(e)(v)).  
27 The Prosecutor v. Dominic Ongwen  Prosecution‘s submission of the document containing the charges, the 
pre-confirmation brief, and the list of evidence, ICC-02/04-01/15,  21 December 2015.  
28 See Chapter one,  paragraph 1.5.  
29 Ibid; See also paragraph 1 of Article 53(1) Report of CAR II Situation. 
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Congo, Congo Brazzaville and Cameroon.30 CAR is one of the poorest countries in the world 
and depends mostly on foreign aid while political instability and armed conflict have plagued 
the country since 2001. 31   The first preliminary examination related to incidents that 
happened between October 2002 and March 2003, involving forces loyal to either one of two 
former presidents of CAR: Ange-Félix Patassé and General François Bozizé. 32  As a result of 
the conflict, General Bozizé removed President Patassé from power in 2003 and dominated 
the political landscape for several years until his leadership was challenged in 2012, leading 
to the second preliminary examination conducted by the ICC Prosecutor. 
 
In August 2012, an armed rebel movement, Séléka, emerged as a coalition of militant 
political and armed groups representing Muslims in the North-East and other groups 
dissatisfied with President Bozizé, including some of his former close associates.33  It is 
alleged that several Sudanese and Chadian nationals joined Séléka to launch a military 
offensive that ultimately resulted in the ouster of President Bozizé on 24 March 2013 through 
a coup d‘état. President Bozizé went into exile while Michel Djotodia, the Séléka leader, was 
appointed President.34   
 
However, when several members of Séléka started committing various atrocities in and 
around Bangui, another rebel group ‗anti-Balaka‘ emerged to counter the activities of the 
Séléka group. The conflict later metamorphosed into sectarian violence as Séléka groups 
attacked mainly Christians while the ‗anti-Balaka‘ attacked mainly Muslim groups. The 
conflict involved gross human rights abuses amounting to international crimes.  
 
6.1.4 The CAR self-referral to the prosecutor of the ICC 
 
As a State Party to the Rome Statute, the CAR government referred the conflicts at different 
times to the ICC Prosecutor. In the letter of referral of Situation I, the government requested 
the Prosecutor to investigate crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court committed ‗anywhere 
                                                 
30 Paragraph 32 of the Preliminary report of the International Commission of Inquiry on the Central African 
Republic, submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 2127 (2013), S/2014/373, 26 June 2014.  
31 Paragraph 9 of the Article 53 Report of the Prosecutor on CAR II Situation.  
32 This preliminary examination resulted in the indictment of Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo by the ICC. See The 
Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, ICC-01/05 -01/08. 
33 Séléka in the local Sango language means an ―alliance‖. See Paragraph 9 of Article 53 Report.  
34 Paragraph 9 - 10 of Article 53 Report on CAR.  
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on the territory of CAR since 1 July 2002, the date of the entry into force of the Rome 
Statute‘.35 In the report published by the Prosecutor, it was announced that investigations 
would go ahead after the conduct of preliminary examinations. In addition, the Prosecutor 
stated that all the conditions for the opening of investigation had been fulfilled and therefore, 
the opening of the investigation was in accordance with the provisions of the Rome Statute. 
As stated in Chapter four, before an investigation is opened the Prosecutor has to be satisfied 
that the Court has jurisdiction over the case,36 and that the case is admissible before the court, 
which entails inquiry into gravity and complementarity.37 Furthermore, the Prosecutor will 
also consider whether the opening of an investigation will be in the interests of justice.38 
These factors will be considered below to ascertain whether the criteria set-out by the Rome 
Statute and the policy on preliminary examination adopted by the Prosecutor were followed 
during the processes in situations I and II in the preliminary examinations conducted in the 
CAR when compared with what obtained in the Uganda situation. 
 
6.2 Analysis of the Prosecutor’s exercise of discretion in Uganda 
 
In terms of temporal jurisdiction, the ICC has jurisdiction over the crimes committed in 
Uganda from the time Uganda ratified the Statute. This is because Uganda is a State Party to 
the Rome statute. In relation to territorial and personal jurisdiction, the alleged crimes were 
committed in the territory of a State Party and against citizens of Uganda. Regarding material 
jurisdiction, crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court were committed. For example, in the 
arrest warrants issued against LRA officials, they are accused of crimes against humanity and 
war crimes.39 In addition, the case was referred by Uganda which is one of the ways that the 
jurisdiction of the Court can be activated.   
 
Line Gissel has claimed that preliminary examination in the Uganda situation commenced 
shortly after the Prosecutor was sworn into office.40 This statement has to be taken into 
                                                 
35 ICC ‗Prosecutor receives referral concerning Central African Republic‘ ICC-OTP-20050107-86, 7 January 
2005.  
36 Chapter four, paragraph 4.4.  
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid. 
39  The Prosecutor v. Joseph Kony, Vincent Otti, Okot Odhiambo and Dominic Ongwen, ICC-02/04-01/05.  
40 Line Gissel Judicialising Peace: The International Criminal Court’s Impact on Political Settlements in Kenya 
and Uganda (2014) Aarhus: Forlaget Politica, 208.  
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context. Although the Prosecutor had started collecting evidence on the patterns of crimes in 
the Northern Uganda situation before it was referred in December 2003, the preliminary 
examination commenced after Uganda made the official referral. This is because the 
procedures to be followed during proprio motu investigation and self-referral are different. 
For example, the Prosecutor has to apply to the Pre-Trial Chamber for authorisation to 
conduct an investigation, while a referral by a State Party dispenses with the need for 
authorisation from the Pre-Trial Chamber. Therefore, a self-referral preliminary examination 
is activated by the state, while in a proprio motu referral, the preliminary examination is 
activated by the ICC Prosecutor.  
 
There have been conflicting stories on the referral. However, it seems the Prosecutor of the 
ICC had encouraged the President of Uganda to refer the matter. The problem with this 
development is that the Prosecutor of the ICC was accused of bias when he was seen with the 
President of Uganda at a Press Conference in London to announce the referral.41 The ICC 
Prosecutor was also accused of siding with the government of Uganda, notwithstanding the 
crimes they committed against the civilian population.42  
 
The Rome Statute encourages States to refer crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court to the 
Prosecutor. However, it becomes problematic in cases where the Prosecutor has actively 
encouraged a State to make a referral because the Prosecutor‘s neutrality in the investigation 
processes becomes suspect. It could be argued that this is what happened in Uganda. Uganda 
initially wanted the Prosecutor to concentrate investigations on crimes committed by the 
LRA, thereby using the ICC as leverage in its war with the LRA. The Prosecutor 
subsequently announced that he was investigating all sides in the conflict. However, there is 
no evidence that any government soldier has been indicted by the Prosecutor.43  
 
                                                 
41 Tim Allen, Trial Justice: The International Criminal Court and the Lord‘s Resistance Army (2006) New York: 
Zed Books, 96. 
42 William Schabas ‗Prosecutorial Discretion v. Judicial Activism at the International Criminal Court (2008) 6 
Journal of International Criminal Justice 731-761.  
43 Kasaija Apuuli ‗The ICC Arrest Warrants for the Lord‘s Resistance Army Leaders and Peace Prospects for 
Northern Uganda‘ (2006) 4 Journal of International Criminal Justice, 179 at 185; David Lanz ‗The ICC‘s 
Intervention in Northern Uganda: Beyond the Simplicity of Peace vs Justice‘ May 2007, The Fletcher School of 
Diplomacy available online at 
http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/EC66215A0071F156C12573910051D06D-
Full_Report.pdf , accessed 6 February 2016.  
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The Uganda preliminary examination was also complicated by the peace negotiation process 
that was happening at the same time, which led to the Prosecutor to conduct the 
investigations without publicity. The reason for this decision was to avoid creating the 
impression that the ICC was interfering with the peace negotiations. The downside of this 
decision was that Ugandans knew little, if anything, about what the ICC was doing. 
 
When it became obvious that the peace negotiations had been stalled, the ICC Prosecutor 
issued indictments against LRA rebels. However, the ICC could not arrest those indicted, 
because the ICC relied on Ugandan soldiers and officials in neighboring countries to make 
the arrests. The fact that the indictments that the Prosecutor issued did not name any soldiers 
from the Ugandan army raised a problem of perceived bias on the part of the ICC. 
 
6.2.1 The prosecutor's intervention in the LRA conflict  
 
As already noted in Chapter four, a self-referral activates the process of preliminary 
examination.44 This means the Prosecutor has to confirm if the ICC has jurisdiction, whether 
admissibility criteria have been met (i.e complementary and gravity), and whether opening an 
investigation is in the interest of justice.45  The involvement of the ICC in the LRA conflict 
raised several issues. There was a genuine dilemma for the ICC Prosecutor whether to 
conduct preliminary examination publicly during peace negotiations. Either decision was 
bound to have a disadvantage.  The second issue is that the ICC indictments were made in 
respect of crimes over which immunity had been granted under the Uganda Amnesty Act, 
which was a locally driven process.46 However the Prosecutor is not bound to implement the 
provisions of a domestic law. It can only be of concern to him if proceeding with the 






                                                 
44See chapter four, paragraph 4.5.1.  
45 Ibid.  
46  Refugee Law Project ‗Whose Justice: Perceptions of Uganda‘s Amnesty Act 2000: The Potential for Conflict 
Resolution‘ February, 2005, Refugee Law Project Working Paper No. 15 available at 
http://www.refugeelawproject.org/working_papers/RLP.WP15.pdf,  accessed 2 March 2016.  
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 6.2.2 Analysis of the prosecutorial discretion in CAR 
 
As a State Party to the Rome Statute, the ICC has jurisdiction over crimes committed in the 
CAR since the entry into force of the Rome Statute on 1 July 2002.47Therefore, since the 
government of CAR referred the situations to the ICC in December 2004 and May 2014 in 
accordance with the provisions of the Rome Statute, the Prosecutor is under obligation to 
commence a preliminary examination.48 Jurisdiction can be divided into temporal, subject-
matter, and either territorial or personal jurisdiction.49 Temporal jurisdiction or jurisdiction 
ratione temporis means that the ICC can only investigate crimes committed within CAR from 
July 2002 when the Rome Statute entered into force.50 This requirement was satisfied to the 
extent that the referral was made in December 2004 for situation I which covers the period 
within which the alleged crimes were committed and May 2014 for situation II.  
 
Jurisdiction ratione materiae or subject matter jurisdiction means that the alleged crimes 
must be within the jurisdiction of the ICC.51 The Prosecutor argued that crimes in CAR were 
committed during a non-international armed conflict that occurred from 2002-2003 in 
situation I and from 2012 – 2014 for situation II.52  For situation I, there were attacks against 
civilians which followed a failed coup attempt. In addition, there was a pattern of massive 
rapes and other acts of sexual violence perpetrated by armed individuals while sexual 
violence was a central feature of the conflict.53 However, in situation II the abuses were 
mainly triggered during confrontations between the Séléka and anti-Balaka rebel groups and 
retaliatory attacks carried out by both groups against the civilian population.54  The ICC had 
both territorial and personal jurisdiction of the alleged crimes in CAR.55 This means that 
crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC were committed on the territory of a State Party or 
by a national of a State Party, which in this case is CAR. 
                                                 
47  ICC ‗Background Situation in the Central African Republic‘ ICC-OTP-BN-20070522-220-A_EN, The 
Hague, 22 May 2007, 1 – 4.  
48 Paragraph 3 of Article 53 (1) Report of the Office of the Prosecutor on CAR II Situation.  
49 See chapter four, paragraph 4.4.  
50 Ibid. 
51 Ibid. 
52 ICC ‗Background to CAR‘ 2; See also Paragraph 14 of Article 53(1) Report of CAR II Situation. 
53 Ibid.  
54 Paragraph 11 – 13 Article 53(1) Report of CAR II Situation. 
55 Chapter  four, paragraph 4.4.  
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 6.2.3 The effects of the self-referral in CAR  
 
The armed conflict in CAR that took place between October 2002 and March 2003 was 
between the armed forces of CAR loyal to the former President Ange-Félix Patassé, allied 
with combatants of the Mouvement de Libération du Congo (MLC) led by Jean-Pierre Bemba 
Gombo from the Democratic Republic of Congo. The troops were confronted by a rebel 
movement led by François Bozizé, former Chief-of-Staff of the CAR armed forces, who 
became President of CAR from 2003 to 2013.56  
 
Only Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo is charged for crimes related to that conflict.57 However, in 
a related case, Bemba and his defence lawyers have appeared before the ICC since 29 
September 2015 for offences against the administration of justice allegedly committed in 
connection with the original case.58   
 
6.3 The Prosecutor and complementarity in Northern Uganda  
 
The issue of complementarity during a preliminary examination is a contested one. The 
complementarity principle involves an examination of the existence of relevant national 
proceedings in relation to the potential cases being considered for investigation by the 
Prosecutor.59 The Prosecutor's report on the preliminary examination in Uganda does not 
contain details of the evaluation conducted to ascertain whether Uganda was unwilling or 
unable to prosecute locally.  In the referral to the ICC, Uganda did not state that there was a 
total or substantial collapse or unavailability of its judiciary. However, the Ugandan 
Government stated that it was unable to arrest and prosecute members of the LRA.60  
                                                 
56 Situation in the Central African Republic, the Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo ICC-01/05-01/08. 
57 See The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo ICC-01/05 -01/08. 
58  See The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Aimé Kilolo Musamba, Jean-Jacques Mangenda 
Kabongo, Fidèle Babala Wandu and Narcisse Arido, ICC-01/05-01/13. According to the Prosecutor of the ICC, 
the offences which were allegedly committed between the end of 2011 and 14 November 2013 in various 
locations, include corruptly influencing witnesses by giving them money and instructions to provide false 
testimony, presenting false evidence and giving false testimony in the courtroom, all perpetrated in various ways 
including: by committing, soliciting, inducing, aiding, abetting or otherwise assisting in their commission. 
59 Paragraph 6 of the Report on Preliminary Examination Activities, November 2013. 
60 Alhagi Marong ‗Unlocking the Mysteriousness of Complementarity: In Search of a Forum Conveniens for 
Trial of the Leaders of the Lord‘s Resistance Army‘ (2011) 40 Georgia Journal of International and 
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6.3.1 The Prosecutor and complementarity in CAR 
 
As shown in Chapter four, the Rome Statute provides that the Prosecutor should consider 
whether a case is or would be admissible under article 17 of the Statute which provides for 
complementarity and gravity.61 Although the Statute does not provide guidance on how the 
inquiry on complementarity and gravity has to be conducted, it is argued that the Prosecutor 
has to be satisfied that the requirements of admissibility are fulfilled during a preliminary 
examination before an investigation can commence.62 In situation I in CAR, the Prosecutor 
alleged that these factors were fulfilled but did not go into enough details on how that 
decision was reached. In addition, the Prosecutor did not differentiate between the issues of 
gravity and complementarity to show clearly how the requirements in the Rome Statute were 
fulfilled.  
 
The Prosecutor stated that CAR had conducted ‗investigations and preliminary court 
hearings‘ regarding the alleged crimes committed in CAR.63 Furthermore, the Prosecutor 
stated that in November 2005, a team of investigators and analysts were sent to Bangui, the 
capital of CAR, ‗to collect additional information on, and carry out an in‐depth assessment of 
those proceedings‘.64 The report of the Prosecutor did not make public an analysis of the 
information collected in relation to gravity and complementarity. However, a statement from 
the Cour de Cassation, the highest criminal court in CAR, may have contributed to the 
decision of the Prosecutor to open an investigation in CAR.   
 
In a decision of 11 April 2006, the Cour de Cassation rejected in part the Prosecutor‘s appeal 
against the decision of the Criminal Chamber of the Court of Appeal in Bangui of 16 
December 2004, which held that only the ICC was capable of trying the serious crimes 
                                                                                                                                                       
Comparative Law 67 – 103; Michael Otim and Marieke Wierda ‗Justice at Juba: International Obligations and 
Local Demands in Northern Uganda‘  in Nicholas Waddell and Phil Clark (eds) Courting Conflict? Justice, 
Peace and the ICC in Africa (2008) The Royal African Society, 21 – 28.  
61See chapter four, paragraph 4.6 .  
62 Ibid.  
63 ICC ‗Background to CAR I Situation‘ 3.  
64 Ibid.  
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committed in the CAR since 1 July 2002.65 Support for this argument is found in a reference 
in the report of the Prosecutor which noted ‗the position of the Cour de Cassation of CAR in 
April 2006 indicating that in relation to the alleged crimes the national authorities were 
unable to carry out the necessary criminal proceedings, in particular to collect evidence and 
obtain the accused‘.66 Furthermore, the Office of the Prosecutor had publicly stated that it 
was waiting for the decision of the Cour de Cassation to decide whether to open an 
investigation in CAR, on the basis of the complementarity principle contained in the Statute 
of the ICC.67  
 
It is argued that the decision of the Cour de Cessation lent credence to the decision of the 
Prosecutor to initiate investigations in situation I. However, a self-referral on its own pre-
supposes that a State is unable or unwilling to investigate and prosecute a crime under the 
principle of complementarity. Although a self-referral could ordinarily make things easier for 
the Prosecutor, the legal requirements of the Rome Statute need to be followed and the 
Prosecutor is expected to show how the preliminary examination was conducted and the 
reasons for opening an investigation.  
 
Unlike in situation I, in situation II Fatou Bensouda, by then the Prosecutor, issued a report, 
clearly setting out issues of admissibility including those of complementarity and gravity. For 
instance, the Prosecutor argued that although limited proceedings had been launched against 
some individuals, ‗the prosecutors and police generally lack the capacity and security to 
conduct investigations and apprehend and detain suspects.‘68 Furthermore, the Prosecutor 
argued that the referral from the CAR authorities indicated that the national judicial system 
was not able to conduct the necessary investigations and prosecutions successfully.69 The 
Prosecutor also stated that no other State with jurisdiction over the crimes committed in CAR 
had conducted national proceedings in relation to crimes allegedly committed during the 
conflict, thus that responsibility lay with the ICC.70 
 
                                                 
65 FIDH ‗The Cour de Cassation confirms the incapacity of the national justice system to investigate and 
prosecute serious crimes. The Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court must open an investigation into the 
situation in the Central African Republic‘ 13 April 2006.  
66 ICC ‗Background on CAR‘. 
67 FIDH op cit. 
68 Paragraph 25 of the Article 53 (1) Report in CAR II Situation.  
69 Ibid, paragraph 26.  
70 Ibid, paragraph 27.  
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The foregoing shows that the preliminary examination conducted under Fatou Bensouda 
followed the policy paper on preliminary examination while that of the former Prosecutor 
clearly did not. A mitigating factor as earlier discussed is that the policy paper was adopted 
during Fatou Bensouda's tenure. It does seem that the publication of the policy paper means 
that the current Prosecutor sees it as an obligation owed to the general public and has made 
effort to communicate it effectively.  
 
6.3.3 The Prosecutor and gravity in Uganda situation 
 
The Prosecutor did not give information on how the evaluation of gravity was arrived at in 
the Uganda situation and it is not clear how the gravity of the crimes allegedly committed by 
the LRA officials is higher than the crimes committed by the UPDF soldiers. 71  The 
Prosecutor consistently stated that the crimes committed by the LRA were graver than those 
committed by the UPDF. 72  However, it is not clear from his analysis whether he was 
referring to quantitative or qualitative gravity. As this distinction was critical to the decision 
whether to charge government soldiers and rebel soldiers without distinction, one expected 
the Prosecutor to justify the focus on rebel soldiers, if only in order to prevent questions of 
bias. To date, the ICC has not yet brought any charges against government forces despite 
allegations to that effect.73   
 
6.3.4 The Prosecutor and gravity in the CAR situation 
 
The Prosecutor was specific about the use of sexual violence by parties to the conflict in 
situation I. However, the Prosecutor's report on Situation I did not explain how the crimes 
met the gravity threshold established by the Rome Statute. By contrast, in Situation II in 
CAR, the Prosecutor carefully analysed the scale, nature manner and impacts of the crimes 
                                                 
71 William Schabas ‗Complementarity in Practice: Some Uncomplimentary Thoughts‘ (2008) 19 Criminal Law 
Forum  5 – 33. 
72 Statement by Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Fourth Session of the 
Assembly of States Parties, 28 November – 3 December 2005, The Hague, 28 November 2005.  
73 Human Rights Watch 'Uganda: Army and Rebels Commit Atrocities in the North' - International Criminal 
Court Must Investigate Abuses on Both Sides, 20, September 2005; Human Rights Watch 'Uprooted and 
Forgotten Impunity and Human Rights Abuses in Northern Uganda' September 2005 Vol. 17, No. 12(A); IRIN ' 
Amnesty and Peace groups urge ICC to probe government army too' 3 February 2004.  
 
160 | Page 
and concluded that, on the information available, there was a basis for launching a formal 
investigation against members of both Séléka and anti-Balaka.74 
 
Although the Prosecutor is yet to issue arrest warrants, it is noticeable in the report made 
public that both parties to the conflict were implicated in the crimes that fall within the 
jurisdiction of the ICC. Fatou Bensouda's analysis of CAR situation II is different from the 
way Moreno Ocampo managed CAR situation I and the Uganda referral. 
 
6.3.5 The Prosecutor and the interests of justice in Uganda 
 
The Rome Statute provides that the Prosecutor must assess whether, taking into account the 
gravity of the crime and the interests of victims, there are nonetheless substantial reasons to 
believe that an investigation would not serve the interests of justice.75  The Prosecutor‘s 
current interpretation of interests of justice under article 53 of the Rome Statute limits its 
application.76 This means that the outcome of peace negotiations does not affect the decision 
of the Prosecutor on whether to initiate an investigation or not. Although the decision may 
seem reasonable, it  is  complicated when parties to a conflict are willing to negotiate peace 
and the ICC is seen as the stumbling block to the consummation of such a peace deal. For the 
northern Uganda conflict, there is no clear evidence that the ICC scuttled any peace deal 
between the Ugandan Government and the LRA, because the peace negotiations happened 
after the Prosecutor had concluded the preliminary examination.  
 
The Prosecutor‘s current opinion on peace negotiations does not affect his decision to initiate 
investigation in the Northern Uganda conflict after the completion of the preliminary 
examination. The UNSC is best suited to decide whether to suspend an investigation in the 
Ugandan situation after a successful completion of the peace process using article 16 of the 
Rome Statute and acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. However, if the Uganda 
situation was a proprio motu referral like Kenya and Côte d‘Ivoire, the provisions of article 
53 as earlier discussed will apply. There is shared division of labour already discussed in 
Chapter five of the study.77 However, this is a subsequent decision that does not affect the 
preliminary examination.  
                                                 
74 Paragraphs 255 – 264 of Article 53(1) Report of CAR Situation II.  
75 Article 53 (1)(c) of the Rome Statute.  
76 See Chapter four, paragraph 4.7.  
77 Chapter five, paragraph 5.6.1.  
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6.3.6 The Prosecutor and the interests of justice in CAR 
 
Unlike the other elements of jurisdiction and admissibility, there is no obligation for the 
Prosecutor to show that an investigation is in the interest of justice.78 Rather, the Prosecutor is 
required to state when an investigation is not in the interests of justice. When this occurs, the 
Prosecutor is under obligation to inform the Pre-Trial Chamber.79   
 
In situation I, the Prosecutor decided after a thorough analysis ‗that there was no reason to 
believe an investigation would not serve the interests of justice‘.80 As part of the assessment, 
the Prosecutor listened to victims‘ views and considered their interests. Furthermore, the 
Prosecutor stated that victims had expressed interest in the involvement of the ICC in the 
investigation of the crimes committed in CAR.81 This clearly shows that there was general 
support for the opening of an investigation among the victim population in CAR. In situation 
II, the Prosecutor also determined that opening an investigation was in the interests of justice. 
The argument was basically the same as that raised in situation I, that, based on the 
assessment of the situation, (including through a mission to the CAR of May 2014), the 
Prosecutor concluded that there were no substantial reasons to believe that an investigation 
into the Situation in the CAR II would not serve the interests of justice.82 
 
From the foregoing, it is clear from the discussions in the Article 53 report that the Prosecutor 
made efforts to ensure that the issues of complementarity were clearly dealt with and the 
circumstances which prompted the intervention of the Court were properly and clearly 
delineated. It can easily be argued that the mere fact that a State referred a situation to the 
ICC pre-supposes that admissibility issues are not in contention. However, this is not the case 
and the Prosecutors in situation I and II clearly carried out preliminary examinations to 
ensure that there was reasonable basis on which to commence investigations.  
 
A noticeable difference is that while the issues in situation I were not clearly delineated and 
thoroughly discussed, the situation II report tried within possible means to fill the gap that 
was lacking in the preliminary examination conducted in situation I. In supporting the reason 
for the publication of the reports of preliminary examinations conducted under her, the 
                                                 
78 See chapter four, paragraph 4.7.  
79 Ibid.  
80 ICC ‗Background: Situation in the Central African Republic‘ 3.  
81 Ibid.  
82 Paragraphs 265 – 266 of Article 53(1) Report of the CAR II Situation.  
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current Prosecutor argues that she is not required to publicise reports when acting pursuant to 
a referral under article 53(1).83 However, she decided to do so in the interests of promoting 
clarity with respect to the statutory activities and decisions involved in conducting a 
preliminary examination. 84  One cannot but agree with the Prosecutor on the need for 
effective public information and clarity, even though the publication of article 53 report is not 
a statutory obligation in the Rome Statute. 
 
A clear difference is noticeable in the two situations. While Bensouda complied with the 
policies that she had adopted, there is nothing to measure Ocampo's decision as his criteria 
were based on provisions of the Rome Statute and policy papers which were not as well 
articulated as Bensouda‘s.  
 
6.4 Application of the general principles during the preliminary examinations  
 
As already noted in Chapter five, the general principles adopted by the ICC Prosecutor during 
preliminary examinations are independence, impartiality and objectivity.85 In addition, these 
principles are related to the theory of prosecutorial neutrality mentioned in Chapter two 
which includes non-bias, non-partisanship and principled decision making.86 These issues are 
further elaborated below in relation to how the principles and policies were respected in 
practice. 
 
6.4.1 Independence and impartiality of the Prosecutor in Uganda  
 
Although there is no clear evidence that the Prosecutor was not independent in the conduct of 
the preliminary examination in Uganda, the circumstances surrounding the referral and the 
joint press conference issued with the President of Uganda to announce the referral has been 
noted as impacting on the perception of partiality on the part of the Prosecutor.87 Although 
the former Prosecutor may argue that he acted within the provisions of the Rome Statute by 
                                                 
83 Paragraph 1 of the Executive Summary of Article 53 Report of the Situation II.  
84 Ibid.  
85 Chapter five, paragraph 5.4. 
86 Chapter two, paragraph 2.1.1 - 2.1.3.  
87  HRW ‗Lack of Accountability‘ 2005, available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2005/uganda0905/6.htm , 
accessed 2 March 2016.  
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not restricting investigations to LRA officials alone, the inability to indict UPDF soldiers is a 
nagging issue in the relationship between the Prosecutor and the government of Uganda. It is 
noteworthy that the accountability mechanism imposed by the Rome Statute regarding 
cooperation between States has already been mentioned in the legal framework that was 
extensively discussed in Chapter four.88  
 
Co-operation with a State Party that referred a matter to the ICC can be interpreted in 
different ways. First, cooperation with a State Party can be seen as fulfilling the obligations in 
the Rome Statute. However, if the State is under preliminary examination and there is the 
likelihood that different parties to the conflict may have committed crimes, it becomes 
difficult to state with certainty that the co-operation between the ICC and a referring State 
does not affect the independence of the Prosecutor. Darryl Robinson argues that there are 
situations where the activities of the Court are subject to criticism, irrespective of decisions of 
the Prosecutor.89  If the Prosecutor does not effectively co-operate with a State Party (in this 
instance Uganda), an effective link that will encourage preliminary examination will be 
missing.  However, inability to show that both parties to a conflict have committed crimes 
exposes the Prosecutor to attacks of partiality.   
 
The onus is on the Prosecutor to show that activities and decisions of the office are 
independent and not influenced by a referring State Party. This is because the policy paper on 
preliminary examination clearly states that the scope of the Prosecutor‘s examination cannot 
be limited in a manner contrary to the Rome Statute.90  Where a referral is accompanied by 
supporting documentation that identifies potential perpetrators, the Prosecutor is not bound or 
constrained by the information contained therein when conducting investigations in order to 
determine whether specific persons should be charged.91 The same principle applies during 
preliminary examinations, which means that in making a determination whether to proceed 
with an investigation or not, the Prosecutor‘s decision is not based only on the information 
supplied by the referring State. 
 
                                                 
88 See chapter four, paragraph  4.9. 
89 Darryl Robinson ‗Inescapable Dyads: Why the ICC Cannot Win‘ (2015) 28 Leiden Journal of International 
Law   323 - 347.   
90 Paragraph 27 of the policy paper on preliminary examination. 
91 Ibid.  
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However, under impartiality, the issue for determination is whether the Prosecutor applied 
consistent methods and criteria, irrespective of the States or parties involved or the person(s) 
or group(s) concerned in determining whether to proceed with an investigation or not.92 The 
answer to this question is tied to the issue of the gravity of crimes committed by UPDF 
soldiers and LRA rebels. The Prosecutor's argument that the gravity of the crimes committed 
by the LRA is greater  than those committed by UPDF is a simplistic way of explaining the 
dilemma in the Northern Uganda conflict. This lack of clarity in the measurement of gravity 
between UPDF soldiers and LRA combatants is a sticky point in the activities of the 
Prosecutor in Uganda. 
 
It is therefore argued that the Prosecutor was independent but did not act in a way that would 
have allayed perceptions of impartiality in relation to the preliminary examination conducted 
in Uganda. This is because it is not clear from the facts whether a thorough investigation of 
the activities of the UPDF was conducted. One argument that may be made about this is that 
the Prosecutor needed the cooperation of the Uganda government to be able to operate freely 
in the country. But that also had its clear limitations to the extent that it was clearly 
impossible for the Prosecutor to investigate UPDF soldiers effectively.  
 
6.4.2 Independence and impartiality of the Prosecutor in CAR 
 
As already discussed in Chapter five of the study, both the Rome Statute and policy paper on 
preliminary examination provide for the independence of the Prosecutor.93 In both Situations 
I and II, it is clear that decisions of the Prosecutor were not influenced or altered by the 
presumed or known wishes of any party, or in connection with efforts to secure cooperation 
of any State Party to the Rome Statute. Although the report of the preliminary examination 
carried out in CAR II situation clearly showed the steps followed by the Prosecutor, the fact 
that the Prosecutor did not do the same in Situation I did not cast doubt on the independence 
enjoyed by the Prosecutor during the process. 
Impartiality is one of the core principles governing the work of the Prosecutor during 
preliminary examinations. It involves a fair-minded and objective treatment of persons and 
issues, free from any bias or influence. 94  In addition, the Prosecutor is expected to be 
impartial during preliminary examinations.  Impartiality requires the application of consistent 
                                                 
92 Paragraph 28 of the policy paper on preliminary examination.  
93 See chapter five, paragraph 5.4.1.  
94 See also paragraph 29 of the Code of Conduct for the Office of the Prosecutor.  
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methods and criteria, irrespective of the States or other parties involved.95 The Prosecutor did 
not make public the preliminary examination conducted in CAR Situation I. That makes it 
difficult to evaluate his decision on this preliminary examination. On the other hand, in 
Situation II, the report was clear on the methodologies adopted by the Prosecutor during the 
preliminary examination and the consistent methods followed in analysing the crimes 
committed by both Séléka and anti-Balaka rebel forces.96 
 
  6.4.3 Objectivity of the Prosecutor in Uganda  
 
The Rome Statute provides that Prosecutor will investigate incriminating and exonerating 
circumstances equally in order to establish the truth.97 The same principle of objectivity is 
applied at the preliminary examination stage in relation to information that could form the 
basis of a determination to proceed with an investigation.98 As information evaluated at the 
preliminary examination stage is largely obtained from external sources, the Prosecutor is 
obliged to pay particular attention to the assessment of the reliability of the source and the 
credibility of the information.99  
 
The present Prosecutor argues that standard formats for analytical reports, standard methods 
of source evaluation, and consistent rules of measurement and attribution in its crime analysis 
are used during preliminary examinations. These are aimed at ensuring internal and external 
coherence. In addition, information from diverse and independent sources is used as a means 
of bias control. 100  Furthermore, the Prosecutor seeks to ensure that, in the interests of 
fairness, objectivity and thoroughness, all relevant parties are given the opportunity to 
provide information during preliminary examination.101  
 
However, the Prosecutor did not demonstrate clearly how these principles and policies were 
applied in the preliminary examination conducted in Northern Uganda. In addition, the 
difficulty in getting information on the policies of the Prosecutor in conducting the 
                                                 
95 Ibid; See also paragraph 28 Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations.  
96 See generally the Article 53 report on CAR II Situation Report.  
97 Article 54(1) of the Rome Statute.  
98 Paragraph 30 of the policy paper on Preliminary Examination.  
99 Paragraph 31 of the policy paper on Preliminary Examination.  
100 Paragraph 32 of the policy paper on Preliminary Examination.  
101 Paragraph 33 of the policy paper on preliminary examination.  
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preliminary examination in Uganda led to several assumptions on why the Prosecutor 
decided there was reasonable basis to commence an investigation.  
6.4.4 Objectivity of the Prosecutor in CAR 
 
The guiding principles of objectivity have already been discussed in Chapter five. 102  
Objectivity requires the Prosecutor to ensure the reliability of the information received, as 
well as its source.103 It has to be noted that during preliminary examinations, the Prosecutor 
receives information from different sources. The ability to collect evidence relating to the 
crimes committed by all parties is key to the principle of objectivity. Furthermore, ensuring 
the reliability of information received as well as its source makes it easier for the Prosecutor 
to conduct a reliable preliminary examination.  
 
In a response to the request by Pre-Trial Chamber III for an update on the status of the 
preliminary examinations conducted by the Prosecutor in situation I, the Prosecutor used the 
opportunity to inform the Chamber of materials that had been gathered, how they were 
gathered and reasons for the delay in making a determination.104 However, an observation 
that has to be made here is that it took the intervention of Pre-Trial Chamber III for the 
Prosecutor to disclose sources of evidence procedures to ensure that accurate information had 
been gathered during the preliminary examination assessment. In contrast, Article 53(1) 
Report of the situation II clearly delineated information on crimes committed by parties to the 
conflict, levels of involvement and modes of participation.105 It can be concluded therefore 
that there is a marked difference between the objectivity shown by the former Prosecutor in 
the CAR I preliminary examination and that conducted by the current Prosecutor in Situation 
II. However, this difference does not imply that the former Prosecutor was not objective in 
situation I. It only shows that there was a higher level of objectivity in the preliminary 




                                                 
102 See chapter five, paragraph 5.4.3 
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104 Paragraph 12 – 20 of the Prosecution's Report Pursuant to Pre-Trial Chamber Ill's 30 November 2006 
Decision Requesting Information on the Status of the Preliminary Examination of the Situation in the Central 
African Republic, ICC-01/05, 15 December 2006.  
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6.5 Application of the policy objectives used by the Prosecutor during preliminary 
examinations 
The policy objectives are used by the Prosecutor during preliminary examinations. These 
include transparency, positive complementary and the prevention of crimes.106 As mentioned 
in discussion in Chapter two, there are correlations between the policy objectives and the 
theory of neutrality discussed in that chapter.107 These issues are addressed below.  
6.5.1 Transparency of the Prosecutor in Uganda  
 
The policy objectives adopted by the Prosecutor are aimed at providing the public with 
regular information.108 In addition, the objectives aim to contribute to the ending of impunity, 
by encouraging genuine national proceedings, and to the prevention of crimes.109As already 
noted, the early preliminary examinations carried out by the former Prosecutor in Uganda did 
not provide public information as expected.  
 
Although there is no legal obligation on the Prosecutor to inform the public about the status 
of preliminary examinations, having an effective public information system increases the 
transparency of the activities of the Prosecutor. This is clearly spelt out in the policy paper on 
preliminary examination adopted by the current ICC Prosecutor.  She argues that making the 
status of a preliminary examination public will enable the office to carry out its mandate 
without raising undue expectations that an investigation will necessarily be opened, while at 
the same time encouraging genuine national proceedings and contributing towards the 
prevention of crimes.110  
 
There is no official report on the preliminary examination carried out in Uganda. The former 
Prosecutor has tried to justify the decision to proceed in Uganda in different fora. 111 
However, it seems his statements are more or less geared towards countering arguments that 
were made by scholars who have argued that the Prosecutor was not transparent in 
                                                 
106 Chapter five, paragraph 5.5.  
107 Chapter two, paragraph 2.1. 
108 Paragraph 93 of the policy paper on preliminary examination. 
109 Ibid.  
110 Paragraph 94 of the policy paper on preliminary examination.  
111 See for examples,  The Statement by the Chief Prosecutor on the Uganda Arrest Warrants‘, The Hague, 14 
October 2005; The Statement by Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, 
Informal meeting of Legal Advisors of Ministries of Foreign Affairs‘, New York, 24 October 2005. 
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Uganda.112 I agree with these scholars to the extent that the Prosecutor failed to exhibit 
transparency in relation to the indictment of LRA soldiers and did not find the same level of 
gravity in the crimes committed by UPDF soldiers. In addition, the inability of the Prosecutor 
to show publicly how the preliminary examination was conducted is clearly responsible for 
this conclusion.  
 
6.5.2 Transparency of the Prosecutor in CAR 
 
According to the Prosecutor and as earlier discussed, transparency involves making public 
the findings of each preliminary examination.113 However, the fact that the CAR government 
had to go to Court to request information from the Prosecutor on the status of the preliminary 
examination conducted in CAR I shows that the Prosecutor did not find it necessary to make 
preliminary examination public until the process was completed.114 Pre-Trial Chamber III in 
its decision stated that: 
 
'[A]lmost two years have passed since the Prosecutor received the referral of the 
Government of the Central African Republic and publicly announced his preliminary 
examination of the CAR situation; and since the referral of the CAR situation to the 
Prosecutor the latter has given no information on the status of his preliminary 
examination of such situation‘115  
 
In addition, the Court argued that even after CAR had requested information on the status of 
the preliminary examination, the Prosecutor was unable to provide adequate or satisfactory 
information on the status of the preliminary examination conducted in CAR.116 It should be 
further noted that even when preliminary examinations were concluded by the former 
                                                 
112 Kamari Clarke Fictions of Justice: The International Criminal Court and the Challenge of Legal Pluralism 
in Sub-Saharan Africa (2009) 237; William Schabas ‗Prosecutorial Discretion v. Judicial Activism at the 
International Criminal Court‘ (2008) 6 Journal of International Criminal Justice, 731-761; Adam Branch ‗The 
Paradoxes of Protection: Aligning Against the Lord's Resistance Army‘ (2012) 5 African Security 160 – 178; 
Adam Branch  ‗Uganda‘s Civil War and the Politics of ICC Intervention‘ (2007) 21 Ethics and International 
Affairs 179 – 198. 
113 see also paragraph 97 Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations.  
114 Decision Requesting Information on the Status of the Preliminary Examination of the Situation in the Central 
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Prosecutor, only very little information was disclosed to the public, fuelling suspicion that 
extraneous factors were taken into consideration in the decision to begin an investigation 
after the preliminary examination.117 There is a marked difference between Ocampo and 
Bensouda, and this is clearly captured in the examinations conducted in situation I and 
situation II. While the former had less information for the public, the later was able to publish 
reports and make them accessible to a wide range of stakeholders in the activities of the 
Court.  
 
From the foregoing, it is clear that the differences between the two case studies hinge in part 
on the identity of the incumbents and their experiences on the ICC. However, we also know 
that the guidelines and policies have evolved over time between the tenures of the two 
Prosecutors. Therefore, the differences can be seen both in the personality of the Prosecutors 
and the way and manner policies and principles on prosecutorial discretion were adopted and 
implemented. Although Fatou Bensouda was Moreno Ocampo's Deputy Prosecutor, it is also 
possible to argue that they entered the position of ICC Prosecutor at different times, around  
nine years apart. Those years saw the development of different attitudes about the judicial 
processes the ICC handled, leading to different attitudes and expectations.  Moreno Ocampo 
was the pioneer, Bensouda followed, having observed what he had had to deal with and 
hearing the criticism of not only Ocampo, but of the ICC system generally.   
 
6.5.3 Ending impunity through positive complementarity in Uganda 
 
The current Prosecutor of the ICC, Fatou Bensouda argues that due to the global nature of the 
Court and the complementarity principle, a significant part of the preliminary examination is 
directed towards encouraging States to carry out their primary responsibility to investigate 
and prosecute international crimes.118  This is because the complementary nature of the Court 
requires national judicial authorities and the ICC to function together.119 However, the effort 
made by the former Prosecutor to encourage judicial activities at the national level during the 
preliminary examination carried out in Uganda is not very clear.  
 
                                                 
117 William Schabas ‗Prosecutorial Discretion v. Judicial Activism at the International Criminal Court‘ (2008) 6 
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The former Prosecutor has been critisised in the way and manner he handled preliminary 
examinations. For example, William Schabas considers former Prosecutor's initial efforts 
were at best aimed at ensuring that the ICC had jurisdiction over the conflicts instead of 
encouraging States to carry out their primary responsibilities.120 This is not far from the truth.  
Uganda clearly stated that its judicial system was capable of holding LRA rebels accountable 
but was unable to do so due to inability of the UPDF to capture them.  
 
However, although the Ugandan Government subsequently established the International 
Crimes Division of the Uganda Court in 2008, this court did not exist at the time of the 
preliminary examinations and so cannot be said to be a sign that Uganda had the capacity to 
hold her citizens accountable.121  Another action that would have shown that Uganda had the 
capacity to investigate and prosecute her citizens is the domestic implementation of the Rome 
Statute as a national law. However, this process was only completed just before the Review 
Conference of the ICC in 2010 which means that as at the time the preliminary examination 
was conducted, there was no clear strategy by the Ugandan government to confront 
impunity.122  
 
It seems Uganda‘s interest in referring the LRA conflict was to galvanise international 
support to isolate the LRA, starve them of support and make them vulnerable for UPDF 
soldiers. When these expectations did not happen and there were subsequent prospects for 
negotiating peace between the LRA and the government of Uganda, the commitment made 
by the Ugandan government to the ICC did not stop the peace process. Uganda also promised 
to withdraw the referral if there was any agreement between the government and the rebels. 
This was clearly meant to undermine the efforts of the ICC to ensure there was no impunity 





                                                 
120 William Schabas ‗Complementarity in Practice: Some Uncomplimentary Thoughts‘ (2008) 19 Criminal Law 
Forum 5 – 33 
121  More details on the International Crimes Division of the Uganda High Court can be found online at 
http://www.judiciary.go.ug/data/smenu/18/International%20Crimes%20Division.html, accessed 6 February 
2016.  
122 See the Uganda International Criminal Court Act of 24 June 2010 Acts Supplement No. 6. 
 
171 | Page 
6.5.4 Ending impunity through positive complementarity in CAR   
 
The ICC Prosecutors have adopted a policy of positive complementarity which is aimed at 
spurring domestic action to end impunity through investigation and prosecution of 
international crimes that are within the jurisdiction of the Court.123 The views of the current 
Prosecutor have not changed from the policies of the former Prosecutor on the role of the 
ICC in activating positive complementarity. This means at best, that the ICC will continue to 
play a limited role in its ability to encourage and facilitate the investigation and prosecution 
of international crimes at local levels.  
 
6.5.5 Prevention of international crimes in Uganda  
 
During preliminary examinations, the Prosecutor seeks to perform an early warning function 
through collection of open source information on alleged crimes that appear to fall within the 
jurisdiction of the Court.124  This enables the Prosecutor to react promptly to upsurges of 
violence by reinforcing early interaction with States, international organisations and non-
governmental organisations in order to verify information on alleged crimes, to encourage 
genuine national proceedings and to prevent reoccurrence of crimes. 125  In addition, the 
preliminary examination enables the Prosecutor to issue public, preventive statements in 
order to deter the escalation of violence and further committing of crimes and to put 
perpetrators on notice about individual criminal responsibility for international crimes.126 
 
The extent to which this objective was carried out in Uganda is subject to debate. This is 
mainly due to lack of information from the former Prosecutor. For instance, critical legal 
scholars have chronicled the failure of the Prosecutor to investigate the crimes committed by 
the UPDF and to encourage the government to prosecute those culpable in the atrocities 
committed against civilians.127 As already discussed, the former Prosecutor‘s argument is that 
                                                 
123 Chapter five, paragraph 5.5.2.  
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the crimes committed by UPDF soldiers were not of comparable gravity with the crimes 
committed by LRA rebels. However, there is no evidence that the former Prosecutor clearly 
supported the investigation and prosecution of UPDF soldiers as envisaged in the policy 
paper. In fact, no indictments were ever issued against UPDF soldiers by Uganda government 
or the ICC.   
 
6.5.6 Prevention of international crimes in CAR 
 
A major policy objective adopted by the Prosecutor during preliminary examinations is the 
prevention of international crimes.128 However, as events in the CAR have shown, the early 
warning function of the Prosecutor through public service announcements did not prevent the 
commission of subsequent crimes in CAR. This is because if the threat of prosecution by the 
first preliminary examination was successful, it would have deterred subsequent escalation of 
violence that led to Situation II. The public service announcements of the Prosecutor in 
Situation I and II included limited visits to CAR and release of press statements about 
ongoing violence.129  
 
The ICC has to design public service announcements that clearly bring closer to the 
population, the possibility of prosecution for perpetrators of international crimes. In addition, 
the usage of social media and other traditional and non-traditional means of information 
dissemination have to be adopted. For example, the Prosecutor could record statements to be 
aired on local television and radio stations in countries where preliminary examinations are 
conducted, to warn of prosecution for violent crimes.    
 
 6.6 Principles, objectives and the three-dimensional neutral prosecutor  
It has to be recalled that the original theory of neutrality was based on the American legal 
system. However, in Chapter two, it was expanded to apply to proceedings at the ICC, noting 
the differences and similarities between the domestic and international criminal justice 
systems. As already noted in Chapter two of this study, the theory of prosecutorial neutrality 
                                                                                                                                                       
the Political: The International Criminal Court in Uganda and Sudan‘ (2011) 21 European Journal of 
International Law  941 – 965.  
128 Chapter five, paragraph  5.5.3.   
129 See for example, Paragraph 2 of Article 53(1) Report of the Situation in CAR II, 24 September 2014.  
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has three broad dimensions: non-bias, non-partisanship and principled decision making.130 In 
relation to non-bias, the prosecutor is expected to avoid  making decisions based on the race, 
gender and ethnicity of the accused person.  In addition the three-dimensional prosecutor is 
expected to have the public interest at heart in every decision whether to prosecute or not.131 
In this instance, it seems  that both ICC Prosecutors have tried to operate within the ambits of 
the ICC legal framework in the exercise of discretion during preliminary examinations.  
 
In terms of non-partisanship, the three-dimensional prosecutor is expected to arrive at 
decisions,  independent  of both internal and external forces. In addition, the prosecutor is 
expected to be objective in weighing evidence before making a decision whether to proceed 
with an investigation or not. However, the way information was relayed to the public 
distinguished the procedure of Moreno Ocampo from that of Fatou Bensouda.    
 
A third principle of the theory of neutrality is that prosecutors should base their decisions and 
activities on readily identifiable and consistently applied criteria.132 Bensouda seems to have 
followed on this principle while the former Prosecutor Moreno Ocampo did not. Although he 
made some of the decisions public, there was no thorough legal analysis on how the decisions 
were made, unlike Bensouda, who made public the policy paper and also tried to follow the 
criteria laid down in the paper.  
 
While both Prosecutors acknowledge that the exercise of discretion during the preliminary 
examination is within the powers of the ICC Prosecutor, Bensouda has carried out her own 
examination in a way that more nearly fits the threshold of a three-dimensional prosecutor as 
discussed by Green  and Zacharias.  
 
6.7 Conclusion  
 
Using the theory of neutrality discussed extensively in Chapter two, the analysis of the 
situations in Uganda and CAR, both self-referrals, shows that the Prosecutor‘s methods 
concerning preliminary examinations has evolved over time. The manner in which the 
preliminary examination in the two situations was handled differed in some important ways. 
While Moreno Ocampo, the first Prosecutor, was not able to articulate clearly the procedure  
                                                 
130 See chapter two, paragraph 2.1 
131 See chapter two, paragraph 2.1.1 
132 See Chapter two, paragraph 2.1.3  
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used in the preliminary examination in Uganda and in the CAR Situation I, Fatou Bensouda 
adopted the policy paper on preliminary examination and showed how she used it to arrive at 
her actions and decisions in CAR Situation II.  
 
In terms of the substantive decisions taken, this chapter has argued that the Prosecutor was 
correct in concluding or assuming that both situations concerning Uganda and CAR fell 
within the jurisdiction of the ICC. Furthermore, the Prosecutor was correct in concluding that 
the admissibility criteria, namely complementarity and gravity, were met in the CAR 
situations I and II. However, the chapter has argued that in respect of the Uganda situation, 
the former Prosecutor failed to substantiate the decision that the crimes committed by 
government forces did not meet the threshold of gravity needed to trigger ICC jurisdiction 
and charges.  
 
Regarding the application of the principle whether it was in the interests of justice that the 
preliminary investigation and full investigation took place, it has been shown that the policy 
paper adopted by the former Prosecutor holds that there is a difference between the ‗interests 
of peace‘ and ‗interests of justice‘, meaning that the Prosecutor is not concerned with peace 
negotiations and probable outcomes. However, these concepts are related and are difficult to 
separate in some cases during preliminary examinations.  
 
On the general principles and policy objectives adopted by the Bensouda‘s administration, it 
has been noted that there is a divergence between the activities of the former Prosecutor and 
the present Prosecutor regarding the policy paper on preliminary examination. One 
conclusion is that the former Prosecutor did not follow the policy paper on preliminary 
examination.   
 
It is argued that the ICC Prosecutors applied restrictive interpretations to the provisions of the 
Rome Statute regarding the principle of positive complementarity during preliminary 
examinations, especially in Uganda.  Since the policy paper was released in November 2013, 
evaluating the former Prosecutor based on the policy that was adopted by his successor in 
2013 for an activity carried out in 2004 may be problematic. However, as already noted in the 
introductory chapter of this study, the draft policy paper was released in 2010 and contained 
many of the issues discussed in the current policy.133 Furthermore, the policy paper has its 
roots in the provisions of the Rome Statute. Therefore, the former Prosecutor clearly 
                                                 
133 Chapter one, paragraph 1.5.  
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endorsed most of the principles that later became the policy paper on preliminary 
examination.134  
 
The next chapter discusses the preliminary examinations carried in the Sudan and Libya 
through UNSC referrals. This is pursuant to the provision of the Rome Statute that the UNSC 




                                                 
134 Ibid.  
135 See chapter one, paragraph 1.6.  
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Chapter Seven 
The UNSC Referrals and the Situations in Sudan and Libya 
 
7.0 Introduction  
 
This chapter examines how the prosecutor exercised discretion regarding the preliminary 
examinations into the situations in Sudan and Libya. The situation in Sudan was referred to 
the ICC by the UNSC based on the recommendations of a report commissioned by the UN 
Secretary-General pursuant to a resolution of the UNSC.1 On the other hand, the Libya 
situation was referred to the ICC by the UNSC based on the need to protect lives and 
properties as a result of the conflict that erupted in Libya. The chapter highlights the 
similarities and differences in the process of initiating investigations in these two situations.  
 
7.1 UNSC referrals and conflicts in Sudan and Libya 
 
As earlier noted in Chapter four, the UNSC can refer situations to the ICC acting under 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter.2 Although Sudan and Libya are not States not party to the 
Rome Statute, the UNSC referred them to the ICC Prosecutor for preliminary examinations 
thereby conferring the Court with jurisdiction.3 At the end of the examinations on the two 
situations, the ICC Prosecutor decided that there was a reasonable basis to believe that crimes 
within the jurisdiction of the ICC had been committed in both situations and decided to open 






                                                 
1 UNSC Resolution 1564 of 18 September 2004; Christine Byron ‗Comment on the International Commission 
of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations‘ (2005) 5 Human Rights Law Review 351 –360; Mathilde van Haren 
‗The Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur and Genocidal Intent – A Critical Analysis‘ 
(2006) 53 Netherlands International Law Review 205 – 245. 
2 Chapter four, paragraph 4.5.3.  
3 Ibid.  
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7.1.1 Background history of the conflict in Darfur, Sudan 
  
The Darfur conflict commenced in February 2003 with the attack and capture of Gulu, the 
capital of Jebel Marra province by the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A).4 The 
rebels were later joined by the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) in attacking 
government soldiers and installations in Darfur, marking the beginning of a conflict that has 
lasted for a decade. The SLM/A and JEM recorded early victories against the government of 
Sudan.5 The rebels were mainly from the Fur, Massalit and Zaghawa tribes in Darfur.   
 
The attack by the armed opposition on government facilities prompted the Sudanese 
government to change its strategy by recruiting Janjaweed militias to fight the rebels in a 
counter-insurgency arrangement. 6  The militia unleashed terror and unprecedented human 
rights abuses against the civilian population with the support of the Sudanese military. The 
abuses involved arson, looting of properties, killing unarmed civilians, raping women and 
girls as part of a planned and organised attack orchestrated by the Sudanese government in 
furtherance of its counter-insurgency activities. In the process, several women became 
pregnant as a result of rape by both government soldiers and Janjaweed militias.7  
 
The Sudanese government and the armed rebels have been involved in several peace 
negotiations. As part of this process, they have signed several peace protocols, declarations 
and agreements aimed at ending the Darfur conflict.8 However, none of these efforts has 
                                                 
4 Dawit Toga ‗The African Union Mediation and the Abuja Peace Talks‘ in Alex de Waal (ed) War in Darfur 
and the Search for Peace (2007) 214. 
5 Usman Tar ‗Old Conflict, New Complex Emergency: An Analysis of Darfur Crisis, Western Sudan (2006) 15 
Nordic Journal of African Studies 406 at 417. 
6 Mamdani  op cit  at 249.  
7 Paragraph 66 Report of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights on the Darfur Conflict. 
8 The Doha Document for Peace in Sudan acknowledges the existence of the following peace agreements: the 
Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement on the Conflict in Darfur & Protocol on the Establishment of Humanitarian 
Assistance in Darfur of  2 and 8 April, 2004, N‘Djamena, Chad; the Agreement with the Sudanese Parties on the 
Modalities for the Establishment of the Ceasefire Commission and the Deployment of Observers in Darfur of 28 
May 2004, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia; the Protocol between the Government of Sudan, The Sudan Liberation 
Movement / Army and the Justice and Equality Movement on the Improvement of the Humanitarian Situation in 
Darfur of 9 November, 2004, Abuja, Nigeria; the Protocol between the Government of Sudan, The Sudan 
Liberation Movement / Army and the Justice and Equality Movement on the Enhancement of the Security 
Situation in Darfur in accordance with the N‘Djamena Agreement of 9 November, 2004, Abuja, Nigeria; the 
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resulted in the resolution of the conflict. The crimes committed in the Darfur conflict have 
been called genocide by some people.9 Women and children have borne the brunt of the 
insurgency by Darfur armed movements and the government of Sudan‘s counter-insurgency, 
implemented mainly through the Janjaweed militia.10 The Darfur conflict has been compared 
to the genocide that occurred in Rwanda in 1994 because of the ethnic nature of the 
conflict.11 The rebels in the Darfur conflict have also committed atrocities. It was the AU‘s 
involvement in the implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement, which was discredited by 
the armed movements, that led to the subsequent attack of the AU by the JEM and SLM/A in 
the town of Haskanita in Darfur.12 
 
As already noted, Sudan is not a State Party to the Rome Statute. The Sudanese Government 
signed the treaty in September 2000 but is yet to ratify it.13 However, the Rome Statute 
                                                                                                                                                       
Declaration of Principles for the Resolution of the Sudanese Conflict in Darfur of 5 July, 2005, Abuja, Nigeria; 
the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) of 5 May, 2006, Abuja, Nigeria; the Goodwill Agreement between the 
Government of Sudan and the Justice and Equality Movement, 17 February 2009, Doha, Qatar; the Framework 
Agreement between the Government of Sudan and the Justice and Equality Movement, 23 February 2010, 
Doha, Qatar; the Framework Agreement between the Government of Sudan and the Liberation and Justice 
Movement, 18 March 2010, Doha, Qatar; the Ceasefire Agreement between the Government of Sudan and the 
Liberation and Justice Movement, 18 March 2010, Doha, Qatar.  
9 Colin Powell ‗The Crisis in Darfur‘, testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Washington, 
District of Columbia, 9 September, 2004, available online at  http://2001-
2009.state.gov/secretary/former/powell/remarks/36042.htm, accessed 2 March 2016; Glenn Kessler and Colum 
Lynch ‗US Calls Killings In Sudan Genocide‘,  The Washington Post Friday, 10 September 2004, available 
online at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A8364-2004Sep9.html, accessed 2 March 2016; 
Robert Barnidge ‗The United Nations and the African Union: Assessing a Partnership for Peace in Darfur‘ 
(2009) 14 Journal of Conflict & Security Law 93 - 113.  
10 David Mickler ‗Darfur‘s Dread: Contemporary State Terrorism in the Sudan‘ in Richard Jackson, Eamon 
Murphy and Scott Poynting Contemporary State Terrorism: Theory and Practice (2010) 35.  
11 Rebecca Hamilton Fighting for Darfur: Public Action and the Struggle to Stop Genocide (2011) 49.  
12 African Confidential ‗AU Investigation of Haskanita Attack in Darfur‘, October 2007, available online at 
http://www.africa-confidential.com/special-report/id/18/AU_investigation_of_Haskanita_attack_in_Darfur, 
accessed 2 March 2016; Abdelbagi Jibril ‗Past and Future of UNAMID: Tragic Failure or Glorious Success?‘ 
(2010) Human Rights and Advocacy Network for Democracy Briefing Paper, 12, available online at 
http://migs.concordia.ca/links/documents/Past_and_Future_of_UNAMID.pdf, accessed 2 March 2016. 
13 Lee Stone and Max du Plessis ‗The Implementation of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
(ICC) in African Countries‘, available online at http://docplayer.fr/12554063-The-implementation-of-the-rome-
statute-of-the-international-criminal-court-in-african-countries.html, accessed 19 September 2016.  
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provides that the UNSC can refer non-States Parties to the ICC, acting under Chapter VII of 
the UN Charter.14 The UNSC referred the Darfur conflict to the ICC on 31 March 2005.15  
 
7.1.2 Background history to the Libyan conflict 
 
The Arab Spring of 2011 caused the change of government in several Arab countries. 
However, none was as dramatic and consequential as that of Libya and the involvement of 
the ICC. Muammar Mohammed Abu Minyar Gaddafi had ruled Libya since 1969, taking 
power through a coup d’etat, and was in control of every facet of Libya through his children 
and cronies.16 Gaddafi was accused of human rights abuses and ruling Libya with an iron fist. 
Protests which initially started in Benghazi snowballed to other cities in Libya and resulted in 
an armed confrontation between government soldiers loyal to Gaddafi and his children, and 
the armed opposition movement. The AU and other countries tried to intervene in Libya 
through peace negotiations but these efforts proved abortive as the armed opposition wanted 
Gaddafi to leave power entirely. In the process causalities were recorded on both sides of the 
conflict. The government of Libya also targeted unarmed protesters which resulted in the 
deaths of civilians.   
 
While the unrest continued in Libya, there were calls for the ICC to intervene. However, the 
ICC had no basis to intervene at that point as Libya was not a State Party and therefore the 
ICC had no jurisdiction over the alleged international crimes that were happening in Libya. 
However, there were possibilities, and this was pointed out by the Prosecutor in a Press 
Release on 23 February 2011 where he argued, that:  
 
 'The decision to do justice in Libya should be taken by the Libyan people. Currently, 
 Libya is not a State Party to the Rome Statute. Therefore, intervention by the ICC on 
 the alleged crimes committed in Libya can occur only if the Libyan authorities accept 
 the jurisdiction of the Court, (through article 12(3) of the Rome Statute). In the 
 absence of such a step, the United Nations Security Council can decide to refer the 
                                                 
14 See chapter four, paragraph 4.5.3. See also Article 13(b) of the Rome Statute. 
15 UNSC Resolution 1593 of 31 March 2005.  
16 Prosecutor‘s Application Pursuant to Article 58 as to Muammar Mohammed Abu Minyar GADDAFI, Saif 
Al‐Islam GADDAFI and Abdullah AL‐SENUSSI ICC‐01/11, 16 May 2011.  
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 situation to the Court. The Office of the Prosecutor will act only after either decision 
 is taken.' 17 
 
The UNSC subsequently referred the situation in Libya from 15 February 2011 to the ICC.18 
In the referral, the UNSC resolved that: 
 
 'The Libyan authorities shall cooperate fully with and provide any necessary 
 assistance to the Court and the Prosecutor pursuant to this resolution and, while 
 recognizing that States not party to the Rome Statute have no obligation under the 
 Statute, urges all States and concerned regional and other international 
 organizations to cooperate fully with the Court and the Prosecutor.'19  
  
In addition, the resolution excluded the investigation or prosecution of nationals, current or 
former officials or personnel from a State outside Libya, that is not a State Party to the Rome 
Statute for all acts or omissions as a result of the decision of the UNSC unless such exclusive 
jurisdiction had been waived by the State concerned.20  
 
The UNSC also invited the Prosecutor to address it every six months on actions taken 
pursuant to the resolution. Furthermore, the resolution also limited the expenses incurred in 
connection with the referral, including investigations or prosecutions to States Parties to the 
Rome Statute and those States that wished to contribute voluntarily.21  
 
After the referral by the UNSC, the Prosecutor issued another statement welcoming the 
referral and stating that a preliminary examination would be conducted to ‗decide whether an 
investigation into alleged crimes against humanity committed in Libya since 15 February 
2011 should be opened‘.22 This confirms earlier discussions of the rule that, irrespective of 
how the jurisdiction of the ICC is triggered, there is an obligation by the Prosecutor to 
                                                 
17  Statement by ICC Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo on Libya 23 February 2011. The statement by the 
Prosecutor corroborates our earlier discussion in the study that the ICC can only have jurisdiction over non-
States Parties if the country in question accepts the jurisdiction of the Court (as happened in Cote d’Ivoire) or 
the Situation is referred to the ICC by the UNSC acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.   
18 UNSC Resolution 1970 (2011) adopted 26 February 2011.  
19 Ibid, paragraph 5.  
20 Ibid, paragraph 6.  
21 Ibid, paragraph 8.  
22 Statement by the Office of the Prosecutor on situation in Libya on 28 February 2015.  
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conduct a preliminary examination to decide whether there are reasonable grounds to believe 
that crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court have been committed.23 This inquiry relates to 
the issues of jurisdiction, admissibility (complementarity and gravity) and interests of justice 
as already discussed in Chapter four of the study.24 These are discussed extensively below.  
 
7.2 Preliminary examinations in Darfur and Libya conflicts 
 
Both preliminary examinations under review in this chapter were conducted by the former 
ICC Prosecutor, Moreno Ocampo. 
 
7.2.1   The Prosecutor and jurisdiction in Sudan  
 
The Sudanese government has consistently contested the exercise of jurisdiction over 
Sudanese nationals by the ICC.25 However, the ICC clearly has jurisdiction over the crimes 
committed in Darfur since these crimes were committed after the entry into force of the 
Rome Statute.26 The referral by the UNSC states that the investigations of the Prosecutor 
should cover events that happened after 1 July 2002.27 The fact that Sudan was not a State 
party to the Statute raises the issue whether Sudan was and is bound by the decisions of the 
UNSC.  
 
The Statute provides that situations of States not party to the treaty can be referred to the 
ICC.28 This is clearly what happened in the case of Sudan. However, Sudan has claimed that 
it is not bound by a statute that it has not ratified. This argument is based on the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), which provides that a ‗treaty does not create 
either obligations or rights for a third State without its consent‘.29 However, since Sudan is a 
member of the UN, it is bound by the decision of the UNSC when acting under Chapter VII 
                                                 
23 See Chapter four, paragraph 4.5.2.  
24 See Chapter four, paragraph 4.4 - 4.7. 
25  Laura Barnett ‗The International Criminal Court: History and Role‘, 4 November 2008, Canadian 
Parliamentary Information and Research Service, 22. 
26 Article 11 (1) of the Rome Statute.  
27 Paragraph 7 of the UNSC Res 1593. 
28  Article 13(b) of the Rome Statute.  
29 Article 34 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969.  
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of the UN Charter.30 Membership of the UN in this instance presupposes acceptance of the 
decisions of the UNSC in the maintenance of international peace and security. In addition, as 
a signatory to the Rome Statute, Sudan is bound not to take actions that defeat the object and 
purpose of the treaty.31 Furthermore, the UN Charter clearly states that Member States of the 
UN ‗agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council‘ in accordance with 
the provisions of the Charter.32 
 
At the conclusion of the preliminary examination three months after the UNSC referred the 
matter to his office, the former Prosecutor decided to open an investigation.33 In deciding to 
proceed with an investigation, the former Prosecutor argued that he had consulted several 
documents from other sources and interviewed 50 experts on the Darfur conflict.34 This may 
be considered an explanation for the length of time it took the Prosecutor to decide whether 
to open an investigation in the Darfur conflict.  
 
Based on the information that was available, the Prosecutor concluded that there was a 
reasonable basis to proceed with an investigation. 35  The Prosecutor reiterated that his 
investigation into the Darfur conflict would be ‗impartial and independent, focusing on the 
individuals who bear the greatest criminal responsibility for crimes committed in Darfur‘.36 
The decision to proceed with an investigation was announced through a one-page press 
release without dealing substantially with the statutory factors considered during preliminary 
examination.37 The first report of the Prosecutor to the UNSC, however, listed the factors 
                                                 
30 Dapo Akande ‗The Legal Nature of Security Council Referrals to the ICC and its Impact on Al Bashir‘s 
Immunities‘ (2009) 7 Journal of International Criminal Justice , 333 – 352.  
31 Article 18 of the VCLT. See also Renee Dopplick ‗Sudan: ICC Prosecutor to Charge a Sitting Head of State‘ 
Inside Justice Postings 11 July 2008, available online at 
http://www.insidejustice.com/law/index.php/intl/2008/07/11/p89, accessed 2 March 2016. 
32 Article 25 of the UN Charter.  See also Dapo Akande ‗The Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court 
over Nationals of Non-Parties: Legal Basis and Limits (2003) 1 Journal of International Criminal Justice 618 – 
650; Dapo Akande ‗Are there Limits to the Powers of the Security Council?‘ (2007) 5 Journal of International 
Law & Policy, 2 – 11. 
33 ICC ‗The Prosecutor of the ICC Opens Investigation in Darfur‘, 6 June 2005, ICC-OTP-0606-104.  
34 Ibid.  
35 Ibid.  
36 Ibid.  
37 Ibid.  
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considered during preliminary examinations,38 but the report was not clear on how the ICC 
legal framework was applied in arriving at the decision to proceed with an investigation. In 
the report presented to the UNSC, it is not clear how jurisdiction, admissibility and interests 
of justice were applied in making a determination to proceed.39  
 
7.2.2 The Prosecutor and jurisdiction in Libya  
 
Jurisdiction is an important aspect of preliminary examination and the Prosecutor has to be 
satisfied that temporal, subject-matter, and either territorial or personal jurisdiction standards 
are satisfied before an investigation can commence.40 It will be recalled that the ICC entered 
into force in July 2002 and the crimes in question took place in February 2011. This clearly 
shows that the requirement of jurisdiction rationae temporis was satisfied.41  
 
As to whether the crimes suspected to have been committed in Libya fall within the subject 
matter jurisdiction of the ICC, in the report to the UNSC pursuant to Resolution 1970, the 
Prosecutor argued that there were reasonable grounds to believe that crimes against humanity 
had been committed in Libya.42 In addition, the Prosecutor argued that war crimes had been 
committed when the conflict developed into a non-international armed conflict.43  
 
                                                 
38 First Report of the Prosecutor of the ICC to the Security Council pursuant to UNSC 1593 (2005) 29 June 
2005. 
39 OTP Press Release on Darfur op cit. 
40 Chapter four, paragraph 4.4.   
41Chapter four, paragraph 4.4.3. See also Article 11 of the Rome Statute. 
42 These include murder under Article 7(1)(a) of the Rome Statute; Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of 
physical liberty under Article 7(1)(e) of the Rome Statute; Other inhumane acts under Article 7(1)(k) of the 
Rome Statute; Torture under Article 7(1)(f); Persecution under Article 7(1)(h) of the Rome Statute; Rape under 
Article 7(1)(g) of the Rome Statute and Deportation or forcible transfer under Article 7(1)(d) of the Rome 
Statute. See Paragraphs 11 - 12 of the First Report of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court to the 
UN Security Council pursuant to UNSC Resolution 1970 (2011). 
43 The Prosecutor argued that the following War Crimes were committed during the conflict: Violence to life 
and person, under Article 8(2)(c)(i) of the Rome Statute; intentionally directing attacks against civilians not 
taking a direct part in hostilities under Article 8(2)(e)(i) of the Rome Statute and Intentionally directing attacks 
against buildings dedicated to religion, education, art, science or charitable purposes, historic monuments, 
hospitals and places where the sick and wounded are collected, provided they are not military objectives, under 
Article 8(2)(e)(iv) of the Rome Statute. See Paragraph 12 of the First Report of the Prosecutor of the 
International Criminal Court to the UN Security Council pursuant to UNSC Resolution 1970 (2011).  
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Another determination that has to be made is whether crimes within the jurisdiction of the 
Court were committed on the territory of a State Party or by the national of a State Party.44 As 
already noted, Libya is not a State Party to the Rome Statute, However, the Statute provides 
that the UNSC can refer States not party to the ICC acting under Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter.45 Therefore, it can be concluded with regard to article 25 of the UN Charter that 
UNSC Resolution 1970 is binding on Libya as a member of the UN Charter. This resolution 
empowers the ICC to exercise jurisdiction over the situation in Libya regarding the events of 
February 2011.46  
 
7.2.3 The Prosecutor and complementarity in Sudan 
 
As already noted, the inquiry into the admissibility of a situation involves inquiries into 
complementarity and gravity. 47  In relation to the Sudan, the Prosecutor announced the 
decision to conduct a preliminary examination into the situation in Sudan in June 2005.48 In 
the statement, the Prosecutor argued that there was ‗sufficient information to believe that 
there are cases that would be admissible in relation to the Darfur situation‘.49 The Prosecutor 
also pointed out that the decision was not an indictment of the Sudanese legal system, but 
based on the absence of domestic criminal proceedings relating to the situation.50  
 
However, the Government of the Sudan in the same month of June 2005 announced the 
establishment of the Special Criminal Court for Events in Darfur (SCCED) in response to the 
announcement by the Prosecutor about the opening of investigations in Darfur. 51  The 
jurisdiction of SCCED included acts constituting crimes under the Sudanese Penal Code and 
other penal codes, charges relating to violations cited in the report of the Commission of 
                                                 
44 See Chapter four, paragraph 4.4.  
45 See Chapter four, paragraph 4.5.3; Article 13 (b) of the Rome Statute.  
46 Paragraph 50 of the Prosecutor‘s Application Pursuant to Article 58 as to Muammar Mohammed Abu 
Minyar Gaddafi, Saif Al‐Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah Al-Senussi, ICC‐01/11, 16 May 2011.  
47 See Chapter four, paragraph 4.6.  
48 See ICC ‗Letter to Judge Claude Jorda from the Prosecutor of the ICC‘, 1 June 2005. 
49 Report of the Prosecutor to the UNSC at 4.  
50 Ibid.       
51 See Letter dated 18 June 2005 from the Charge d’affaires  a.i of the Permanent Mission of the Sudan to the 
United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council S/2005/403, 22 June 2005, available at  
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=%20S/2005/403, accessed 27 January 2014; See also 
UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs - Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN) 
‗Sudan: Judiciary Challenges ICC over Darfur Cases‘, 24 June 2005. 
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Inquiry, and any charges pursuant to any other law, as determined by the Chief Justice of 
Sudan.52 Furthermore, in November 2005, the Sudan established two additional chambers for 
the SCCED and created special investigative committees to oversee the activities of SCCED.  
 
These bodies were the Judicial Investigations Committee, the Special Prosecutions 
Commissions, the Committees against Rape, the Unit for Combating Violence against 
Women and Children and the Committee on Compensation.53 These committees aimed at 
addressing the crimes in Darfur.54 The Decree that established the SCCED was amended in 
November 2005 to include ‗international humanitarian law‘ in the jurisdiction of the SCCED 
while two additional seats were established for Nyala and El Geneina.55 
 
At the time preliminary examinations were conducted on the Darfur situation, Sudan had not 
conducted any trials relating to the referral by the UNSC. This is because cases brought 
before the SCCED did not mirror the international crimes committed in Darfur. In fact, the 
cases at SCCED were seen as a ploy by the Sudanese government to circumvent ICC‘s 
jurisdiction.56   
 
Later on, several other developments occurred in the Sudanese criminal justice system. For 
example, in 2009, Sudan amended its Criminal Act of 1991 through the efforts of the Arab 
League, introducing international crimes into the Sudanese Penal Code. 57  Despite this 
development, there are still flaws in the Sudanese criminal justice system. For example, the 
Armed Forces Act of 2007, while criminalising serious violations of international 
humanitarian law and human rights law, also provides for immunity to members of the armed 
forces which can only be waived by the President.  
 
                                                 
52Article 5 of the Decree Establishing the Special Criminal Court on the Events in Darfur, June 7, 2005 reprinted 
in UN Document S/2005/403. 
53 ICC ‗Third Report of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court to the UN Security Council Pursuant 
to UNSCR 1593 (2005)‘ 14 June 2006. 
54  Suliman Baldo ‗Sudan: Impact of the Rome Statute and the International Criminal Court‘, June 2010 
International Centre for Transitional Justice Briefing Paper on the Review Conference, 3. 
55 Omer Elagab ‗The Darfur Situation and the ICC: An appraisal‘ (2008) 1 Journal of Politics and Law 43 – 60. 
56 HRW ‗Lack of Conviction: The Special Criminal Court on the Events in Darfur‘ June 2006. 
57 Paragraph 15 of the Prosecutor‘s statement to the United Nations Security Council on the situation in Darfur, 
the Sudan, pursuant to UNSCR 1593 (2005)‘ 4 December 2009. 
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The Sudanese Criminal Procedure Act (CPA) prohibits investigations and proceedings 
outside Sudan for any citizen that may have committed the crimes in the amended 2009 
Criminal Act of 1991. The CPA also prohibits anyone in Sudan from assisting in the 
extradition of any Sudanese for the prosecution of war crimes, crimes against humanity and 
genocide. 58  Sudan did not meet the threshold established by the Rome Statute for the 
Prosecutor to decide not to proceed with an investigation. In addition, some of the efforts 
embarked upon by the Sudanese government occurred after the Prosecutor had already 
decided to proceed with an investigation.  Therefore in the evaluation of evidence during 
preliminary examination in Sudan, the activities carried out by the Sudanese government do 
not in any way affect the decision to proceed with an investigation.  
 
From the foregoing, it is clear that the Sudanese legal system did not meet the 
complementarity test to the extent that at the time the preliminary examination was 
conducted, there was no evidence that it was investigating any of the crimes that the ICC 
Prosecutor had indicated interest in pursuing.  
 
7.2.4 The Prosecutor and complementarity in Libya 
 
The Prosecutor during preliminary examination has to consider whether the case is or would 
be admissible under article 17 of the Rome Statute. 59  Admissibility is divided into 
complementarity and gravity. Complementarity is the process through which the Prosecutor 
defers to national jurisdictions in the investigation and prosecution of international crimes.60  
 
In the Libya situation, the Prosecutor argued that, based on the preliminary examination 
carried out, the situation was admissible because there were no ongoing investigations or 
prosecutions by any State in relation to the conflict in Libya. The Prosecutor argued that the 
case was of sufficient gravity to justify any action by the Court. 61 In the report to the UNSC, 
the Prosecutor stated that both Gaddafi and his son Sayf Al-Islam had called for the 
establishment of a national commission to investigate the protests and unrest, including a UN 
commission to investigate the origin and consequences of the conflict. However, none of 
                                                 
58 Baldo op cit at 3. 
59 Chapter four, paragraph 4.6.  
60 Chapter four, paragraph 4.6.1.  
61 Paragraph 51 of the Prosecutor‘s Application Pursuant to Article 58 as to Muammar Mohammed Abu 
Minyar Gaddafi, Saif Al‐Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah Al-Senussi, ICC‐01/11, 16 May 2011.  
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these materialized during the period under study.62 Clearly, the situation was admissible, as 
there was no credible evidence that the Libyan government was investigating the crimes 
allegedly committed during the unrest.  
 
7.2.5 The Prosecutor and gravity in Sudan 
 
As already noted in Chapter four, gravity is a factor to be considered during preliminary 
examination.63 However, the report of the Prosecutor to the UNSC centred on the issue of 
complementarity. There is no mention of gravity regarding admissibility issues. This 
confirms that at the initial stages of developing the criteria for conducting preliminary 
examinations, gravity did not play any important role in the factors identified by the 
Prosecutor.64 However, this omission does not by itself contradict the fact that the gravity of 
the crimes committed in the Darfur conflict meets the gravity requirements of the ICC.  The 
following reports discussed below are used to illustrate the gravity of the crimes committed 
in the Darfur conflict. 
 
In May 2004, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR) 
released a report which concluded that war crimes and crimes against humanity were 
committed by the Sudanese soldiers and the Janjaweed militia armed by the government as 
part of its counter-insurgency campaign.65 According to the UNHCHR, ‗[i]n certain areas of 
Darfur, the Janjaweed have supported the regular armed forces in attacking and targeting 
civilian populations suspected of supporting the rebellion, while in other locations it appears 
that the Janjaweed have played the primary role in such attacks with the military in 
support‘.66  The report of the UNHCHR recommended the setting up of an international 
commission of inquiry to determine the culpability of the Sudanese government in relation to 
the crimes committed in Darfur.67   
                                                 
62 Paragraph 13 of the Prosecutors Report to the UNSC on the Libyan Situation. 
63 Chapter four, paragraph 4.6.2.  
64 William Schabas ‗Prosecutorial Discretion v Judicial Activism at the International Criminal Court‘ (2008) 6 
Journal of International Criminal Justice 731 at 737; Ray Murphy ‗Gravity Issues and The International 
Criminal Court‘ (2006) 17 Criminal Law Forum 281 – 315; Mohamed El Zeidy ‗The Gravity Threshold under 
the Statute of the International Criminal Court‘ (2008) 19 Criminal Law Forum 35 – 57.  
65 Report of the  United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and Follow Up to the World Conference 
on Human Rights: Situation of human rights in the Darfur region of the Sudan‘ E/CN.4/2005/3 7 May 2004.   
66 Ibid at 6.  
67 Paragraph 103 UNHCR report on Darfur op cit . 
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In the same month under review in 2004, the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights 
(ACHPR) adopted a resolution deploring ‗on-going gross human rights violations in the 
Darfur region of Sudan‘. 68  The resolution welcomed the decision of the Sudanese 
government to facilitate a fact-finding mission by the ACHPR to carry out on-the-spot 
assessment of human rights abuses in Darfur.69 The ACHPR fact-finding mission took place 
in July 2004.70 In the report issued in September 2004, the ACHPR confirmed that the Darfur 
conflict commenced when two rebel groups, SLM/A and the JEM, took up arms against the 
Sudanese government.  
 
The ACHPR Darfur report noted that the counter-insurgency campaign of the government 
exacerbated the conflict as the Sudanese government recruited Janjaweed militia that targeted 
civilians with the support of Sudanese military officers.71 The report found that all parties to 
the conflict had committed human rights abuses, but stated that the Janjaweed were 
responsible for the massive human rights violations of those living in the IDPs camps.72 The 
report further found that attacks by the Sudanese soldiers and allied Janjaweed militias on the 
civilian population amounted to war crimes and crimes against humanity.73  
 
The report recommended that the government of Sudan ‗should disarm all irregular armed 
groups, in particular the Janjaweed militia, the Pashtun, the Torabora, the Pashmerga, and 
any such militias operating illegally within Darfur‘.74 It called on the government of Sudan 
                                                 
68 ACHPR ‗Resolution on Darfur‘ adopted during the 35th Ordinary Session of the ACHPR held in Banjul from 
21st May – 4th June 2004, in Banjul, The Gambia, available online at 
http://www.achpr.org/sessions/35th/resolutions/68/, accessed 2 March 2016. The African Commission on 
Human and Peoples‘ Rights (ACHPR) established by the African Charter was adopted in 1981 in Banjul, The 
Gambia. The ACHPR has contributed to the promotion and protection of human rights in the continent despite 
some limitations. The human rights violations in Darfur have been of interest to the ACHPR during its public 
sessions. The ACHPR has adopted several resolutions and statements on human rights developments in Darfur 
since the beginning of the conflict.   
69Ibid.   
70 ACHPR ‗Report of the African Commission on Human and Peoples‘ Rights‘ Fact-Finding Mission to the 
Republic of Sudan‘ EX.CL/364 (XI) Annex III, available at http://www.achpr.org/files/sessions/41st/mission-
reports/sudan/misrep_factfind_sudan_2004_eng.pdf, accessed  2 March 2016..  
71 Ibid, paragraph 110. 
72 Ibid, paragraph 121. 
73 Ibid, paragraph 123.  
74 Ibid, paragraph 141. 
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and the rebel movements to consider human rights abuses and humanitarian situation on the 
civilian population, arising out of the delay in adopting a peace agreement on the Darfur 
conflict. 75  The report concluded by calling on the government of Sudan and the rebel 
movements to resolve their differences through negotiations, in the interest of peace and for 
the protection of victims in Darfur.76  It recommended the setting up of an international 
commission of inquiry to investigate government officials in the military and police including 
Janjaweed militias in relation to international crimes committed in Darfur.77 
 
The report was presented to the AU without any follow up from the Commission and nothing 
was heard about the report thereafter. The report highlighted serious violations of human 
rights that took place in Darfur. It is also noteworthy that the report concluded categorically 
that war crimes and crimes against humanity had been committed in Sudan. However, it did 
not elaborate on the elements of war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in 
Darfur. 78  Furthermore, the report requested the Sudanese government to investigate the 
crimes allegedly committed in Darfur, protect its citizens and hold those responsible for the 
crimes accountable. 
 
Another report that discussed the Darfur conflict is the report of the International 
Commission of Inquiry on Darfur (ICID).79 Some of the main responsibilities of the ICID 
were to find out if the crime of genocide had been committed, identify the perpetrators, and 
recommend appropriate action to ensure accountability that will end impunity.80 The ICID‘s 
report confirmed the ethnic nature of the conflict by stating that the ‗vast majority of the 
                                                 
75 Ibid, paragraph 153. 
76 Ibid, 
77 Ibid, paragraph 137. 
78 See for example Elements of Crimes of the ICC available online at http://www2.icc-
cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/336923D8-A6AD-40EC-AD7B-45BF9DE73D56/0/ElementsOfCrimesEng.pdf, accessed 2 
March 2016.   
79 The ICID was set-up pursuant to the UNSC Resolution 1564 of 18 September 2004. 
80 The ICID‘s terms of reference were: (1) to investigate reports of violations of international humanitarian law 
and human rights law in Darfur by all parties; (2) to determine whether or not acts of genocide have occurred; 
(3) to identify the perpetrators of violations of international humanitarian law and human rights law in Darfur; 
and (4) to suggest means of ensuring that those responsible for such violations are held accountable. See the 
ICID report.  
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victims of all of these violations are from the Fur, Zaghawa, Massalit, Jebel, Aranga and 
other so-called ‗African‘ tribes.‘81  
 
The report stated that though the government of Sudan had not pursued a policy of genocide 
in its counter-insurgency campaign, ‗in some instances individuals, including government 
officials, may commit acts with genocidal intent. Whether this was the case in Darfur, 
however, is a determination that only a competent court can make on a case by case basis‘.82 
The report further stated that it was for ICC judges to determine whether the allegations by 
the Prosecutor could be proved or not. Furthermore, the ICID argued that the determination 
that no genocide had occurred should not detract from the fact that crimes against humanity 
and war crimes had been committed in Darfur Sudan,  as ‗international offences such as the 
crimes against humanity and war crimes that have been committed in Darfur may be no less 
serious and heinous than genocide‘.83  
 
The Janjaweed militias have been accused of complicity with the government forces to 
commit international sex crimes of mass rape and other sexual crimes in Darfur. The ICID 
found several incidents of mass rape and sexual crimes committed against women and girls in 
Darfur.84 
 
In addition, the ICID stated that international sex crimes committed in Darfur may have been 
under-reported owing to the sensitive nature of the issue. 85  The ICID report also 
recommended that the UNSC refer the Darfur conflict to the ICC, asserting that the referral 
would help restore peace in the region. A list of those allegedly responsible for the crimes in 
Darfur was forwarded to the Secretary-General of the UN in a sealed envelope for onward 
transmission to the ICC or a competent prosecutor to ensure accountability.  
 
A combination of these reports may have swayed the Prosecutor in the decision to proceed 
with an investigation. This is because these reports clearly argue that the gravity of the crimes 
committed in Darfur met the threshold in the Rome Statute. Therefore, it can be safely 
                                                 
81  Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary-General 
pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1564 of 18 September 2004 Geneva, 25 January 2005,  available online 
at http://www.un.org/news/dh/sudan/com_inq_darfur.pdf, accessed 2 March 2016.  
82 Paragraph 641 of the ICID Report, 2005.   
83 Executive Summary II of the ICID Report.  
84 Paragraph 334 of the ICID Report 2005.  
85 Paragraph 336 ICID Report 2005. 
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concluded that although the Prosecutor did not discuss the issue of gravity, the reports 
discussed above which the Prosecutor had access to prove that the crimes in issue had met the 
gravity threshold.  
 
7.2.6 The Prosecutor and gravity in Libya 
 
 
Regarding the issue of gravity in Libya, the Prosecutor argued that in referring the situation 
to the ICC, the UNSC highlighted the gravity of the situation which clearly meets the 
threshold criteria of gravity required by Rome Statute.86 In relation to other elements of 
gravity, the Prosecutor was of the opinion that the required gravity was met. For instance, 
regarding the manner and nature of the crimes, the Prosecutor argued that shooting at 
peaceful protesters in Tripoli and other cities in Libya were systematic, following the same 
modus operandi in multiple locations and executed through Libyan security forces. In 
addition, the Prosecutor argued that the persecution of protesters appeared to be systematic 
and implemented in different cities while war crimes were apparently committed as a matter 
of policy.87  
 
With regard to the scale of the conflict, the Prosecutor argued that the efforts to cover up the 
crimes by the Libyan government made it difficult to ascertain the precise number of victims. 
This is because dead bodies were removed from streets and hospitals and buried secretly.  In 
addition, medical personnel were not allowed to document the number of dead and injured 
persons admitted to the hospitals after the violent clashes between government forces and 
protesters began.88 Furthermore, security forces were allegedly stationed in the hospitals and 
arrested injured protestors who sought medical treatment. The Prosecutor also argued that 
there was information showing that some protestors sought medical attention in private 
homes and did not bring injured or dead persons to the hospitals to avoid arrest and 
victimisation. Furthermore, victims of rape were reportedly arrested and subjected to 
harassment by security forces.89   
 
The Prosecutor concluded that the total number of persons that died during the conflict is up 
to 10 000, according to the Libyan Interim National Council (INC). In addition, the 
                                                 
86 Paragraph 16 of the Report to the UNSC. 
87 Paragraph 17 of the Report to the UNSC.  
88 Paragraph 18 of the Report to the UNSC. 
89 Ibid. 
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Prosecutor further argued that more than 50 000 persons were wounded, according to the 
INC. 90  Furthermore, the Prosecutor stated that the number of those displaced included 
approximately 535 000 migrant workers, refugees and asylum seekers, and 327 342 Libyans 
internally displaced as estimated by the UN. However, other organizations place the total of 
those displaced at 475 000.91 
 
7.2.7    The interests of justice in Sudan 
 
The interest of justice requirement is a vital component of preliminary examinations. The 
interest of justice principle is considered by the Prosecutor when there is a positive 
determination of jurisdiction and admissibility.92 The Prosecutor argued that the concept of 
interests of justice should not be perceived to embrace all issues related to peace and 
security.93 The Prosecutor further argued that when there is a conflict between the interests of 
justice and interests of peace, the best way to seek for a deferral is through article 16 of the 
Rome Statute.94 However, the report of the Prosecutor to the UNSC did not go into detail 
regarding the interactions between peace and justice in the Darfur conflict. Although the AU 
has requested that the UNSC defer the referral in the interests of justice, the UNSC is yet to 
act on the request.95  
 
Regarding the interests of justice, the UNSC Resolution 1593 contemplates alternative justice 
mechanisms to complement criminal prosecutions in the resolution of the Darfur conflict. 
The resolution: 
 
 'Emphasises the need to promote healing and reconciliation and encourages in this 
 respect the creation of institutions, involving all sectors of Sudanese society, such as 
 truth and/or reconciliation commissions, in order to complement judicial processes 
                                                 
90 Paragraph 19 of the Report to the UNSC. 
91 Paragraph 20 of the Report to the UNSC  
92 Chapter four, paragraph 4.7.  
93 Paragraph 67 of the Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations 
94 Ibid. See also Kenneth Rodman ‗Is Peace in the Interests of Justice? The Case for Broad Prosecutorial 
Discretion at the International Criminal Court‘ (2009) 22 Leiden Journal of International Law 99 at 120.  
95  Benson Olugbuo ‗The African Union, the United Nations Security Council and the Politicisation of 
International Justice in Africa‘ (2014) 7 African Journal of Legal Studies, 351–379.  
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 and thereby reinforce the efforts to restore long-lasting peace, with African Union and 
 international support as necessary.'96  
 
Undoubtedly, the UNSC has an important role to play regarding the invocation of article 16 
of the Rome Statute to suspend the activities of the ICC. However, this action does not 
effectively remove the powers conferred on the ICC Prosecutor.  
 
The Prosecutor may be justified by insisting that issues relating to peace should be handled 
only by the UNSC in relation to UNSC referrals. Peace and justice should be complementary 
and not mutually exclusive in resolving the on-going Darfur conflict. Some scholars have 
argued that the intervention of the ICC in the Darfur conflict would derail peace negotiations 
and resolution of the conflict.97 The AU has also called on the UNSC to defer the ICC 
referral using article 16 of the Rome Statute.98 However, article 16 of the Statute does not 
suspend the prosecutorial discretion granted to the Prosecutor in article 53 of the Statute.  At 
the time of conducting the preliminary examination, there was no evidence to show that the 
initiation of an investigation was not in the interests of justice.  
 
7.2.8 The interests of justice in Libya  
 
In the Libyan situation, the Prosecutor decided that there were no serious reasons to believe 
that the investigation would not serve the interests of justice.99 The Prosecutor is not expected 
to show reasons why an investigation is not in the interest of justice.  The interests of justice 
are only considered when the requirements of jurisdiction and admissibility are met.100 While 
jurisdiction and admissibility are positive requirements, the interests of justice provide a 
potentially countervailing consideration that may give a reason not to proceed. As earlier 
                                                 
96 Paragraph 5 of UNSC resolution 1593.   
97 Julie Flint and Alex de Waal ‗To Put Justice before Peace Spells Disaster for Sudan‘, 5 March 2009, The 
Guardian, available online at http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/mar/06/sudan-war-crimes, 
accessed 6 August 2012; Julie Flint and Alex de Waal ‗Justice Off Course In Darfur‘, 28 June 2008 The 
Washington Post, available online at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2008/06/27/AR2008062702632.html , accessed 2 March 2016. 
98 Paragraph 11 of the Communiqué of the 142nd Meeting of the Peace and Security Council, PSC/MIN/Comm 
(CXLII); Simon Weldehaimanot ‗Arresting Al-Bashir: The African Union‘s Opposition and the Legalities‘ 
(2011) 19 African Journal of International and Comparative Law 208 -235.  
99 Paragraph 21 of the Report of the UNSC.  
100 Paragraph 67 of the Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations.  
 
194 | Page 
noted, the Prosecutor is not required to establish that an investigation serves the interests of 
justice. Rather, the Prosecutor has argued that she will proceed unless there are specific 
circumstances which provide substantial reasons to believe that the interests of justice are not 
served by an investigation at that time.101 It is also argued that the referral by the UNSC 
shows that the conflict was a threat to international peace and security and therefore it can 
only be in the interest of justice for investigations to commence.  
 
From the foregoing, it is clear that the factors within the ICC framework, namely; 
jurisdiction, admissibility (complementarity and gravity) and the interests of justice were met 
during the preliminary examinations conducted in Sudan and Libya. It is also important to 
note that the involvement of the UNSC raised the stakes of the conflict. This is because a 
referral by the UNSC presupposes a threat to international peace and security.  
 
7.3    General principles during preliminary examinations  
 
As noted in Chapter two of the study, there is a correlation between the theory of neutrality 
adopted in this study and the general principles developed by the office of the Prosecutor.102 
While the theory of neutrality is concerned with non-bias, non-partisanship and principled 
decision making, the general principles during preliminary examinations discuss 
independence, impartiality and objectivity.  It is submitted that these attributes of a three-
dimensional neutral prosecutor are interchangeable and will be discussed bearing in mind the 
theory of prosecutorial neutrality extensively discussed in Chapter two, and policies adopted 
by the ICC Prosecutor discussed in chapter five of the study.  Furthermore, it is important to 
recall that the theory of neutrality was originally conceptualised for the American criminal 
justice system. However, the theory was retooled in Chapter two to accommodate 
proceedings at the ICC noting the similarities and differences between the domestic and. 
international criminal justice systems.   
 
7.3.1    The Prosecutor and independence in Sudan 
 
The independence of the Prosecutor in the Darfur conflict is not in question. Despite the fact 
that the situation was referred by the UNSC, the Prosecutor conducted an independent 
assessment of evidence available to determine whether there was a reasonable basis to 
                                                 
101 Ibid.  
102 Chapter two, paragraph 2.1 
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proceed with an investigation. The Prosecutor argued that the materials submitted by the 
ICID were not binding on him, and this is correct. The Statute provides that ‗[a] member of 
the office shall not seek or act on instructions from any external source.‘103 An argument can 
be made that since the UNSC referred the matter to the ICC, it will ultimately determine how 
proceedings will be carried out. This is far from the truth. The mere fact that the UNSC 
referred the Darfur conflict to the ICC does not remove the Prosecutor‘s discretion in 
conducting the preliminary examinations. 104  This means that the UNSC cannot defer a 
preliminary examination, but can only defer an investigation or prosecution of an 
international crime.105  
 
7.3.2 The Prosecutor and independence in Libya  
 
The activities of the Prosecutor in Libya were directly influenced by the UNSC referral.106  
This is not a problem as the Rome Statute provides that the UNSC can refer a matter to the 
Prosecutor acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.107  The Rome Statute provides that 
the Prosecutor shall be responsible for receiving referrals and any substantiated information 
on crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court, for examining them and for conducting 
investigations and prosecutions before the Court.108 However, there is nothing in the conduct 
of the former Prosecutor to show that he was not independent in the preliminary examination 
conducted in Libya and the subsequent decision to open an investigation. However, an issue 
that should be raised is whether the subsequent indictments issued by the Prosecutor reflect 
the level of crimes committed in Libya.  
 
For instance, the International Commission of Inquiry on Libya clearly identified three 
parties to the conflict and made specific recommendations regarding the activities of the 
Gaddafi forces, members of the armed opposition and NATO officials. The report confirmed 
that the Gaddafi forces had committed various violations of international humanitarian law 
                                                 
103 Article 42(1) of the Rome Statute.  
104 Rules 104 and 105 RPE.   
105 Chapter four, paragraph 4.5.3. 
106 As already noted in the study, the former ICC Prosecutor had initially issued a statement to the effect that he 
could only act through a UNSC referral or if the Libyan government accepted the jurisdiction of the Court.  
107 Chapter four, paragraph 4.5.3. 
108 Article 42 of the Rome Statute.  
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which amounted to war crimes.109 In addition, the report stated that the armed opposition 
during the Libyan conflict committed war crimes and crimes against humanity during the 
conflict.110 The report pointed out too that there had been no investigation into the violations 
committed by the armed opposition.111 Regarding the activities of NATO forces in Libya the 
report of the commission was ambivalent and recommend further investigation in relation to 
the activities of NATO. 112 
 
However, there is no further information from the Prosecutor on the activities of the armed 
opposition and those of NATO. It may be rightly argued that since the preliminary 
examination in the Libyan conflict was conducted in less than a week, these activities 
happened after the Prosecutor had made a determination to commence investigation. 
However, the Rome Statute provides that the Prosecutor may, at any time, reconsider a 
decision whether to initiate an investigation or prosecution based on new facts or 
information. 113  In fact, the decision to proceed with an investigation means that the 
Prosecutor had the discretion to investigate all sides to the conflict.  
 
7.3.3 The Prosecutor and impartiality in Sudan 
 
As already noted in Chapter five, impartiality involves a fair-minded and objective treatment 
of persons and issues, free from any bias or influence.114 Under the theory of neutrality, it is 
discussed as non-bias in decision making.115 This is because the exercise of prosecutorial 
discretion during preliminary examinations must adhere to internationally recognised human 
rights, and be without any adverse distinction founded on gender, age, race, colour, language, 
religion or belief, political or other opinion, national, ethnic or social origin, birth or other 
                                                 
109 Paragraph 119 of the Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Libya.  
110 Ibid, paragraph 120. 
111 Ibid.  
112 The Commission stated that 'NATO conducted a highly precise campaign with a demonstrable determination 
to avoid civilian casualties. For the most part they succeeded. On some limited occasions the Commission 
confirmed civilian casualties and found targets that showed no evidence of military utility. The Commission 
was unable to draw conclusions in such instances on the basis of the information provided by NATO and 
recommends further investigations' See Paragraph 122 of the Report of the International Commission of Inquiry 
on Libya.   
113 See Article 53(4) of the Rome Statute. 
114 Chapter five, paragraph 5.4.2.  
115 Chapter two, paragraph 2.1.1.  
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status.116 The fact that the Darfur situation was referred by the UNSC may have made the 
determination easier than is the case in a proprio motu referral. This is because the Prosecutor 
has also charged both parties to the conflict for international crimes committed during the 
conflict.  
  
7.3.4 The Prosecutor and impartiality in Libya  
 
Although the situation referred by the UNSC to the Prosecutor is the Libyan Situation, only 
individuals allied to Gaddafi have been indicted by the ICC. However, there is a clear case 
that has been made against the National Transitional Council, showing that they committed 
crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court. For instance the International Commission of 
Inquiry on Libya expressed its deep concern that no investigation or prosecutions were 
instigated into the crimes committed by the National Transitional Council.117 This statement 
is supported by Kevin Heller who argues that the National Transitional Council committed 
crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC and should have been investigated.118  
 
7.3.5 The Prosecutor and objectivity in Sudan 
 
The former Prosecutor seems to have been objective in the Darfur conflict to the extent that 
he gave both the Sudanese government and rebels opportunities to send materials relating to 
the conflict to his office.119  Furthermore, beyond the preliminary examination stage, the 
Prosecutor investigated both sides to the conflict. For example, the Prosecutor presented five 
cases involving seven defendants.120 In the case of the Prosecutor v Ahmad Muhammad 
Harun (‘Ahmad Harun’) and Ali Muhammad Ali Abd-Al-Rahman (‘Ali Kushayb’), the 
                                                 
116 Ibid.  
117 Paragraph 37 of the Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Libya A/HRC/19/68, 8 March 
2012.  
118Kevin Heller 'The International Commission of Inquiry on Libya: A Critical Analysis.' In: Meierhenrich, Jens, 
(ed.), International Commissions: the Role of Commissions of Inquiry in the Investigation of International 
Crimes. (2016) Oxford: Oxford University Press (Forthcoming), 1-51, available online at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2123782, accessed 19 September 2016.  
119 See Paragraph 33 of the Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations.  
120 The Prosecutor v Ahmad Muhammad Harun (‘Ahmad Harun’) and Ali Muhammad Ali Abd-Al-Rahman (‘Ali 
Kushayb’) ICC-02/05-01/07; The Prosecutor v Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09; The 
Prosecutor v Bahar Idriss Abu Garda, ICC-02/05-02/09; The Prosecutor v Abdallah Banda Abakaer Nourain 
and Saleh Mohammed Jerbo Jamus, ICC-02/05-03/09; The Prosecutor v Abdel Raheem Muhammad Hussein, 
ICC-02/05-01/12. 
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defendants were charged with war crimes and crimes against humanity.121 The Prosecutor 
made an application for warrants of arrest against them in February 2007 and Pre-Trial 
Chamber I issued the warrants in April 2007.122  
 
In the Prosecutor v Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, the defendant was charged with crimes 
against humanity, war crimes and genocide.123 Warrants of arrest were issued against him in 
March 2009124 and July 2010.125 In the Prosecutor v Abdel Raheem Muhammad Hussein, the 
accused was charged with crimes against humanity and war crimes. 126  All the accused 
persons in the three cases are currently at large and the Sudanese government has refused to 
arrest and surrender them to the ICC despite repeated demands.127 The charges all relate to 
the activities of the Sudanese forces and Janjaweed militia in Darfur.  
 
The Prosecutor alleged that the rebel groups fighting the government of Sudan have 
committed international crimes. In the Prosecutor v Bahar Idriss Abu Garda, the defendant 
was charged with war crimes under article 25(3)(a) of the Statute. He appeared before the 
Court after a summons to appear was issued against him.128 Pre-Trial Chamber I refused to 
confirm charges against him129 and rejected the Prosecutor‘s application for leave to appeal 
                                                 
121ICC ‗Situations – Darfur, Sudan‘ June 2005. 
122 See Warrant of Arrest for Ahmad Harun in the Prosecutor v Ahmad Harun (‘Ahmad Harun’) and Ali 
Muhammad Al Abd-Al-Rahman (‘Ali Kushayb’), 27 April 2007, ICC-02/05-01/07; Warrant of Arrest for Ali 
Kushayb in the Prosecutor v Ahmad Harun (‘Ahmad Harun’) and Ali Muhammad Al Abd-Al-Rahman (‘Ali 
Kushayb’), 27 April 2007, ICC-02/05-01/07. 
123ICC ‗Situations – Darfur, June 2005. 
124 Warrant of Arrest for Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir in the Prosecutor v Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, 4 
March 2009, ICC-02/05-01/09. 
125 Second Warrant of Arrest for Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir in 12 July 2010, No ICC-02/05-01/09 
126  See Warrant of Arrest for Abdel Raheem Muhammad Hussein in the Prosecutor v Abdel Raheem 
Muhammad Hussein, 1 March 2012, ICC-02/05-01/12. 
127 ICC ‗Seventeenth Report of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court to the UN Security Council 
Pursuant to UNSC 1593 (2005) 5 June 2013 (Seventeenth Report of the Prosecutor to the UNSC); Paragraph 17 
of the UNSC Resolution 2091 (2013) 14 February 2013, S/RES/2091 (2013) which ‗call[s] on the Government 
of Sudan to fulfil all its commitments, including lifting the state of emergency in Darfur, allowing free 
expression and undertaking effective efforts to ensure accountability for serious violations of international 
human rights and humanitarian law, by whomsoever perpetrated.‘ 
128 See Summons to Appear for Bahar Idriss Abu Garda in Prosecutor v Bahar Idriss Abu Garda 7 May 2009, 
ICC-02/05-02/09. 
129 Decision on the Confirmation of Charges in Prosecutor v Bahar Idriss Abu Garda, 8 February, 2010, ICC-
02/05-02/09. 
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the decision.130 In the Prosecutor v Abdallah Banda Abakaer Nourain and Saleh Mohammed 
Jerbo Jamus, the accused persons were charged with war crimes.131 Pre-Trial Chamber I 
confirmed the charges against them in March 2011.132  
 
The Defence team of Saleh Mohammed Jerbo Jamus recently notified the Court of his death 
during an attack in North Darfur.133 However, the Prosecutor decided to keep his name on the 
charge sheet until there is official confirmation of his death.134 The decision of the Prosecutor 
to open investigations in Sudan after preliminary examinations cannot be faulted because of 
the gravity of crimes that were committed. In addition, the fact that the UNSC referred the 
matter may have worked to the advantage of the Prosecutor. However, discussions below will 
assess how the Prosecutor used the policy objectives of the office to make a decision.  
 
7.3.6 The Prosecutor and objectivity in Libya 
 
 
As already discussed in Chapter five, objectivity relates to the ability of the Prosecutor to 
investigate both incriminating and exonerating circumstances equally in order to establish the 
truth in a situation before the ICC.135 From the discussions above, it is not clear that the 
Prosecutor has been objective in the preliminary examination conducted in Libya as the 
preliminary examination carried out in Libya only considered the crimes committed by the 
Gaddafi government but not those of the National Transitional Council. The report of the 
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135Chapter five, paragraph 5.4.3; Article 54(1) of the Rome Statute; Regulation 34(1) OTP Regulations.   
136 Paragraph 60 – 64 of the Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Libya.  
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7.4 Policy objectives during preliminary examinations  
 
The policy objectives are part of the policies adopted by the Prosecutor in the policy paper on 
preliminary examinations.137 These policies are also similar to the theory of neutrality 
adopted in the study and are discussed extensively in Chapter two.138 
 
7.4.1 The Prosecutor and transparency in Sudan  
 
 
The former Prosecutor was not adequately transparent during the preliminary examination 
carried out in the Darfur conflict, as he failed to issue any situation specific reports except the 
presentation made to the UNSC. Although it could be argued that there is no legal 
requirement on the Prosecutor to inform the public about ICC proceedings during preliminary 
examinations, the onus is on the Prosecutor to be transparent to the fullest extent possible.139 
As already noted, the current Prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda has made transparency a core 
responsibility of her office, which means that there is a clear change in policy between 
Moreno Ocampo and Fatou Bensouda.140 
 
7.4.2 The Prosecutor and transparency in Libya 
 
 
It is argued that there was a restricted level of openness during the preliminary examination. 
It seems the Prosecutor relied more on the referral of the UNSC and other external sources to 
conduct the preliminary examination in Libya. For example, regarding the gravity of the 
situation in Libya, the Prosecutor argued that ‗in referring the situation in Libya to the ICC, 
the UN Security Council has highlighted the gravity of the situation. It clearly meets the 
threshold of gravity required by the ICC Statute, taking into account all relevant criteria.‘141 
However, the Rome Statute does not expect the Prosecutor to rely on the referral by the 
                                                 
137 Chapter five, paragraph 5.5.  
138 Chapter two, paragraph 2.1 - 2.1.3 
139 Chapter five, paragraph 5.5.1.   
140Ibid.   
141 Paragraph 16 of the First Report of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court to the UNSC Pursuant 
To UNSCR 1970 (2011); See also Paragraph 50 of the Prosecutor‘s Application Pursuant to Article 58 as to 
Muammar Mohammed Abu Minyar Gaddafi, Saif Al‐Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah Al‐Senussi. 
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UNSC as the basis for a decision to proceed with an investigation. Rather, the Prosecutor is 
expected to analyse the situation taking into consideration the provisions of article 53 of the 
Rome Statute. Furthermore, the Prosecutor took less than one week to reach a decision to 
commence with an investigation, while it has taken longer periods in other situations 
discussed in this study. 142  Although the length of time of conducting a preliminary 
examination is not an important criterion, it can be argued that the ICC Prosecutor should 
take a reasonable time to conduct the examination..143  
 
7.4.3 The Prosecutor and ending impunity through positive complementarity in Sudan 
 
 
The Prosecutor did not articulate the potentials of positive complementarity in the decision to 
proceed with an investigation in the Sudanese conflict. A case can be made for the 
application of positive complementarity in Sudan. The UNSC Resolution 1593 that referred 
the Darfur conflict to the ICC arguably supported the application of positive 
complementarity. For instance, the Resolution urges all States and concerned regional and 
international organisations to cooperate fully with the ICC. 144  This recognises that co-
operation between the ICC and the AU is vital for effective investigation and prosecution of 
international crimes in Africa. It also suggests that there should be a shared burden between 
the ICC and the AU to ensure co-operation between them.  
 
In analysing Resolution 1593 and the promotion of positive complementarity at the regional 
level, the words of the Resolution are pertinent. It ‗[i]nvites the Court and the African Union 
to discuss practical arrangements that will facilitate the work of the Prosecutor and of the 
Court, including the possibility of conducting proceedings in the region, which would 
contribute to regional efforts in the fight against impunity.‘145 The possibility of conducting 
proceedings in the region can be given three different interpretations. The first interpretation 
is that the AU should facilitate the work of the ICC in the investigation and prosecution of 
                                                 
142 See Annexure I for the approximate periods of conducting preliminary examinations in other countries in 
Libya and other countries.  
143 See Grotius Centre for International Legal Studies 'Preliminary Examination and Legacy/Sustainable Exit: 
Reviewing Policies and Practices' 26 October 2015, available at  http://postconflictjustice.com/wp-
content/uploads/2015/10/Report-Preliminary-Examination-and-Legacy_Sustainable-Exit_Reviewing-Policies-
and-Practices.pdf, accessed 1 March 2016.  
144 Paragraph 2 of UNSC Resolution 1593 of 2005.   
145 Paragraph 3 of the UNSC Resolution 1593 of 2005.  
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international crimes in Africa. This can be achieved using the relationship agreement that is 
yet to be concluded, or through a memorandum of understanding that can be reviewed 
regularly.146   
 
The second argument is that the AU can assist or empower Sudan to carry out investigations 
and prosecutions of international crimes in Sudan in collaboration with the ICC. This can 
either be possible through the hybrid court recommended by the AUHLPD or the proposed 
Chambers of the African Court of Justice on Human and Peoples‘ Rights (ACJHPR).147 The 
third interpretation is that the ICC and the AU can work out modalities of carrying out in situ 
trials on the continent. The plan for the AU to set-up a criminal chamber to investigate and 
prosecute international crimes committed in Africa supports the UNSC resolution that 
referred the Darfur conflict to the ICC. However, this conclusion does not deny that there are 
several issues yet to be resolved regarding the proposed hybrid court and criminal chambers 
of the ACJHPR.  None of these were possible options for the Prosecutor at the time the 
assessment on preliminary examination was made and actually speaks to the discretion 
exercised by the Prosecutor. However, since the ICC is a Court of last resort, the Prosecutor 
                                                 
146 Article 87(6) of the Rome Statute. 
147 The AU has started the process of extending the jurisdiction of the ACJHPR to adjudicate over international 
crimes committed in Africa. The proposal which is now at an advanced stage, has elicited several reactions from 
different segments of the society in Africa and abroad. While there are supporters of the decision, some scholars 
argue that the process has not benefitted from wider consultations on the viability of the project. See generally: 
AU ‗Draft Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human 
Rights‘, 15 May 2012; Max du Plessis, Antoinette Louw and Ottilla Maunganidze ‗African Efforts to Close the 
Impunity Gap: Lessons for Complementarity from National and Regional Actions‘, ISS Paper 241, November 
2012; Avocats Frontieres ‗Africa and the International Criminal Court: Mending Fences‘, July 2012; Ademola 
Abass ‗The Proposed International Criminal Jurisdiction for the African Court: Some Problematical Aspects‘ 
(2013) 60 Netherlands International Law Review 27-50; Martin Matasi and Jürgen Bröhmer ‗The Proposed 
International Criminal Chamber Section of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights: A Legal Analysis‘, 
20 March 2013; Max Du Plessis ‗A Case of Negative Regional Complementarity? Giving the African Court of 
Justice and Human Rights Jurisdiction over International Crimes‘, 27 August 2012; Frans Viljoen ‗AU 
Assembly should consider Human Rights Implications before Adopting the Amending Merged African Court 
Protocol‘, Africa Law, 23 May 2012; Max du Plessis ‗Implications of the AU Decision to Give the African 
Court Jurisdiction over International Crimes‘, June 2012, Institute for Security Studies Paper No 235; Chidi 
Odinkalu ‗Concerning the Criminal Jurisdiction of  the African Court – A Response to Stephen Lamony‘, 19 
December 2012; Stephen Lamony ‗African Court not Ready for International Crimes‘, 10 December 2012; 
Drew Mitnick ‗African Union Considers Proposals to Add International Criminal Jurisdiction to the Pan-
African Court‘, Human Rights Brief, 3 April 2013; Frans Viljoen ‗AU Assembly should consider Human Rights 
Implications before Adopting the Amending Merged African Court Protocol‘, Africa Law, 23 May 2012.. 
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has a responsibility to ensure that local remedies, where they exist, should be encouraged and 
explored.  
 
7.4.4 The Prosecutor and ending impunity through positive complementarity in Libya 
 
 
As has already been discussed in this study, complementarity is the hallmark of the Rome 
Statute.  It encourages national judicial systems to carry out investigations and prosecutions 
of international crimes that occurred within their jurisdiction.148 On the other hand, positive 
complementarity refers to the policy of co-operation between the ICC and States party to the 
treaty, aimed at promoting national proceedings.149 However, the period within which the 
Prosecutor carried out preliminary examination did not give room for the application of 
positive complementarity. The issue then is whether the Prosecutor should have allowed for 
more time in Libya to see whether it was possible to conduct genuine investigations and 
prosecutions as required by the Statute. Since the Rome Statute is silent on the time it will 
take to complete a preliminary examination, it is at the discretion of the Prosecutor, and 
depends on the available evidence and urgency of the situation to decide when to complete a 
preliminary examination.  
 
7.4.5 The Prosecutor and prevention of international crimes in Darfur 
 
 
The extent to which the preliminary examination carried out in the Darfur conflict prevented 
international crimes is subject to debate. It may be argued that the involvement of the ICC 
exacerbated the conflict and even put civilians at a greater risk when the Sudanese 
government expelled humanitarian workers because of the ICC indictment.150 The procedure 
itself was not made public. The only information that was made available to the public 
regarding the preliminary examination carried out in Darfur was the report presented to the 
UNSC by the Prosecutor. Therefore, it is safe to conclude that the Prosecutor did not perform 
any early warning function with the preliminary examination carried out in the Darfur 
                                                 
148Chapter five, paragraph 4.6.1. 
149 Ibid.  
150 Liv Tønnessen ‗From Impunity to Prosecution? Sexual Violence in Sudan beyond Darfur‘ (2012) Norwegian 
Peacebuilding Resource Centre 1- 10.  
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conflict. The preliminary examination in Darfur was not used to put perpetrators on notice or 
to promote national proceedings in Sudan.151  
 
7.4.6 The Prosecutor and prevention of international crimes in Libya 
 
 
The Prosecutor‘s ability to prevent crimes in Libya during the preliminary examination was 
limited by time and circumstances. First, Libya was not a State Party to the Rome Statute and 
therefore, the ICC has no jurisdiction over crimes committed in Libya except with the UNSC 
resolution. Second, the four days‘ window used to complete the preliminary examination did 
not give room for any effect. In addition, the Prosecutor did not make public the findings of 
the examination and the reasoning behind it. It is only the first report to the UNSC mandated 
by resolution 1970 that the Prosecutor used to discuss the preliminary examination. In 
summary, the process did not contribute to the prevention of international crimes in Libya.  
 
7.6 Conclusion  
 
This chapter has looked at the manner in which prosecutorial discretion exercised by the ICC 
during preliminary examination is informed by the law and other legal principles and policy 
objectives adopted by the ICC Prosecutor, in recognition of the theory of prosecutorial 
neutrality. 
 
The chapter has argued that the UNSC has the power to refer States not party to the ICC as 
provided by the Rome Statute. In addition, the ICC legal framework provides for the conduct 
of preliminary examination irrespective of how the jurisdiction of the ICC was activated. The 
involvement of the UNSC under Chapter VII of the UN Charter was significant on its own 
and therefore indicated that the two situations were threats to international peace and 
stability.  
 
The chapter has shown that there was evidence that legal factors like jurisdiction, 
admissibility (complimentarity and gravity) and interests of justice were met during the 
preliminary examinations conducted by the ICC Prosecutor. However, it is argued that the 
Prosecutor did not adhere to some of the policies and principles adopted by the office in the 
exercise of discretion during preliminary examination. These include the policies on interests 
                                                 
151 See Paragraph 106 of the Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations.  
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of justice, positive complementarity and using the preliminary examination as a preventive 
mechanism against the commission of crimes within the jurisdiction of the court.  
 
Despite the controversial nature of the UNSC referrals of the Darfur and Libyan conflicts, it 
could be argued that the referrals have strengthened the activities of the ICC. This is because 
the involvement of the UNSC gave the conflicts and the activities of the ICC a global 
attention. The chapter agrees with the decision of the Prosecutor that the crimes committed in 
the Darfur and Libyan conflicts meet the gravity threshold established in the Statute. One 
cannot but agree with the Prosecutor that there was a reasonable basis to proceed with 
investigations.  
 
As has been discussed in this chapter, the interpretation of the interests of justice by the 
Prosecutor has necessitated abandoning the peace negotiations that were organised to end the 
Darfur conflict. None of them has proved to be successful so far and most of the recent ones 
took place after the decision to proceed with an investigation. However, in Libya the limited 
time of conducting the preliminary examination did not give room to activate national 
proceedings through positive complementarity.  
 
The Prosecutor did not provide enough information on how the preliminary examinations 
were conducted and the information that is readily available is contained in the reports 
submitted to the UNSC which are unfortunately limited in content and analysis of issues 
involved. Regarding the jurisdiction of the Court over the crimes committed in Darfur and 
Libya, it is evident that though Sudan and Libya are not States party to the Statute, the 
referrals by the UNSC satisfy the jurisdiction threshold as UN members are under an 
obligation to carry out the decisions of the UNSC. Besides, the Rome Statute makes 
provision for the referral.  
 
The next chapter discusses the Kenyan and Côte d’Ivoire Situations and the decisions of the 
prosecutor to proceed with an investigation. Both Situations were initiated by the Prosecutor 
using the proprio motu powers in article 15 of the Rome Statute. 
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Chapter Eight 





This chapter focuses on the last two case studies, the situations in Kenya and Côte d‘Ivoire - 
both of which are proprio motu referrals. The nature of the inquiry is that discussed in the last 
two chapters. It is to determine whether the ICC Prosecutor exercised his discretion correctly 
or in a manner that can be defended in both these situations. Of all the three procedures 
through which situations are referred to the ICC, proprio motu referral is the most 
controversial. There have been several developments in the Kenya and Côte d’Ivoire 
situations that bring into focus the prosecutorial discretion exercised during preliminary 
examinations. After a brief discussion of the post-election violence in both countries and the 
preliminary examinations conducted by the Prosecutor, this chapter discusses whether the 
prosecutor applied the ICC legal framework, principles and policies correctly in the decision 
to open investigations in Kenya and Côte d‘Ivoire.  
 
8.1    The 2007-8 post-election violence in Kenya and the ICC referral 
 
Kenya experienced unfortunate post-election violence from late 2007 to early 2008. Although 
the 2007 elections were primarily responsible for the post-election violence, it has been 
argued that it reflected deeper historical and material inequalities that have trailed Kenya 
since its independence.1 Several unsuccessful efforts were made to end the conflict, both 
within and outside the continent.2  Finally, the African Union Panel of Eminent African 
                                                 
1 Muthoni Wanyeki ‗The International Criminal Court‘s Cases in Kenya: Origin and Impact‘ (2012) Institute for 
Security Studies Paper No 237, 1;  Gabrielle Lynch  and Zgonec-Rožej ‗The ICC Intervention in Kenya‘ (2013) 
Chatham House, AFP/ILP 2013/01; Report from the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights Fact-
Finding Mission to Kenya, 6-28 February 2008; HRW ‗Ballots to Bullets: Organised Political Violence and 
Kenya's Crisis of Governance‘ March 2008 Vol 20, No 1 (A), Africa Report No 137. 
2 Elisabeth Lindenmayer and Josie Kaye ‗A Choice for Peace? The Story of Forty-One Days of Mediation in 
Kenya‘, August 2009, International Peace Institute, 1-2. 
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Personalities (AUPEAP) led by the former Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Kofi 
Annan, spearheaded the mediation process that ultimately ended the violence.3  
 
At the end of the negotiations, the parties signed an agreement which led to the establishment 
of a coalition government through the adoption of the National Accord and Reconciliation 
Act, 2008.4 Mwai Kibaki of the Party of National Unity (PNU) retained his position as 
President of Kenya and Raila Odinga of the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) became 
Prime Minister.5 The Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation (KNDR) agreement also 
recommended the setting up of the Commission of Inquiry into Post-Elections Violence 
(CIPEV) answerable to the AU and acceptable to both parties of the conflict.6 The CIPEV 
was chaired by Justice Philip Waki of the Kenyan judiciary and was assisted by international 
human rights and security experts from Australia and the DRC.7  
 
The CIPEV report stated that ‗the post-election violence was spontaneous in some 
geographic areas and a result of planning and organisation in other areas, often with the 
involvement of politicians and business leaders‘.8  The CIPEV recommended the setting up 
of a Special Tribunal for Kenya ‗to seek accountability against persons bearing the greatest 
responsibility for crimes, particularly crimes against humanity, relating to the 2007 General 
Elections in Kenya‘.9 The CIPEV also recommended that the Special Tribunal should apply 
Kenyan law and the International Crimes Act and be staffed with local and international 
personnel.10 The CIPEV further recommended that the Special Tribunal be anchored on the 
Constitution of Kenya to ensure that it is ‗insulated against objections of constitutionality‘.11  
 
In the proposed Bill for the establishment of the Special Tribunal, the Special Tribunal was 
expected to have four organs: the Chamber, the Prosecutor, the Registry and the Defence 
                                                 
3 Ibid.  
4The National Accord and Reconciliation Act, 2008.   
5 Stephen Brown and Chandra Sriram ‗The Big Fish won't Fry Themselves: Criminal Accountability for Post-
Election Violence in Kenya‘ (2012) 111 African Affairs 244 - 245. 
6 Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation ‗Commission of Inquiry on Post-Election Violence‘, 4 March 
2008.  
7 Muthoni Wanyeki op cit  at 6.  
8 The Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Post-Election Violence (CIPEV Report) VIII.  
9 Ibid at 472. 
10 Ibid, at 471.  
11 Ibid, at 473. 
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Office.12 The CIPEV report also provided procedures  for appointing  the judges of the 
Chamber, the Prosecutor and the registrar of the Special Tribunal for Kenya.13  
 
The report recommended that the jurisdiction of the Special Tribunal should be the 
adjudication of cases brought against individuals who committed international crimes during 
the 2007-2008 post-election violence.14 The CIPEV argued against publicly releasing the 
names of the perpetrators.15 In addition, the CIPEV report provided that if Kenya failed to set 
up the Special Tribunal, the list of individuals alleged to be responsible for the crimes 
committed during the post-election violence should be forwarded to the Prosecutor of the 
ICC for subsequent investigation and prosecution of the crimes committed in Kenya.16  
 
The proposed Special Tribunal faced several hurdles. 17  Different attempts to create the 
Special Tribunal in 2009 failed because Kenyan parliamentarians could not garner the 
quorum needed to amend the Constitution and adopt the draft bill setting up the Tribunal.18 It 
was also obvious that some of the law-makers were not interested in accountability as they 
were afraid that they could be indicted by the Special Tribunal.19 After several delays and the 
failure to set up accountability mechanisms as agreed with the AUPEAP, Kofi Annan handed 
over the sealed list to the ICC Prosecutor for further action.20 This set the stage for the 
intervention of the ICC Prosecutor in the situation.  
 
8.1.1 The 2010 post-election violence and Côte d’Ivoire’s referral  
 
The Government of Côte d‘Ivoire accepted the jurisdiction of the ICC through a declaration 
pursuant to article 12(3) of the Rome Statute. The initial declaration which was accepted 
during the government of former President Laurent Gbagbo related to crimes committed in 
                                                 
12 Ibid, at 474. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid, at 475. 
15 Ibid, at 18.  
16 Ibid, at 473.  
17Ben Rawlence and Nick Daniels ‗100% Waki‘, 28 November 2008. 
18 Open Society Foundations: Putting Complementarity into Practice:  Domestic Justice for International Crimes 
in DRC, Uganda, and Kenya (2011) New York: Open Society Foundations, 97; HRW ‗Kenya: Swiftly Enact 
Special Tribunal - International Criminal Court Should Be a Last Resort for Justice‘ 25 March 2009.  
19 Sam Omwenga ‗Will Kenya be governed from The Hague?‘ The Star, 17 November 2012,. 
20 Xan Rice ‗Annan hands ICC list of perpetrators of post-election violence in Kenya‘, The Guardian. 9 July 
2009,  
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the country from 16 September 2002.21 However, after the events that led to the removal of 
Laurent Gbagbo from office, President Alassane Ouattara re-confirmed the declaration made 
by Gbagbo on 18 December 2010. According to the Human Rights Council: 
 
'The refusal of former President Gbagbo to give up power after being defeated in the 
presidential elections of 28 November 2010 plunged Côte d'Ivoire into an 
unprecedented political crisis marked by grave and massive violations of human 
rights and international humanitarian law. There were many reports of extra-judicial 
and summary executions, rape, acts of torture and other cruel, inhuman and degrading 
treatment, enforced disappearances, arbitrary arrests and detentions, attacks against 
religious buildings, and act of intimidation, harassment and extortion.'22 
  
The UNSC also adopted a resolution in which it deplored the conflict in Côte d’Ivoire and 
called on Laurent Gbagbo to step aside and hand over power to Alassane Ouattara.23 The AU 
set-up a High Level Panel that recommended a Government of National Unity under the 
leadership of Alasssane Ouattara. However, the proposal was rejected by President Gbagbo‘s 
government. Subsequently, clashes erupted between forces loyal to Gbagbo and Ouattara, 
leading to human rights abuses and international crimes committed by both sides of the 
conflict. Forces loyal to Ouattara, with the help of French soldiers and UN officials, later 
arrested Laurent Gbagbo and placed him in protective custody.   
 
After Alassane Ouattara became the legitimate President of Côte d’Ivoire, he wrote to the 
Prosecutor of the ICC in May 2011 requesting the involvement of the Court in investigating 
and prosecuting those responsible for the crimes committed after the general elections.24 The 
Prosecutor started a preliminary investigation to determine whether there was a reasonable 
basis to open an investigation and concluded that the statutory criteria established by the 
Rome Statute to open an investigation were met in the Côte d’Ivoire situation.  
 
                                                 
21 ICC ‗OTP Report of Preliminary Examination 2011‘ 13 December 2011, 1 – 25.  
22 Human Rights Council ‗Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Côte d'Ivoire‘ A/HRC/17/48, 1 
July 2011 paragraph 1.   
23 UNSC Resolution 1975 (2011) SC/10215 adopted 30 March 2011.  
24 Situation in the Republic of Cote d‘Ivoire - Request for Authorisation of an Investigation pursuant to article 
15 of the Rome Statute, ICC-02/11, 23 June 2011.  
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The Prosecutor requested for authorisation from the Pre-Trial Chamber III in June 2011 to 
open an investigation into the situation in Côte d’Ivoire.25 In the request for authorisation, the 
Prosecutor argued that the threshold for the activation of the jurisdiction of the ICC had been 
met, based on the level of violence.26  
 
The request for authorisation covered crimes committed within Côte d’Ivoire from 28 
November 2010. Pre-Trial Chamber III granted the authorisation to the Prosecutor in October 
2011.27  The Chamber stated that the ICC had jurisdiction to entertain the case as Côte 
d‘Ivoire had lodged a declaration accepting the jurisdiction of the Court. The Court also 
stated that crimes committed during the non-international armed conflict were within the 
jurisdiction of the Court.  
 
8.2 The preliminary examinations in Kenya and Côte d’Ivoire 
 
This section reviews the manner in which the Prosecutor exercised jurisdiction in the two 
preliminary examinations using the criteria that were set out in Chapters 6 and 7. As with the 
previous four case studies, this analysis will help to determine whether the Prosecutor 
exercised his/her discretion properly and hence whether there was a reasonable basis upon 
which the decisions to open the investigations was made. As already discussed in Chapter 
four, the main criteria relate to jurisdiction, admissibility (complementarity and gravity) and 
the interests of justice.28  
 
8.2.1 Jurisdiction in Kenya  
 
As already noted in previous chapters, preliminary examinations are carried out by the 
Prosecutor of the ICC to determine whether there is a reasonable basis to proceed with an 
                                                 
25 Ibid.  
26 See Ibid, where the ICC Prosecutor argued that the ‗[v]iolence has reached unprecedented levels in the 
aftermath of the presidential election held on 28 November 2010. There is a reasonable basis to believe that at 
least 3000 persons were killed, 72 persons disappeared, 520 persons were subject to arbitrary arrest and 
detentions and there are over 100 reported cases of rape while the number of unreported incidents is believed to 
be considerably higher.‘ 
27 Situation in the Republic of Cote d‘Ivoire -  Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the 
Authorisation of an Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Côte d'Ivoire ICC-02/11, 3 October 2011. 
28 Chapter four, paragraph 4.4 - 4.7.  
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investigation. 29  The period of preliminary examination in the Kenya situation was 
approximately 21 months.30 During this period the Prosecutor examined the legal factors 
provided in article 53 of the Rome Statute and used the general principles and policy 
objectives developed in the office as evaluation tools.31  
A key decision of the Prosecutor to proceed with an investigation in the Kenya is the request 
for authorisation to open investigation submitted to Pre-Trial Chamber II in November 
2009. 32  The Prosecutor informed Pre-Trial Chamber II (PTC II) that his preliminary 
examination was based on reliable public documents that discussed in detail Kenya‘s post-
election violence.33 The Prosecutor alleged that both parties to the post-election violence had 
committed international crimes including murder, rape and other forms of sexual violence, 
deportation or forcible transfer of population and other inhumane acts.34  In addition, he 
addressed both admissibility and interests of justice issues relating to the post-election 
violence.  
 
Kenya is a State Party to the Rome Statute, having signed the treaty in August 1999 and 
deposited its instrument of ratification in March 2005. 35  Kenya is also one of the few 
countries that have domesticated the Rome Statute.36 The transformation of the Rome Statute 
into Kenyan law was part of the recommendations of the Waki Commission and therefore 
took place only after the post-electoral violence referred to earlier.37  
 
Since the violence involving international crimes took place between 2007 and 2008, the ICC 
clearly has jurisdiction over the incidence and that citizens of Kenya who were involved in 
                                                 
29 See Chapter one, paragraph 1.2; Chapter four, paragraph 4.4.  
30 Paragraph 5, Request for authorisation of an investigation pursuant to Article 15, Situation in the Republic of 
Kenya, ICC‐01/09, 26 November 2009. This is from 5 February 2008 when the Prosecutor officially announced 
his office was monitoring the Kenyan Situation to 26 November 2009 when the Prosecutor requested for 
authorization to open an investigation. See ICC ‗OTP statement in relation to events in Kenya The Hague, 5 
February 2008 (Hereafter ‗Request for authorisation of an investigation pursuant to Article 15‘).  
31 See chapters three and four.  
32 Request for authorisation of an investigation pursuant to Article 15.  
33 Ibid.  
34 Request for authorisation of an investigation pursuant to Article 15. 
 35ICC ‗Kenya‘, 16 March 2005,. 
36 See Kenya International Crimes Act, 2008.  
37 Antonina Okuta ‗National Legislation for Prosecution of International Crimes in Kenya‘ (2009) 7 Journal of 
International Criminal Justice, 1063-1076.  
 
212 | Page 
the violence are subject to the jurisdiction of the ICC.38 It is therefore not surprising that the 
Prosecutor concluded that crimes committed during Kenya‘s post-election violence fell 
within the jurisdiction of the ICC, ratione materiae, ratione temporis and ratione personae, 
as laid down in Article 12 of the Rome Statute.39  
 
Regarding jurisdiction ratione materiae, the determination by PTC II that crimes against 
humanity were committed in Kenya is significant. The Kenya situation is the first one for 
which the Court approved a request by the Prosecutor to initiate an investigation based on 
Article 15 of the Statute.40 However, the decision of the Court raises questions regarding the 
characterisation of the crimes committed during the post-election violence. Such 
characterisation goes to the root of the discretion exercised by the Prosecutor to initiate the 
investigations in Kenya.  
 
The majority judgment that authorised the opening of the investigation held that crimes 
falling within the jurisdiction of the ICC had been committed in Kenya. In particular, they 
held that 'organizations not linked to a State may, for the purposes of the Statute, elaborate 
and carry out a policy to commit an attack against a civilian population‘.41 In reaching this 
decision, the judges relied on decisions of the ICC,42 the ad-hoc tribunals43 and commentaries 
of scholars.44  
 
                                                 
38 Chapter four, paragraph 4.4.  
39 Paragraph 47 of the request for authorisation of an investigation pursuant to Article 15.     . 
40 Kirsten Ainley ‗The International Criminal Court on Trial‘ (2011) 24 Cambridge Review of International 
Affairs 309 at 312.  
41 See paragraph 92 of the decision on the request for authorisation. The majority judgment further argued that if 
'the drafters of the Statute intended to exclude non-State actors from the term "organization", they would not 
have included this term in article 7(2)(a) of the Statute.'  
42 Paragraph 81 of Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges of the 
Prosecutor Against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, ICC-01/05-01/08-424, 15 June 2009, available online at 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc699541.pdf, accessed 10 July 2013.  
43 Paragraph 98 of the Prosecutor vs Dragoljub Kunarac and others IT-96-23 & IT-96-23/1-A, 12 June 2002; 
para 653 of Prosecutor v Tadic, Case No IT-94-1-T, ‗Judgment‘, 7 May 1997. See also Gerhard Werle and 
Boris Burghardt ‗Do Crimes against Humanity Require the Participation of a State or a ‗State-like‘ 
Organisation? (2012) 10 Journal of International Criminal Justice, 1151 at 1165 – 66. 
44 Machteld Boot, Rodney Dixon and Christopher Hall ‗Article 7‘ in Otto Triffterer (ed) Commentary on the 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: Observers' Notes, Article by Article 2 ed (2008) 236. 
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Had the Prosecutor characterised the crimes as ordinary crimes punishable within the national 
judicial system, the Prosecutor‘s role would have been limited to how Kenyan courts would 
investigate and prosecute the crimes. However, the fact that PTC II and Appeals Chamber of 
the ICC held that crimes committed in Kenya met the definition of international crimes 
means that the judges were persuaded by the Prosecutor‘s submissions.  
 
Curiously, Judge Kaul wrote a dissenting judgment regarding the elements of crimes against 
humanity, doubting whether these elements were actually fulfilled and whether the majority 
decision had paid sufficient attention to this issue before authorising the initiation of 
investigation. His dissent was based on a difference of opinion between him and the majority 
regarding the interpretation of article 7(2)(a) of the Statute.45 Judge Kaul was of the view that 
there was no nexus between the individual act of a perpetrator (specific crime) and the attack 
(contextual element) mentioned in the Rome Statute.46 In addition, he said that 'State or 
organisational policy' is a legal requirement of a crime against humanity and there was no 
clear evidence of this in the Kenyan situation.47 
 
He further held that downgrading the requirements for crimes against humanity to ordinary 
serious crimes that should be prosecuted by Kenya would expand the jurisdiction of the ICC 
to the extent that it would become over-burdened and over-stretched in its activities.48 
                                                 
45 Article 7(2)(a) of the Rome Statute provides that  ‗[a]ttack directed against any civilian population‘ means a 
course of conduct involving the multiple commission of acts referred to in paragraph 1 against any civilian 
population, pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organizational policy to commit such attack.‘ See Thomas 
Hansen ‗The Policy Requirement in Crimes against Humanity: Lessons from and for the case of Kenya‘ (2011) 
43 The George Washington International Law Review 1 – 41. 
46 Paragraph 22 of the dissenting judgment of Judge Hans Peter Kaul in Pre-Trial Chamber II, "Decision 
Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an Investigation into the Situation in the 
Republic of Kenya", ICC-01/09-19-Corr. The crux of Judge Kaul's dissent is that ―Article 7(2) (a) of the Statute, 
which sets out the legal definition of ‗attack directed  against any civilian population‘ as constitutive contextual 
element  of crimes against  humanity, and my examination of the Prosecutor's Request and supporting material, 
including the victims' representations, have led me to conclude that the  acts which occurred on the territory of 
the Republic of Kenya do not qualify as crimes against humanity falling under the jurisdictional ambit of the 
Court. I have concluded in particular that there is no reasonable basis to believe that crimes, such as murder, 
rape and other serious crimes, were committed in an ‗attack against any civilian population‘ ‗pursuant to or in 
furtherance of a State or organizational policy to commit such attack‘, as required by article 7(2)(a) of the 
Statute.‖ 
47 Ibid paragraph, 32.  
48  Paragraph 10 of Dissenting Opinion of Judge Hans-Peter Kaul in Decision on the Authorisation of an 
Investigation. 
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Regarding the relationship between international crimes and ordinary crimes, Judge Kaul 
argued that ‗[t]he qualitative requirement of ‗State or organisational policy‘ in article 7(2)(a) 
of the Statute distinguishes crimes against humanity from other common crimes which are to 
be prosecuted at the national level only.‘49  
 
Judge Kaul further stated the issue is not whether serious crimes were committed during the 
post-election violence that occurred in Kenya but whether the ICC is the right forum for the 
investigation and prosecution of the crimes.50 This thesis adopts the minority judgment of 
Judge Kaul which means that the violence did not meet the legal requirements of ‗State and 
organisational policy‘ provided in the Statute. This in effect means that the characterisation 
of the crimes committed in Kenya omitting the 'State and organisational policy' and 
discretion exercised by the Prosecutor elevated the crimes punishable under Kenyan laws to 
international crimes under the Statute. 
 
After the PTC II had authorised the prosecutor to commence investigations in relation to the 
crimes committed in Kenya, the Prosecutor requested summons against six Kenyans in 
December 2010 as provided in the Statute.51 He alleged that there were reasonable grounds to 
believe that the defendants had committed crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC, 
necessitating the issuance of summonses to answer to the charges.52  
 
In March 2011, PTC II issued summonsed the six defendants to appear.53 However, Judge 
Kaul issued a second dissenting opinion from the decision of the majority, reiterating his 
earlier stance that the ICC lacked jurisdiction to hear the cases because crimes committed 
                                                 
49  Paragraph 54 of Dissenting Opinion of Judge Hans-Peter Kaul in Decision on the Authorisation of an 
Investigation. 
50  Paragraph 6 of Dissenting Opinion of Judge Hans-Peter Kaul in Decision on the Authorisation of an 
Investigation. 
51 Article 58(7) of the Rome Statute.  
52 See Prosecutor‘s Application Pursuant to Article 58 as to William Samoei Ruto, Henry Kiprono Kosgey and 
Joshua Arap Sang ICC‐01/09, 15 December 2010; Prosecutor‘s Application Pursuant to Article 58 as to Francis 
Kirimi Muthaura, Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta and Mohammed Hussein Ali ICC‐01/09, 15 December 2010.. 
53 Decision on the Prosecutor's Application for Summonses to Appear for Francis  
Kirimi Muthaura, Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta and Mohammed Hussein Ali ICC-01/09-02/11, 8 March 2011; 
Decision on the Prosecutor's Application for Summons to Appear for William Samoei Ruto, Henry Kiprono 
Kosgey and Joshua Arap Sang ICC-01/09-01/11, 8 March 2011..  
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during the post-election violence did not amount to crimes against humanity.54  At the end of 
the confirmation hearing, PTC II confirmed charges against four of the six defendants 
summonsed to appear before the ICC while Judge Kaul dissented from the decision of the 
majority.55  
 
Although the Prosecutor concluded during preliminary examination that there was reasonable 
basis to proceed with an investigation, the majority and minority arguments in the decision to 
authorise the investigation reveal the on-going debate on whether the crimes that occurred in 
Kenya were indeed crimes against humanity.  The reliance of the PTC II on the decisions of 
the ad-hoc tribunals to find that the crimes do not have to result from State or organisational 
policy  in order for them to be crimes against humanity is significant for the jurisprudence of 
the ICC. This is because the Rome Statute makes it clear that decisions of the ad-hoc 
tribunals are not binding on the ICC.56 Furthermore, the elements of crimes of the ICC clearly 
supports the conclusion that ‗State or organisational policy‘ is indeed a requirement in 
defining crimes against humanity.57  
 
For the purposes of this study, the discretion exercised by the Prosecutor is within the powers 
granted in the Rome Statute. The decision of the judges was either to confirm or disagree 
with the dispositions of the Prosecutor.  
                                                 
54 Paragraph 2 of the Dissenting Opinion by Judge Hans-Peter Kaul to Pre-Trial Chamber II's ‗Decision on the 
Prosecutor's Application for Summons to Appear for William Samoei Ruto, Henry Kiprono Kosgey and Joshua 
Arap Sang‘ ICC-01/09-01/11, 15 March 2011; paragraph 2 of Dissenting Opinion by Judge Hans-Peter Kaul to 
Pre-Trial Chamber II's ‗Decision on the Prosecutor's Application for Summonses to Appear for Francis Kirimi 
Muthaura, Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta and Mohammed Hussein Ali‘ ICC-01/09-02/11, 15 March 2011. 
55Confirmation hearings take place before trials. See Art 61 of the Rome Statute. In the Situation in Kenya, the 
ICC confirmed charges against William Samoei Ruto; Joshua Arap Sang; Francis Kirimi Muthaura and Uhuru 
Muigai Kenyatta. The charges against Henry Kiprono Kosgey and Mohammed Hussein Ali were rejected and 
dismissed. See Decision on the Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome 
Statute (The Prosecutor  v William Samoeiruto, Henry Kiprono Kosgey And Joshua Arap Sang) ICC-01/09-
01/11,  23 January 2012; Decision on the  Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the 
Rome Statute (The Prosecutor v Francis Kirimi Muthaura, Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta And Mohammed Hussein 
Ali) ICC-01/09-02/11, 23 January 2012.  
56Article 21 of the Rome Statute; paragraph 29 of Dissenting Opinion of Judge Hans-Peter Kaul in Decision on 
the Authorization of an Investigation. 
57 Article 7(3) of the Elements of Crimes of the ICC; Charles Jalloh ‗Situation in the Republic of Kenya: 
Decision on the Authorisation of an Investigation‘ (2011) 105 American Journal of International Law 540 – 
547.  
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8.2.2 Jurisdiction in Côte d’Ivoire  
 
In Côte d‘Ivoire, the alleged crimes were committed within the jurisdiction of the Court as 
earlier communicated by the government of Laurent Gbagbo and re-confirmed by President 
Alassane Ouattara. They included crimes against humanity and war crimes.58 The Pre-Trial 
Chamber accepted the argument of the Prosecutor that those crimes fell within the 
jurisdiction of the Court and allowed the opening of an investigation.  
 
8.2.3 Complementarity in Kenya 
 
In the Kenya situation, the Prosecutor stated in the request for authorisation to open an 
investigation that there were no national proceedings during the preliminary examinations, 
thus making the situation automatically admissible before the ICC.59  He argued that the 
inability of Kenyan leaders to establish accountability mechanisms like the Special Tribunal 
recommended by the CIPEV meant that no domestic prosecution was contemplated for those 
who committed crimes during the post-election violence.60 He noted that limited prosecutions 
conducted in several parts of Kenya after the violence were for lesser crimes not related to 
the atrocities committed during the post-election violence.61  
 
The determination by ICC judges that crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court had 
occurred during the post-election violence was challenged by the Kenyan government on 
grounds related to complementarity.62 Kenya‘s challenge was based on article 19 of the 
Rome Statute.63  
                                                 
58 These include murder constituting a crime against humanity under article 7(1)(a); rape and other forms of 
sexual violence constituting a crime against humanity under article 7(1)(g); imprisonment or other severe 
deprivation of physical liberty in violation of fundamental rules of  international law under article 7(1)(e); 
enforced disappearance of persons under article 7(1)(i); and murder under article 8(2)(c)(i); attacking civilians 
under article 8(2)(e)(i); attacking personnel or objects involved in a humanitarian assistance or peacekeeping 
mission under article 8(2)(e)(iii), attacking protected objects under article 8(2)(e)(iv) and rape under article 
8(2)(e)(vi). See Paragraph 39 of the Request for Authorisation in the Situation in Cote D’Ivoire.  
59 Paragraph 52 of the Request for Authorisation. 
60 Paragraph 53 of the Request for Authorisation. 
61 Paragraph 54 of the Request for Authorisation.  
62 Application on Behalf of the Government of The Republic of Kenya Pursuant to Article 19 of The ICC 
Statute ICC-01/09-01/11 and ICC-01/09-02/11, 31 March 2011, available online at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1050005.pdf, accessed 11 July 2013. (Kenya‘s Challenge of Admissibility).  
63 Article 19(2) provides  that ‗[c]hallenges to the admissibility of a case on the grounds referred to in article 17 
or challenges to the jurisdiction of the Court may be made by: (a) An accused or a person for whom a warrant of 
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Kenya argued that it had embarked on several fundamental and far-reaching constitutional 
and judicial reforms, including the adoption of a new Constitution in August 201064, and 
therefore it was unreasonable for the Prosecutor to investigate and prosecute Kenyan 
citizens.65 Kenya further argued that it had adopted the International Crimes Act of 2008 as 
part of the reforms that were initiated after the post-election violence.66 The adoption of the 
International Crimes Act, Kenya argued, represented an effort to give effect to the principle 
of complementarity. Kenya maintained that its national judicial system was capable of 
prosecuting those responsible for the post-election violence.67  
 
Because of the willingness and actual efforts taken by the domestic authorities to investigate 
the crimes, Kenya argued that the cases should be held not admissible by the Court pursuant 
to the complementarity principle. In his response to the application by Kenya, the Prosecutor 
argued that the burden of proof lay with Kenya to show that it was conducting investigations 
into the cases before the ICC.68 The Prosecutor also argued that promising to conduct an 
investigation does not suffice to prevent the ICC from admitting a case.69 Although there 
were investigations regarding the post-election violence, the ICC Prosecutor submitted that 
crimes investigated and the individuals under investigation were not the same parties that 
were before the ICC.70  
 
In its decision, Pre-Trial Chamber II dismissed Kenya‘s application by stating that there was 
no evidence that Kenya was conducting investigations in respect of the individuals wanted by 
the ICC.71 The Court held that the admissibility test in article 17 of the Statute has two 
prongs, namely, complementarity in article 17 (1)(a)–(c) of the Statute and gravity in article 
                                                                                                                                                       
arrest or a summons to appear has been issued under article 58; (b) A State which has jurisdiction over a case, 
on the ground that It is investigating or prosecuting the case or has investigated or prosecuted; or (c) A State 
from which acceptance of jurisdiction is required under article 12. 
64 Paragraph 2 of the Kenya‘s Challenge of Admissibility.  
65 Paragraph 9 of Kenya‘s Application.  
66 Paragraph 23 of Kenya‘s Admissibility Challenge. 
67 Ibid.  
68 Paragraph 16 of the Decision on Application.  
69 Paragraph 17 of the Decision on Application.  
70 Ibid. 
71 Paragraph 66 of Decision on Application.  
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17(1)(d) of the Statute.72 In relation to complementarity, there has to be a determination 
whether national proceedings have begun or not. It is only when this question is answered in 
the affirmative that the issue of ‗unwillingness or inability‘ will arise.73 The Court applied the 
views of the Appeals Chamber on complementarity.74 The Court further held that for Kenya‘s 
application to succeed, its national proceedings had to address both the person and the 
conduct which was the subject of the case before the ICC.75  
 
Kenya appealed this decision to the Appeals Chamber in June 2011,76 pursuant to Article 
82(1)(a) of the Statute77 and Rule 154(1)78 of the ICC.79 In support of the appeal, Kenya 
contended that Pre-Trial Chamber II erred in law by not considering its efforts to investigate 
those accused of masterminding the post-electoral violence. 80  Kenya argued that it had 
primacy over the ICC regarding the investigation and prosecution of the post-election 
violence. 81  In addition, it argued that Pre-Trial Chamber II had ignored the strong 
                                                 
72 Paragraph 43 of the Decision on Application; See also Para 52 of the Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the 
Rome Statute on the Authorisation of an investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Kenya‘, ICC-01/09-
19-Corr. 
73 Paragraph 44 of Kenya‘s Admissibility Challenge.  
74 Paragraph 78 of Judgment on the Appeal of Mr Germain Katanga against the Oral Decision of Trial Chamber 
II of 12 June 2009 on the Admissibility of the Case, ICC-01/04-01/07 OA 8, 25 September 2009. 
75Paragraph 50 and 51 of Decision on Application. See also para 24 of the Decision on the Prosecutors 
Application under Article 58(7) of the Statute, ICC-02/05-01/07-1-Corr, 27 April 2007.  
76 See Appeal of the Government of Kenya against the ‗Decision on the Application by the Government of 
Kenya Challenging the Admissibility of the Case Pursuant to Article 19(2)(b) of the Statute, ICC-01/09-01/11, 6 
June 2011 (Appeal of Government of Kenya).  
77 Article 82 (1)(a) provides, ‗[e]ither party may appeal any of the following decisions in accordance with the 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence: (a) A decision with respect to jurisdiction or admissibility.‘ 
78 Rule 154(1) provides, ‗[a]n appeal may be filed under article 81, paragraph 3 (c)(ii), or article 82, paragraph 1 
(a) or (b), not later than five days from the date upon which the party filing the appeal is notified of the 
decision.‘ 
79 Paragraph 2 of Appeal of Government of Kenya.  
80 Paragraph 5 of Document in Support of the ‗Appeal of the Government of Kenya against the Decision on the 
Application by the Government of Kenya Challenging the Admissibility of the Case Pursuant to Article 19(2)(b) 
of the Statute‘, ICC-01/09-02/11,  20 June 2011 (Document in Support of Appeal).  
 81 Kenya stated in the document of appeal that ‗[o]n the basis of the information provided by the Government of 
Kenya, there can be no doubt that an investigation into the six Suspects has been and is in fact going on and that 
it is patently wrong to find that there is “inactivity‘‘.‘ Paragraph 6 of Document in Support of Appeal 
[Emphases in the original].  
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presumption that the principle of complementarity creates in favour of the national 
jurisdiction.82  
 
In relation to the same person/same conduct principle relied upon by the Pre-Trial Chamber, 
Kenya argued that the principle of complementarity does not necessarily require that 
individuals being investigated by a State and by a Prosecutor must be identical to render the 
case inadmissible before the ICC.83 Kenya called on the Appeals Chamber to reverse the 
decision of the Pre-Trial Chamber II or send the case back for re-hearing.84 
 
In dismissing Kenya‘s appeal, the Appeals Chamber held that the Pre-Trial Chamber II had 
applied the correct legal test and that Kenya was inactive regarding the investigation of the 
individuals currently before the ICC.85 The Appeals Chamber further held that a case is ‗only 
inadmissible before the Court if the same suspects are being investigated by Kenya for 
substantially the same conduct‘.86 Regarding Kenya‘s argument that the Pre-Trial Chamber 
was biased against the government of Kenya, the Appeals Chamber held that the Pre-Trial 
Chamber was right in rejecting Kenya‘s objection as it was evident that Kenya was not 
prosecuting the three suspects before the ICC for international crimes.87  
 
The judgment of the Appeals Chamber forecloses any speculation that there could be a 
difference in the interpretation and application of inaction in situations involving self-
referrals and proprio motu referrals. The decision is subject to criticism in some respects. The 
ICC serves a complementary role to national jurisdictions and was not established to supplant 
the activities of the national governments. Although it can be questioned whether there was 
evidence that Kenya had started preliminary investigations regarding the post-election 
violence, its primacy cannot be waived as long as it has the capacity to show compliance with 
the ingredients of complementarity in Article 17 of the Rome Statute. In addition, the 
decision of the Appeals Chamber in the Kenyan situation has a broader implication of the 
                                                 
82 Paragraph 8 of the Document in Support of Appeal.  
83 Paragraph 12 of the Document in Support of Appeal.  
84 Paragraph 93 and 94 of the Document in Support of Appeal.  
85 Judgment on the appeal of the Republic of Kenya against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber II of 30 May 
2011 entitled 'Decision on the Application by the Government of Kenya Challenging the Admissibility of the 
Case Pursuant to Article 19(2)(b) of the Statute‘, ICC-01/09-02/11 O A, 30 August 2011 (Appeal Decision).  
86 Paragraph 40 of Appeal Decision.  
87 Paragraph 82 of the Appeal Decision. 
 
220 | Page 
ICC. This is because the decision ‗appears to rest primarily on a broader, more interventionist 
and perhaps unrealistic vision of the ICC.‘88 
 
However, the case of Kenya is peculiar as the Court's decision was based on the fact that the 
Kenyan government was not investigating those currently before the ICC for crimes 
committed during the post-election violence.  
 
8.2.4 The Prosecutor and complementarity in Côte d’Ivoire 
 
As already noted in Chapter four, complementarity during the preliminary examination phase 
involves the evaluation of the existence of relevant national proceedings in relation to the 
potential cases being considered for investigation.89 The Prosecutor therefore argued that  the 
Côte d‘Ivoire situation was admissible before the ICC because ‗no national investigations or 
proceedings are pending in Côte d‘Ivoire against those bearing the greatest responsibility for 
the most serious crimes falling within the jurisdiction of the Court allegedly committed in 
Côte d‘Ivoire since 28 November 2010‘.90 The fact that there was no pending investigation 
before the courts in Côte d‘Ivoire meant that the ICC was justified to commence proceedings. 
 
8.2.5 The Prosecutor and gravity in Kenya  
 
The Rome Statute requires that crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court must be of 
sufficient gravity to justify further action by the Court.91 In deciding whether a crime is of 
sufficient gravity for purposes of the ICC, the Prosecutor considers the scale, nature, manner 
of commission of the crimes and their impact, bearing in mind the potential cases that would 
likely arise from an investigation of the situation.92 In the Kenya situation, the Prosecutor 
argued that the gravity requirement was met.93 In the request for authorisation to open an 
                                                 
88 Charles Jalloh ‗Kenya v the ICC Prosecutor‘ (2012) 53 Harvard International Law Journal Online 269 at 
277.  
89Chapter four, paragraph 4.6.1.  
90 Paragraph 52 of the Request for Authorisation.  
91 Article 17 (1)(d) of the Rome Statute.  
92Chapter four, paragraph 4.6.2; Paragraph 7 of the Report on Preliminary Activities 2013.  
93 The Prosecutor stated that  ‗the scale of the post‐election violence resulted in a reported 1,133 to 1,220 
killings of civilians, more than nine hundred documented acts of rape and other forms of sexual violence, with 
many more unreported, the internal displacement of 350,000 persons, and 3,561 reported acts causing serious 
injury.‘   See Paragraph 56 of the Request for Authorisation.  
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investigation, the Prosecutor argued that ‗widespread or systematic attack has been 
interpreted as excluding isolated or random acts from the concept of crimes against 
humanity‘. 94  The Prosecutor stated that although the conflict was at first seen as a 
spontaneous reaction of citizens to the perceived rigging of the election, subsequent events 
confirmed that the attacks were planned, pre-meditated and co-ordinated attacks.95 As noted 
earlier, the Prosecutor argued these crimes amounted to crimes against humanity.96  
 
Based on article 15(4) of the Statute, the Prosecutor requested Pre-Trial Chamber II to 
authorise the commencement of an investigation.97 Furthermore, the Prosecutor argued that 
prospective cases were admissible before the ICC because there was an absence of national 
proceedings against those bearing greatest responsibility for the crimes and due to the gravity 
of the acts committed during the post-election violence.98  
 
The Prosecutor noted that crimes were committed in six out of the eight regions and these 
areas were the most populated including the cities of Nairobi, the Rift Valley, and the Nyanza 
and Western provinces.99 The Prosecutor also described in detail how the crimes committed 
in the Kenyan post-election violence met the gravity criteria.100 From the Prosecutor's report, 
it is unclear whether gravity was considered from  a quantitative or qualitative angle.  
 
                                                 
94 Paragraph 79 of the Request for Authorisation; See Para 33 of  Decision on the Prosecutor‘s Application for a 
Warrant of Arrest against Jean‐Pierre Bemba Gombo ICC‐01/05‐01/08,  10 June 2008, Paragraph 62 of 
Decision on the Prosecution Application under Art 58(7) of the Statute, The Prosecutor v Ahmad Muhammed 
Harun (‗Ahmad Harun‘) and Ali Muhammad Ali Abd-Al-Rahman (‗Ali Kushayb‘) 11-02/05-01/07 27 April 
2007.  
95 Paragraph 84 of the Request for authorisation of an investigation pursuant to Article 15. 
96 These acts include: ‗(a) murder constituting a crime against humanity under Article 7(1)(a) of the Statute; (b) 
rape and other forms of sexual violence constituting a crime against humanity under Article 7(1)(g) of the 
Statute; (c) forcible transfer of population constituting a crime against humanity under Article 7(1)(d) of the 
Statute; and (d) other inhumane acts causing serious injury constituting a crime against humanity under Article 
7(1)(k) of the Statute.‘ See paragraph 93 of the Request for Authorisation.  
97 Article 15 (4) of the Rome Statute provides, ‗[i]f the Pre-Trial Chamber, upon examination of the request and 
the supporting material, considers that there is a reasonable basis to proceed with an investigation, and that the 
case appears to fall within the jurisdiction of the Court, it shall authorize the commencement of the 
investigation, without prejudice to subsequent determinations by the Court with regard to the jurisdiction and 
admissibility of a case.‘ 
98 Paragraph 55 of the Request for authorisation of an investigation pursuant to Article 15. 
99 Ibid. 
100 Paragraphs 58 - 59 of the Request for authorisation of an investigation pursuant to Article 15. 
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8.2.6 The Prosecutor and gravity in Côte d’Ivoire 
 
According to the Prosecutor and consistent with the provisions of the Rome Statute, the 
Prosecution‘s assessment of gravity includes both quantitative and qualitative considerations 
based on the prevailing facts and circumstances.101 In addition, as stated in Regulation 29(2) 
of the Regulations of the Office of the Prosecutor, the non-exhaustive factors that guide the 
Office‘s assessment include the scale, nature, manner of commission of the crimes, and their 
impact.102  
 
Based on the preliminary analysis conducted by the Prosecutor, it was determined that the 
gravity threshold established in the Rome Statute was made in the Côte d‘Ivoire Situation. 
This is because the Prosecutor identified high-ranking government officials who were 
involved in ordering, inciting, planning, facilitating, and otherwise contributing to the 
organization of the violence.103 Furthermore,  the Prosecutor argued that  ‗the information 
available indicates that serious crimes by their very nature such as murders, rapes, and 
enforced disappearances have been committed on a large-scale, as part of a plan or in 
furtherance of a policy, or in the context or association with an armed conflict.‘104   
 
The conclusion therefore, is that the crimes committed in Côte d‘Ivoire met the gravity 
criteria as provided by the Rome Statute and earlier discussed in this study.105 The request by 





8.2.7 The Prosecutor and the interests of justice in Kenya 
 
The interests of justice is a legal factor affecting the decision to proceed with an investigation 
during preliminary examinations. 106  While jurisdiction and admissibility are positive 
requirements, the interest of justice is a potential countervailing consideration that results in 
                                                 
101 Chapter four, paragraph 4.6.2. 
102 See Prosecutor v. Abu Garda, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, ICC-02/05-02/09-243-Red, 8 
February 2010, paragraph 31. 
103 See Paragraph 57 of the Request for Authorisation.  
104 See Paragraph 58 of the Request for Authorisation. 
105 Chapter four, paragraph 4.6.2 
106 Chapter four, paragraph 4.7 
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the decision not to proceed after the conduct of a preliminary examination.107 The Rome 
Statute does not mandate the Prosecutor to give reasons why an investigation is in the interest 
of justice.108 Based on these analyses, the Prosecutor concluded that there was no reason to 
believe that opening an investigation in the Kenyan situation would not be in the interests of 
justice.109  
 
The Kenyan situation has progressed beyond the preliminary examination stage. However, 
the issue of interests of justice is still relevant in the proceedings of the ICC. This is because 
the UNSC can defer proceedings before the ICC.110 Kenya officially requested a referral of 
the ICC indictment under article 16 of the Rome Statute in March 2011. 111  During 
discussions at the UNSC on the issue, some members expressed concern that the request did 
not enjoy the support of all members of the government of national unity set-up after the 
election violence.112 The UNSC met again in April 2011 and it was agreed that the best 
option available to Kenya was to seek a deferral under article 19 of the Rome Statute.113 
Following the conclusions of local elections in 2013, Kenya made another appeal to the 
UNSC through its permanent mission to the UN and argued for recognition of the positive 
changes in Kenya that should warrant a deferral to consolidate Kenya‘s progress to 
democracy and stability and fight against impunity.114  
 
                                                 
107 Paragraph 60 of the Request for authorisation of an investigation pursuant to Article 15. 
108 Ibid. 
109 Paragraph 61 of the Request for authorisation of an investigation pursuant to Article 15. 
110 Article 16 of the Rome Statute; see chapter three and discussions on the UNSC. 
111 Ben Agina ‗Kibaki,Muthaura and Security Chiefs meet Envoys over ICC Deferral Bid‘ 16 February 2011, 
Standard Digital News; See Letter dated 23 March 2011 from the Permanent Representative of Kenya to the 
United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council titled ‗Request of Kenya for deferral under 
article 16 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court‘ 29 March 2011, S/2011/201. 
112 Ibid. 
113 Security Council Report ‗Chronology of Events‘, 31 May 2013.  
114 In the presentation to the UNSC, the permanent representative of Kenya to the UN stated that, ‗Kenya is 
committed to fighting impunity. In this respect the Government has put in place legislative and administrative 
reforms to reinforce the fight against impunity. Some of the measures taken include: adoption of a new popular 
Constitution and enactment of over 200 pieces of legislation to implement it, operationalisation of independent 
constitutional bodies, robust judicial reforms, police reforms, strengthening the principle of separation of 
powers, upheld the public right to access information, ensuring public participation in national affairs and 
further entrenched the freedom of the media.‘ See statement by H.E Mr Macharia Kamau, 
Ambassador/Permanent Representative, Permanent Mission of Kenya to the UN during the Interactive Dialogue 
with members of the UN Security Council, 23 May 2013.  
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Kenya‘s permanent representative to the UN argued that the UNSC should use its inherent 
power in maintaining international peace and security and relevant provisions of the Statute 
to terminate the ICC cases.115 The UNSC did not accede to the request because Kenya was 
unable to prove that the referral was a threat to international peace and security. It seems that 
Kenya‘s request for a deferral or termination under article 16 of the Rome Statute did not 
succeed. This is because article 16 pre-supposes the existence of a threat to international 
peace and security. 116  The UNSC did not make a determination that the post-election 
violence in Kenya was a threat to international peace and security.117  
 
The current investigation and prosecution of the crimes do not pose a threat to international 
peace and security and therefore does not fall within the stipulations of article 16. A deferral 
under article 16 of the Statute is limited to 12 months and cannot be automatically 
renewed.118 Termination of the ICC case as argued for by Kenya is not an option as the 
UNSC cannot terminate a case before the ICC. It can only defer an investigation or 
prosecution for a limited period of time. Another option available to Kenya was for the 
Prosecutor to use her discretion under article 53 of the Rome Statute to terminate the case in 
the interest of justice.119  
 
It seems that complementarity offered a better opportunity for Kenya to demonstrate that it is 
not inactive but willing and able to prosecute those responsible for the crimes.120 While there 
may be issues with holding trials in Kenya while the ICC cases are still on-going, there is 
                                                 
115 Ambassador Macharia Kamau argued that ‗[t]he current peaceful situation in Kenya has not come with ease 
and to maintain peace and stability in Kenya and the region is the common responsibility of the international 
community including the UN Security Council. Kenya would like to see these cases terminated as soon as 
possible, how and by whom is debatable, but to end they should.‘ Ibid.  
116 Claus Kress ‗On the Outer Limits of Crimes against Humanity: The Concept of Organisation within the 
Policy Requirement: Some Reflections on the March 2010 ICC Kenya Decision (2010) 23 Leiden Journal of 
International Law 855 - 873. 
117 At the height of the conflict, the UNSC only released a Presidential Statement condemning the violence and 
calling the parties to end the violence through negotiations. See UNSC ‗Statement by the President of the 
Security Council‘ 6 February 2008, S/PRST/2008/4..  
118 Amir Rahgoshay ‗The Deferral of Investigation or Prosecution in the ICC by request of the Security Council 
of UN organisation‘ (2011) 8 Life Science Journal 796 – 804.  
119 See paragraph 2.6 of chapter two.  
120 Max du Plessis and Christopher Gevers ‗Kenya‘s ICC Deferral Request and the Proposed Amendment to 
article 16 of the Rome Statute‘, 17 February 2011. See also paragraph 2.5 of chapter two discussions regarding 
admissibility issues. 
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nothing that stops Kenya from prosecuting the middle-level perpetrators using its national 
judicial system in the interim. This will be evidence that Kenya has the political will to hold 
its citizens accountable and supports her earlier argument about adopting a ‗bottom-up‘ 
approach to the investigation and prosecution of those responsible for the post-election 
violence.121 It also corresponds with the latest strategy paper of the Prosecutor of building 
cases from middle perpetrators to the top hierarchy.122  
 
From the foregoing, it is submitted that at the time the Prosecutor decided that there was 
reasonable basis to open investigation in Kenya, there was no basis for Kenya to claim that it 
was investigating or prosecuting the same people that are currently before the ICC for crimes 
committed during the post-election violence. However, although subsequent initiatives by the 
Kenyan Government can be seen in a positive light, they still did not meet the threshold of 
complementarity as set by the Appeals Chamber. If the Prosecutor had applied positive 
complementarity, it would have helped the Kenyan government to overcome the inability to 
hold trials. The Prosecutor had the discretion to suspend investigations and prosecutions and 
allow Kenya to conduct the trials, but this option was not used.  
 
8.2.8 The Prosecutor and the interests of justice in Côte d’Ivoire 
 
It is needful here to recall that jurisdiction and admissibility are positive requirements that 
must be satisfied for the ICC to investigate a situation. However, the interests of justice under 
the Rome Statute is a potential countervailing consideration that may produce a reason not to 
proceed, as already discussed in Chapter four.123 The Prosecutor is therefore not required to 
establish that an investigation is in the interests of justice, but rather, whether there could be 
specific circumstances which provide substantial reasons to believe it is not in the interests of 
justice to proceed at that time.124 Based on developments in Côte d‘Ivoire, it is submitted that 
not opening an investigation was not in the interests of justice as the victims of crimes had 
clearly stated that they needed justice. Furthermore, the government reiterated the need for 
the ICC to commence investigations because of lack of capacity of the Ivorian judiciary to 
carry out investigations. Therefore, based on the information available at the time the 
                                                 
121  Paragraph 34 of Application Pursuant Article 19 of the ICC Statute. See discussions on positive 
complementarity.  
122 See Strategies of the Prosecutor 2012 to 2015  
123 Chapter four, paragraph 4.7; Article 53(1) of the Rome Statute; Paragraph 59 of the Request for 
Authorisation. 
124 Ibid.  
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decision to conduct a preliminary examination was made, the Prosecutor argued that opening 
an investigation would be in the interests of justice.125  
 
8.3    Prosecutorial discretion and general principles during preliminary examination  
 
8.3.1 The Prosecutor and independence in Kenya  
 
A lot has been said about the independence of the Prosecutor.126 In the Kenyan situation, it 
does not seem as if his decision to proceed with an investigation was based on external 
influences. Rather, what is evident is that the Prosecutor had given Kenya the possibility of 
conducting trials in the region, but this was not possible during the period, as the Kenya 
Parliament failed to pass the law that would have set-up the Special Tribunal recommended 
by the CIPEV report. The Prosecutor had given the Kenyan Government enough opportunity 
to set-up an accountability mechanism to investigate and prosecute those responsible for 
planning and executing the post-electoral violence in Kenya.127   
 
Both the Prosecutor and a delegation from Kenya decided on a time-table for accountability. 
However, if that agreement failed, Kenya agreed to refer the matter to the ICC in accordance 
with article 14 of the Statute.128 However, when the government and the parliamentarians 
could not agree on the establishment of the Special Tribunal, the Prosecutor made a request 
to Pre-Trial Chamber II to be allowed to initiate an investigation on the crimes committed in 
Kenya.129 The Prosecutor also reviewed materials relating to the conducts of all the parties to 
the conflict which showed an improvement compared to the Ugandan and DRC situations 
where the Prosecutor had failed to initiate proceedings against individuals allied to 
government institutions. The determination of the Prosecutor to proceed with an investigation 
under proprio motu referral is subject to the approval of the Pre Trial Chamber.130 But this 
does not limit the exercise of discretion, since the Pre-Trial Chamber can make a 
determination only when a request is submitted to it by the Prosecutor to initiate an 
                                                 
125 Paragraph 60 of the Request for Authorisation.  
126 Chapter four, paragraph 5.4.1. 
127 Mba Nmaju ‗Violence in Kenya: Any Role for the ICC in the Quest for Accountability?‘(2009) 3 African 
Legal Studies 78 - 95.  
128 See ICC ‗Agreed Minutes of the Meeting between Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo and the Delegation of the 
Kenyan Government‘ The Hague, 3 July 2009. . 
129 Paragraph 1 of request for authorisation of an investigation pursuant to Article 15.  
130 See chapter four, paragraph  4.2.    
 
227 | Page 
investigation or whenever the Prosecutor decides not to proceed because of the interests of 
justice.131  
 
8.3.2 The Prosecutor and independence in Côte d’Ivoire 
 
 
From the foregoing, it is argued that the Prosecutor was clearly independent in the 
preliminary examination of crimes allegedly committed in Côte d‘Ivoire. In the request for 
authorisation under article 15 of the Rome Statute, the Prosecutor clearly set out how the 
preliminary examination was conducted and the factors that influenced the decision to open 
an investigation in that situation.132 In addition, the request for authorisation also stated the 
legal parameters within which the preliminary examination was conducted.133 The request for 
authorization, to the extent of the information it contains, shows that the Prosecutor acted 
within the parameters of the Statute and was not guided by extraneous considerations in 
making the determination to proceed with an investigation. 
 
8.3.3 The Prosecutor and impartiality in Kenya 
 
The principle of impartiality flows from article 21(3) of the Rome Statute. It involves the 
Prosecutor applying consistent methods and criteria, irrespective of the States or parties 
involved or the person(s) or group(s) concerned.134 Impartiality also means that there should 
not be any discrimination as recognised under international human rights law. When the 
preliminary examination in Kenya is viewed independently, the manner the procedure was 
carried out indicates the Prosecutor was not partial. This is because as already stated, geo-
political implications or geographical balance between situations are not relevant criteria for 
determining whether to open an investigation or not into a situation under the Statute.  
 
The question of partiality is clearly related to the discretion of the Prosecutor. Since this 
study is not looking specifically at the political outcomes of the decision of the Prosecutor, 
the decision to open investigations in Kenya within the available information cannot be said 
to be tainted with partiality. The Prosecutors ability to charge both parties to the conflict is a 
                                                 
131 Ibid.  
132 Paragraph 23 – 34 of the Request for Authorisation in Cote D‘Ivoire.  
133 Paragraph 35 – 50 of the Request for Authorisation in Cote d‘Ivoire. 
134 Paragraph 28 of the Policy Paper on Preliminary Examination. 
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clear evidence of impartiality and showed that the Prosecutor applied ‗consistent methods 
and criteria‘ as required by the Rome Statute.  
 
8.3.4 The Prosecutor and impartiality in Côte d’Ivoire  
 
As already noted in the study, impartiality requires the application of consistent methods and 
criteria, irrespective of the States or other parties involved.135  Furthermore, the exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion during preliminary examinations must adhere to internationally 
recognised human rights, and be without any adverse distinction founded on gender, age, 
race, colour, language, religion or belief, political or other opinion, national, ethnic or social 
origin, birth or other status.136  
 
It is submitted that the Prosecutor was fairly impartial during the preliminary examination 
conducted in Côte d‘Ivoire. A sticking issue in the activities of the Prosecutor relates to the 
prosecution of only one party to the conflict although there was evidence that both parties to 
the conflict had committed crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court. Is also acknowledged 
that this responsibility is at the discretion of the Prosecutor and subject to available evidence. 
A clear contrast can be made between the Kenyan situation and the Côte d’Ivoire situation in 
the sense that the Prosecutor charged both parties to the conflict for crimes within the 
jurisdiction of the Court.  
 
8.3.5 The Prosecutor and objectivity in Kenya  
 
 
This requires the Prosecutor to investigate both incriminating and exonerating circumstances 
in order to establish the truth. 137  Any information received by the Prosecutor during 
preliminary examination is subjected to evaluation to assess its authenticity and reliability. 
Objectivity refers not only to the conduct in the Kenyan situation but also in relation to other 
situations before the ICC.138 The review of the materials submitted to the Prosecutor revealed 
that crimes had been committed during the post-election violence. The objectivity of the 
decision by the Prosecutor that the crimes committed during the post-election violence were 
                                                 
135 chapter five, paragraph 5.4.2; Paragraph 28 Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations.  
136 Ibid. See also Article 21(3) of the Rome Statute.  
137See chapter five, paragraph 5.4.3; Article 54 of the Rome Statute; Paragraph 30 of the Policy Paper on 
Preliminary Examinations.  
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crimes against humanity meeting the threshold of gravity under the Statute can be questioned, 
in relation to the arguments made by Judge Kaul who argues that the crimes committed 
during the post-election violence did not meet the legal criteria for such crimes.  
 
This study agrees with Judge Kaul‘s argument that the crimes committed during the post-
election violence did not meet the legal requirement of resulting from 'State and 
organisational policy'. In addition, it is argued that the Prosecutor did not avail himself the 
possibility of applying the principle of positive complementarity which offered the 
Prosecutor an opportunity to advance the ideals of the ICC. This is because the Rome Statute 
in its preamble recognises that it is the primary duty of States to hold their citizens 
accountable for international crimes. However, since the decision of the Prosecutor is subject 
to the approval of the Pre-Trial Chamber, it is obvious that the decision of the majority 
stands, irrespective of any misgivings regarding the decision to seek for an authorisation.   
 
8.3.6 The Prosecutor and objectivity in Côte d’Ivoire   
 
As discussed earlier, the principle of objectivity relates to the ability of the Prosecutor to 
investigate both incriminating and exonerating circumstances equally in order to establish the 
truth in a situation before the ICC.139 Article 54(1) of the Rome Statute refers to the duties 
and powers of the prosecution during investigations, but the Prosecutor also maintains 
‗objectivity‘ as a self-regulating principle during preliminary examination.140  
 
The request for authorisation makes a clear connection between the activities of the militias 
and the support and assistance they received from government forces, showing that the 
crimes committed by pro-Gbagbo forces were organised, systematic and widespread.141 The 
request for authorisation clearly articulated the fact that the organised nature of the armed 
groups showed unmistakable evidence that a situation of non-international armed conflict 
existed.142 In addition, the request for authorisation also indicated instances where armed 
groups loyal to Ouattara may have committed crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC.143 
                                                 
139Chapter five, paragraph 5.4.3; Article 54(1) of the Rome Statute; Regulation 34(1) OTP Regulations.   
140 Ibid; Paragraph 30 Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations. 
141 Paragraph 73 – 133 of the Request for Authorisation.  
142 Paragraph 4 of the Request for Authorisation.  
143 Paragraph 71 of the Request for Authorisation to Open an Investigation Under Article 15 in Cote d‘Ivoire.  
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However, the inability to charge those loyal to President Ouattara may be a sign og lack of 
objectivity on the side of the Prosecutor of the ICC.   
 
8.4   Prosecutorial discretion and policy objectives during preliminary examination  
The policy objectives also relates to the theory of prosecutorial neutrality as already 
discussed in chapter two of the study which includes non-biased decision making, non-
partisanship and principled decision making.144 These issues are discussed extensively below.  
 
8.4.1 The Prosecutor and transparency in Kenya 
 
The Prosecutor was transparent during the preliminary examination in Kenya in trying to get 
the government to establish accountability mechanisms.145 However, regarding the procedure 
of conducting preliminary examination, there was no public information available on the 
procedure before the Prosecutor announced the decision to seek for an authorisation from the 
Pre-Trial Chamber.  The Prosecutor did not issue any report on the reasons why the decision 
to proceed with an investigation was made, except the in documents submitted to the Pre-
Trial Chamber. One can argue that the policy changes between Ocampo and Bensouda may 
have accounted for the difference in carrying out effective public enlightenment on the 
activities of the Prosecutor during preliminary examinations in Kenya. 
 
8.4.2 The Prosecutor and transparency in Côte d’Ivoire 
 
 
The circumstances surrounding the Côte d‘Ivoire situation show that the Prosecutor tried to 
be transparent in the activities carried out in Côte d‘Ivoire prior to the decision to open 
investigations. However, as has been consistently argued in this study, the inability of the 
former Prosecutor to adopt a transparent approach in the process of carrying out a 
preliminary examination leads to a lot of speculations regarding the activities of the 
Prosecutor and the influence of extraneous factors that do not meet the provisions of the 
Rome Statute.  
 
It is clear that the intention of the Prosecutor may have been to act within the provisions in a 
transparent manner and pursue the policies of the office in a way that will close the impunity 
                                                 
144 Chapter two, paragraph 2.1. 
145 See chapter five, paragraph 5.5.1.  
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gap. However, the effect of the decisions of the Prosecutor not to inform the public 
adequately, particularly  about the conduct of preliminary examinations has undermined the 
transparency required in the Prosecutor‘s performance, and also increased doubt as to 
whether the Prosecutor really acted within the provisions of the Statute. The activities of the 
Prosecutor in Côte d’Ivoire are verifiable cases in this regard.  
 
A clear engagement on the legal factors regulating preliminary examination is only found in 
the request for authorisation. Therefore, it is argued that the Prosecutor may have acted 
within the provisions of the Rome Statute but the actions were not transparent to the extent 
that the public was not kept informed in the conduct of preliminary examination in Côte 
d’Ivoire.  
 
8.4.3 The Prosecutor and complementarity in Kenya 
 
 
The issue of complementarity has already been addressed in the chapter. One of the policy 
objectives of the Prosecutor is to end impunity through positive complementarity. However, 
this policy was not well articulated and practised by the Prosecutor during and after 
preliminary examinations. After the initiation of investigations, the issue of positive 
complementarity should not be abandoned. The effectives of not applying positive 
complementarity during preliminary examinations and during the investigation and 
prosecution stage can be seen in the relationship between the ICC and Kenya.  
 
Kenya challenged the admissibility of the situation and also took certain steps to show that it 
was willing and able to investigate those accused of international crimes during the post-
election violence. So far, Kenya‘s bid to have the cases deferred or transferred to its national 
courts has failed to garner any positive response. However, Kenya still has the opportunity to 
assume jurisdiction of the cases, if it can show that the defendants before the ICC are charged 
with the same conducts before Kenyan courts as in the ICC Appeals Chamber.146  
 
                                                 
146 Paragraph 40 of the judgment on the appeal of the Republic of Kenya against the decision of Pre-Trial 
Chamber II of 30 May 2011 entitled ‗Decision on the Application by the Government of Kenya Challenging the 
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Kenya can also challenge the admissibility of the case after the commencement of trial. This 
is only possible through the leave of the Court and may be based only on article 17(1)(c).147 
This is only possible when there is a clear case of investigation and prosecution of accused 
persons under Kenyan law. The ICC Prosecutor has acknowledged that a deferral is possible 
if ICC judges agree that Kenya has made substantial progress in the investigation and 
prosecution of those accused of international crimes in Kenya.148 At the time of writing, this 
is yet to happen.  
 
It has been argued that the judges of the PTC II and not the Prosecutor should be blamed for 
the characterisation of the crimes committed in Kenya as crimes against humanity and not 
ordinary crimes.149 However, this argument fails to appreciate the fact that an application by 
the Prosecutor to open an investigation is a pre-supposition that crimes within the jurisdiction 
of the ICC have been committed.150 Besides, it was the Prosecutor that characterised the 
crimes committed during the post-election violence in Kenya as crimes against humanity.151  
 
The subsequent requests for issuance of summons were made by the Prosecutor. It was within 
the discretion of the prosecutor to decide whether to allow Kenya to exercise jurisdiction over 
its citizens concerning the post-election violence. This is because the Statute allows the 
Prosecutor to exercise such option while maintaining the possibility of intervening when 
Kenya fails to investigate or prosecute the crimes as alleged. If the Prosecutor had elected the 
procedure of positive complementarity, it would have aided Kenya in its efforts to investigate 
those responsible for the crimes during the period of preliminary examination. In addition, 
Kenya had requested the assistance of the Court and the Prosecutor regarding the post-
election violence in Kenya.152  
 
                                                 
147Article 17 (1)(c) provides  ‗[h]aving regard to paragraph 10 of the Preamble and article 1, the Court shall 
determine that a case is inadmissible where:  […] (c)  The person concerned has already been tried for conduct 
which is the subject of the complaint, and a trial by the Court is not permitted under article 20, paragraph 3‘. 
148 Capital News ‗ICC Ready to Engage Kenya Legally on Deferral Bid‘, 30 May 2013.  
149Aiste Dumbryte ‗The Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion at The International Criminal Court: Does the 
Need for Functional Independence Outweigh Calls for Increased Oversight and Accountability for Decisions 
Made and Policies Pursued by the Office of the Prosecutor?‘ 1 – 8.  
150 See Article 15(1) of the Rome Statute.  
151 Paragraph 93 of the Request for authorisation of an investigation pursuant to Article 15. 
152 Paragraph 1 of Request for Assistance on behalf of the Government of the Republic of Kenya pursuant to 
Article 93(10) and Rule 194, ICC-01/09, 21 April 2011.  
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The request for assistance under article 93(10) of the Rome Statute became an issue in 
relation to the admissibility challenge by Kenya. If the request made by the government of 
Kenya had been accepted by the Prosecutor, it would have been an opportunity for the 
Prosecutor and the Government of Kenya to discuss practical issues relating to the 
investigation and prosecution of the ICC cases locally. It was within the discretion of the 
Prosecutor to support Kenya‘s request for assistance.  
 
Kenya could have used its domestic laws to prosecute offenders for the post-election violence 
as confirmed by a decision of the ICC.153 In this case, the Court held that the Statute ‗does 
not make a distinction between ordinary and international crimes.‘154 In relation to the Ne bis 
in idem rule,155 the Court also held that ‗article 20(3) of the Statute does not require the same 
legal characterisation of the crime in order to satisfy the ne bis in idem principle.‘156 It can be 
concluded from the discussions above that prosecuting those responsible for the post-election 
violence using Kenya‘s domestic law is supported by ICC‘s jurisprudence on 
complementarity.  
 
The activities of the Prosecutor in Kenya do not show a clear example of positive 
complementarity or assistance under article 93(10) of the Statute. The emphasis on only ICC 
prosecution does not acknowledge the primary responsibility on States Party to the treaty to 
exercise criminal jurisdiction over their citizens.  
 
It is submitted that where a State Party has shown interest and willingness to engage the ICC, 
such a state should be given every opportunity and assistance. This is to ensure that states 
carry out their obligations under the Rome Statute in recognition that the jurisdiction of the 
                                                 
153  In Prosecutor v Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah Al-Senussi Pre-Trial Chamber I held that ‗the 
assessment of domestic proceedings should focus on the alleged conduct and not its legal characterisation. The 
question of whether domestic investigations are carried out with a view to prosecuting ‗international crimes‘ is 
not determinative of an admissibility challenge.‘ Paragraph 85 Decision on the admissibility of the case against 
Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi, ICC-01/11-01/11, 31 May 2013, Prosecutor v Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah Al-
Senussi. 
154 Ibid at 86.  
155 This is the rule against double jeopardy. See Linda Carter ‗The Principle of Complementarity and the 
International Criminal Court: The Role of Ne Bis in Idem’ (2010) 8 Santa Clara Journal of International Law 
165 – 198.  
156 Ibid.  
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ICC is complementary to the domestic legal systems.157 The current difficulties faced by the 
Prosecutor in dealing with the Kenyan situation may be linked to the inability of the 
Prosecutor to appreciate the potentials of positive complementarity.  
 
8.4.4 The Prosecutor and complementarity in Côte d’Ivoire 
 
One important aspect of the activities of the Prosecutor is ending impunity through positive 
complementarity.158 While the study agrees with the Prosecutor regarding the assessment of 
complementarity under admissibility issues, the Prosecutor‘s restricted view of positive 
complementarity has hampered the effective deployment of the principle in the fight against 
impunity. 159  Although Article 17 of the Rome Statute clearly deals with issues of 
admissibility which involve complementarity and gravity, positive complementarity offers a 
cost effective way of improving the possibility of conducting local trials and ensuring States 
are able to hold their citizens accountable. However, the Kenyan situation can be contrasted 
with the Côte d‘Ivoire situation in the sense that while Kenya contested the involvement of 
the ICC in the investigation of the crimes committed during the post-election violence, both 
leaders of governments, Laurent Gbagbo and Allassane Ouattara of Côte d‘Ivoire accepted 
the jurisdiction of the Court and encouraged the ICC Prosecutor to investigate crimes 
committed after the elections.   
 
Although there was evidence of minimal investigation by the government of Côte d‘Ivoire, 
the issue that was of interest to the Prosecutor was not how to support these activities but to 
weigh whether they met the admissibility criteria.160 In addition, the Prosecutor based his 
assessment of the Ivorian judiciary on a letter written by the President about the inability of 
the judiciary to conduct trials.161 However, it is argued that as a party to the conflict, the 
President of Côte d‘Ivoire might not have been in the best position to give a clear and 
impartial assessment of the judiciary. In addition, the Prosecutor did not show evidence of 
efforts made to ascertain whether the statement of the President represented the true picture 
of the judiciary. Furthermore, it should be noted that when President Ouattara announced the 
launch of a criminal probe against Laurent Gbagbo, Simone Gbagbo and 100 other close 
                                                 
157 Article 1 of the Rome Statute.  
158 Chapter five, paragraph 5.5.2..  
159 Ibid.  
160 Paragraph 47 – 53 of the Request for Authorisation in the Cote d‘Ivoire Situation  
161 Paragraph 49 of the Request for Authorisation.  
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associates in April 2011, the Justice Minister specified that the preliminary investigation 
excluded crimes that might fall under the jurisdiction of the ICC.162  
 
The Prosecutor did not inquire further whether the investigations were for the same crimes 
committed during the post-election violence. In the end, some of the people who were under 
investigation in Côte d‘Ivoire were also indicted by the ICC for crimes within the jurisdiction 
of the Court, although the prosecutor in Côte d’Ivoire excluded the crimes. It is submitted 
that the Rome Statute does not insist that accused persons should be investigated and 
prosecuted only for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court. Therefore as long as there is 
evidence that an individual has been investigated for the same crime or offence and punished 
or acquitted, the accused person, if charged in the second court, can plead double jeopardy 
under article 20 (3) of the Rome Statute. 163  
 
8.4.5 The Prosecutor and prevention of crimes in Kenya  
 
It is highly debatable whether the preliminary examination carried out in Kenya helped to 
prevent the commission of international crimes. There was much less violence following the 
2013 election, compared with what happened in 2007. However, what really minimised the 
electoral violence was not the fear of the ICC but a re-alignment of political interests between 
the Kikuyus and the Kalenjins.164 This led to the formation of the Jubilee Alliance which is 
an amalgam of The National Alliance (TNA) and United Republican Party (URP) that won 
the 2013 election, thereby tentatively reconciling bitter rivals and political enemies.165 The 
ICC intervention helped Uhuru Kenyatta to win Kenya‘s presidency with the Jubilee Alliance 
because it was seen as representing a ‗Western interest.‘166  
                                                 
162 Ibid. 
163 Article 20 (3) provides that ‗[n]o person who has been tried by another court for conduct also proscribed 
under article 6, 7 or 8 shall be tried by the Court with respect to the same conduct unless the proceedings in the 
other court: (a) Were for the purpose of shielding the person concerned from criminal responsibility for crimes 
within the jurisdiction of the Court; or (b) Otherwise were not conducted independently or impartially in 
accordance with the norms of due process recognized by international law and were conducted in a manner 
which, in the circumstances, was inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to justice.  
164 Gabrielle Lyncha ‗Electing the ‗Alliance of the Accused': The Success of the Jubilee Alliance in Kenya's Rift 
Valley‘ (2013) Journal of Eastern African Studies 1 – 22.  
165 Gabrielle Lynch ‗Non-Judicial Battles: Kenyan Politics and the International Criminal Court‘ (2014) 8 Africa 
Policy Brief 1 – 10. 
166 BBC News Africa ‗Did the ICC help Uhuru Kenyatta win Kenyan election?‘ 11 March 2013.  
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What happened in Kenya may also be compared with what happened in Uganda. The ICC is 
believed to have helped stop the conflict between the government and the LRA, however, it 
also made it impossible for the LRA to complete the peace deal as Joseph Kony could not get 
a guarantee that he would not be prosecuted in The Hague if he signed the peace deal with 
the government of Uganda. While the ICC may have good intentions, it seems some of the 
outcomes of its interventions are highly unpredictable. It also means that using the ICC to 
prevent people from committing international crimes is subject to several factors that may be 
beyond the control of the ICC Prosecutor.  
 
8.4.6 The Prosecutor and prevention of crimes in Côte d’Ivoire 
 
The Prosecutor has stated that prevention of crimes is one of the core functions of a 
preliminary investigation.167 This is aimed at breaking the circle of impunity by deterring 
international criminals and their sponsors.168  Although the Prosecutor has intervened by 
issuing press statements in several countries where crimes are ongoing, the deterrent effects 
of these activities are yet to be determined. For example, the acceptance of the jurisdiction of 
the ICC by the Laurent Gbagbo government did not deter subsequent conflicts that plagued 
the country after the presidential elections. Most of the parties to the conflict at least knew 
about the existence of the ICC and that it had jurisdiction over the crimes that were taking 
place at that time.  
 
One thing that is clear is that both the former and current Prosecutors of the ICC have yet to 
find a way to have an impact on situations during preliminary examinations. This may be a 
function of several factors. First, the ICC is situated in The Hague and literarily removed 
from the theatres of these conflicts, making the possibility of its deterrent effect very remote. 
Second, the issuance of press releases through the website of the ICC is a very limited means 
of communication. This is because most of the individuals who perpetrate the targeted crimes 
may not have the internet as their primary means of communication. Third, the Prosecutors‘ 
interpretation of positive complementarity means that  their primary concern is to evaluate 
admissibility issues and not to encourage national investigations and prosecution of 
international crimes. Taken together, this policy did not work in Côte d‘Ivoire and barely had 
any measurable impact.   
                                                 
167 Chapter five, paragraph 5.5.3; Paragraph 104 Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations.  
168 Paragraph 106 Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations.  
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8.5 Conclusion  
 
The situations in Kenya and Côte d‘Ivoire marked the first time the Prosecutor decided there 
was a reasonable basis to proceed with investigations using the proprio motu powers in 
article 15 of the Rome Statute. This power is subject to oversight by the Pre-Trial Chamber of 
the ICC whose responsibility is to scrutinise and weigh the evidence submitted by the 
Prosecutor. 
 
In Côte d‘Ivoire, the initial acceptance of jurisdiction of the Court and its subsequent 
ratification by the government meant that the Prosecutor‘s power to conduct the preliminary 
examination into that country‘s situation could not be challenged. The main challenge in Côte 
d‘Ivoire was that the Prosecutor did not charge key perpetrators from all parties to the 
conflict for crimes. This has called into question the neutrality of the Prosecutor.  
 
The use of 'inactivity' or 'inaction' under article 17 of the Rome Statute to determine Kenya‘s 
challenge of jurisdiction is a lost opportunity to engage with the ICC on interpretations of 
unwillingness and inability in a proprio motu proceedings. The adoption of 'inaction' as a 
basis for the intervention of the ICC under article 15 of the Statute raises fundamental issues 
in the activities of the Prosecutor during preliminary examinations. Although the Prosecutor 
has argued that positive complementarity is a key policy objective, it was not used in Kenya 
and Côte d‘Ivoire to spur national trials, and this lack is clearly demonstrated by subsequent 
events in both countries.  
 
The chapter also discussed the evidence available to the Prosecutor at the time the 
preliminary examination was conducted and subsequent developments that necessitated the 
dropping of charges against some of the suspects. This is as a result of the lack of co-
operation between the ICC and Kenya, and constitutes one of the challenges identified earlier 
in the study, that lack of co-operation between a State and the ICC may hamper the 
investigation of crimes. However, it was seen that there is cooperation between the 
Prosecutor and the government of Côte d‘Ivoire although some of the requests made by the 
ICC to the Ivorian government are yet to be acceded to.  
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With regard to the bid by the Kenyan government to invite the UNSC to use article 16 of the 
Rome Statute to stop the activities of the Court, this chapter has noted that Kenya needed to 
demonstrate that the principles of positive complementarity applied to the case.   
 
One major issue that the Prosecutor did not take into consideration during the preliminary 
examination conducted in the two countries is that the ICC policy paper provides for the use 
of positive complementarity. Positive complementarity presupposes that the ICC will defer to 
national judicial systems when they show interest in investigating and prosecuting crimes 
within the jurisdiction of the ICC. However, this issue was not prioritised in the Kenya and 
Côte d‘Ivoire situations.   
 
It is clear that the Prosecutor failed to charge all parties to the conflict for the crimes 
committed, especially in Côte d‘Ivoire. Although the Prosecutor had used gravity to show 
why some parties to conflicts were not charged in Kenya, it is not clear how the Prosecutor 
reached the decision on who to charge or not to charge in Côte d‘Ivoire and the reasons for 
the decision.  
 
From discussions in the last two case studies and issues already discussed in this chapter, it is 
difficult to conclude that the ICC Prosecutor was consistent in the preliminary examinations 
conducted in Kenya and Côte d‘Ivoire. The reasons are not far-fetched. The possibility of 
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Chapter Nine 
Conclusion and recommendations 
 
9.0 Introduction  
 
According to the office of the Prosecutor of the ICC, between July 2002 and October 2015, 
the Prosecutor received about 11,568 'communications' (petitions) to open preliminary 
examinations proprio motu, under article 15 of the Rome Statute, in different countries 
around the world.1 Only eleven situations made it to the preliminary examination stage, while 
only two--Kenya and Côte d‘Ivoire--reached the investigation and prosecution stages. This 
means that overwhelming majority of petitions received by the ICC for preliminary 
examination are manifestly outside the jurisdiction of the ICC. Furthermore, it also means 
that the ICC as an international criminal justice institution has been very busy since it was 
established in 2002. In addition, it means that preliminary examinations fulfills an essential 
task of gate keeping at the ICC, so that the ICC is not over-burdened with frivolous petitions 
or petitions that are not clearly within the jurisdiction of the Court.   
 
As stated in Chapter one, the purpose of the thesis is to investigate the exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion during preliminary examinations. Some of the questions answered 
include: what is the extent and scope of prosecutorial discretion regarding the conduct of 
preliminary examinations? what is its legal basis? and how has the prosecutor exercised that 
discretion in practice? As the Prosecutor has a key role in the ICC, perceptions of partiality or 
accusations of lack of independence or objectivity in his or her work, have an adverse impact 
on the effectiveness of the ICC and international criminal law in general. For that reason, this 
study seeks to provide suggestions on how the exercise of prosecutorial discretion during 
preliminary examinations could be improved. 
 
Several scholars have written on the exercise of prosecutorial discretion by the Prosecutor.2 
However, very few have focused specifically on the exercise of discretion during the 
                                                 
1 ICC 'Preliminary Examinations' available online at https://www.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/icc/structure%20of%20the%20court/office%20of%20the%20prosecutor/comm%20and%20ref
/Pages/communications%20and%20referrals.aspx, accessed 11 February 2016.  
2 See Chapter one, paragraph 1.4.  
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preliminary examination stage.3 A unique feature of this study is the use of the theory of 
prosecutorial neutrality, the legal criteria in the Rome Statute and the policies and principles 
of the Prosecutor as analytical tools. More importantly, the study investigates the situations of 
six countries across Africa, where specific criticisms of bias have been leveled against the 
ICC Prosecutor.4 It argues that the ICC Prosecutor should exercise his or her discretion 
independently, impartially and objectively, as demanded by the theory of prosecutorial 
neutrality in the interests of the effective administration of international criminal justice. Such 
neutrality has to be maintained at both the formal and practical levels.  
 
It will be recalled that the theory of prosecutorial neutrality was originally propounded for the 
American criminal justice system. However, in Chapter two of this thesis, the theory was re-
designed to accommodate developments at the ICC. This was possible by identifying the 
similarities and differences in the domestic and international criminal justice systems. In 
addition, the research noted that the exercise of discretion by the ICC Prosecutor is limited by 
the Rome Statute through the oversight functions of the Pre-Trial Chamber of the ICC and 
the UNSC.  
 
This study has demonstrated that the preliminary examination is an essential feature of the 
ICC and as such plays a strategic role in the administration of international criminal justice. 
The Rome Statute grants the Prosecutor unprecedented powers to initiate investigations 
proprio motu on the basis of information on crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC, subject 
to the approval of the Pre-Trial Chambers of the ICC.5 Even when States party to the treaty 
and the UNSC refer matters to the ICC, the Prosecutor has the discretion to decide whether 
there is a reasonable basis to proceed with investigations. This suggests that the discretion 
granted to the Prosecutor to conduct preliminary examinations is not limited by the powers of 
the UNSC to suspend investigations or prosecutions in article 16 of the Rome Statute.6  
 
Preliminary examinations at the ICC serve different purposes. First,  they are used to 
establish whether or not there is a reasonable basis to proceed with full investigation.7 
                                                 
3 Ibid.  
4 See chapters six to eight for the case studies.  
5 Article 15 of the Rome Statute; HRW ‗Courting History The Landmark International Criminal Court‘s First 
Years‘ July 2008, 30 – 66.  
6 Chapter four, paragraph 4.5.2.  
7 Chapter four, paragraph 4.6. 
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Second, they are also used by the Prosecutor to advance the principle of positive 
complementarity.8 Third, they serve as an early warning mechanism enabling the Prosecutor 
to put parties to a conflict on notice that the ICC is following developments in a conflict 
situation.9  
 
 The adoption of the policy paper on preliminary examinations is a welcome development 
and its contents have been thoroughly analysed in this study.10  Not only does it offer an 
opportunity for supporters and critics of the ICC, to scrutinise the activities of the Prosecutor 
based on the general principles and policy objectives adopted to guide the exercise of 
discretion during preliminary examinations, but it also helps the Prosecutor to make 
consistent decisions using the re-established criteria.  
 
9.1 The evolution of prosecutorial discretion 
 
This thesis has shown that the notion of prosecutorial discretion has evolved over time, from 
the time it was first used in the domestic legal system and incorporated into the international 
criminal justice system, to its current form in the Rome Statute and the ICC Prosecutor‘s 
practice. The legal systems of most countries model their prosecutorial institutions on the 
adversarial system found in the UK or the inquisitorial system of the civil law systems. 
However, some legal systems have adopted mixed criminal justice systems, incorporating 
elements of both inquisitorial and adversarial models of prosecution.11 
 
The mixed model was transferred into international criminal justice systems to the extent that 
the early prosecutors of these international tribunals carried out investigations and 
prosecutions as well. However, those first prosecutorial offices lacked independence. As the 
study has shown, the prosecutors of the ad-hoc criminal tribunals that sat in Nuremberg and 
Tokyo operated under the directions of the allied powers that appointed them into office.12 
Again, the prosecutors of other international and hybrid tribunals such as the ICTY, ICTR, 
SCSL, ECCC and the STL exercised varied degrees of independence in the prosecution of 
                                                 
8 Chapter five, paragraph 5.5.2; Paragraph 100 of the Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations.  
9 Chapter five, paragraph 5.5.3; Paragraph 104 of the Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations. 
10Chapter five, paragraphs 5.3 - 5.5.  
11 See chapter three, paragraph 3.1. 
12 Ibid, paragraph 3.1.2. 
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perpetrators of international crimes.13 It is only the Prosecutor of the ICC that has clear 
institutional independence to conduct preliminary examinations as part of the discretion 
exercised by the office. Hence, the ICC‘s Prosecutor is a hybrid of both common and civil 
law systems, which is a unique observation of this research.14  
 
9.2 The significance of the theory of prosecutorial neutrality  
 
It is essential that the Prosecutor is non-biased, non-partisan and principled. The Prosecutor 
must also be independent, objective, and non-political. These principles constitute the 
elements of the theory of prosecutorial neutrality. Implementing these principles in practice 
could make the decisions of the Prosecutor to be more transparent and accountable, and 
hence bolster public confidence in the administration of international criminal justice.   
 
As noted in Chapter two, prosecutorial neutrality is crucial to the administration of criminal 
justice at both national and international levels.15 It emphasises the absence of bias, non-
partisanship and the principled application of established rules and procedures, and also 
provides the possibility for the exercise of prosecutorial discretion that can ensure the just 
and fair administration of international criminal justice irrespective of the interests of the 
parties to a conflict.16 
 
9.3 Formal independence of the ICC Prosecutor 
 
From an institutional point of view, the ICC Prosecutor is guaranteed more independence 
than any of his predecessors. As already noted in Chapter four, the Prosecutor is elected by 
an absolute majority of States party to the Rome Statute.17 In addition, the ICC Prosecutor 
                                                 
13 Ibid, paragraph 3.2.1 - 3.2.3. 
14 This is discussed exhaustively in Chapter four. See also Juan Acevedo Victims’ Status at the International 
Criminal Court: Victims as Witnesses, Victim Participants/Civil Parties and Reparations Claimants (2014)Abo: 
Abo Akademi University Press, 96; Kai Ambos ‗International criminal procedure: "adversarial", "inquisitorial" 
or mixed?‘ (2003) 3 International Criminal Law Review 1 – 37; Claus Kress ‗The Procedural Law of the 
International Criminal Court in Outline: Anatomy of a Unique Compromise‘ (2003) 1 Journal of International 
Criminal Justice 603 - 617. 
15 See chapter two, paragraph 2.6.  
16 Ibid.  
17 See Chapter Four, paragraph 4.3. 
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enjoys an uninterrupted nine-year term and can only be removed from office by the 
Assembly of State party of the Rome Statute due to ‗serious misconduct‘ or a ‗serious 
breach‘.18 However, although the formal guarantee of independence is necessary, it is not 
sufficient to prevent perceptions of partiality. The Prosecutor must act independently in 
practice. As this thesis has shown, this could be achieved by the office of the Prosecutor 
adopting practices which promote transparency and accountability. 19  In essence, the 
Prosecutor should be a three-dimensional neutral prosecutor.  
 
Initially, the Prosecutor did not fully embrace the notion of prosecutorial neutrality, as 
discussed in Chapter two of the study. As a result, some of the preliminary examinations 
were conducted under the cloak of secrecy and decisions made were not justified publicly. 
This was partly because the former Prosecutor had not yet developed detailed guidelines, 
policies and principles governing the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in general and 
during preliminary examinations. There have been significant improvements with the 
adoption of the policy paper on preliminary examinations by the current Prosecutor. 
However, some problems still remain as will be highlighted in this chapter.  
 
9.4 Principles, policies and guidelines on the exercise of prosecutorial discretion during 
preliminary examinations 
 
The thesis discussed the procedural principles that should govern the exercise of discretion 
during preliminary examinations. 20  They were drawn from the theory of prosecutorial 
neutrality, from the Rome Statute, the jurisprudence of the ICC and from the Prosecutor‘s 
own interpretative documents. These principles include independence, impartiality, 
objectivity and transparency. The study argues that there is a convergence between the policy 
paper on preliminary examinations adopted by the current Prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda and 
the theory of neutrality, which is the framework used to evaluate the activities of the 





                                                 
18 Ibid.  
19 Ibid. 
20 Chapter five, paragraph 5.4 - 5.5.  
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9.5  Legal basis for prosecutorial discretion for preliminary examinations and guidance  
 
As this study has shown, article 53 establishes the legal framework for preliminary 
examinations. That article clearly shows that jurisdiction, admissibility (complementarity and 
gravity), and interests of justice are the substantive factors that must be taken into account 
when making decisions pertaining to preliminary examinations.21 In addition to these factors, 
the Prosecutor also has to consider the question of jurisdiction in its all elements – subject 
matter, time and territory.22   
 
In Chapter four, it was shown that article 17 of the Statute regulates complementarity and 
gravity and that, though they relate to issues of admissibility before the ICC, these are vital 
elements of preliminary examinations.23  It was also argued that the absence of proceedings 
by a State that has jurisdiction over a case is enough to make a situation admissible. If a State 
is inactive, the issues of unwillingness and inability do not arise.24  
 
Under gravity, it was argued that the Prosecutor‘s assessment of gravity includes quantitative 
and qualitative considerations.25 Other factors affecting gravity include the scale, nature, 
manner of commission of the crimes, and their impact. 26  The thesis found that the 
Prosecutor‘s application of the principle of gravity to preliminary examinations has been 
inconsistent to the extent that it is not clear how the Prosecutor arrives at decisions on the 
issue of gravity. For example, in Uganda, the Prosecutor was not clear on how the gravity of 
the crimes allegedly committed by UPDF soldiers did not meet the assessment under the 
Rome Statute.    
 
The last major factor that decisions on preliminary examinations have to consider is the 
interests of justice. It has been argued that the Prosecutor's differentiation between 'interests 
of peace' and 'interests of justice' restricts a practical application of the principle of interests 
of justice in the Rome Statute.27 The Prosecutor's policy paper states that the office is only 
                                                 
21 Chapter four, paragraph 4.4 - 4.7.  
22 Ibid.  
23 Ibid, paragraph 4.6. 
24 Ibid.  
25 Chapter four, paragraph 4.6.2. 
26 Ibid.  
27 Chapter four, paragraph 4.7.  
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concerned with the interest of justice and not with the interest of peace. However, the Rome 
Statute does not make this distinction. The effect is that a situation where the Prosecutor 
should consider the broader effect of a peace negotiation or its potential impact on a situation 
is not a primary concern of the ICC Prosecutor. This is not a progressive interpretation of the 
Rome Statute and should be revised.  
 
9.6 Accountability mechanisms regulating the exercise of prosecutorial discretion  
 
Despite the independence and discretion granted to the ICC Prosecutor, the Rome Statute 
also establishes checks and balances to ensure the Prosecutor does not act out of context. 
These checks and balances serve as accountability mechanisms.28 As discussed in Chapter 
four, there are three main accountability mechanisms that serve as a check on the powers of 
the Prosecutor. The first is the judicial review carried out by the Pre-Trial Chamber before 
the Prosecutor is granted leave to proceed with an investigation under article 15 of the Rome 
Statute.  In addition, if the Prosecutor decides that it is not in the interest of the justice to 
carry out an investigation, the Prosecutor is under an obligation to inform the Pre-Trial 
Chamber of this outcome.29 
 
Second, the Assembly of States Party to the Rome is responsible for the election and 
discipline of the ICC Prosecutor.30 This means that if the Prosecutor commits a serious or 
material breach of his or her duties under the Rome Statute, the Assembly of States Parties 
can remove him or her from office with an absolute majority. Furthermore, the body 
approves the budget of the Prosecutor, which means they have a controlling influence on the 
activities of the office of the Prosecutor, through the allocation of funds to the office.31  
 
Third, the UNSC acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter can suspend an on-going 
investigation using article 16 of the Rome Statute. As earlier argued in Chapter four, the 
Rome Statute gives the UNSC the power to defer proceedings currently before the Court, if 
the proceedings constitute a threat to international peace and security.32  
                                                 
28 Chapter four, paragraph 4.9.  
29 Chapter four, paragraph 4.9.1. 
30 Chapter four, paragraph 4.9.2. 
31 Ibid.  
32 Chapter four, paragraph 4.9.3. 
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9.7 The exercise of discretion by the Prosecutor in preliminary examinations in six 
African countries 
 
Six country situations, all African, were used to consider how the Prosecutor has applied the 
principles discussed above. In essence, the inquiry in the case studies sought to find out if the 
Prosecutors understood and correctly applied the substantive and procedural powers provided 
for in the Rome Statute in the exercise of prosecutorial discretion during preliminary 
examinations. The choice of case studies from Africa was informed by the fact that the 
strongest criticisms of the ICC has come from the African continent. It was thus important to 
establish whether there is a substantive claim that the Prosecutor is biased against African 
leaders. 
 
The analysis of the case studies produced mixed results.33 For example, in the preliminary 
examinations conducted in Uganda and Central African Republic, while Moreno Ocampo, 
the first Prosecutor, did not clearly articulate the procedure through which the preliminary 
examinations were carried out in Uganda and Situation I of the Central African Republic, 
Fatou Bensouda adopted the policy paper on preliminary examination and used it to justify 
her actions and decisions in Central African Republic Situation II. 34 
 
In addition, in terms of the substantive decisions made during the preliminary examinations 
conducted in Uganda and Central African Republic, the study found that the Prosecutor was 
correct in concluding that both situations fell within the jurisdiction of the ICC. Furthermore, 
the Prosecutors were correct in concluding that the admissibility criteria, namely 
complementarity and gravity, were met in the Central African Republic Situations I and II. 
However, in respect of the Uganda situation, former Prosecutor Moreno Ocampo failed to 
substantiate the decision that the crimes committed by government forces did not meet the 
threshold of gravity needed to trigger ICC jurisdiction and charges.35  
 
The former Prosecutor did not follow the policy paper on preliminary examinations in 
investigations conducted in Uganda and Central Africa Situation I although the policy paper 
mirrors provisions of the Rome Statute.36  Furthermore, the study argues that the former ICC 
                                                 
33 See generally, Chapters  six to eight of the study.  
34 Chapter six, paragraph 6.7 
35 Ibid.  
36 Ibid. 
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Prosecutor applied a restrictive interpretation to the provisions of the Rome Statute regarding 
the principle of positive complementarity during preliminary examinations especially in 
Uganda.37  This means that Uganda was not given the benefit of doubt to prove that it was 
willing and able to hold accountable those accused of committing international crimes in the 
northern Uganda conflict.  
 
In relation to the preliminary examinations conducted in Sudan and Libya, the study noted 
that UNSC has the power to refer States not party to the ICC as provided by the Rome 
Statute.38 Furthermore, the ICC legal framework provides for the conduct of preliminary 
examinations irrespective of how the jurisdiction of the ICC was activated, UNSC referrals 
inclusive.39 With respect to both Sudan and Libya situations, the study concludes that legal 
factors such as jurisdiction, admissibility and interests of justice were met during the 
preliminary examinations conducted by the ICC Prosecutor. However, the former Prosecutor 
did not adhere to some of the policies and principles adopted by the office in the exercise of 
discretion during preliminary examination. 40 These include policies on positive 
complementarity and the use of preliminary examination to spur national trials.  
 
The study agrees with the decision of the Prosecutor that the crimes committed in the Darfur 
and the Libyan conflict met the gravity threshold established in the Statute. Therefore, there 
was a reasonable basis to proceed with the investigations. The interpretation of the interests 
of justice by the Prosecutor necessitated abandoning the peace negotiations that were 
organised to end the Darfur conflict.  As noted in the study, none of these peace processes has 
proved to be successful so fa,r and most of the recent ones took place after the decision to 
proceed with an investigation. In addition, the study argues that the limited time of 
conducting preliminary examination in Libya did not give room to the government of Libya 
to activate national proceedings through positive complementarity.41  
 
However, in Sudan and Libya, the former Prosecutor did not provide enough information 
regarding how the preliminary examinations were conducted and the information that is 
available are reports submitted to the UNSC, which are limited in content and analysis. 
                                                 
37 Ibid. 
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Regarding the jurisdiction of the Court over the crimes committed in Darfur and Libya, the 
study argues that although Sudan and Libya are not States party to the Statute, the referrals by 
the UNSC satisfies the jurisdiction threshold.42 
 
The situations in Kenya and Côte d’Ivoire represent the first cases where the Prosecutor 
decided there was a reasonable basis to proceed with investigations using the proprio motu 
powers in article 15 of the Rome Statute. This power is subject to oversight by the Pre-Trial 
Chamber of the ICC whose responsibility is to scrutinise and weigh the evidence submitted 
by the Prosecutor before approving a request by the Prosecutor to conduct an investigation 
into alleged crimes.43 
 
With respect to Côte d’ Ivoire, the initial acceptance of the jurisdiction of the Court and 
subsequent ratification of the same by the government meant that the Prosecutor‘s power to 
conduct the preliminary examination into that country‘s situation could not be challenged. 
However, the Prosecutor did not charge the perpetrators of violence from all parties to the 
conflict for crimes. This called into question the neutrality of the Prosecutor.44  
 
With respect to Kenya, the use of 'inaction' or inactivity to determine Kenya‘s challenge of 
jurisdiction represented a lost opportunity to engage with the ICC on interpretations of 
unwillingness and inability in proprio motu proceedings. The adoption of 'inaction' or 
inactivity as a basis of the intervention of the ICC under article 15 of the Statute raises 
fundamental questions for the Prosecutor during preliminary examinations. Although the ICC 
Prosecutors have argued that positive complementarity is a key policy objective, it was not 
utilised in Kenya and Côte d‘Ivoire to spur national trials. 45  Positive complementarity 
presupposes that the ICC will defer to national judicial systems when they show interest to 
investigate and prosecute crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC.  
 
Overall, the ICC Prosecutors mostly followed the provisions of the Rome Statute in the 
preliminary examinations conducted in Uganda, Central African Republic, Sudan and Libya. 
However, the study has found several grey areas in the implementation of the principles 
governing prosecutorial discretion. Of the six countries discussed in the study, the Prosecutor 
                                                 
42 Ibid.  
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received most criticisms in respect of the preliminary examinations conducted in Kenya and 
Côte d‘Ivoire. This is due in part to the fact that proprio motu examinations in Situation 
countries are controversial, and perhaps also to the questionable decisions of the Prosecutor 
and supported by the ICC Chamber that the crimes committed in Kenya reached the threshold 
of gravity required for crimes against humanity, and the failure to charge all parties to the 
violence in Côte d’Ivoire.46  
 
9.8  Recommendations  
 
As the conclusion above shows, the ICC Prosecutor enjoys significant institutional 
independence. There have also been notable improvements in the manner in which the office 
has carried out its functions especially in preliminary investigations, from the first Prosecutor 
who was not as transparent to the current Prosecutor who has been more transparent. The 
development of guidelines and policy papers has also helped to clarify the Prosecutor‘s own 
understanding of the powers and factors that must be taken into account when exercising 
prosecutorial discretion during preliminary examinations. Although most of these principles 
are valid and have a legal basis, their application in practice has raised some concerns, and 
this thesis has shown that some of those concerns have some merit.  It is in view of the 
foregoing discussions that the following recommendations are offered. This is to support the 
efforts of the current Prosecutor to ensure that the activities of the Court are understood by 
different stakeholders, including those directly affected by conflicts currently under 
preliminary examination, investigation or prosecution stages.   
 
9.8.1    Clarification of the roles of the Pre-trial Chamber and Prosecutor in decisions 
concerning preliminary examinations  
 
It is generally acknowledged that the Rome Statute is not a perfect document and contains 
ambiguous provisions that are difficult to reconcile.47 One issue that is not clear is whether 
preliminary examination is subject only to the discretion of the Prosecutor or whether the 
Pre-Trial Chamber can intervene in certain circumstances. In Central African Republic 
Situation I, the decision of the Pre-Trial Chamber III, and the response of the former 
                                                 
46 See Chapter four, paragraph 4.2.  
47 See Chapter one, paragraph 1.2.  
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Prosecutor are not clear on this.48 It is therefore argued that this is an issue that needs to be 
clarified either in the Prosecutor‘s guidelines and policy papers or by the ICC. This will help 
to define the role of the Prosecutor during preliminary examinations and define the role of the 
Pre-Trial Chambers beyond authorisation for proprio motu investigations. Included in this 
clarification should be the timelines within which the Prosecutor has to make a decision. 
 
The principle of a reasonable time adopted by the Pre-Trial Chamber III in the Central 
African Republic Situation I should be adopted as a benchmark, and the Court empowered to 
enforce a timeline on the Prosecutor regarding preliminary examinations.49  This will be 
subject to the peculiarities of the situation and the Pre-Trial Chamber may give the 
Prosecutor the option of reporting the status of preliminary examinations while the process is 
ongoing.   
 
The Pre-Trial Chamber should perform oversight functions on the exercise of prosecutorial 
discretion during preliminary examinations. This is because it will enhance the quality of 
proceedings at the ICC. If the Prosecutor routinely informs the Pre-Trial Chamber of its 
activities prior to a request for authorisation, it will create a dialogue process that will enable 
the Pre-Trial Chamber to understand the activities of the ICC Prosecutor better, thus 
enhancing the overall administration of justice at the ICC.  After all, the Prosecutor has to 
obtain an authorisation from the Court before launching a proprio motu investigation. 
 
9.8.2    Review of the gravity policy 
 
The Prosecutor‘s application of the principle of gravity has been questionable. Although the 
Appeal Chambers has almost made gravity a non-issue during admissibility proceedings, the 
issue of gravity is still of importance to the Prosecutor during preliminary examinations. The 
former Prosecutor was not clear on the application of gravity and whether it involved a 
qualitative or quantitative analysis during some of the preliminary examinations carried out 
during his tenure. Although the policy paper on preliminary examination has clarified this 
                                                 
48  See Situation in the Central African Republic Decision Requesting Information on the Status of the 
Preliminary Examination of the Situation in the Central African Republic, ICC-01/05, 30 November 2006; See 
also Prosecution's Report Pursuant to Pre-Trial Chamber III's 30 November 2006 Decision Requesting 
Information on the Status of the Preliminary Examination of the Situation in the Central African Republic, ICC-
01/05, 15 December 2006. 
49 See Decision Requesting Information on the Status of the Preliminary Examination of the Situation in the 
Central African Republic above. 
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position, stating that gravity involves both quantitative and qualitative analysis of victims of 
international crimes, it is not yet clear how the gravity analysis is carried out. It is 
recommended that a gravity policy specifically detailing how the Prosecutor analyses the 
gravity criteria in the Rome Statute be adopted. Since it is clear from this study that there is a 
change in policy between Moreno Ocampo and Fatou Bensouda‘s administrations, it is 
recommended that the current gravity policy should be revisited.  
 
9.8.3    Enhancing positive complementarity during preliminary examinations 
 
The current Prosecutor states in the policy paper on preliminary examinations that the process 
is used to encourage positive complementarity whereby States are encouraged to investigate 
and prosecute international crimes. While there have been efforts to galvanise local support 
for the investigation and prosecution of international crimes by domestic judicial systems 
during preliminary examinations, the Prosecutor has not asserted the same pressure on all 
countries under preliminary examination, thereby fueling allegations of bias against the 
Prosecutor.50 As already stated, the ICC is a court of last resort. This means that it is not 
meant to suppliant or take-over genuine investigations and prosecutions of international 
crimes by national governments. Therefore, its strength should lie in the ability to ensure that 
State Parties comply with the provisions of the Rome Statute regarding the principle of 
complementarity.51   
 
The thesis therefore recommends that the Prosecutor should endeavor to use preliminary 
examinations to spur national governments to investigate and prosecute crimes within the 
jurisdiction of the ICC committed by citizens. Such efforts will enhance positive 
complementarity and support national investigation and prosecution of international crimes. 
This will likely decrease the need to rely on the ICC for the investigation and prosecution of 





                                                 
50 See the case studies in Chapters six to eight for details.    
51 Max du Plessis, Antoinnette Louw and Ottilla Maunganidze ‗ African efforts to close the impunity gap: 
Lessons for complementarity from national and regional actions‘ Institute for Security Studies Paper No 241, 
November 2012, 1 – 24; Thomas Hansen ‗ A Critical Review of the ICC‘s Recent Practice Concerning 
Admissibility Challenges and Complementarity‘ (2012) 13 Melbourne Journal of international Law, 217 – 234.   
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9.8.4    Public disclosure of preliminary examinations and prevention of crimes  
 
The Prosecutor argues that it uses preliminary examinations as an early warning mechanism. 
This is, however, a recent development and was not part of the practice of the ICC during the 
early years of its operations. The practice itself is currently not uniform and the study has 
found that its effect is at best minimal.52 The press statements of the Prosecutor are mostly 
posted on the website of the ICC and distributed through social media, print and electronic 
media outlets. However, very few of the target audience get the information when it is needed 
most.  
 
It is recommended that this policy be overhauled thereby necessitating the adoption of a 
better strategy that will ensure the statements and official communications of the Prosecutor 
reach the target audience. This suggests that translating the statements into the local 
languages where conflicts are ongoing is vital. In addition, other means of enhancing the 
effectiveness of public service announcements should be explored instead of restricting it to 
the traditional methods of press releases and uploading information on the website of the 
ICC.53 These include uploading video and audio messages that can be played by radio and 
television stations across the States involved.54 
 
9.8.5   Division of labour between the UNSC and the Prosecutor 
 
The current policy paper on the interests of justice adopted by the former Prosecutor of the 
ICC differentiates between the interests of peace and the interests of justice. 55  The 
implication is that only the UNSC acting under chapter VII of the UN can use article 16 of 
the Rome Statute to defer proceedings currently before the Court. The political nature of the 
UNSC has made it impossible for the Council to operate in a transparent and fair manner. 
                                                 
52 See the case studies in Chapters six to eight.  
53 Press releases on preliminary examinations are posted on the first page of the ICC website. However, once the 
information is overtaken by other events, it gets lost in the ICC website. It is only when the media picks up the 
information that it gets serious attention from the international community.  
54 The Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court recently issued a public statement ahead of Nigeria‘s 
elections. The ICC website contains downloadable audio and video files that can be played by radio and 
television stations across Nigeria. See ICC ‗Statement by the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, 
Fatou Bensouda, ahead of elections in Nigeria: ―I reiterate my call to refrain from violence‖‘ 16 March 2015.  
55 Policy Paper on the Interests of Justice, September 2007.  
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This development has resulted in the charge that the ICC is biased when the UNSC also has a 
role to play as provided under article 16 of the Rome Statute.   
 
This study recommends that the decision to suspend or defer investigations or prosecutions in 
the ‗interests of justice‘ under article 53 of the Rome Statute should be a shared responsibility 
between the ICC and the UNSC. This will involve the UNSC handling issues that emanate 
from its referrals using article 16 of the Rome Statute while the Prosecutor concentrates on 
cases arising from States Party referrals or the Prosecutor‘s proprio motu powers. This will 
conform to the argument by the Prosecutor that the ‗interests of peace‘ are political in nature 
and therefore beyond the mandate of his office.  
 
Situations referred by the UNSC to the ICC are usually threats to international peace and 
security. Therefore, it should be the UNSC who considers deferrals in these Situations. Such 
a division of labour between the UNSC and the ICC Prosecutor in considering the deferral of 
cases will ensure that the checks and balances provided by the Rome Statute are used to its 
optimum and help avoid the UNSC exerting undue influence over the activities of the ICC.56  
 
9.8.6  Reports of termination of preliminary examinations 
 
The Prosecutor needs to review the reports announcing the termination of preliminary 
examinations. Although the Statute provides that those that inform the ICC Prosecutor of 
crimes allegedly committed in their countries should be notified of the outcome of 
preliminary examinations, it does not preclude the Prosecutor from making the information 
available to the public.57 Although it is conceded in the study that the effort of the Prosecutor 
in releasing reports has improved since Fatou Bensouda became the Prosecutor, reports that 
thoroughly discuss the substantive and procedural issues regulating the conduct of 
preliminary examinations is recommended.  




                                                 
56 Benson Olugbuo op cit, 351 – 379.  
57 Paragraph 97 of the Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations. 
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Annexure I: Preliminary Examinations at the International Criminal Court from July 2002 to August 2016 
 
Situation  Method of initiating 
PE 
Current status of PE Decision on PE  Reason for decision  Approximate time  





Admissibility Phase On-going N/A N/A 
Côte d‘Ivoire 
(Africa) 
Art (12) 3  and Proprio 
motu 
 (Art 15) 
Completed 
  
Proceed Legal criteria met (Art 53 (1) 
(a-c) 
Seven years and nine 
 months  (1 Oct. 2003  
 –  23 June 2011) 
Columbia 
(South America) 
Proprio motu (Art 15) Admissibility Phase On-going N/A N/A 
 




First PE: Self -Referral 
(Article 14) 
 
Second PE: Self- 
Referral (Article 14)  
First PE :Completed 
 
 
Second PE: Completed 
First PE: Proceed 
 
 
Second PE: Proceed 
First PE: Legal criteria met 
(Art 53 (1) (a-c) 
 
Second PE: Legal criteria 
met (Art 53 (1) (a-c) 
First PE: Two years and four 
months  (7 Jan. 2005 
 – 22 May 2007)  
 








Completed Declined Did not meet legal criteria 
Article 53 – Admissibility – 
gravity  
One year and five months 






Completed Proceed Legal criteria met (Art 53 (1) 
(a-c) 
One year and two months  
(19 April 2004 
- 23 June 2004)  
 






Complete Proceed Legal criteria met  (Art 53 
(1) (a-c) 
 Seven years and 2 months 












Completed Declined  Did not meet admissibility 
criteria under Art 53 
Four years and eleven 
months (18 November 2010 
- 27 October 2015) 
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Iraq 
(Asia) 




Second PE: Proprio 
Motu 
(Article 15)  
  
First PE:  Completed  
 
 
Second PE: Reopened 
on 13 May 2014 
(Jurisdiction Phase) 




First PE: admissibility 
criteria not met regarding 
gravity  
Second PE: N/A 
First PE Two years and nine 
 months  (19 March   
2003 – 9 Feb. 2006) 
 






Completed Proceed Legal criteria met (Art 53 (1) 
(a-c) 
One year and eleven months  
(27 December 2007  – 26 






Completed Proceed Legal criteria met (Art 53 (1) 
(a-c) 
6 days (26 Feb. 2011 –  
3 March 2011) 
 





Completed Proceed Legal criteria met (Art 53 (1) 
(a-c) 
6 Months (13 July 2012 –  






Admissibility Phase  
 











Second PE: Ongoing 











Three years and two months  

















Did not meet legal criteria 
under Art 53 (Admissibility)  
Three years and five months  
(6 December 2010 -  




(Article 13 (b) 
  
Completed Proceed Legal criteria met (Art 53 (1) 
(a-c) 
3 Months (31 March –  




 (Article 14) 
  
Completed Proceed Legal criteria met (Art 53 (1) 
(a-c) 
Seven months (16 December 
2013  –  29 July 2004) 
      
Ukraine  Declaration under 
Article 12(3)  
Jurisdiction Phase Ongoing N/A N/A 
 




 (Article 15) 
Completed Declined lack of subject-matter 
jurisdiction 
Three years and six 
 months  
(1 July 2002 –  
9 Feb. 2006) 
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